THE  LIFE 


OF 


prince  ©tto  fcon  3Si0marcfe 


BY 

FRANK  PRESTON  STEARNS 

li t^~*"  '    .-.-...  "^ 

AUTHOR  OF  "  SKETCHES  FROM  CONCORD  AND  APPLEDORE,"  ll  LIFE  OF  TINTORETTO,' 
"MODERN  ENGLISH  PROSE  WRITERS,"  ETC. 


PHILADELPHIA   AND  LONDON 

J.   B.   LIPPINCOTT    COMPANY 

1899 


COPYRIGHT,  1899, 

BY 
J.  B.  LIPPINCOTT  COMPANY. 


ELECTROTYPED  AND  PRINTED  BY  J.  B.  LIPPINCOTT  COMPANY,  PHILADELPHIA,  (J.S  A. 


TO 


PROFESSOR  EDWARD  T.  REICHERT 

OF  THE 

UNIVERSITY  OF  PENNSYLVANIA 


171144 


THE  GAME  OF  LIFE 

The  life  of  man  is  like  a  game  of  chess, 

The  which  he  plays  according  to  his  art ; 
Winning  or  losing,  he  does  nothing  less 

Than  to  obey  the  dictates  of  his  heart. 
Himself  against  himself,  he  ever  sets 

His  pawns,  knights,  castles  in  a  brave  array ; 
His  soul  the  stake  he  on  the  issue  bets, — 

Too  high  a  prize  to  risk  in  thoughtless  play. 
Honor  and  conscience  do  the  white  men  guide 

Desire  and  his  self-love  the  red  direct 
An  angel  and  a  demon  on  each  side 

O'erlook  the  game, — for  its  result  elect. 

If  thou  wouldst  win  and  not  thy  fortune  rue, 
Subdue  thyself,  yet  to  thyself  be  true. 


PREFACE 


BISMARCK'S  memoirs,  although  his  advanced  age  is  some- 
times perceptible  in  them,  contain  a  mine  of  wisdom  for  the 
practical  statesman ;  and  yet  they  are  not  in  the  true  sense  an 
autobiography,  for  they  are  not  a  record  of  the  man's  own 
life.  Likewise  there  are  valuable  incidents  'in  Dr.  Busch's 
voluminous  sketches  of  the  German  chancellor;  but  Dr. 
Busch's  acquaintance  with  his  employer  _only  began  in  1870, 
and  he  makes  no  attempt  to  explain  Bismarck's  policy  or 
how  he  accomplished  his  mighty  work.  Mr.  Lowe's  larger 
English  life  of  Bismarck  is  a  dignified  study  of  the  subject, 
but  it  was  published  many  years  before  his  death,  and  is 
written  too  much  from  the  English  Tory  and  monarchical 
'stand-point  to  please  American  readers.  Von  Sybel's  his- 
tory of  the  foundation  of  the  new  German  empire  contains 
the  only  adequate  statement  of  Bismarck's  statecraft  between 
1862  and  1870;  but  the  period  comprising  the  last  twenty- 
five  years  of  his  life  was  hardly  less  important  than  that  which 
immediately  preceded  it.  What  Americans  now  require  is  a 
clear  statement  of  the  character  of  the  mart,  the  principal 
events  of  his  life,  and  an  explanation  of  his  policy  as  related 
to  the  historical  events  of  his  time.  This  is  what  I  have 
undertaken  to  give  in  the  present  volume. 

In  order  to  do  Bismarck  justice,  however,  we  should  divest 
ourselves  for  the  time  of  our  national  antipathy  to  royalty.  The 
name  of  king  is  hateful  to  Americans,  as  it  was  to  the  ancient 
Romans,  and  with  good  reason ;  but  in  order  to  do  justice  to 
Bismarck  and  recognize  him  as  he  was,  we  must  endeavor  to 
place  ourselves  in  the  position  of  a  man  who  was  born  and 

7 


PREFACE 

brought  up  with  the  idea  that  loyalty  to  his  sovereign  was  an 
ethical  principle,  and  who,  even  after  he  had  somewhat  out- 
grown this  belief,  found  it  useful  as  a  basis — perhaps  the  only 
basis  he  could  find — on  which  to  raise  the  political  super- 
structure of  his  own  life's  work,  the  elevation  of  Germany  to 
its  proper  position  in  the  family  of  nations,  and  its  liberation 
from  those  evils  from  which  it  had  suffered  for  centuries, 
owing  to  its  interminable  subdivisions  and  its  liability  to 
foreign  intrigues. 

I  think  it  will  be  admitted  that  so  grand  and  difficult  an 
undertaking,  and  one  accomplished  in  so  short  a  space  of 
time,  could  in  all  probability  have  only  been  carried  through  in 
the  manner  that  it  was  ;  and  this  probability  is  largely  increased 
by  the  fact  that  during  the  succeeding  twenty  years  of  Bis- 
i  marck's  administration  he  is  credited  with  not  having  made  a 
single  important  political  blunder.  If  he  had  joined  the  revo- 
lutionists in  1848  and  rendered  himself  conspicuous  as  an 
opponent  of  royalty,  it  is  impossible  to  imagine  how  he  could 
have  accomplished  it. 

The  notion  that  Bismarck  was  a  sort  of  political  Mephis- 
topheles,  which  originated  long  since  with  a  sensational 
writer  for  the  Edinburgh  Review,  becomes  dissipated  in  the 
light  of  historical  investigation  like  mist  before  the  sun.  His 
worst  enemies  have  never  been  able  to  prove  a  single  dis- 
creditable act  against  him  in  his  public  or  his  private  life. 
His  remark  that  Dr.  Busch  would  write  the  secret  history  of 
his  time  must  have  been  ironical,  for  no  secret  history  of 
Bismarck's  diplomacy  has  come  to  light.  He  was  sometimes 
violent  and  domineering,  but  never  for  personal  ends.  He 
appears  always  in  the  light  of  a  disinterested  statesman, 
whose  whole  thought  and  activity  are  concentrated  on  what 
he  considers  the  welfare  of  his  country. 

F.  P.  S. 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER   I  PAGB 

THE  BISMARCKS u 

CHAPTER   II 
THE  REVOLUTION  OF  FORTY-EIGHT 31 

CHAPTER   III 
FRANKFORT  AND  ST.  PETERSBURG    ......      49 

CHAPTER   IV 
MINISTER-PRESIDENT         .         .         .         ,         .         .         .         .86 

CHAPTER   V 

SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN IOO 

CHAPTER   VI 
THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1866  .         .         .         .         .        .         .         .118 

CHAPTER  VII 
BISMARCK  ENLARGES  PRUSSIA  .         .         .         .         .        .         .     142 

CHAPTER  VIII 
THE  NORTH  GERMAN  CONFEDERATION     .         .         .        .        .154 

CHAPTER   IX 

THE  FRANCO-GERMAN  WAR 187 

9 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER   X  PAGB 

THE  SIEGE  OF  PARIS 214 

CHAPTER   XI 
y    THE  IRON  CHANCELLOR 247 

CHAPTER   XII 
1873  TO  1876 — INTRIGUES  OF  VON  ARNIM        ....     270 

CHAPTER   XIII 
THE  RUSSO-TURKISH  WAR  AND  THE  CONGRESS  OF  BERLIN    .     303 

|  CHAPTER   XIV 

.SOCIALISM  AND  THE  TARIFF     .......     322 

CHAPTER   XV 
J^/KEEPER  OF  THE  PEACE 350 

CHAPTER   XVI 
FREDERICK  III.  AND  WILLIAM  II 380 

CHAPTER   XVII 
NEARING  THE  GOAL          . 412 


10 


THE 

UNIVERSITY 

OF 


THE  LIFE 

OF 

Prince  <^tto  bon  SStemarcfc 


CHAPTER    I 

THE   BISMARCKS 

POMERANIA  lies  between  Brandenburg,  the  Baltic,  and 
Prussia  proper.  It  is  rather  a  dreary  waste,  with  little  to 
recommend  it  either  to  the  common  traveller  or  the  student 
of  history.  The  soil  is  sandy,  and,  like  the  adjacent  Hoi- 
stein,  better  suited  to  grazing  than  agriculture.  Long  reaches 
of  pasture-land  are  dotted  with  small  hamlets  and  peasants' 
cottages,  and  broken  up  by  occasional  patches  of  woods  and 
more  extensive  game-preserves.  Its  chief  advantage  consists 
in  a  healthy  and  bracing  climate,  which,  with  an  habitually 
cloudy  sky,  makes  toil  pleasant  to  the  laborer,  and  has  built 
up  a  race  of  men  as  strong  and  vigorous  as  those  of  the 
Scotch  border-land,  a  tract  which  it  closely  resembles.  It 
was  originally  a  portion  of  the  old  Vandalic  territory,  and  is 
still  inhabited  largely  by  their  descendants,  who  have  a  dialect 
of  their  own,  and  until  the  reforms  of  Von  Stein  were  mostly 
in  the  condition  of  serfs.  Through  the  centre  of  Pomerania 
flows  the  Oder,  which  near  Stettin  is  joined  by  the  Biese,  a 
smallish  river  on  whose  bank  are  situated  the  town  and  castle 
of  Bismarck. 

It  would  be  natural  to  suppose  that  the  name  Bismarck 
had  been  derived  from  the  river  "Biese,  but  this  does  not 
appear  to  have  been  the  case.  It  should  be  a  warning  to  the 

ii 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

fine-spun  arguments  of  archaeologists  to  learn  that  the  earliest 
spelling  of  the  name  on  record — early  in  the  thirteenth  cen- 
tury— was  Bischofsmark,  or  mark  of  the  bishop,  nearly  all 
Germany  being  divided  at  that  time  into  marks  or  marches, 
and  the  Bishop  of  Havelberg  being  in  authority  over  the  dis- 
trict where  the  castle  of  Bismarck  stands.  It  is  a  very  old 
castle,  belonging  to  the  great  days  of  the  German  empire, 
perhaps  as  early  as  the  tenth  century,  and  must  have  been 
inhabited  by  the  Bismarck  family  long  before  the  earliest 
record  of  them.  We  do  not  even  know  what  their  surname 
was,  which,  like  that  of  the  Hohenzollerns,  was  exchanged  or 
fell  into  disuse  after  residing  at  the  castle.  The  name  of  the 
Hohenstaufens  (Weiblingen)  has  been  preserved  to  us  by 
Ghibelline  tradition,  though  the  family  became  extinct  with 
Conradin. 

In  those  early  times  of  political  integration  men  improved 
their  fortunes  chiefly  by  valor  on  the  battle-field  and  discre- 
tion in  the  hour  of  victory,  qualities  for  which  the  Bismarck 
family  would  seem  to  have  been  always  distinguished.  To 
judge  by  their  descendants,  they  were  powerful  and  athletic 
men,  such  as  would  carve  their  way  to  fortune  with  the  edge 
of  the  sword,  and  maintain  it  against  all  comers.  There  are 
some  historical  evidences  of  this,  especially  of  a  Nicholas  von 
Bismarck,  whose  father  left  the  family  castle  about  the  time 
when  Dante  was  chief  magistrate  in  Florence,  and  removed 
to  the  city  of  Stendal,  where  he  and  his  son  became  impor- 
tant in  civil  affairs.  Nicholas  especially  dominated  for  a  time 
over  Stendal  and  the  adjacent  districts,  but  was  finally  driven 
out  of  Stendal  to  seek  his  better  fortune  in  the  service  of  the 
Margrave  of  Brandenburg.  This  resulted  in  the  Bismarcks' 
removal  from  Pomerania;  and  Nicholas,  for  his  valuable  as- 
sistance in  peace  and  war,  received  from  the  Margrave  the 
estate  and  castle  of  Bergstall,  one  of  the  largest  baronial  fiefs 
in  the  Altmark,  as  the  Prussians  continue  to  call  it.  We  do 
not,  however,  hear  of  other  notable  Bismarcks  from  this  time 
forward,  though  the  family  continued  to  hold  its  position,  and 
was  represented  in  all  the  great  German  wars  down  to  the 
time  of  the  French  Revolution.  They  were  tyrannically 

12 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

treated  by  the  Elector  John  George  of  Hohenzollern,  who 
dispossessed  them  of  the  valuable  property  of  Bergstall,  and 
removed  them  to  a  much  inferior  piece  of  property  during 
the  latter  part  of  the  sixteenth  century. 

In  spite  of  this  unjust  affront,  they  continued  to  serve  the 
Hohenzollern  family  with  true  mediaeval  loyalty.  We  find  a 
Colonel  von  Bismarck  in  the  army  of  Duke  Bernard  of 
Weimar,  at  the  defeat  of  Nordlingen ;  after  which  he  returned 
to  Brandenburg  to  fight  under  the  Great  Elector,  and  came 
through  the  whole  period  of  the  Thirty  Years'  War  without 
injury,  so  far  as  we  know.  Between  1570  and  1650,  how- 
ever, three  branches  of  the  Bisnfarck  family  had  perished, — 
a  witness  to  the  terrible  ordeal  of  that  period, — though  in 
what  way  we  are  not  informed,  and  only  the  present  Schon- 
hausen  line  survived  to  represent  the  family.  Crevese  and 
Schonhausen  are  the  two  estates  which  the  Elector  John 
George  had,  \vith  a  bonus  of  two  thousand  thalers,  presumed 
to  consider  an  equivalent  for  the  Bergstall  property.  It  is 
stated  that  he  also  made  a  present  of  an  hundred  florins 
apiece  to  each  of  the  ladies,  to  console  them  for  their  change 
of  residence ! x  Frederick  William  I.,  in  like  manner,  attempted 
to  console  the  relatives  of  Lieutenant  Katte  for  the  execution 
which  depended  entirely  on  his  own  will. 

Prince  Bismarck's  third  grandfather  married  a  lady  of  the 
Katte  family  early  in  the  eighteenth  century,  and  the  Prince's 
great-grandfather  was  a  contemporary  of  Frederick  the  Great 
and  much  in  favor  with  him,  but,  unfortunately,  was  killed  in 
1742  at  the  battle  of  Czaslau,  where  Frederick  defeated  the 
Austrians  with  inconsiderable  loss.  He  was  a  colonel  of 
hussars,  and  we  may  judge  him  to  have  been  the  ablest  of 
the  Bismarck  family  in  recent  times  until  the  present  Prince. 
The  most  distinguished  connection  of  the  family,  though  the 
Bismarcks  of  our  time  are  not  descended  from  him,  was 
Lieutenant-General  Ziethen,  the  great  hussar  commander  of 
the  Seven  Years'  War,  whose  daring  exploits  and  hair-breadth 
escapes  have  become  a  household  legendary  store  among  thej 

1  Hesekiel's  Biography,  p.  27. 
13 


LIFE  OF  BTSMARCK 

Prussians.  The  Germans  consider  him  to  have  been  fully 
the  equal  of  Murat,  and  there  is  an  attractive  statue  of  him 
by  Schadow  in  Dessau  Place  at  Berlin, — a  rather  slender 
man,  in  a  dreamy,  nonchalant  attitude,  as  if  life  were  a  matter 
of  indifference  to  him.  -  So  it  probably  is  to  the  bravest  kind 
of  men. 

We  cannot  discover  anything  in  the  Bismarck  genealogy 
which  would  lead  us  to  expect  the  appearance  of  a  first-class 
genius  in  the  family.  Prince  Bismarck's  own  father,  Carl 
Wilhelm  Ferdinand  von  Bismarck,  born  in  1771,  was  a  man 
of  rather  imposing  personal  appearance,  with  refined  features 
and  a  forehead  that  reminds  one  of  Goethe,  but  left  no  record 
which  distinguishes  him  in  any  way.  As  Kaunitz  said,  Nature 
has  to  rest  before  producing  a  great  statesman.  Carl  Wil- 
helm served  in  the  king's  body-guard  for  a  time,  but  we  do 
not  hear  of  him  as  taking  an  active  part  in  the  defence  of  his 
country  against  the  French.  His  one  distinction  is  that  he 
chose  a  most  excellent  wife.  Three  months  before  the  battle 
of  Jena  he  was  married  to  Louisa  Wilhelmina  Menken,  not 
of  a  noble  family,  but,  what  was  much  better,  the  daughter 
of  Privy  Councillor  Menken,  and  in  all  respects  a  superior 
woman.  Councillor  Menken  was  a  man  of  ability,  of  liberal 
tendencies,  and  much  trusted  by  Frederick  the  Great  in  his 
last  years.  It  is  from  this  direction,  evidently,  that  Prince 
Bismarck  derived  his  diplomatic  talent,  and,  perhaps,  his  intel- 
lectual ability.  Carl  von  Bismarck  saved  his  young  wife  from 
the  anxiety  of  his  presence  at  the  battle  of  Jena,  and  lived 
thenceforth  a  rather  retired  and  very  domestic  life,  chiefly  given 
to  the  oversight  of  his  estates,  of  which  he  had  two  in  Pome- 
rania,  besides  his  head-quarters  at  Schonhausen, — and  to  the 
shooting  of  ground  game.  His  children  were  many,  and 
their  birthdays  extended  over  the  space  of  twenty  years. 
Otto  was  the  fourth  in  order,  but  his  eldest  brother  died  in 
infancy,  so  that  he  became  his  father's  second  son,  a  position 
among  noble  German  families  which  commonly  requires  of  a 
young  man  either  to  earn  his  living  as  a  soldier,  or  to  make 
some  unusual  exertion  if  he  wishes  to  secure  a  place  for 
himself  in  the  great  world. 

14 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

OTTO   VON   BISMARCK 

Great  events  ^re  the  starsjadiich-  preside  -over-tke  birth  of 
remarkable  men.  There  is  every  reason  why  they  should 
have  this  stimulating  effect,  and  sufficient  instances  are  known 
to  bear  witness  to  it.  Webster,  the  defender  of  the  constitu- 
tion, was  born  while  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States 
was  under  discussion,  and  most  of  the  great  men  of  the  nine- 
teenth century  came  into  existence  during  the  wars  of  Napo- 
leon. Bismarck  was  the  last  and  most  important  of  these. 
He  first  saw  the  light  on  the  first  of  April,  1815,  when  all 
Europe  wa$  in  an  uproar.  Napoleon  had  been  welcomed 
back  to  France,  and  received  in  Paris  with  enthusiasm ;  the 
Vienna  Congress  had  dissolved  itself  in  haste,  and  armies 
everywhere  were  in  motion.  The  effect  of  this  on  some 
women  might  have  been  slight  enough ;  but  the  Frau  Louisa 
Wilhelmina  von  Bismarck  was  a  person  to  recognize  its  sig- 
nificance, and  it  may  have  had  a  determining  influence  on  the 
future  of  her  second  son.  As  events  have  proved,  a  more 
unfavorable  circumstance  for  the  fortunes  of  the  Bonaparte 
family  could  not  have  happened  than  the  advent  of  Otto 
Edward  Leopold  von  Bismarck.  The  Frau  von  Bismarck 
could  not  be  blamed  if  she  felt  a  hostility  towards  the  French ; 
for  in  1806  she  had  only  been  saved  from  the  insults  of 
Napoleon's  soldiers  by  a  stout  oaken  door  at  Schonhausen, 
which  still  bears  the  marks  of  their  violence.  If  Otto  von 
Bismarck  bore  any  ill  will  towards  the  French  as  a  nation, 
this  is  sufficient  to  account  for  it. 

He  was  not,  however,  brought  up  at  Schonhausen,  for  his 
parents  removed  the  following  year  to  the  estate  of  Kniephof, 
in  the  vicinity  of  Naugard,  Pomerania,  and  not  very  distant 
from  the  old  castle  of  Bismarck,  where  the  family  had  ac- 
quired its  knightly  character  seven  or  eight  centuries  before. 
There  was  no  place  for  Count  Carl  Wilhelm  in  the  rejoicings 
and  congratulations  after  the  return  of  the  Prussian  army 
from  Paris,  and  his  high-spirited  wife  must  have  felt  this 
keenly.  They  lived  in  retirement  for  the  next  seven  years  or 
more,  during  which  time  Otto  grew  to  be  a  strong,  vigorous 

15 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

boy  in  the  bracing  air  of  Pomerania,  with  a  liking  for  domestic 
animals,  woods,  and  country  life  which  never  left  him.  The 
Pomeranians  are  the  tallest  men  and  accounted  the  bravest 
soldiers  in  the  German  army,  and  Bismarck,  both  in  mind 
and  physique,  was  a  typical  example  of  them. 

He  inherited  his  father's  figure  and  his  mother's  mental 
endowment,  as  well  as  the  vigorous  and  clear-sighted  intelli- 
gence of  the  old  Privy  Councillor  Menken.  His  mother  was 
a  master  of  the  game  of  chess,  as  well  as  a  fine  linguist  and  a 
reader  of  the  best  literature.  She  possessed  sufficient  insight 
into  character  to  discover  that  her  son  Otto  was  well  suited 
for  the  profession  of  a  diplomat,  and  destined  him  at  an  early 
age  for  his  future  career.  It  is  probable  that  there  was  more 
of  the  Menken  than  of  the  Bismarck  in  him. 

It  would  be  well  if  we  could  know  more  of  Otto's  child- 
hood, and  the  manner  in  which  his  mother  brought  him  up, 
but  we  never  shall  unless  he  has  left  some  record  of  it  him- 
self. The  Prussians  believe  in  severe  discipline,  and  it  is  this 
which  gives  the  slight  stiffness  to  their  manners,  and  the  Frau 
Louisa  Wilhelmina  was  no  exception.  When  Otto  was  ex- 
actly six  years  old  she  placed  him  in  charge  of  Dr.  Plamann, 
who  kept  the  strictest  school  in  the  city  of  Berlin.  He  after- 
wards confessed  that  this  was  the  severest  portion  of  his  life. 
His  elder  brother,  fortunately,  was  with  him,  also  a  bright  and 
vigorous  boy,  and  was  no  doubt  much  of  a  help  to  him,  but 
there  were  no  entertainments,  such  as  make  school-life  pleasant 
to  English  and  American  boys.  They  could  not  go  out  to 
walk  except  in  charge  of  an  instructor,  like  the  pupils  in  a 
convent ;  and  to  a  child  so  full  of  life  and  energy  as  young 
Otto  this  was  very  oppressive.  He  suffered  from  home- 
sickness, a  mental  malady  which  some  children  never  become 
acquainted  with.  Though  not  fond  of  his  studies,  he  made 
excellent  progress,  was  liked  by  his  companions,  and  at  the 
age  of  eleven  years  and  six  months  he  entered  the  Friedrich 
Wilhelm  Gymnasium  to  prepare  for  the  university. 

German  gymnasia  are  secondary  schools  of  instruction,  and 
something  more  than  that.  The  name  would  seem  to  be 
badly  selected,  unless  it  refers  to  the  unclothed  condition  of 

16 


OF 
FOi 

LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

the  youthful  mind  at  that  time  of  life.  The  graduate  of  a 
gymnasium  is  supposed,  however,  to  be  thoroughly  versed  in 
Greek,  Latin,  mathematics,  and  such  modern  languages  as  his 
parents  may  designate  for  him,  and  altogether  as  well  equipped 
as  a  junior  in  our  best  colleges.  He  then  goes  to  the  uni- 
versity and  commences  the  study  of  his  profession,  taking 
parallel  courses  in  history,  philosophy,  art,  and  literature.  In 
this  manner  time  is  saved,  and  the  youth  is  not  thrown  upon 
his  own  resources  at  too  tender  an  age,  before  he  knows 
properly  how  to  care  for  himself. 

Otto  troubled  himself  about  his  Latin  and  Greek  only  as 
much  as  was  necessary  to  pass  the  examinations.  All  through 
life  he  cared  little  for  such  things  as  were  not  of  practical  use 
to  him.  In  the  modern  languages  he  made  better  progress, 
and  was  always  an  assiduous  reader  of  history,  the  true 
foundation  of  good  statesmanship.  Besides  the  regular  cur- 
riculum, his  ambitious  mother  inflicted  on  her  sons  French 
and  English  tutors  during  the  summer  vacation,  so  that  there 
was  practically  no  cessation  to  their  studies.  No  expense 
was  spared  for  their  education,  and  they  were  as  carefully 
guarded  against  evil  influences  as  the  sons  of  wealthy  Atheni- 
ans in  the  time  of  Plato. 

The  Frau  von  Bismarck  was  much  given  to  theological 
reading,  and  felt  the  influence  of  the  great  wave  of  religious 
liberality  which  swept  over  Europe  and  America  between 
1820  and  1840.  She  was  a  warm  friend  and  devoted  admirer 
of  Dr.  Schleiermacher,  of  Berlin,  who  was  not  more  remark- 
able for  his  profound  scholarship  than  for  the  eloquence  of 
his  discourse.  No  German  theologian  of  the  century  has  ex- 
ercised so  extended  and  long-continued  influence  in  America 
as  Schleiermacher,  and  the  prudent  liberality  of  his  views  has 
largely  contributed  to  the  moulding  of  such  minds  as  Chan- 
ning,  Beecher,  and  Phillips  Brooks.  At  his  mother's  desire, 
Otto  was  confirmed  in  the  church  of  the  Trinity  at  Berlin,  at 
Easter  in  the  year  1830,  an  event  whose  importance  the  dis- 
tinguished clergyman  did  not  live  to  recognize,  but  which 
may  have  had  a  decided  influence  on  the  future  of  his  young 
neophyte.  The  path  in  religion  pointed  out  by  Schleier- 
2  17 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

macher  and  his  mother  was  the  one  which  Bismarck  followed 
throughout  life,  as  his  frequent  conversations  on  religious 
topics  bear  witness.  With  creeds  and  theological  tenets  he 
did  not  concern  himself  much,  but  his  faith  in  an  all-wise 
ruler  of  the  universe  remained  unshaken  through  all  the 
physical  and  metaphysical  scepticisms  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury. It  is  true  that  after  his  diplomatic  service  began  Bis- 
marck did  not  often  attend  church,  but  there  were  always 
religious  books  on  his  table,  and  he  carried  them  on  his  cam- 
paigns to  France  and  Bohemia.  One  of  Napoleon's  most 
sensible  remarks  was,  that,  as  a  rule,  it  was  best  for  every 
man  to  adhere  to  the  religion  in  which  he  was  brought  up, 
and  Bismarck  exemplified  this. 

Obstinate  and  unruly  school-boys  often  make  able  men, 
but  are  always  narrow-minded.  It  is  because  they  cannot  see 
both  sides  of  a  subject  that  they  act  as  they  do.  Young  Bis- 
marck's conduct  at  school  was  such  that  he  rarely  required 
correction,  and  never  severe  punishment.  We  like  this  better 
than  that  more  perfect  behavior  which  results  from  too  strict 
a  consideration  for  form, — the  behavior  of  the  martinet.  Dr. 
Bonnell,  who  was  one  of  Otto's  instructors  for  whom  he 
acquired  an  enduring  affection,  and  in  whose  family  he  re- 
sided from  his  sixteenth  to  his  eighteenth  year,  has  said  of 
him  that  he  was  a  thoroughly  amiable  and  unaffected  boy, 
showing  a  decided  preference  for  domestic  life,  not  given  to 
roaming  about  at  night.  His  only  fault  was  that  he  was 
rather  domineering  and  exacting  with  servants,  as  sons  of 
the  nobility  too  often  are.  He  made  few  friends  at  school, 
but  those  few  he  retained  through  life.  This  may  have  been 
because  he  did  not  often  find  in  others  those  substantial 
qualities  on  which  lasting  friendship  is  based.  At  Kniephof 
he  learned  to  ride  and  shoot,  as  a  matter  of  course.  He  was 
always  a  daring  horseman  and  an  expert  swimmer,  besides 
being  a  good  fence;  and  dancer.  He  was  not,  however,  so 
fond  of  these  amusements  as  to  neglect  more  serious  business 
for  them.  Gymnastics  he  never  cared  for.  He  grew  up  tall, 
but  a  rather  slender  figure,  and  it  was  not  until  middle  life 
that  he  broadened  out  as  we  now  see  him  in  his  pictures.  He 

18 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

was  much  attached  to  a  great  Danish  dog  which  his  father 
purchased  for  him  at  this  time,  and  which  became  his  constant 
attendant  for  many  years. 

GOTTINGEN 

Having  graduated  from  the  Berlin  gymnasium  with  honor, 
Bismarck  wished  to  go  to  Heidelberg,  where  there  is  always 
a  large  corps  of  Prussian  students ;  but  his  mother,  who  had 
long  since  obtained  control  of  all  the  family  affairs,  preferred 
Gottingen  for  him.  It  is  sufficient  evidence  of  her  strong 
will  that  she  could  thus  prevail  over  the  wishes  of  her  strong- 
willed  son.  It  is  said  that  she  objected  to  Heidelberg  for  fear 
Otto  might  contract  the  habit  of  beer-drinking  there,  for 
which  she  had  an  especial  dislike ; x  but  she  could  assign  a 
better  reason  than  that,  since  Gottingen  is  in  Hanover,  where 
the  purest  German  is  spoken,  and  this  for  a  diplomat  was  also 
of  importance. 

Otto  went  accordingly  to  Gottingen  in  May,  1832,  and  re- 
mained till  November,  1833,  studying  law,  and  whatever  else 
he  had  time  or  fancy  for.  He  went  alone,  and,  what  seems 
strange,  was  wholly  unacquainted  with  his  fellow-students. 
Inexperienced  and  left  to  his  own  devices,  for  the  first  time  in 
life,  with  an  exceptionally  active  mind  and  full  of  Pomeranian 
energy,  he  plunged  from  one  mishap  or  blunder  into  another. 
His  record  at  the  university  was  a  turbulent  one,  not  unlike 
that  which  Schiller  describes  in  his  account  of  Wallenstein. 
He  had  already  fought  his  first  student's  duel,  a  very  boyish 
affair,  in  Berlin ;  and  one  morning,  being  laughed  at  in  the 
streets  of  Gottingen  for  his  rather  eccentric  attire,  Otto  in  his 
confusion  or  disgust  knew  of  no  better  alternative  than  to  chal- 
lenge the  whole  party.  This,  however,  had  consequences  that 
could  not  have  been  foreseen.  The  second  of  the  Hanoverians, 
who  called  on  young  Bismarck  to  arrange  a  meeting,  found  so 
little  ill  will  and  so  much  good  humor  in  him,  that  he  was 
strongly  attracted  towards  him,  and  offered  to  bring  about  a 
reconciliation,  which  was  accordingly  done.  The  Hanoverian 

1  Hesekiel's  Biography,  p.  98. 
19 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

soon  afterwards  became  Bismarck's  churn,  and,  being  older 
and  more  experienced,  persuaded  him  to  leave  the  Bruns- 
wick corps,  to  which  Otto  then  belonged,  and  to  join  his 
own,  since  there  was  no  regular  Prussian  corps  at  the  uni- 
versity. Thus  early  did  Bismarck  evince  his  indifference  to 
party  attachments. 

The  Brunswickers,  however,  were  highly  offended,  and 
their  leading  man  challenged  him  to  fight  with  the  schlager, 
from  which  Bismarck  escaped  with  a  few  blows,  and  his  oppo- 
nent with  a  cut  in  his  face.  Of  course,  the  Brunswickers  were 
not  going  to  let  him  off  on  such  terms  as  this,  and  Otto  was 
challenged  successively  by  all  their  ablest  swordsmen.  It 
was  a  miniature  of  his  after- experience  as  a  statesman  with 
the  great  powers  of  Europe.  Bismarck  is  credited  with  having 
fought  twenty  duels  with  the  schlager  during  the  first  year, 
and  in  every  instance  but  one  he  had  the  advantage  over  his 
antagonist.  In  his  encounter  with  a  student  named  Bieder- 
wig,  whom  he  afterwards  greeted  on  the  floor  of  the  Reichs- 
tag, the  latter's  sword-blade  broke  as  Bismarck  was  parrying 
his  attack,  and  gave  him  a  slight  cut  on  the  cheek.  A  con- 
vention of  experts,  however,  decided  that  such  an  accident 
did  not  constitute  a  victory  for  Biederwig,  though  the  gentle- 
man himself  always  held  a  different  opinion.  In  this  way 
Bismarck  became  the  champion  of  the  Hanoverians,  and, 
though  only  eighteen,  he  became  the  admired  and  most 
dreaded  fencer  of  the  university.  It  is  the  fair  explanation  of 
his  duelling  experience,  which  otherwise  might  be  difficult  to 
account  for.  Though  of  an  aggressive  nature,  he  was  not 
quarrelsome,  but  rather  conciliatory. 

It  is  a  peculiar  custom,  this  schlager  duelling  of  German 
students,  and  seems  to  take  the  place  with  them  of  those 
athletic  games  which  the  Saxon  race  so  much  delight  in.  It 
was  only  at  a  later  period  that  English  foot-ball  was  intro- 
duced at  Heidelberg.  Though  their  encounters  rarely  result 
in  a  more  serious  injury  than  a  permanent  scar  on  the  face, 
these  scars  are  so  common  that  they  would  almost  seem  to 
be  the  mark  of  an  educated  German.  From  the  earliest 
times  the  Germans  have  been  given  to  such  rude  tests  of 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

personal  courage,  and  there  is  no  doubt  a  certain  advantage 
in  them.  Schlager-fighting  trains  the  nerves  and  hand  for 
the  more  serious  emergencies  of  life,  and  is  as  useful  to  the 
surgeon  or  lawyer  as  it  is  to  the  soldier;  but  the  idea  of 
sending  one's  sons  to  college  to  be  marked  in  this  manner  is 
not  very  pleasant,  and  perhaps  it  would  be  quite  as  well  if 
German  students  found  some  other  method  of  proving  their 
manliness. 

The  pistol  duel,  with  which  Bismarck  was  connected  in 
January,  1833,  was  in  no  wise  to  his  discredit.  An  English- 
man, named  Knight,  had  fallen  out  with  a  young  German 
baron,  and  they  had  arranged  for  a  deadly  encounter.  At 
the  last  moment  the  baron's  second  disappointed  him,  and 
Bismarck  was  asked  to  fill  his  place.  This  he  did  from  that 
sentiment  of  loyalty  to  his  countrymen  which  is  the  best 
virtue  in  early  life ;  and  he  showed  on  this  occasion  that 
masterful  trait  in  his  nature  arising  from  a  clear  perception 
of  the  case  before  him,  and  readiness  to  act  according  to  his 
thought.  The  principals  were  too  nervous  to  hit  each  other 
at  the  first  fire,  and  Bismarck,  who  had  purposely  lengthened 
the  distance  between  them,  proposed  a  cessation  of  hostilities, 
which  all  parties  were  glad  enough  to  agree  to.  Such  affairs 
of  honor,  however,  were  contrary  to  the  laws  of  the  university, 
and  the  participants  in  it  were  severely  punished ;  the  rector 
allotting  Bismarck  for  his  connection  in  it  eleven  days  of 
solitary  confinement,  though  public  opinion  spoke  loudly  in 
his  favor.  At  another  time  he  was  accorded  four  days'  con- 
finement for  having  associated 'with  an  illegal  organization, 
but  what  this  was  we  are  not  informed. 

Among  the  friends  that*  he  made  at  Gottingen  were  Dr. 
Windhorst,  afterwards  his  most  active  opponent  in  the  Reichs- 
tag, and  John  Lothrop  Motley,  the  historian  of  the  Dutch 
Republic.  There  were  other  Americans  there  at  the  time 
with  whom  he  became  friendly,  and  assisted  in  the  celebration 
of  the  Fourth  of  July  with  pleasant  international  courtesy. 
He  has  himself  recorded  his  acquaintance  with  Motley  in  a 
letter  to  Oliver  Wendell  Holmes,  dictated  in  March,  1878,  as 
follows : 

21 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

"  I  met  Motley  at  Gottingen  in  1832 ;  I  am  not  sure  if  at  the 
beginning  of  Easter  Term  or  Michaelmas  Term.  He  kept  com- 
pany with  German  students,  though  more  addicted  to  study  than 
we  members  of  the  fighting  clubs.  Although  not  having  yet  mas- 
tered the  German  language,  he  exercised  a  marked  attraction  by  a 
conversation  sparkling  with  wit,  humor,  and  originality.  In  the 
autumn  of  1833,  having  both  of  us  migrated  from  Gottingen  to 
Berlin  for  the  prosecution  of  our  studies,  we  became  fellow-lodgers 
in  the  house  No.  161  Friedrich  Strasse.  There  we  lived  in  the 
closest  intimacy,  sharing  our  meals  and  out-door  exercise.  Motley 
by  that  time  had  arrived  at  talking  German  fluently ;  he  occupied 
himself  not  only  in  translating  Goethe's  poem  'Faust,'  but  tried 
his  hand  even  in  composing  German  verses.  Enthusiastic  admirer 
of  Shakespeare,  Byron,  Goethe,  he  used  to  spice  his  conversation 
abundantly  with  quotations  from  these  his  favorite  authors.  A  per- 
tinacious arguer,  so  much  so  that  sometimes  he  watched  my  awaken- 
ing in  order  to  continue  a  discussion  on  some  topic  of  science, 
poetry,  or  practical  life,  cut  short  by  the  chimes  of  the  small  hours, 
he  never  lost  his  mild  and  amiable  temper.  Our  faithful  com- 
panion was  Count  Alexander  Keyserling,  a  native  of  Courland, 
who  has  since  achieved  distinction  as  a  botanist. ' ' x 

This  is  an  invaluable  letter,  for  it  throws  light  on  the 
deeper  thought  and  feeling  of  Bismarck  during  his  academic 
years.  Motley  would  not  have  found  pleasure  in  discuss- 
ing Shakespeare  and  Goethe  with  him,  if  Bismarck  had  not 
also  been  a  man  of  ideas.  They  were  evidently  kindred 
spirits. 

Bismarck  escaped  his  second  incarceration  by  suddenly 
changing  from  the  University  of  Gottingen  to  the  one  at 
Berlin,  where  he  continued  his  study  of  law  with  Sarigny,  the 
Ulpian  of  Germany.  Sarigny's  lectures  on  the  Roman  law, 
however,  did  not  interest  him.  He  cared  little  for  the  an- 
cients or  their  methods,  and  lived  wholly  in  the  present  time. 
Although  seemingly  neglectful  of  his  college  duties,  he  never- 
theless accomplished  a  good  deal  of  work,  and  in  the  spring 
of  1835  passed  the  rigid  Prussian  examination  for  admission 
to  the  bar, — an  exceptional  age,  and  a  severe  mental  ordeal. 

1  Holmes's  Life  of  Motley,  p.  18. 
22 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

He  seems  to  have  disliked  lectures,  and  preferred  studying 
alone,  with  the  occasional  help  of  a  tutor. 

BARRISTER   AND   SOLDIER 

Through  the  influence  of  his  family  Bismarck  was  imme-  / 
diately  appointed  an  examiner  in  one  of  the  intermediary/ 
courts  of  Berlin,  where  he  found  active  employment  during] 
the  year  1835-36  in  taking  the  testimony  of  witnesses.  Ac-\ 
cording  to  the  practice  of  the  civil  law  the  evidence  in  court 
is  not  elicited  by  the  counsel  on  either  side,  but  by  state 
examiners,  and  after  they  have  finished,  the  counsellors  are 
also  permitted  to  make  inquiries.  This  has  the  advantage 
over  the  common  law  of  preventing  witnesses  from  being 
brow-beaten  and  otherwise  imposed  on  by  unscrupulous 
lawyers  who  often  entertain  the  jury  at  the  witnesses'  ex- 
pense; but  in  exceptional  cases  it  has  the  disadvantage  of 
allowing  the  government  too  great  an  influence  over  judicial 
proceedings.  Bismarck  distinguished  himself  in  this  new 
avocation  by  his  pertinent  and  searching  questions,  and  the 
slight  impatience  of  his  manner  was  ameliorated  by  an  evi- 
dent personal  interest  in  the  witness.  He  here  became  ac- 
quainted with  human  nature  as  it  appears  in  the  substrata 
of  society,  which  is  sometimes  hidden  altogether  from  those 
who  are  fortunately  born,  and  learned  to  know  men  and 
women  as  they  really  are  at  heart  more  clearly  than  he  could 
have  done  in  any  other  way.  He  was  particularly  impressed, 
as  he  afterwards  related  to  Dr.  Busch,  by  a  woman  who  was 
required  to  sign  a  certain  document,  but  absolutely  refused 
to  do  so,  although  he,  and  the  judge  as  well,  tried  all  their 
powers  of  persuasion  upon  her. 

In  the  same  year  he  was  introduced  at  court,  where  his 
commanding  figure  and  the  strong  stamp  of  his  face  attracted 
the  attention  of  royalty  itself.  His  future  patron,  William  I., 
was  then  commander  of  an  army  corps,  and  it  was  thought 
that  if  he  only  had  a  chance  to  distinguish  himself  he  would 
make  a  celebrated  general.  These  two  men,  afterwards  so 
indispensable  to  each  other,  met  and  parted  without  the  least 
anticipation  of  their  future  relations.  Prince  William  was 

23 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

devoted  to  the  army,  and  Bismarck  to  the  law ;  but  his  expe- 
rience at  court  was  excellent  discipline  for  him,  after  the  neg- 
ligent ease  and  freedom  of  German  student  life.  Old  Dr. 
Johnson  said  in  regard  to  his  interview  with  George  III.,  "  It 
does  you  good  to  talk  with  your  king :  one  cannot  become 
angry  with  the  king."' 

In  1836  Bismarck  exchanged  his  Berlin  office  for  the  posi- 
tion of  referendary  at  Aix-la-Chapelle,  a  government  position 
which  afforded  him  small  pay,  and  work  of  even  a  smaller 
description ;  but  it  was  considered  important  that  he  should 
become  acquainted  with  the  government  system  of  bureau- 
cracy and  the  details  of  its  administration.  It  is  likely  that 
Frau  von  Bismarck  had  a  hand  in  this,  though  she  was  now 
in  failing  health  and  lived  in  retirement  for  the  most  part  at 
Schonhausen,  for  Aix  was  the  resort  of  French,  English,  and 
Hollanders,  with  whom  Otto  might  be  expected  to  improve 
his  knowledge  of  those  languages.  So,  at  least,  it  turned 
out,  for  we  find  him  making  English  and  French  acquaint- 
ances there ;  reading  Hamlet  and  Richard  ///., — the  last,  per- 
haps, from  a  curiosity  to  learn  what  Shakespeare  would  make 
of  such  a  hideous  character.  The  close  neighborhood  of  the 
Rhineland,  which,  with  its  old  castles,  romantic  scenery, 
wines,  and  dreamy  atmosphere,  seem  like  an  enchanted  region 
to  the  inhabitants  of  prosaic  Prussia,  was  an  allurement  that 
attracted  Bismarck  strongly.  "  How  much  time,"  he  said 
afterwards,  "  I  wasted  in  my  youth,  strolling,  drinking,  dan- 
cing, and  flirting  on  the  Rhine !"  Unhappily  he  was  obliged 
to  pay  for  this  youthful  Elysium  by  an  equal  period  of  sad- 
ness and  melancholy  afterwards.  It  was  a  midsummer 
night's  dream,  in  which  folly  and  delusion  were  mingled  with 
delight.  It  was  from  Aix  that  he  made  his  first  journey  to 
England,  and  was  cautioned,  after  landing  in  London  on  Sun- 
day morning,  for  whistling  in  the  streets.  The  solemnity  of 
the  English  Sabbath  did  not  impress  Bismarck  favorably,  but 
he  noticed  the  great  advantage  which  the  country  had  de- 
rived by  its  exemption  from  the  ravages  of  war. 

Hesekiel  suggests  that  Bismarck  did  not  leave  Aix  of  his 
own  free  will,  but  whatever  happened  there  could  not  have 

24 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

been  very  serious,  for  he  still  remained  in  the  government's 
service.  The  following  year  (1838)  we  find  him  at  Potsdam 
engaged  as  a  referendary,  and  at  the  same  time  doing  service 
as  a  private  in  the  Jager  (riflemen)  battalion  of  the  Royal 
Guard,  which  had  formerly  been  Bliicher's  guard  also  in  the 
French  campaigns.  To  see  the  Jager  battalion  drill  at  Pots- 
dam is  a  spectacle  like  the  Strasburg  clock.  In  1839,  how- 
ever, Bismarck  removed  again  to  Greifswald,  where  there  was 
an  agricultural  academy,  for  the  purpose  of  learning  better 
how  to  manage  the  paternal  estates,  which  he  foresaw  would 
soon  require  his  personal  attention.  Here  also  he  united  the 
duties  of  a  soldier  with  those  of  the  civilian,  thus  completing 
his  two  years  of  service  to  the  Prussian  state.  In  this  way 
he  finished  the  circuit  of  his  accomplishments,  and  might  step 
forth  now  into  the  great  world  a  complete  and  well-rounded 
man,  illustrating  the  words  of  the  poet, — 

"  Who  takes  his  hand  from  the  ploughing, 
The  kingdom  is  not  for  him. ' ' 

The  great  world,  however,  was  still  far  enough  off*  from 
Otto  von  Bismarck.  His  happy  student  life,  the  splendor  of 
the  Berlin  court,  and  the  festivities  of  the  Rhineland  were  a 
dream  of  the  past  never  to  return.  At  Potsdam  he  again 
met  his  brother  Bernhard,  who  had  served  four  years  in  the 
dragoons  and  now  also  accepted  office  as  a  referendary  ;  and 
it  was  about  this  time  that  the  two  brothers  discovered  that 
the  family  exchequer  was  wellnigh  empty.  Their  chess- 
playing  mother  had  not  proved  a  wise  manager  of  the  Bis- 
marck estates.  It  may  have  been  good  policy  to  spend  lib- 
erally on  her  children  during  their  years  of  education,  but 
she  was  also  given  to  agricultural  experiments  and  expensive 
improvements  which  did  not  bring  the  return  she  expected. 
A  visit  to  the  Pomeranian  properties  of  Kniephof  and  Jarche- 
lin  satisfied  Bernhard  and  Otto  that  the  time  had  come  for 
them  to  interfere.  They  accordingly  went  to  their  father  and 
laid  the  case  plainly  before  him.  They  persuaded  him  that 
the  only  way  to  relieve  the  financial  embarrassment  of  the 
family  was  to  make  over  the  Pomeranian  estates  to  his  sons 

25 


LIFE   OF   BISMARCK 

for  good  and  all.  This  was  acceded  to,  and  Kiilz,  which  was 
quite  equal  to  the  two  other  properties,  fell  to  Bernhard's 
share,  while  Otto  received  Kniephof  and  Jarchelin.  Frau 
von  Bismarck  died  in  1839,  leaving  her  children  well  equipped 
for  the  race  of  life,  but  still  near  the  foot  of  the  ladder.  Her 
husband  followed  her  six  years  later,  having  lived  to  witness 
the  revival  of  prosperity  in  the  hands  of  his  energetic  sons. 

Bernhard  von  Bismarck  was  a  man  of  ability,  and  would 
have  given  the  family  a  national  distinction  if  he  had  not  been 
overshadowed  by  his  more  brilliant  brother.  He  did  well  at 
Kiilz,  and  later  in  life  became  a  member  of  the  King's  Privy 
Council.  Otto  now  began  work  in  earnest,  and  applied  the 
knowledge  he  had  learned  at  the  agricultural  college  to  till 
the  soil  of  Pomerania  in  a  practical  manner.  He  was  present 
in  many  places  and  feared  in  all.  His  expression  as  applied 
to  ineffectual  work,  "  Noch  lange  nicht  genug"  x  has  become  a 
proverb  in  Germany.  Gradually  the  condition  of  his  two 
properties  began  to  improve.  Better  crops  were  raised  ;  order 
and  economy  enforced;  small  obligations  liquidated.  The 
condition  of  the  tenants  was  also  looked  after.  When  Otto 
found  that  they  were  working  on  Sunday  in  order  to  make 
up  for  extra  hours  in  his  service,  he  ordered  that  they  should 
till  their  own  ground  before  they  attended  to  his  affairs,  and 
he  found  himself  the  gainer  by  this  arrangement  in  the  good- 
will with  which  they  afterwards  worked  for  him.  It  was  not, 
however,  the  life  that  Bismarck  was  intended  for  by  destiny. 
The  harness  of  his  daily  routine  galled  him  as  it  might  a 
Pegasus.  The  management  of  a  farm  requires  as  much 
thinking  as  the  management  of  a  railroad,  but  of  a  very  dif- 
ferent kind.  His  mental  activity  had  to  find  an  outlet  in 
some  other  direction.  "  If  you  plant  an  acorn  in  a  flower- 
pot," says  Goethe,  "  either  the  oak  will  die  or  the  flower-pot 
will  break."  Neither  were  his  prospects  for  the  future  encour- 
aging. He  had  left  the  government  service,  not  in  disgrace 
certainly,  but  without  such  official  commendation  as  might 
encourage  him  to  think  of  it  again.  Would  he  always  have 


1  "  By  no  means  sufficient." 
26 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

to  continue  in  his  present  mode  of  life?     Hesekiel  says  of  his 
Kniephof  days : 

'  <  When  Bismarck,  at  the  age  of  twenty-three,  in  the  most  press- 
ing circumstances,  without  credit  or  capital,  undertook  the  conduct 
of  the  wasted  estates,  he  evinced  prudence  and  activity,  and,  as 
long  as  bitter  want  pressed  upon  him,  he  found  solace  in  agricult- 
ural activity ;  but  when,  by  his  means,  the  estates  began  to  rise  in 
value,  and  everything  went  on  smoothly,  and  he  was  able  to  rely 
upon  able  subordinates,  the  administration  gave  him  less  satisfac- 
tion, and  he  felt  the  circle  in  which  he  moved  too  contracted  for 
him.  In  his  youthful  fancy  he  had  formed  a  certain  ideal  of  a 
country  Junker ;  hence  he  had  no  carriage,  performed  all  his  jour- 
neys on  horseback,  and  astonished  the  neighborhood  by  riding 
twenty  to  thirty  miles  to  evening  assemblies  in  Polzin.  Despite 
of  his  wild  life  and  actions,  he  felt  a  continually  increasing  sense 
of  loneliness,  and  the  same  Bismarck,  who  gave  himself  to  jolly 
carousals  among  the  officers  of  the  neighboring  garrisons,  sank, 
when  alone,  into  the  bitterest  and  most  desolate  state  of  reflection. 
He  suffered  from  that  disgust  of  life  common  to  the  boldest  officers 
at  certain  times,  and  which  has  been  called  'first  lieutenant's  mel- 
ancholy.' The  less  real  pleasure  he  had  in  his  wild  career,  the 
madder  it  became ;  and  he  earned  himself  a  fearful  reputation 
among  the  elder  ladies  and  gentlemen,  who  predicted  the  moral 
and  pecuniary  ruin  of  '  Mad  Bismarck. '  "  * 

This  was  Bismarck's  Wertherian  period,  which  developed 
itself  according  to  the  peculiarity  of  his  nature.  It  has  been 
more  than  hinted  that  he  also  had  his  Charlotte,  not  the  wife 
of  another  man,  but  an  unmarried  woman,  who  did  not  appre- 
ciate him.  He  made  one  more  visit  to  the  Rhineland,  and  one 
only.  The  gay  Fraulein,  who  admired  him  as  a  government 
official,  with  prospects  of  promotion,  was  not  well  pleased  at 
the  idea  of  burying  herself  in  the  country.  Bismarck  re- 
turned to  Kniephof  with  his  spirits  at  a  very  low  ebb,  not 
realizing  that  he  had  made  a  fortunate  escape,  and  that  he 
was  yet  to  find  a  much  better  helpmate.  To  a  nature  so 
ardent  and  intense  such  an  experience  brings  a  strong  reac- 
tion,— a  disgust  of  life,  an  indifference  to  self,  and  a  contempt 

1  Life  of  Bismarck,  p.  109. 
27 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

for  human  nature.  To  the  rejected  admirer  the  world  for  a 
time  seems  upside-down,  the  sunshine  a  mockery,  and  happi- 
ness an  illusion.  Bismarck  went  to  Paris,  went  to  London, 
and  thought  of  more  distant  journeys.  He  revelled  with  the 
officers  of  the  neighboring  garrison ;  pistol-shots  were  heard 
in  the  night  at  Kniephof;  nobody  could  predict  what  Bis- 
marck would  do  next. 

A  man  so  full  of  energy,  and  with  the  wine  of  youth  in  his 
veins,  has  to  let  off  steam  in  some  manner  or  he  will  explode. 
We  do  not  hear  that  Bismarck  ever  injured  a  human  person, 
— except  in  his  schlager-duelling, — and  the  tales  about  him 
were  probably  very  much  exaggerated  after  he  became  dis- 
tinguished. The  faults  of  great  men  are  ever  looked  at 
through  a  magnifying-glass.  Certain  it  is  that  Otto  von  Bis- 
marck came  out  of  this  moral  fermentation  perfectly  sound  in 
mind  and  body,  whereas  a  few  years  of  genuine  dissipation 
will  commonly  abbreviate  a  man's  life  before  he  is  fifty. 

In  the  midst  of  it  all  he  astonished  the  prophesiers  of  his 
future  ruin  by  an  act  of  heroism  which  has  become  historic. 
Going  with  his  groom  and  others  one  morning  to  a  neigh- 
boring horse-pond,  the  banks  of  which  were  somewhat  pre- 
cipitous, the  groom's  horse  stumbled  and  suddenly  pitched 
its  rider  into  deep  water.  Either  the  man  could  not  swim  or 
he  lost  his  presence  of  mind,  and  was  in  evident  danger  of 
being  drowned.  Bismarck,  alone  among  those  present,  went 
to  his  rescue.  Tearing  off  his  sword  and  coat,  he  plunged 
in,  and,  though  at  one  time  they  both  disappeared,  and  Bis- 
marck was  in  great  peril  from  the  convulsive  struggles  of  the 
groom,  he  finally  succeeded  in  bringing  him  to  land.  The 
on-lookers  do  not  appear  to  have  offered  their  assistance, 
though  by  forming  a  chain  in  the  water  it  would  seem  as  if 
they  might  have  done  so  effectively. 

Bismarck,  having  learned  the  duties  of  a  private  soldier, 
applied  for  and  obtained  in  1842  the  commission  of  a  lieu- 
tenant in  the  Landwehr  battalion  stationed  near  Kniephof, 
and  in  1843  he  exchanged  this  position  for  a  command  in 
the  Uhlans  at  Graiffenberg  in  Pomerania.  His  military  duties 
were  not  so  exacting  but  that  he  was  able  to  continue  the 

28 


LIFE  OF   BISMARCK 

oversight  of  his  estates.  A  Prussian  nobleman  considers  a 
practical  knowledge  of  military  affairs  as  an  essential  part  of 
his  education,  and  in  the  evening  of  his  life  Bismarck  ex- 
pressed his  regret  in  a  letter  to  the  emperor  that  he  had  not 
made  military  science  his  profession  instead  of  diplomacy. 
We  are  unable  to  trace,  however,  any  decided  inclination 
during  his  early  years  for  the  career  of  a  soldier ;  though  we 
cannot  but  think,  with  his  rare  presence  of  mind,  decisiveness 
in  action,  and  mental  ingenuity,  he  would  have  become  one 
of  the  famous  captains  of  the  century.  Inclination  shapes 
our  lives  quite  as  much  as  mental  endowments,  and  in  this 
field  he  would  have  encountered  a  rival  of  a  genius  quite 
equal  to  his  own,  while  among  diplomats  he  was  facile  prin- 
ceps.  It  is  doubtful  if  the  perpetual  restraint  of  army  life 
could  have  long  been  endured  by  a  nature  so  impulsive,  irre- 
pressible, and  full  of  original  designs.  As  it  happened  at 
Kniephof,  Bismarck  was  repeatedly  summoned  before  his  com- 
manding officer,  either  for  breach  of  discipline  or  neglect  of 
duty,  and  this  would  have  seriously  interfered  with  his  chances 
of  promotion.  With  his  powerful  physique  and  immense  vi- 
tality he  was  also  endowed  with  a  nervous  system  more  sen- 
sitive than  that  of  the  average  woman,  and  though  his  head 
was  one  of  the  coolest,  this  might  have  proved  a  disadvantage 
to  him  on  the  field  of  battle. 

Thus  he  continued  farming,  drilling,  hunting,  drinking,  and 
reading  for  a  number  of  years, — not  a  model  life  by  any 
means,  but  an  exceptional  one,  which  somehow  suited  Otto 
von  Bismarck,  and  proved  more  fruitful  than  many  a  model 
life  has  been ;  though  we  could  not  advise  our  young  friends 
to  imitate  it.  In  1844  his  sister  Mai  wine  became  betrothed 
to  Oscar  von  Arnim,  who  had  been  his  friend  at  the  Friedrich 
Wilhelm  Gymnasium  and  had  remained  so  ever  since.  This 
was  a  great  satisfaction  to  him,  and  his  letter  of  congratula- 
tion to  her  has  a  playful  affectionateness  which  suggests  the 
coming  of  brighter  days.  His  father  died  in  1845,  leaving 
his  estates  equally  divided  between  Bernhard  and  Otto, — 
an  unusual  practice,  rendered  still  more  so  by  his  willing  the 
ancestral  residence  of  Schonhausen  to  his  younger  son.  It 

29 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

may  be  surmised  from  this  that  he  realized  Otto's  exceptional 
ability,  and  looked  to  him  as  the  one  who  would  give  distinc- 
tion to  the  name  of  Bismarck. 

Some  time  in  1847  Otto  von  Bismarck  became  acquainted 
with  the  young  lady  who  was  to  be  his  future  wife.  She 
belonged  to  the  Prussian  family  of  the  Puttkamers,  time- 
honored  in  the  service  of  the  state,  and  her  given  names  were 
Johanna  Frederica  Charlotta  Dorothea  Elinore.1  She  was  not 
beautiful,  but  what  is  much  better,  a  pleasant,  sensible  person. 
From  the  first  she  seems  to  have  appreciated  him,  which  is 
also  important  in  such  cases.  This  is  evident  from  the  fact 
that  Herr  Ernst  von  Puttkamer  did  not  understand  Bismarck 
at  all,  and  at  first  disapproved  of  the  match.  The  wild  life 
of  the  country  squire  may  not  have  been  so  much  of  an 
objection  as  his  unconventional  behavior;  but  the  man  who 
was  to  conquer  kingdoms  was  not  to  be  defeated  by  a  Putt- 
kamer. Only  a  woman  who  is  true  to  her  heart  can  see  into 


thejuture.  Frauietn  Johanna  knew  her  man  and  stood  by 
him  with  creditable  firmness.  It  was  a  love-match  on  both 
sides, — not  a  common  occurrence  where  large  properties  are 
at  stake, — and  the  parents  were  finally  persuaded  to  give  way. 
Bismarck  was  married  to  her  on  July  28,  1847.  Their  wed- 
ding journey  included  a  visit  to  Switzerland  and  Northern 
Italy,  and  at  Venice  they  accidentally  met  and  were  enter- 
tained by  the  King  of  Prussia,  Frederick  William  IV.  Ernst 
von  Puttkamer  and  his  wife  never  had  occasion  to  regret  the 
marriage  of  their  daughter. 


1  These  long  personal  appellations   have  a  charm  for  the   German  nobility 
which  others  know  not  of. 


CHAPTER    II 

THE    REVOLUTION   OF   FORTY-EIGHT 

GREAT  political  convulsions  produce  men  of  equal  magni- 
tude. Napoleon  was  the  fearful  offspring  of  the  first  French 
revolution ;  Bismarck  the  colossal  child  of  "  forty-eight." 
Metternich  foresaw  and  predicted  the  revolution  of  1848,  but 
hoped  to  defer  it  to  a  later  time  by  a  repression  of  all  the 
tendencies  which  he  thought  might  lead  towards  it;  but  by 
this  policy  he  only  helped  to  precipitate  it. 

While  the  first  French  revolution  was  confined  to  France 
and  was  a  great  success,  the  revolution  of  1848,  extending 
from  Warsaw  to  Lisbon,  proved  a  failure.  In  only  one  country 
at  least  did  the  seed  which  was  sown  by  it  come  to  be  har- 
vested, and  that  country  was  Prussia.  Everywhere  else  the 
reaction  that  followed  upon  it  produced  a  condition  of  affairs 
less  favorable  to  the  development  of  liberal  institutions  than 
the  conditions  that  preceded  it.  Yet  the  heroes  who  died  for 
it  under  the  walls  of  Rome,  in  the  plains  of  Lombardy,  and 
in  the  valley  of  the  Danube  did  not  fall  wholly  in  vain. 

The  revolution  possessed  a  different  character  in  different 
countries.  In  France,  where  it  originated,  there  was  less  oc- 
casion for  it  than  anywhere  else.  The  government  of  Louis 
Philippe  was  mild  and  liberal.  The  position  of  the  king  dif- 
fered only  from  that  of  a  president  in  the  title  and  hereditary 
right.  It  was  Thiers's  history  of  the  first  empire  and  the 
lack  of  an  aggressive  foreign  policy  which  upset  the  Orleans 
dynasty.  The  revolution  was  inaugurated  by  the  socialists 
and  taken  advantage  of  by  the  Bonapartists.  France  is  now 
substantially  republican,  but  in  1848  republicanism  was  con- 
fined to  Paris,  Lyons,  and  Marseilles.  The  election  of  Louis 
Napoleon  as  president  was  an  ominous  event,  which  plainly 
foreshadowed  the  second  empire. 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

In  Italy  there  had  been  for  centuries  sufficient  cause  for 
revolution,  and  looked  at  broadly  it  was  a  hopeful  sign  that  it 
should  have  succeeded,  even  for  a  single  year.  The  tem- 
poral power  of  the  pope  was  looked  upon  as  a  perpetual  evil 
by  Macchiavelli ;  and  if  he  thought  so  it  certainly  must  have 
been.  Yet  we  must  give  Pius  IX.  the  credit  of  having  been 
the  first  to  inaugurate  reforms,  and  the  frivolous  assassination 
of  his  nuncio  was  a  commencement  of  bad  augury  for  the 
revolution.  Sardinia  and  Tuscany  were  well  governed,  and 
the  people  of  those  states  expressed  little  desire  for  a  change 
of  form ;  Naples  was  badly  governed ;  and  the  Austrian  por- 
tion of  Italy,  after  its  quasi-independence  under  Napoleon, 
was  continually  fermenting  under  a  rule  which  felt  no  interest 
in  its  welfare  beyond  the  collection  of  taxes. 

In  Austria  proper  the  complaint  arose  from  a  bureaucracy 
of  such  long  standing  that  the  government  machine  had  come 
wholly  into  the  possession  of  a  limited  number  of  families, 
who  provided  for  their  relatives  in  comfortable  offices  of 
which  the  outside  public  could  obtain  no  share.  The  pro- 
fessional and  commercial  classes  suffered  from  a  burden  of 
feudatory  privileges  like  those  of  France  in  the  eighteenth 
century,  though  not  to  the  same  extent.  The  Hungarians, 
who  had  proved  the  shield  of  Austria  in  the  Napoleonic  wars, 
had  been  deliberately  oppressed  by  Metternich,  from  a  cow- 
ardly anticipation  of  what  they  might  demand  in  return  for 
this.  They  were  governed  almost  entirely  by  Austrian 
officials,  obliged  to  use  the  German  language  for  all  public 
business  and  forms  of  legal  procedure,  and  could  only  obtain 
redress  for  their  supposed  grievances  through  the  bureaucracy 
of  Vienna,  a  dubious  and  wearisome  method  of  procedure. 
What  the  people  of  Hungary  wanted  was  to  manage  their 
own  affairs ;  but  the  revolution  there  commenced  with  a 
wanton  act  of  cruelty  also,  which  prejudiced  the  thinking 
world  against  it. 

The  people  of  Prussia  and  the  smaller  German  states 
wished  for  constitutional  government  and  a  fulfilment  of  the 
broken  promises  of  1813.  Besides  this,  the  desire  for  national 
unity,  and  the  political  theory  which  looked  for  a  republican 

32 


LIFE   OF   BISMARCK 

government  as  the  most  direct  means  of  effecting  this,  stood 
ready  to  take  advantage  of  any  situation  which  might  seem 
favorable  for  the  attainment  of  its  wishes.  Everywhere  in 
1848  there  were  three  distinct  revolutionary  elements, — con- 
stitutional government,  republicanism,  and  socialism,  f  In 
France,  however,  Bonapartism  was  substituted  for  the  first  of 
these,  and  in  all  countries  except  Hungary  the  socialistic 
element  preponderated  over  the  republican.  In  Germany 
there  was  little  true  republicanism,  for  the  reason  that  the 
class  of  people  who  form  the  solid  material  of  republican  in- 
stitutions— those  who  see  their  objects  at  shooting  distance — 
perceived  plainly  that  for  the  present  a  republic  was  imprac- 
ticable there.  They  accepted  the  socialists  as  allies  for  the 
time  being,  but  they  did  not  aim  beyond  a  constitutional 
monarchy. 

It  was  socialism  that  handicapped  the  revolution  in  France, 
Italy,  and  Austria,  and  prevented  its  success.  The  struggle 
of  1848  had  neither  the  grandeur  nor  the  disinterestedness 
which  gave  a  terrible  momentum  to  the  revolution  of  1789. 
jJLt  was  largely  a  warfare  of  class  against  class ;  and,  though 
this  was  justified  to  a  certain  extent,  it  was  what  evidently 
interfered,  like  a  frost,  to  prevent  its  proper  fruition.  Otto  von 
Bismarck  would  seem  to  have  perceived  this  at  the  outset, 
and  to  have  taken  in  the  political  situation  at  a  glance. 

There  is  ample  evidence  of  his  always  having  been  inter- 
ested in  political  affairs, — that  he  was  a  public-spirited  man. 
His  discussions  with  Motley  may  have  been  largely  on  this 
subject.  The  one  was  a  democratic  monarchist,  and  the  other 
an  aristocratic  republican.  For  that  matter,  there  are  plenty 
of  people  in  America  who  are  less  accessible  than  the  Ger- 
man and  English  nobility.  French  and  Italian  noblemen  are 
different,  and  much,  of  course,  depends  on  the  individual. 
Bismarck's  military  associates  at  Kniephof  considered  him 
much  of  a  liberal.  We  find  him,  in  1846,  soliciting  Oscar 
von  Arnim  for  his  company  to  attend  a  meeting  of  the  Society 
for  the  Improvement  of  the  Working  Classes  at  Potsdam. 
As  early  as  1843  Bismarck  was  a  candidate  for  nomination  as 
a  delegate  to  the  Provincial  Diet  of  Pomerania  which  met  at 
3  33 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

Stettin,  but  he  does  not  appear  to  have  desired  this.  Two 
years  later  he  was  elected,  although  Prussian  politics  at  that 
time  were  more  underground  than  on  the  surface  of  events. 

In  1846  he  began  to  take  hold  in  earnest.  There  was  a 
rumor  in  the  air  that  a  great  crisis  was  at  hand.  Everybody 
felt  it,  and,  as  usual  at  such  times,  there  was  a  requisition  for 
serious  and  determined  men.  The  king  had  summoned  a 
national  assembly  to  meet  in  the  White  Chamber  at  Berlin  in 
February,  1847,  and  Bismarck  was  active  among  the  electors 
of  his  district,  and  made  no  secret  of  his  desire  to  represent 
them.  He  would  go,  however,  as  a  conservative  candidate, 
pledged  to  support  the  throne  above  all ;  and  as  for  other 
matters,  he  would  do  what  he  considered  for  the  best  interest 
of  the  nation,  without  special  regard  to  party  lines.  Bis- 
marck rode  much  about  the  country  on  his  horse  Caleb,  in 
the  autumn  and  winter  of  1846,  explaining  his  views  on 
politics  to  all  who  were  willing  to  listen.  The  electors  were 
satisfied  with  his  views,  but  did  not  select  him  for  their  dele- 
gate. He  was  chosen,  however,  as  a  substitute,  when  some- 
thing happened  to  prevent  the  regular  delegate  from  attending 
at  the  White  Chamber.  What  a  chance  this  was  ! 

There  is  no  enemy  equal  to  an  imprudent  and  over-zealous 
friend.  Bismarck's  first  German  biographer,  by  introducing 
his  own  political  opinions  where  he  should  have  contented 
himself  with  an  explanation  of  those  of  his  hero,  has  pro- 
duced an  impression  of  ultra  conservatism  on  Bismarck's 
part,  which  has  continued  to  the  present  time.  He  has  suf- 
fered more  in  this  manner  than  from  all  the  hostile  attacks  of 
French  and  Austrian  journalists.  In  his  remarks  on  the 
revolution  of  1848,  Hesekiel  shows  himself  a  narrow  and 
intolerant  partisan  of  absolute  monarchy,  who,  like  Metter- 
nich,  can  see  nothing  in  the  demands  of  the  Prussian  people 
for  a  constitutional  government,  but  the  spirit  of  insubordina- 
tion and  the  lust  of  power.  It  is  to  be  feared  that  he  has 
done  very  slight  justice  to  Bismarck's  position  in  1847, 
which  was  at  first  like  that  of  a  mediator  between  contending 
factions,  repressing  the  extravagance  of  the  revolutionary 
party,  but  ready  to  accept  such  propositions  or  changes  in 

34 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

the  existing  political  status  as  might  be  prudent,  practical, 
and  conservative.  He  was  comparatively  a  young  man  among 
those  about  him  in  the  Diet,  but  he  appears  already  as 
the  most  clear-headed  and  resolute  figure  in  the  Prussian 
state. 

,  Otto  von  Bismarck  was  always  superior  to  paftgj  He  rec- 
ognized political  parties  exactly  for  what  they  are  worth,  and 
his  unvarying  success  has  been  due  to  this  cause  in  a  greater 
degree  than  to  any  other.  He  stood  on  the  high  ground  of 
national  patriotism,  which  is  above  all  parties,  and  this  has 
prevented  his  running  into  those  extravagances  by  which 
political  parties  are  shipwrecked.  A  political  party  may  be  pa- 
triotic, but  it  is  always  selfish,  and,  except  on  those  rare  occa- 
sions when  a  whole  nation  rises  to  its  feet,  it  always  represents 
the  interests  of  a  class.  Bismarck  was  from  1867  till  1878 
the  leader  of  the  German  National  Liberals,  which  under  his 
guidance  remodelled  Central  Europe.  His  impartial  attitude 
towards  general  politics  cannot  be  better  explained  than  by 
the  following  extract  from  a  letter  which  he  wrote  in  1861  : 
"  Nor  do  I  see,  moreover,  why  we  should  recoil  so  prudishly 
from  the  idea  of  popular  representation,  whether  in  the  Diet  or 
in  any  customs,  or  associative  parliament.  Surely  we  cannot 
combat  an  institution  as  revolutionary  which  is  legally  estab- 
lished in  every  German  state,  and  which  we  Conservatives 
even  would  not  wish  to  see  abolished,  even  in  Prussia.  In 
national  matters  we  have  hitherto  regarded  every  moderate 
concession  as  valuable.  A  thoroughly  conservative  national 
representation  might  be  created  and  yet  receive  the  gratitude 
of  the  Liberals."  The  true  statesman  is  he  who  not  only 
can  see  both  sides  of  a  question,  but  can  weigh  both  sides  in 
the  balance,  and  decide  where  to  apply  his  force  when  the 
time  for  action  arrives. 

We  hear  of  Bismarck  as  having  belonged  originally  to  the 
Junker  Partei  in  Prussia,  but  no  explanation  accompanies  this 
statement  which  might  help  us  to  a  conception  as  to  how  the 
Junker  Partei  \$  constituted,  and  what  it  desires  to  accom- 
plish. As  a  matter  of  fact  there  is  no  such  political  party, 
but  the  younger  sons  of  noblemen  form  a  class  by  themselves, 

35 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

usually  proud  and  indigent,  whose  only  prospects  in  life  are 
to  be  found  through  service  in  the  army  or  civil  positions 
under  the  government.  That  they  should  be  the  most  con- 
servative of  conservatives  is,  therefore,  to  be  expected.  Bis- 
marck was  not  a  true  Junker,  though  he  was  frequently  called 
so  in  1847,  for  his  sufficient  patrimony  placed  him  above  the 
necessity  of  seeking  office  as  a  means  of  livelihood.  We  all 
begin  life,  however,  from  the  family  stand-point,  and  it  was 
inevitable  that  Bismarck  should  begin  it  as  a  conservative. 
AnotheT'young  German  of  those  days,  a  man  of  rare  ability, 
was  destined  to  take  the  opposite  side,  to  be  imprisoned,  and 
as  an  exile  in  America  to  become  one  of  the  foremost  states- 
men of  the  western  hemisphere.  If  Bismarck  had  been  born 
in  the  same  position  as  Carl  Schurz .  he  might  have  taken  a 
similar  course,  though,  perhaps,  not  have  gone  quite  so  far; 
and  if  Schurz  had  been  a  Junker,  he  also  might  have  sup- 
ported the  government.  Late  in  life  they  met  together  at 
Schonhausen  and  discussed  old  times  with  mutual  respect 
and  admiration.  It  was  fortunate  for  Bismarck  and  for  Ger- 
many that  he  took  this  course  in  1848,  for  otherwise  he  could 
never  have  gained  the  confidence  of  the  king,  which  was 
essential  to  his  future  success. 

THE   DAYS   OF  MARCH 

Violent  revolutions  are  bad,  and  to  be  avoided  if  possible. 
The  loss  of  life  and  waste  of  property  which  they  cause  are 
not  so  much  to  be  regretted  as  the  disturbing  effect  which 
they  have  on  public  affairs,  the  unsettled  state  of  public  feeling 
which  they  produce,  and  the  reaction  which  is  sure  to  follow 
them.  Sometimes,  however,  they  are  not  to  be  avoided.  The 
slow,  gradual  transformation  of  society  which  has  been  going 
on  in  Germany  for  the  last  hundred  years  is  much  more  effect- 
ual, accomplishes  its  work  with  much  less  friction,  and  is 
more  likely  to  be  enduring  than  those  spasmodic  efforts  at 
reform  which  meanwhile  have  taken  place  in  France. 

To  understand  the  position  of  Frederick  William  IV.  and 
his  advisers  during  the  days  of  March  it  should  be  consid- 
ered that  they  were  not  only  obliged  to  resist  a  pressure  from 

36 


LIFE  OF   BISMARCK 

within  the  capital,  but  a  more  distant  and  equally  real  pressure 
from  without.  Max  Miiller  speaks  in  sincere  praise  of  Fred- 
erick William  IV.,  whom  he  knew  personally,  but  he  was  a 
man  of  too  retiring  a  nature,  too  much  given  to  literature  and 
philosophy,  to  make  a  very  effective  king.  He  might  have 
been  more  distinguished  as  a  professor  or  in  the  pulpit.  A 
timid  deference  to  Metternich  and  the  Tsar  had  become  ha- 
bitual with  him,  yet  he  struggled  somehow  through  the  storm 
of  1848,  and  though  he  appeared  at  one  time  as  the  forcible 
represser  of  the  revolution,  and  afterwards  as  the  leader  of  it, 
we  need  not,  therefore,  consider  him  inconsistent.  The  story 
of  his  being  seen  by  Bismarck  reading  Shakespeare  in  the 
forest,  with  a  stag  watching  him  from  behind,  is  one  of  the 
prettiest  in  all  the  annals  of  royalty. 

Bismarck  soon  found  himself  in  a  small  minority  in  this 
assembly.  The  revolution  of  forty-eight  was  not  inspired  by 
the  noble  impulse  for  rational  reform  and  philosophic  govern- 
ment with  which  the  revolution  of  1789  began.  Before  1789 
socialism  had  not  been  thought  of.  It  was  a  development  of 
the  revolution, — as  Madame  de  Stael  said,  an  invasion  of  the 
barbarians, — owing  to  the  general  prostration  of  governmental 
power.  In  1848  it  was  a  deliberate  and  well-developed  theory, 
and  asserted  itself,  not  in  the  spasmodic  manner  of  the  Reign 
of  Terror,  but  with  a  persistent  energy  which  made  it  much 
more  dangerous.  There  can  be  no  doubt  of  what  a  majority 
of  the  Prussian  people  wanted,  and  that  was  a  parliamentary 
government  like  that  of  England,  but  the  socialistic  element 
was  also  strong.1  The  meetings  of  the  Diet  were  occupied 
with  long-winded  harangues  full  of  patriotic  sentiments,  but 
without  much  practical  consideration  of  the  application  of 
means  to  ends.  Bismarck  soon  discovered  that  the  assembly 
was  composed  of  such  diverse  and  chaotic  elements  that  no 
ultimate  good  could  come  from  it,  and  that  the  only  prudent 
course  was  to  support  the  government  without  reservation. 


1  During  the  March  revolution  of  1848  a  mob  collected  in  front  of  the  royal 
palace  in  Berlin,  shouting  the  French  war-cry,  «  Liberty,  equality,  and  frater- 
nity," to  which  the  king  sent  the  reply,  "  Infantry,  cavalry,  and  artillery." 

37 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

Nothing  alarmed  him  so  much  as  the  tendency  to  socialism, 
forjiejoiew^as  every  clear-sighted  person  must,  that  socialism 
could_ojihL_end  in  anarchy  and  the_utter  ruin  of  civilization . 
The  personal  attacks  on  the  royal  family  angered  him,  for 
though  the  ceremonial  of  court  life  was  distasteful  to  him, 
and  he  had  not  as  yet  made  acquaintance  with  Frederick 
William,  he  knew  the  royal  family  to  be  worthy  people,  and 
he  resented  these  reflections  upon  their  character  as  a  man  of 
spirit  always  will  in  such  cases.  The  worst  of  democracy  and 
popular  elections  is  the  advantage  it  gives  to  calumny  as  a 
political  weapon,  which  is  very  effective  among  the  illiterate, 
and  always  has  less  weight  in  proportion  to  a  man's  intelli- 
gence. 

Bismarck,  though  inexperienced  in  parliamentary  debate, 
soon  became  the  leader  of  defence.  He  was  too  rapid  a 
thinker  to  be  a  very  good  speaker,  and  he  never  cultivated 
the  graces  of  oratory,  but  his  cool-headed  and  determined 
manner  was  not  without  its  effect.  He  replied  to  the  bursts 
of  patriotic  eloquence  by  a  well-considered  statement  of  the 
legal  aspects  of  the  question,  which  could  not  but  have  weight 
with  those  in  the  Diet  of  his  own  profession.  The  platform 
he  stood  on  was  rather  a  shaky  one,  but  he  made  the  most 
of  it.  It  was  no  other  than  the  divine  right  of  kings,  a  plat- 
form which  at  that  time  might  be  considered  on  its  last  legs, 
and  which  now  exists  no  longer.  The  divine  right  of  kings 
seems  absurd  enough  in  America,  but  during  the  Middle 
Ages  it  formed  a  solid  basis  of  political  right,  and  answered 
much  the  same  purpose  that  a  national  constitution  does  at 
present.  It  was,  in  fact,  an  unwritten  covenant  between  a 
sovereign  and  his  subjects,  and  was  as  much  an  obligation 
upon  the  former  to  do  what  was  right,  as  it  was  for  the  latter 
to  fulfil  whatever  their  sovereign  considered  it  best  to  do. 
This,  of  course,  left  a  large  margin  to  the  personal  interest  or 
caprice  of  the  prince;  but  its  influence  on  such  men  as  Saint 
Louis  and  Barbarossa  cannot  be  questioned ;  and  without  it 
there  would  have  been  nothing  but  temporary  expediency 
and  the  right  of  the  strongest.  It  was  essentially  a  Ger- 
manic principle,  and  was  more  efficacious  in  Germany  than 

38 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

in  other  countries.  It  was  on  account  of  the  disregard  of  it 
in  England  that  the  Magna  Charta  was  extorted  from  King 
John ;  and  in  Italy,  where  it  never  obtained  a  foothold,  the 
numerous  crimes  of  small  potentates  may  readily  be  accounted 
for  by  the  insecurity  of  their  position.  It  is  not  to  be  supposed 
that  this  moral  covenant  was  strictly  observed  in  Germany, 
but  German  mediaeval  history  has  a  much  more  humane  and 
benevolent  tone  than  that  of  England  or  France,  and  political 
executions  were  rare  in  ft. 

Although  the  Prussian  people  in  1848  were  mainly  in  the 
right,  and  Bismarck  and  the  king  mainly  in  the  wrong,  the 
position  which  Bismarck  assumed  had  a  sound  legal  basis. 
The  divine  right  of  kings  was  a  right  de  facto,  and  would 
continue  to  be  until  either  the  king  had  retreated  from  that 
position  or  had  been  driven  from  it  by  a  permanent  revolu- 
tion. The  constitutional  agreement  between  the  English  Par- 
liament and  William  of  Orange  was  brought  forward  in  debate, 
and  Bismarck  replied,  "  The  English  people  were  then  in  a 
different  position  from  that  of  the  Prussian  people  at  present ; 
a  century  of  revolution  and  civil  war  had  invested  it  with  the 
right  to  dispose  of  a  crown,  and  bind  up  with  it  conditions 
accepted  by  William  of  Orange."  This  was  a  valid  argu- 
ment ;  for  as  a  new  proprietary  right  can  only  be  acquired  by 
adverse  possession  for  a  prescribed  length  of  time,  so  the  loss 
of  a  similar  right  can  only  happen  by  a  similar  dispossession. 
The  change  in  public  opinion  could  no  more  effect  it  than 
public  opinion  in  America  could  change  the  Constitution  of 
the  United  States  by  a  single  election. 

The  German  people  were  inexperienced  in  parliamentary 
government,  and  their  first  attempts  at  it  were  awkward  and 
ineffective,  as  might  have  been  expected.  The  Diet  at  Berlin, 
after  speechifying,  discussing,  and  amending  for  about  three 
months,  wound  up  its  proceedings  with  a  series  of  demands 
and  resolutions,  some  of  which  were  needful  and  to  the 'point, 
but  others  so  impracticable  that  it  is  not  to  be  wondered  that 
Frederick  William  and  his  cabinet  decided  to  reject  them 
altogether.  The  work  of  the  Diet  was  not  good  enough  to 
pass  muster,  and  was  returned  to  be  done  over  again,  like  an 

39 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

ill-constructed  piece  of  furniture.  The  Prussian  people  would 
not  believe  this,  and  it  caused  great  irritation,  destined  to  re- 
sult the  following  year  in  the  only  revolt  that  has  ever  taken 
place  against  the  Prussian  government. 

After  his  return  from  his  wedding  journey, — and  no  pleas- 
anter  excursion  can  be  imagined,1 — Bismarck  settled  down  to 
matrimonial  life  at  Schonhausen,  where  he  could  watch  the 
events  at  Berlin  from  a  closer  stand-point  than  at  Kniephof. 
There  his  eldest  child,  Mary  Elizabeth  Johanna,  was  born  in 
August,  1848.  He  added  the  name  of  Schonhausen  to  the 
family  appellation  of  Bismarck,  though  it  has  not  become 
customary  to  use  it  except  on  official  documents.  That  his 
early  married  life  was  happy  and  contented  we  learn  from  the 
letters  to  his  wife  when  absent  from  her  on  public  business, 
of  which  there  was  plenty  in  store  for  him.  Marriage  and  an 
active  profession  was  all  that  Bismarck  needed  to  balance  his 
natural  forces.  After  this  we  hear  nothing  more  of  his  mad 
frolics  and  other  eccentric  behavior,  though  he  always  con- 
tinued to  be  unconventional  outside  of  court  circles.  Count 
Herbert  was  born  at  Berlin  in  December  of  1849,  and  William 
Otto  Albert  at  Frankfort  in  1852.  These  were  his  only  chil- 
dren. Frau  Johanna  von  Bismarck  became  distinguished  as 
an  exemplary  housekeeper  and  a  skilful  manager  of  her  hus- 
band's estates  during  his  long  periods  of  absence.  The  hams 
she  cured  were  supposed  to  be  the  best  in  Germany,  though 
the  name  of  Bismarck  perhaps  served  as  a  spice  to  their 
flavor. 

Bismarck's  utterances  during  the  days  of  March,  1848,  are  no 
more  to  be  seriously  considered  now  than  the  profane  exclama- 
tions of  a  shipmaster  when  his  vessel  has  gone  ashore  in  a  fog. 
He  remained  mostly  at  Potsdam,  in  order  to  learn  what  events 
were  taking  place,  and  to  serve  the  government  if  called  on ; 
but  no  call  came  for  him.  It  continues  to  be  a  disputed  point 
to  this  day  how  the  collision  between  the  troops  and  the  in- 
surgents took  place  in  Berlin.  The  order  to  clear  the  streets 
was  attributed  to  Prince  William,  afterwards  Emperor  Wil- 


1  Switzerland  and  Northern  Italy. 
40 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

liam,  who  went  to  England  in  exile  for  some  months  in  con- 
sequence, but  this  has  been  denied  by  a  competent  authority.1 
The  case  was  similar  to  the  Boston  massacre  in  1774.  It  was 
necessary  that  a  collision  should  occur,  in  order  to  disinfect 
the  movement  of  its  socialistic  element  and  give  the  constitu- 
tional party  untrammelled  freedom  of  .action^  The  troops  re- 
mained masters  of  the  streets,  but  not  of  the  city,  and,  worn 
out  with  fatigue,  were  finally  obliged  to  retire.  The  king 
dismissed  his  ministers  and  approved  the  organization  of  a 
citizen  guard,  chosen  from  the  better  and  more  reliable  class, 
to  preserve  order  in  Berlin.  It  was  an  affecting  spectacle, 
when  the  corpses  of  those  who  had  been  killed  in  the  barri- 
cades were  brought  to  the  court-yard  of  the  Schloss,  and  the 
king  and  queen  surveyed  them  and  bowed  their  heads  before 
them.  Three  days  later  the  victims  of  the  revolution  were 
buried  in  a  common  grave  in  the  Friedrichshain,  accompanied 
by  a  funeral  procession  of  twenty  thousand  people,  to  which 
Frederick  William  paid  his  respects,  decorated  with  the  black, 
red,  and  gold  of  the  revolutionists.  Historians  may  call  this 
weakness,  vacillation,  or  whatever  they  please ;  but  it  was  the 
best  policy  he  could  have  adopted,  for  it  showed  the  people 
that,  after  all,  they  and  the  government  were  one.2  A  con- 
stitutional convention  was  appointed  to  meet  on  May  22. 

The  behavior  of  this  convention,  to  which  Bismarck  de- 
clined an  election,  was  such  as  to  justify  the  government  in 
more  rigorous  measures.  Knives  were  drawn  on  the  more 
moderate  and  conservative  delegates,  in  order  to  compel  them 
to  vote  for  the  most  extravagant  resolutions.  A  large  party 
urged  a  declaration  of  war  against  Austria,  in  order  to  assist 
their  democratic  brethren  in  Vienna,  and  the  wrangling  was 
so  fierce,  over  questions  like  the  annulling  of  patents  of  no- 
bility, that  no  progress  could  be  made.3  No  enduring  govern- 

1  Pro'fessor  William  Miiller,  of  Tubingen. 

2  It  is  only  fair  to  state  that  Bismarck  could  never  see  this,  and  never  became 
reconciled  to  the  revolution.     In  his  memoirs   he  attributes  the  conduct  of 
Frederick  William  IV.  to  mental  and  physical  frailty.     If  so,  it  was  a  fortu- 
nate frailty  for  Prussia. 

3  The  presiding   officer  of  this  convention  was  pne  Herr  Unruke,  or  Mr. 
Unrest,  a  name  singularly  appropriate  to  the  occasion. 

41 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

ment  has  yet  been  founded  in  such  a  manner,  and  it  was  not 
long  before  the  saner  portion  of  the  convention  became  con- 
vinced of  this.  The  storming  of  the  city  arsenal  by  a  disor- 
derly mob  created  supporters  of  the  monarchy  by  the  ten 
thousand.  The  liberal  ministry  resigned,  and  was  replaced 
by  a  more  conservative  one.  The  convention  was  prorogued 
to  meet  again  in  November  at  Brandenburg,  and  General 
Wrangel,  a  popular  veteran  of  the  War  of  Liberation,  was 
summoned  to  Berlin  with  a  strong  force  to  preserve  order, 
for  which  the  citizen  police  had  been  found  ineffectual. 
Meanwhile  Bismarck  was  busy  in  his  own  way, — on  the 
street,  in  the  gallery  of  the  convention,  in  the  palace,  watch- 
ing events  and  writing  his  opinion  of  them  for  the  news- 
papers, especially  the  Kreuz  Zeitung,  like  a  common  reporter. 
As  his  letters  were  unsigned,  they  can  only  now  be  guessed 
at  from  the  vigor  and  decisiveness  of  their  style,  but  it  is  fair 
to  presume  that  they  exercised  a  decided  influence  on  the 
public  mind.  The  adjourned  convention  met  on  November 
27,  but,  as  a  majority  of  the  members  absented  themselves, 
no  business  could  be  transacted.  A  few  days  later  a  sufficient 
number  of  socialists  and  republicans  appeared  to  constitute  a 
quorum  ;  but  after  entering  a  protest  against  the  transference 
from  Berlin,  where  they  could  be  supported  by  the  mob,  they 
disappeared  again,  and  the  convention  adjourned  sine  die.  As 
the  popular  assembly  had  failed  to  bring  forth  the  constitu- 
tion, Frederick  William  now  proposed  one  drawn  up  by  his 
own  ministers. 

The  revolution  was  successful  and  went  just  far  enough,  a 
creditable  fact  for  all  parties  concerned.  Nothing  more  was 
heard  of  the  French  war-cry, — liberty,  equality,  and  frater- 
nity. Frederick  William  granted  the  Prussian  people  a  much 
more  liberal  constitution  than  the  Magna  Charta  which  was 
extorted  from  King  John.  Its  fundamental  principles,  how- 
ever, were  the  same :  the  right  to  levy  taxes  and  to  enlist 
soldiers  was  vested  in  an  assembly  called  the  Landtag,  elected 
by  the  people;  but  the  king  retained  an  absolute  veto  on 
all  changes  of  the  laws  or  of  the  constitution.  An  upper 
chamber  of  notables,  similar  to  the  House  of  Lords,  was  to 

42 


LIFE  OF   BISMARCK 

reconsider  the  action  of  the  Landtag  in  certain  cases,  pass 
judgment  on  constitutional  changes,  and  legislate  on  all  mat- 
ters appertaining  to  the  nobility.  This,  certainly,  was  not  a 
very  liberal  constitution,  for  it  provided  no  means  for  con- 
trolling the  executive  action ;  but  the  difference  between  an 
absolute  veto  and  a  two-thirds  majority  is  not  so  very  great ; 
for  where  public  opinion  is  nearly  unanimous  it  will  generally 
accomplish  its  object,  even  in  an  old-fashioned  monarchy. 
If  the  Prussian  army  had  fraternized  with  the  insurgents  in 
1848  as  the  French  army  did  in  1792,  the  Hohenzollern 
dynasty  would  have  come  to  an  end,  at  least  for  a  term  of 
years. 

Much  more  important  than  the  Prussian  fiasco  was  the 
national  convention  which  assembled  at  Frankfort,  to  consider 
measures  for  the  establishment  of  German  unity.  In  this 
assembly  were  gathered  the  most  notable  men  in  Germany, 
outside  of  the  royal  families,  and  some  of  them  more  distin- 
guished than  any  monarchs  of  their  time.  Simson,  the  jurist, 
afterwards  president  of  the  North  German  Reichstag,  was 
one  of  its  prominent  members.  There  were  poets,  philoso- 
phers, lawyers,  and  historians.  A  more  dignified  assemblage 
could  not  be  imagined,  and  yet  all  its  labors  came  to  naught, 
as  Bismarck  predicted,  because  they  were  not  supported  by 
any  material  force.  It  was  a  convention  on  paper,  and  carried 
no  more  authority  with  it  than  an  unsigned  writ  of  habeas 
corpus. 

They  were  too  high-minded  for  the  people,  and  too  far  re- 
moved from  practical  affairs  for  the  princes.  It  was  an  omi- 
nous mistake  that  they  should  have  selected  for  president 
Henry  Gagern,  frequently  called  Jupiter  Gagern  from  his  im- 
posing figure,  grandiose  features,  and  thundering  voice;  the 
most  popular  orator  in  Germany,  but  whose  speeches  were 
not  of  such  material  as  would  convince  an  audience  like  the 
Roman  Senate.  Bismarck,  in  his  slashing  way,  called  Gagern 
"  the  watering-pot  of  phrases." 

The  Frankfort  Convention  spent  over  a  year  on  its  work, 
and  elaborated  a  constitution  much  after  the  pattern  of  the 
unwritten  constitution  by  which  England  is  now  governed. 

43 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

It  was  to  have  an  all-powerful  national  assembly,  a  chamber 
of  princes  for  the  sake  of  appearances,  and  an  emperor  at  the 
head  who  would  possess  as  little  authority  as  Queen  Victoria. 
Frederick  William  IV.  was  offered  the  honor  of  this  precari- 
ous position,  and  a  deputation  of  members,  including  Gagern 
and  Simson,  went  to  Berlin  to  confer  with  His  Majesty.  All 
Germany  was  breathless  with  interest  while  the  King  of 
Prussia  and  his  ministers  consulted  on  its  acceptation ;  and 
great  was  the  disappointment  when  the  offer  of  the  convention 
was  rejected.  Frederick  William,  however,  could  do  nothing 
less ;  for  its  acceptance  would  have  placed  him  in  antagonism 
not  only  to  the  smaller  princes  of  Germany,  but  to  the  Em- 
peror of  Austria,  and  would  inevitably  have  involved  him  in  an 
unequal  conflict,  where  he  would  have  had  to  depend  on  his 
own  resources,  without  any  assistance  from  the  wise  men  of  the 
Frankfort  Convention.  In  fact,  it  was  much  to  be  feared  that  at 
the  first  sound  of  the  bugle  they  would  disappear  like  foxes  in 
their  holes.  A  marked  majority  of  the  new  Prussian  assembly 
passed  a  resolution  recommending  the  king  to  accept  the 
imperial  crown,  but  he  declared  that  it  would  only  make  him 
the  servant  of  the  revolution.  Bismarck,  who  had  been 
chosen  a  member  of  the  first  Prussian  Landtag,  made  a 
speech  on  the  occasion,  in  which  he  objected  to  the  imperial 
title  on  legal  grounds.  The  Frankfort  Convention,  he  said, 
proposes  that  the  king  should  surrender  the  crown  which  he 
had  inherited  from  his  ancestors,  and  receive  in  place  of  it 
one  which  bore  the  stamp  of  popular  sovereignty,  and  which 
he  would  hold  merely  in  fief  from  the  people  of  Germany, 
who  might  afterwards  revoke  the  gift  whenever  they  thought 
fit.  The  Frankfort  crown  seemed  to  him  too  much  like  a 
tinsel  affair,  and  he  could  not  advise  the  acceptance  of  so 
dubious  a  present. 

The  revolution  in  Germany  did  not  find  such  able  leaders 
as  Mirabeau  and  Danton.  Simson  and  Gagern  were  talkers 
and  thinkers,  not  men  of  action,  and  the  German  people  are 
slow  to  turn  aside  from  their  daily  mill-round.  Yet  the  fine 
oratory  at  Frankfort  was  not  without  its  influence  on  the 
time.  It  served  like  a  breeze  to  waft  the  destiny  of  the  Ger- 

44 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

man  people  on  its  appointed  course.  A  fresh  impulse  had 
been  given  to  the  aspiration  for  national  unity,  and  Bismarck 
may  have  noticed  that  the  proposition  brought  before  the 
convention  which  caused  the  most  animated  discussion  was 
whether  the  Austrian  empire  should  be  included  as  a  whole 
in  United  Germany,  or  only  the  two  German  provinces  of  it. 
The  Austrian  delegates  declared  that  either  their  empire  must 
be  accepted  in  its  completeness  or  excluded  altogether.  Here 
was  a  problem  for  any  future  statesman  who  hoped  to  accom- 
plish national  unity  to  reflect  on. 

Bismarck  relates  an  amusing  interview  which  he  had  with 
Jupiter  Gagern  on  behalf  of  Frederick  William  IV.  in  order 
to  effect  some  kind  of  a  bargain  or  compromise  with  the 
party  or  group  of  which  Gagern  was  the  leader.  General 
ManteufFel,  who  was  then  in  the  ministry,  brought  the  two 
together  and  then  left  them  to  fight  it  out.  Bismarck  says, 
"  As  soon  as  ManteufTel  was  gone,  I  commenced  to  talk  on 
politics,  and  explained  my  whole  position  in  a  very  sober  and 
business-like  way.  You  should  have  heard  Gagern.  He  put 
on  his  Jupiter  face,  lifted  his  eyebrows,  bristled  up  his  hair, 
rolled  his  eyes  about,  fixed  them  on  the  ceiling  till  they  all 
but  cracked  the  plaster,  and  talked  at  me  with  his  big  phrases 
as  if  I  had  been  a  public  meeting.  Of  course,  that  got  noth- 
ing out  of  me.  I  answered  him  quite  coolly,  and  we  remained 
as  far  apart  as  ever."  When  Bismarck  told  this  story1  he 
could  not  remember  whether  it  was  in  1850  or  1851,  so  that 
it  is  impossible  to  place  it  exactly  in  the  events  of  that  time ; 
but  it  contradicts  those  biographers  who  assert  Bismarck's 
ultra  conservatism  during  the  revolutionary  period,  for  in  that 
case  the  king  would  not  have  employed  him  as  a  mediator 
with  the  opposition.  The  anecdote  also  discloses  Gagern's 
lack  of  practical  sense  in  dealing  with  men. 

In  the  winter  of  1849-50  Bismarck  went  to  live  in  Berlin, 
and  occupied  the  first  story  on  Dorotheen  Strasse,  No.  37, 
and  there  his  son  Herbert  was  born  in  December,  and  the 
boy  was  christened  in  February  by  a  Lutheran  pastor  in  the 

1  November  18,  1870.     Cf.  Busch. 
45 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 


orthodox  Prussian  manner.  Bismarck's  letter  to  his  sister, 
Frau  von  Arnim,  and  others  this  year  are  more  filled  with 
domestic  affairs  than  the  politics  which  seemed  to  absorb  him. 
His  political  work  was  disinterested  enough  in  one  sense,  for 
he  received  no  remuneration  for  it,  and  the  income  from  his 
estates  only  enabled  him  to  live  in  a  very  modest  way  with 
two  establishments,  one  at  Schonhausen  and  the  other  at 
Berlin.  His  parliamentary  duties  were  but  a  small  portion  of 
his  daily  business,  and  his  chief  entertainment  was  an  even- 
ing hour  in  a  beer-saloon,  where  a  number  of  Conservatives 
were  in  the  habit  of  congregating. 

•  It  was  at  another  establishment  of  the  kind  that  Bismarck 
committed  the  only  act  of  violence  for  which  he  is  held 
responsible.  A  saucy  Radical,  or  Socialist,  came  into  the 
beer-garden  evidently  for  the  purpose  of  bucking  the  tiger. 
He  soon  commenced  to  talk  politics,  and  indulged  in  some 
very  offensive  expressions  in  regard  to  the  royal  family. 
Thereupon  Bismarck  informed  him  that  if  he  did  not  leave 
the  room  he  would  break  a  beer-glass  over  his  head,  and  as 
the  man  continued  obdurate  he  kept  his  word.  The  Radical 
was  not  seriously  injured,  and  appears  to  have  received  small 
sympathy  from  the  by-standers,  but  it  is  barely  possible  that 
such  a  blow  might  prove  fatal. 

There  is  no  phase  of  this  many-sided  revolution  so  diffi- 
cult to  understand  as  the  Convention  of  Erfurt.  The  impe- 
rial offer  of  the  Frankfort  delegates  had  in  no  wise  been  solic- 
ited by  the  King  of  Prussia,  and  yet  the  act  was  considered 
by  foreign  courts,  especially  Austria,  as  a  dangerous  prece- 
dent for  which  he  was  directly  responsible.  Prince  Schwar- 
zenberg,  who  had  succeeded  to  Metternich's  policy,  and  was 
himself  an  inferior  kind  of  Metternich,  informed  the  smaller 
German  governments  that  the  exclusion  of  Austria  from 
German  affairs  was  a  subject  not  to  be  considered,  and  that 
the  Frankfort  Diet  must  be  restored  under  Austrian  suprem- 
acy. This  was  a  diplomatic  attack  on  Prussia,  and  Frederick 
William  attempted  to  offset  it  by  establishing  a  league  of 
German  princes  in  which  Prussia  would  become  the  military 
and  diplomatic  leader.  The  kings  of  Saxony  and  Hanover 


LIFE   OF   BISMARCK 

supported  this  plan,  but  Bavaria  held  aloof  from  it.  A  con- 
vention of  delegates  was  convened  at  Erfurt  to  consider  the 
subject.  Bismarck  was  present,  and  his  keener  intelligence 
foresaw  that  the  result  of  the  movement  would  be  to  place 
Prussia,  though  really  at  the  head  of  the  confederation,  in  a 
position  subordinate  to  the  votes  of  princes,  like  the  Elector 
of  Cassel  and  the  Grand  Duke  of  Baden.  It  was  now  that 
he  showed  himself  the  true  statesman.  Though  a  conserva- 
tive delegate,  he  was  expected  to  support  the  project,  but  he 
turned  against  it  and  expressed  his  opposition  plainly  and 
boldly.  The  leadership  of  Prussia  in  such  a  confederation 
would  not  be  a  real  leadership,  but  one  so  fettered  as  to  make 
the  direction  of  its  affairs  intolerable.  His  first  principle  was 
that  the  independence  and  integrity  of  the  Prussian  monarchy 
must  be  maintained.  If  such  a  confederation  of  princes  could 
be  established  it  would  possess  no  enduring  vitality.  German 
nationality  must  be  achieved  in  some  other  manner. 
.  '*  In_  fact  the  Erfurt  Convention  and  the  Frankfort  Conven- 
ytion  would  seem  to  have  been  supplements  of  each  other, 
\he  one  representing  the  wishes  of  the  people,  and  the  other 
constituted  under  popular  influence  by  a  number  of  isolated  ^ 
governments.  Each  was  a  fraction  by  itself,  and  only  by  the 
union  of  the  two  could  German  nationality  be  accomplished. 
The  adoption  of  either  plan  would  have  placed  the  Prussian 
government  at  the  mercy  of  an  uncertain  influence,  and  could 
only  have  resulted  in  Prussia  breaking  through  the  legislative \) 
net-work  by  a  sudden  revolution  to  its  former  position.  Bi<£ 
marck  was  rejoiced  when  the  intervention  of  Austria  over- 
turned the  Erfurt  Constitution.  Prince  Schwarzenberg  pro- 
claimed the  restoration  of  the  Frankfort  Diet,  and  invited 
all  the  German  powers  to  send  delegates  to  a  meeting  there 
on  the  1st  of  September.  Frederick  William  IV.  and  Count 
Brandenburg  refused  to  do  this,  and  issued  a  circular  pro- 
testing against  the  re-establishment  of  the  Diet.  The  Em- 
peror of  Austria  accordingly  threatened  the  withdrawal  of 
diplomatic  relations,  and  was  supported  in  this  by  the  King 
of  Bavaria.  For  a  short  time  German  affairs  assumed  a  war- 
like appearance,  but  the  questions  at  stake  were  too  ephem- 


LIFE   OF   BISMARCK 

eral  to  carry  either  government  to  such  an  extreme.  Both 
sides  appealed  to  the  Tsar  Nicholas,  who  decided  in  favor  of 
the  old  Frankfort  Diet,  but  without  granting  any  special  favor 
therein  to  Austria.  Thus  the  revolution  in  Germany  sud- 
denly came  to  an  end.  Tlie^rJlirt^Convention  had  at  least 
served  like  a  bogus  railroad  to  prevent  an  Austrian  hegemony, 
and  Bismarck  gained  in  prestige  what  he  may  have  lost  in 
favor  with  the  Prussian  Ministry. 

The  polity  of  the  Roman  Republic,  the  best  government  of 
ancient  times,  was  worked  out  through  a  protracted  struggle 
between  patricians  and  plebeians.  So  the  present  consiitijr 
tional  government  of  Prussia,  and  of  all  Germany,  resulted 
from  the  obstinate  struggle  between  the  king  and  the  people 
in  1848.  It  will  be  observed  that  of  all  the  European  revolu- 
tions at  that  time  this  was  the  only  one  which  was  not  carried 
too  far,  and  was  the  only  one  which  bore  good  fruit.  The 
Parisians,  who  expelled  Louis  Philippe  with  so  much  ease, 
were  soon  obliged  to  accept  a  military  government  in  his 
place.  The  Athenian  democracy,  which  Mazzini  and  Gari- 
baldi established  in  Rome,  was  suppressed  by  a  French  army, 
and  Pius  IX.  returned  to  establish  a  Roman  despotism  for 
twenty  years  longer.  The  King  of  Sardinia's  support  of  the 
revolt  in  Lombardy  cost  him  his  crown,  and  the  Hungarian 
revolution  was  suppressed  with  a  severity  which  left  that 
unfortunate  country  little  to  hope  for  in  the  future.  Prussia, 
however,  had  made  a  distinct  step  in  advance ;  and  yet  it  was 
a  step  on  a  dangerous  path.  As  the  Berlin  papers  said,  she 
"  was  on  the  constitutional,"  and  so  much  the  better  for  her 
good  health-and  internal  condition;  but  she  was  surrounded 
by  jealous  rivals,  who  viewed  this  change  in  her  form  of  gov- 
ernment with  slightly  disguised  hostility,  and  were  eager  to 
find  a  pretext  for  interference  in  Prussian  affairs  so  as  to  pro- 
duce a  counter-revolution,  and  a  return  to  the  previous  politi- 
cal condition. 


CHAPTER    III 

FRANKFORT   AND    ST.    PETERSBURG. 

FORTUNATE  are  the  people  who  are  strong  and  numerous 
enough  to  establish  national  unity.  Without  this  there  can 
be  no  lasting  independence,  and  without  independence  no  supe- 
rior national  development.  The  world  is  becoming  crowded  ; 
nations  press  against  one  another,  and  their  population  in- 
creases so  that  it  everywhere  is  straining  to  find  an  outlet. 
Those  that  are  not  strong  enough  to  maintain  themselves  in  this 
continual  struggle  become  absorbed  by  others,  and  disappear 
as  independent  communities.  At  the  same  time  the  spirit  of 
nationality  has  never  been  so  daring  and  self-assertive,  so  that 
every  small  branch  of  the  Aryan  family  is  ambitious  to  attain 
it.  These  are  the  centrifugal  and  centripetal  forces  of  Europe. 

The  numerous  French  invasions  of  Germany  from  the  time 
of  Louis  XIV.  to  that  of  Napoleon  I.  had  sufficiently  devel- 
oped the  need  of  a  closer  consolidation  of  the  German  states 
and  national  interests.  Austria,  lying  most  remote  from 
France,  was  the  only  German  community  sufficiently  powerful 
to  offer  a  substantial  resistance  to  the  ambition  of  French 
rulers ;  and  the  interest  of  the  Austrian  government  in  prov- 
inces situated  on  the  Rhine  was  wholly  a  philanthropic  one, 
an  element  which  cannot  safely  be  counted  for  much  in  inter- 
national affairs.  Though  the  aggrandizement  of  France  was 
always  something  of  a  menace  to  the  Austrian  empire,  this 
would  not  become  serious  so  long  as  the  French  confined 
themselves  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine.1  Frederick  the 
Great  formed  a  league  with  the  Protestant  German  states  for 
their  better  protection  against  both  France  and  Austria,  but 

1  It  is  only  fair  to  say  in  justice  to  the  French  that,  as  the  Rhine  was  the  an- 
cient boundary  of  Gaul,  they  have  always  felt  that  they  had  an  immemorial  right 
to  it,  though  such  a  right  could  not  be  considered  legal  or  international. 
4  49 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

this  was  broken  up  by  the  first  French  revolution.  So  Alex- 
ander Hamilton  made  use  of  the  history  and  condition  of 
Germany  as  one  of  his  strongest  arguments  in  favor  of  our 
national  government.  He  says  in  the  Federalist,  No.  19: 
"  The  history  of  Germany  is  a  history  of  foreign  intrusions 
and  foreign  intrigues ;  of  requisitions  of  men  and  money  dis- 
regarded or  partially  abortive,  or  attended  with  slaughter  and 
desolation,  involving  the  innocent  with  the  guilty ;  of  general 
imbecility,  confusion,  and  misery."  Again,  in  No.  22,  he 
says :  "  German  empire  is  in  continual  trammels  from  the 
multiplicity  of  the  duties  which  the  several  princes  and  states 
exact  upon  the  merchandises  passing  through  their  territories, 
by  means  of  which  the  fine  streams  and  navigable  rivers  with 
which  Germany  is  so  happily  watered  are  rendered  useless." 
This  condition  continued,  with  some  amelioration,  during  the 
nineteenth  century,  until  it  was  brought  to  a  close  by  Bis- 
marck's new  German  empire  in  1871.  So  long  as  the  Holy 
Alliance  endured  there  was  no  danger  to  Germany  from  for- 
eign invasion,  but  the  Diet  established  at  Frankfort  for  the 
regulation  of  customs  duties  and  the  settlements  of  differences 
between  German  states  could  accomplish  little,  for  the  simple 
reason  that  it  possessed  no  material  means  with  which  to 
enforce  its  decisions.  The  conflicting  interests  of  so  many 
small  commonwealths  were  not  easily  reconciled,  and  the  pro- 
ceedings of  the  Diet  were  characterized  by  interminable  dis- 
cussions and  a  "  masterly  inactivity."  This  much  may  be 
said,  however,  in  favor  of  Metternich,  that  he  honestly  desired 
to  maintain  peace  in  Europe,  and  that  his  policy  towards  other 
governments  was  always  conciliatory.  So  long  as  he  guided 
the  power  of  Austria  the  King  of  Prussia  could  depend  on 
friendly  consideration,  but  after  1848  there  was  a  change  in 
the  attitude  of  Austria  which  was  felt  both  by  the  represent- 
atives in  the  Diet  and  by  the  Prussian  ambassador  at  Vienna. 
The  causes  of  this  were  twofold. 

In  the  first  place,  Austria  had  emerged  from  the  revolution 
with  victorious  banners.  Hungary  and  Lombardy  had  been 
placed  under  military  government,  and  the  concessions  wrung 
from  the  emperor  by  the  Vienna  mob  were  easily  cancelled  by 

50 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

his  abdication  and  the  inauguration  of  his  son,  Francis  Joseph, 
who  was  too  young  to  resist  the  tide  of  reaction  even  if  he 
desired  to.  The  adoption  of  a  constitution  in  Prussia  was 
looked  upon  in  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburg  as  a  confession  of 
weakness,  and  at  the  same  time  produced  a  feeling  of  estrange- 
ment like  that  which  results  from  a  change  of  political  parties. 
The  sudden  rise  of  Louis  Napoleon  was  considered  an  ephem- 
eral event,  and  henceforth  Austria  and  Russia  were  to  deter- 
mine the  destinies  of  Europe. 

Near  the  close  of  his  life  Talleyrand  pointed  out  that  there 
was  a  strong  tendency  to  a  closer  political  organization  in 
Germany,  which  either  Austria  or  Prussia  would  be  likely  to 
take  advantage  of,  and  which  might  prove  detrimental  to  the 
interests  of  France.  Hegel,  a  South  German,  born  in  Stutt- 
gart, but  who  in  middle  life  was  called  to  the  University 
of  Berlin,  preached  the  doctrine  of  national  unity  boldly  and 
vigorously  from  1820  to  1830.  He  found  many  proselytes 
and  successors  among  philosophers  and  historians,  and  the 
professorial  class  exercise  an  influence  on  public  opinion 
in  Germany  like  that  of  the  newspapers  in  England  and 
America.  Such  instruction  could  not  fail  to  have  its  effect  on 
a  people  intellectually  vibrating  with  the  music  of  Beethoven 
and  the  poetry  of  Goethe  and  Schiller.  One  of  the  peculiar 
phenomena  of  the  revolution  was  a  national  assembly  of  three 
hundred  and  twenty  delegates,  chosen  by  popular  suffrage 
independently  of  the  governments  of  the  German  states, 
which  met  at  Frankfort  with  deliberate  intention  of  replacing 
the  old  German  Diet  and  inaugurating  a  new  German  em- 
pire. The  high-minded  and  patriotic  men  who  composed  this 
organization  evidently  did  not  take  into  account  that  their 
deliberations  could  have  no  actual  value  without  the  support 
of  a  military  force,  and  when  they  finally  offered  the  imperial 
crown  to  Frederick  William  of  Prussia,  disregarding  the 
Austrian  government,  which  at  the  time  had  its  hands  full 
with  the  Hungarian  rebellion,  the  honor  was  unhesitatingly 
rejected.  Only  men  experienced  in  public  affairs  know  how 
dangerous  it  would  have  been  for  the  King  of  Prussia  to  have 
accepted  a  title  which  would  not  only  have  brought  him  into 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

direct  conflict  with  the  Emperor  of  Austria,  but  with  most  of 
the  smaller  German  princes.  The  king  and  his  ministers  per- 
ceived plainly  enough  that  such  a  result  could  only  be  reached 
through  a  European  convulsion.  The  event,  however,  had  a 
significance  which  cast  a  long  shadow  into  the  future.  It  was 
the  handwriting  on  the  wall,  which  served  to  warn  the  duo- 
decimo monarchs  of  Germany,  as  well  as  the  Emperor  of 
Austria,  of  a  danger  to  their  absolutism  which  they  might 
some  day  be  obliged  to  encounter,  and  the  method  they 
adopted  to  strangle  this  baby  Hercules  was  an  instance  of 
that  short-sighted  political  narrowness  which  often  brings  to 
pass  the  very  result  which  it  desires  to  prevent.  Nothing 
could  be  further  from  the  unambitious  mind  of  Frederick 
William  IV.  than  to  assert  a  superiority  over  the  kings  of 
Saxony,  Bavaria,  and  Hanover,  but  this  did  not  prevent  him 
from  becoming  none  the  less  an  object  of  suspicion  to  them. 

The  Frankfort  Diet  resumed  its  sessions  on  May  30,  1851. 
General  von  Rochow  was  the  Prussian  delegate,  and  Bis- 
marck accompanied  him  in  the  position  of  secretary, — much 
the  same  as  a  secretary  of  legation.  In  the  course  of  the  first 
year,  however,  von  Rochow  resigned,  weary,  perhaps,  of  the 
dulness  and  monotony  of  the  Diet,  and  recommended  Bis- 
marck for  his  successor.  The  king  readily  acted  on  this  sug- 
gestion, for  it  had  come  to  be  rumored  in  Berlin  that  there 
was  no  better  man  for  any  kind  of  business.  The  position, 
which  in  the  hands  of  another  might  have  been  little  more 
than  an  empty  form,  was  soon  infused  by  Bismarck  with  all 
the  character  of  his  sturdy  nature  and  penetrating  intelli- 
gence. 

Bismarck  seems  to  have  found  from  the  first  a  hostile  atti- 
tude in  the  Diet  towards  Prussia,  and  it  is  more  remarkable 
that  this  was  quite  undisguised.  The  mythical  story  that  he 
asked  the  Austrian  delegate  for  a  light  for  his  cigar  at  a 
meeting  of  the  Diet  has  been  reduced  by  Bismarck's  own 
statement  (and  that  of  his  biographer)  to  a  private  interview, 
in  which  the  Austrian  delegate  received  him  smoking,  and 
offered  him  neither  cigar  nor  chair.  Bismarck  took  a  cigar 
out  of  his  own  pocket,  asked  the  other  for  a  light,  and  made 

52 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

himself  comfortable.  After  that,  however,  the  conference 
could  come  to  nothing;  the  slight  almost  amounted  to  a 
direct  insult,  and  the  campaign  of  1866  may  be  said  to  have 
originated  at  that  moment.  Subsequently  Bismarck  was  so 
roughly  treated  by  the  Austrian  delegate,  that  he  challenged 
him  to  fight.  This'  policy  was  steadily  maintained  by  the 
Austrian  court  for  the  following  sixteen  years. 

The  leaders  of  this  new  movement  of  the  Austrian  cabinet 
were  Prince  Schwarzenberg  and  Count  Buol  Schauenstein.  A 
more  shallow,  empirical  policy  than  theirs  could  not  easily  be 
imagined,  and  in  the  result  it  brought  Austria  to  the  verge  of 
ruin.  Among  other  motives,  they  would  seem  to  have  been 
actuated  by  personal  ambition  and  a  vainglorious  spirit.  It 
was  not  difficult  for  them  to  find  allies  among  the  German 
states.  Saxony  had  been  deprived  of  half  its  territory  by 
Prussia,  in  return  for  the  French  alliance  of  1813.  Hanover 
and  Nassau  were  under  English  influences,  and  England  had 
been  the  ally  of  Austria  for  more  than  two  centuries.  Bavaria 
was  Catholic,  and  was  inclined  towards  Austria  on  the  score 
of  religion.  By  means  of  a  majority  vote  these  states  hoped 
to  discipline  Prussia,  and  control  the  Diet  wholly  in  their 
own  interest. 

It  is  a  shrewd  statement  that,  no  matter  how  autocratic  a 
monarch  may  be  in  theory,  he  is  practically  surrounded  by 
barriers  which  it  requires  a  strong  man  to  overleap.1  The 
youthful  Francis  Joseph  could  hardly  have  been  expected  to 
overleap  the  barriers  with  which  this  court  party  surrounded 
him,  and  as  he  grew  older  he  evidently  lacked  either  the 
ability  or  the  will  to  do  so.  The  first  important  consequence 
of  this  policy  was  the  Italian  campaign  of  1858.  Count 
Cavour  was  not  a  statesman  to  be  blind  to  what  was  going 
on  around  him,  and  the  isolated  position  which  the  Austrian 
cabinet  thus  made  for  itself  served  as  a  tempting  bait  to  the 
ambition  of  Napoleon  III.  Austria  might  control  the  Diet 
at  Frankfort,  and  regulate  the  customs  duties  in  a  way  un- 
favorable to  Prussian  industry,  but  Lombardy  was  lost  in  con- 

1  E.  J.  Lowell,  in  The  Eve  of  the  French  Revolution. 
53 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

sequence.  The  French  emperor  would  not  have  dared  to 
attack  a  united  Germany,  for  he  could  not  have  done  so 
with  any  prospect  of  success. 

Bismarck's  attitude  at  the  Diet  was  firm  and  dignified,  but 
appears  to  have  been  conciliatory.  At  least  his  letters  have 
this  tone,  and  he  could  not  otherwise  have  served  the  gentle- 
spirited  Frederick  William,  who  shrank  from  anything  like  a 
collision.  Nevertheless,  there  was  always  the  same  compact 
majority  against  everything  that  Prussia  wanted,  as  Bismarck 
said  himself  during  the  campaign  of  1870.*  He  went  on  a 
special  embassy  to  Vienna  in  1852,  and  had  a  personal  con- 
ference with  Schwarzenberg  and  Francis  Joseph  himself,  but 
he  was  met  there  with  the  same  overbearing  spirit  as  at  Frank- 
fort. They  thought  they  were  masters  of  the  situation,  and 
intended  to  make  the  most  of  it.  He  wrote  to  his  wife  from 
Vienna : 

"  In  business,  however,  there  prevails  great  nonchalance  ;  either 
people  don't  want  to  arrange  with  us,  or  they  think  we  look  upon 
it  as  more  important  than  appears  to  them.  I  fear  that  the  oppor- 
tunity of  coming  to  an  understanding  is  gone,  which  will  prove  a 
bad  result  for  us ;  for  it  was  thought  that  a  very  great  step  towards 
reconciliation  was  taken  in  sending  me,  and  they  will  not  soon  send 
another  here  as  desirous  of  coming  to  an  understanding,  and  who 
at  the  time  can  deal  so  freely." 

The  same  sentiments  were  expressed  in  a  report  from  Count 
Bernsdorf,  the  Prussian  ambassador,  to  the  king,  from  Vienna, 
on  the  nth  of  February,  1851  : 

"  According  to  Schwarzenberg 's  plan,  no  notice  is  to  be  taken  of 
any  objection  from  the  minor  states.  Prussia  is  to  assist  in  this, — 
that  is,  to  drop  her  allies,  and  with  her  own  hand  help  form  a  Direc- 
tory in  which  she  would  always  be  in  the  minority,  and  which 

1  The  Saxon-Austrian  premier,  Von  Beust,  says  in  his  Memoirs  (i.  313),  "I  do 
not  deny  if  my  appointment  had  been"  made  previous  to  1866,  I  could  have  been 
more  useful,  especially  in  regard  to  German  affairs.  I  am  sure  that  I  would 
have  succeeded  in  preserving  Austria's  dominant  position,  and  in  averting  dis- 
asters like  those  of  1866."  This  innocent  confession  from  one  of  Bismarck's 
chief  opponents  is  the  best  vindication  of  Bismarck's  policy. 

54 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

would  be  of  great  advantage  to  her  bitterest  enemies.  Russia  is 
expected  to  support  Austria.  The  two  powers,  which  a  short  time 
ago  were  ready  to  fight  Prussia  on  account  of  violation  of  the  treaties 
of  1815,  now  urge  a  reckless  abolition  of  those  treaties.  If  the  ques- 
tion concerned  the  transferrence  of  the  executive  into  the  hands  of 
the  two  great  powers  alone,  this  would  be  a  progressive  step  for  the 
attainment  of  which  it  would  be  worth  while  making  considerable 
sacrifice.  But  rather  than  establish  a  many-handed  Directory,  in 
which  Austria  would  not  share  the  power  with  Prussia,  but  with  the 
lesser  states,  it  would  be  decidedly  better  for  Prussia  to  return  to 
the  old  Confederate  Diet."  ' 

The  despatches  of  a  foreign  ambassador  are  intended  to 
convey  the  exact  truth,  for*  otherwise  they  would  be  of  no 
value  to  his  government.  In  Bismarck's  circular  note  to  the 
German  courts  of  January  24,  1863,  he  said: 

"Before  1848  it  had  been  unheard  of  that  questions  of  any  mag- 
nitude should  have  been  introduced  in  the  confederation  without 
the  concurrence  of  the  two  great  powders  previously  being  secured. 
Even  in  cases  where  the  opposition  had  come  from  the  less  power- 
ful states,  as  in  the  matter  of  the  South  Germany  fortresses,  it  had 
been  preferred  to  allow  objects  of  such  importance  and  urgency  to 
remain  unfulfilled  for  years  rather  than  seek  to  overcome  opposition 
by  means  of  a  majority.  At  the  present  day,  however,  the  opposition 
of  Prussia,  not  only  to  a  proposal  in  itself,  but  in  reference  to  its 
unconstitutionality,  is  treated  as  an  incident  undeserving  of  notice,  by 
which  no  one  is  to  be  restrained  from  pursuing  a  deliberately 
chosen  course  to  any  extent  whatever." 

This  is  a  memorable  document.  Nothing  could  be  clearer 
or  more  explicit  as  a  description  of  the  political  situation. 
Voting  seems  like  peaceful  and  harmless  business ;  but  when 
it  takes  place  on  certain  definite  lines,  and  continues  so  year 
after  year,  the  minority  will  always  resort  to  arms  if  they  can 
do  so  with  the  probability  of  success.  The  condition  of 
affairs  was  the  more  galling  to  Prussian  patriotism  because 
the  Austrians  had  never  been  found  a  match  for  the  Prus- 
sians on  the  field  of  battle ;  and  though  the  Austrian  empire 

1  Von  Sybel's  German  Empire,  ii.  101. 
55 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

held  a  much  greater  population  than  Prussia,  the  German 
portion  of  Austria  was  not  much  larger  than  Bavaria.  Bis- 
marck attempted  a  reconstruction  of  the  Diet,  by  which  dele- 
gates would  be  chosen  pro  rata  instead  of  according  to  the 
system  then  in  vogue.  This  would  have  placed  Prussia  in  a 
more  advantageous  position,  and  the  absurdity  of  so  large  a 
kingdom  being  offset  by  the  vote  of  Saxony  or  Baden  must 
have  been  apparent  to  every  one.  Bismarck  probably  did  not 
expect  his  plan  to  succeed.  Too  much  stress  cannot  be  laid 
on  the  point  that  previous  to  1848  no  proposition  was  intro- 
duced into  the  Diet  by  either  of  the  great  powers  without  a 
previous  consultation  with  the  other.  In  this  way  their  con- 
flicting interests  were  harmonized  before  the  smaller  German 
states  could  have  a  chance  to  pass  judgment  upon  them. 

How  dangerous  was  the  path  that  constitutional  Prussia 
was  likely  to  tread  we  may  judge  from  the  outcome  of  the 
Hessian  revolution  of  September,  1850.  The  house  of  Cas- 
sell  had  been  a  pestilent  disgrace  to  Germany  for  nearly  a 
hundred  years.  The  Elector  of  Hesse,  who  sold  the  lives  of 
his  subjects  to  the  British  government  during  our  War  of 
Independence,  is  reported  to  have  had  over  a  hundred  ille- 
gitimate children.1  Napoleon  abolished  the  state  entirely,  but 
after  his  downfall  the  electoral  family  was  restored  to  its  rights 
and  properties  by  the  Congress  of  Vienna.  When  the  re- 
action came,  in  1849. tne  reigning  Elector  of  Cassell  formed  an 
ultra-conservative  ministry,  with  a  Count  Hassenpflug  at  the 
head  of  it,  a  man  formerly  prosecuted  for  forgery,  and  univer- 
sally mistrusted  by  the  Hessians.  He  immediately  proceeded 
to  such  arbitrary  actions  that  the  people  arose  in  wrath  against 
him  and  expelled  him  from  the  state.  King  Frederick  Wil- 
liam, not  liking  such  an  unprincipled  neighbor,  and,  perhaps, 
also  actuated  by  a  sense  of  right  and  justice,  supported  the 
Hessian  people,  and  expressed  a  wish  to  have  the  Elector 
form  such  a  ministry  as  would  be  acceptable  to  his  subjects. 
Schwarzenberg,  however,  insisted  that  the  Elector  should  be 
supported,  right  or  wrong,  and  that  Hassenpflug  should  be 

1  See  E.  J.  Lowell's  account  of  him  in  The  Hessians  in  America. 

56 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

restored  to  power.  Prussian  and  Austrian  troops  were  mobil- 
ized, and  for  a  few  weeks  war  seemed  imminent.  The  result 
could  hardly  have  been  unfavorable  to  Prussia,  but  Fred- 
erick William's  courage  could  not  be  brought  to  the  sticking 
point.  In  a  moment  of  weakness  he  accepted  the  mediation 
of  the  Tsar  Nicholas,  and  a  conference  was  held  at  Warsaw. 
Contrary  to  the  whole  course  of  Russian  diplomacy,  Nicholas, 
instead  of  conciliating  the  Prussian  government  by  a  com- 
promise, threw  his  whole  power  into  the  Austrian  scales. 
Hassenpflug  was  recalled;  the  unfortunate  Hessians  were 
saddled  with  Austrian  troops  after  the  Metternich  method, 
and  obliged  to  endure  such  humiliation  that  many  of  them 
emigrated  to  Prussia.  Schwarzenberg  had  played  with  loaded 
dice;  there  was  evidently  a  bargain  between  Nicholas  and 
himself;  and  it  seems  incredible  now  that  an  Austrian  chan- 
cellor should  have  deliberately  consented  to  the  aggrandize- 
ment of  Russia  at  the  mouth  of  the  Danube.  Nicholas 
already  had  the  invasion  of  Turkey  in  his  plans,  and  the  Cas- 
sell  affair  was  one  of  the  steps  which  led  ultimately  to  his 
own  humiliation. 

The  liberation  of  Schleswig  and  Holstein  had  been  fairly 
accomplished  by  their  own  troops  and  the  Tenth  Prussian 
Army  Corps,  but  the  intervention  of  Russia  and  Great  Britain 
brought  it  to  an  untimely  end.  Great  Britain  might  have 
some  reason  to  fear  the  aggrandizement  of  Prussia  in  this  in- 
stance, but  the  interest  of  the  Tsar  could  not  possibly  coin- 
cide with  this,  and  his  course  would  seem  to  have  been  insti- 
gated by  hostility  to  constitutional  government.  Schleswig 
and  Holstein  had  never  been  placed  on  an  equal  footing  with 
the  other  provinces  of  Denmark,  but  rather  governed  after 
the  manner  of  conquered  territory.  They  seem  now  to  have 
been  subjected  to  a  more  shameful  treatment  than  the  Hes- 
sians. The  historian,  Wilhelm  Muller,  says :  "  No  land  in  all 
Europe  was  abused  and  trodden  under  foot  with  such  cynical 
brutality  as  Schleswig,  and  every  German  with  a  spark  of 
honor  in  him,  while  cursing  a  diplomacy  which  in  the  nine- 
teenth century  still  treated  the  people  like  cattle,  and  exe- 
crating a  system  of  government  which  could  dispose  in 

57 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 


that  wholesale  way  of  so  many  German  souls,  blushed  for 
shame  and  rage  when  he  heard  the  name  of  Schleswig- 
Holstein." 

"  Individuals,"  says  Froude,  "  have  suffered  by  millions  in 
this  world,  but  the  communi.ty  which  permits  the  injustice  to 
be  perpetrated  is  finally  obliged  to  atone  for  it  to  the  last 
drop  of  blood  that  has  been  shed."  So  it  is  with  nations. 
The  brutal  oppression  of  the  Hessians  and  of  the  people 
of  Schleswig-Holstein  met  with  a  more  speedy  atonement 
than  has  often  happened  in  such  instances,  and  resulted 
in  a  European  convulsion  which  extended  from  Paris  to 
Constantinople. 

Such  were  the  subjects  which  Bismarck  had  to  reflect  on 
during  the  monotonous  sittings  of  the  Diet  at  Frankfort. 
What  conclusions  he  formed  on  them  can  only  be  judged  by 
his  subsequent  course.  His  position  required  him  to  keep  a 
close  watch  on  his  tongue  and  pen ;  but  his  letters  at  this 
time  breathe  a  spirit  of  calm  confidence  which  show  that  his 
faith  in  the  future  of  Germany,  and  especially  of  Prussia,  had 
the  character  almost  of  a  religious  belief.  The  greatest  actors 
in  the  world's  history  have  always  been  strong  believers,  and 
Bismarck's  assertion  during  the  campaign  of  1870  has  been 
recorded  by  Dr.  Busch,  that  but  for  his  faith  in  God  and  im- 
mortality he  could  not  have  remained  at  his  post  a  single 
day ;  but  he  added,  "  I  live  in  an  age  of  unbelievers."  His 
post  of  duty  had  not  yet  become  a  dangerous  one,  nor  had 
the  cares  of  his  position  begun  to  worry  him,  and  we  find  in 
his  letters  from  Frankfort  plenty  of  calm,  healthful  enjoyment, 
especially  enjoyment  of  nature.  His  ardent  love  of  nature  is 
much  in  Bismarck's  favor.  As  Emerson  says,  the  sighing  of 
the  pine-tree  has  a  meaning  which  only  the  pure  can  under- 
stand. Bismarck  always  preferred  a  ramble  in  the  woods  to 
an  evening  at  the  opera.  He  was  fond  of  solitary  excursions, 
as  many  a  great  man  has  been  before  him.  He  went  alone  to 
Rudesheim  on  the  Rhine,  to  spend  the  night  and  swim  in 
the  great  river.  As  the  evening  was  warm  (August,  1851),  he 
went  in  bathing  by  moonlight,  and  floated  down  the  river  to 
the  Rat  Tower,  "  where,"  he  says,  "  that  wicked  old  bishop 

58 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

came  to  his  end."1  He  luxuriated  in  the  sea-bathing  at  Ostend, 
and  was  always  very  fond  of  water,  either  fresh  or  salt.  He 
made  visits  to  old  Metternich  at  Johannisberg  Castle,  and 
listened  to  his  old  stories  about  Napoleon  and  Alexander  I. 
Metternich's  stories  were  not  much  to  be  trusted,  and  Bis- 
marck appears  to  have  come  to  that  conclusion,  for  he  did 
not  afterwards  speak  of  Metternich  with  any  great  respect, — 
a  remarkable  diplomat,  but  not  a  constructive  statesman. 
Metternich,  on  the  other  hand,  would  seem  to  have  recog- 
nized Bismarck's  genius,  and  to  have  delighted  in  his  society. 

Bismarck's  letters  to  his  wife  from  Frankfort,  and  also  from 
Hungary,  are  the  finest  literature  of  their  kind;  not  senti- 
mental, but  warm-hearted,  considerate,  and  clear-sighted,  and 
written  in  language,  whether  you  call  it  German  or  English, 
not  easily  excelled.  He  had  only  been  married  three  years, 
and  more  than  half  the  time  had  been  separated  from  her  by 
the  necessities  of  his  political  life.  His  descriptions  of  natural 
scenery  remind  one  of  Byron.  They  properly  belong  to  this 
period,  and  we  meet  with  little  of  them  in  his  later  writings, 
which  are  too  business-like  and  diplomatic  to  be  particularly 
entertaining. 

The  loneliness  of  his  situation  at  Frankfort  and  indifference 
of  the  people  about  him  lead  him  to  reflect  on  his  past  life, 
and  in  a  letter  to  his  wife,  July  3,  1851,  he  says : 

"  I  cannot  understand  how  a  man  who  considers  his  own  nature 
and  yet  knows  nothing  of  God,  and  will  know  nothing,  can  en- 
dure his  existence,  from  mere  contempt  and  wearisomeness.  I 
know  not  how  I  could  formally  support  it ;  were  I  to  live  as 
then,  without  God,  without  you,  without  my  children,  I  should 
not  indeed  know  whether  I  had  not  better  abandon  life  like  a  dirty 
shirt ;  and  yet  most  of  my  acquaintances  are  in  that  state,  and  live 
on  !  If  I  ask  of  an  individual  what  object  he  has  in  living  on,  in 
laboring  and  growing  angry,  in  intriguing  and  spying,  I  obtain  no 
answer.  Do  not  conclude  from  this  tirade  that  my  mood  is  dark ; 


1  The  Rat  Tower  could  never  have  been  the  habitation  of  a  bishop  or  any 
person  but  an  anchorite.  It  appears  to  have  been  an  old  Roman  tower,  con- 
verted, perhaps,  into  a  granary. 

59 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

on  the  contrary,  I  feel  like  a  person  who  looks  of  a  fine  September 
morning  on  the  yellowing  foliage;  I  am  healthy  and  cheerful,  but 
I  feel  some  melancholy,  some  longing  for  home,  a  desire  for  forests, 
ocean,  wilderness,  for  you  and  my  children,  mingled  with  the  im- 
pressions of  sunset  and  of  Beethoven." 

Bismarck  sits  in  his  study,  penning  long  epistles  to  his 
wife,  with  his  great  Danish  dog  looking  solemnly  at  him 
across  the  table.  He  repents  of  the  idleness  and  frivolity  of 
his  youth ;  he  finds  little  satisfaction  in  his  diplomatic  honors, 
true  trait  of  a  veracious  nature ;  he  longs  for  the  society  of 
his  wife  and  children ;  to  see  the  sunset  from  his  own  home, 
and  for  a  little  of  Beethoven's  music.  Such  was  the  man  of 
"  blood  and  iron,"  of  whom  an  English  magazine  hack,  with 
these  letters  before  him,  wrote  in  the  Edinburgh  Review  in 
1869,  after  affirming  that  Bismarck's  political  ideas  were  not 
in  accordance  with  the  nineteenth  century,  and  that  his  career, 
though  brilliant,  would  undoubtedly  be  a  brief  one : 

"  He  knows  how  to  flatter  his  interlocutors  by  assuming  an  air  of 
genuine  admiration  for  their  talents ;  they  leave  him  charmed  by 
his  condescension,  whilst  he  laughs  at  the  fools  who  took  his  fine 
words  for  solid  cash.  His  contempt  of  men  is  profound ;  he  dislikes 
independence,  though  he  probably  respects  it.  There  is  not  a 
single  man  of  character  left  in  the  ministry  or  the  more  important 
places  of  the  civil  service."  x 

Truly  this  writer's  soul  must  have  been  as  arid  as  the  desert 
of  Gobi.  We  wonder  if  he  could  appreciate  Beethoven,  and 
preferred  the  society  of  his  own  household  to  wandering  about 
at  night.  It  is  safe  to  presume  that  this  judgment  on  Bis- 
marck came  into  his  head  after  he  had  taken  up  his  pen,  and 
it  is  a  fair  example  of  the  mendacious  criticism  to  which  great 
men  are  exposed  in  our  time.  Surely  it  is  these  literary  gad- 
flies, and  not  the  Napoleons  and  Bismarcks,  who  are  the 
tyrants  of  the  nineteenth  century.  Bismarck's  chief  sin  con- 
sisted, of  course,  in  his  being  a  Prussian.  If  he  had  been  an 

1  We  trust  the  reader  will  weigh  this  last  sentence  as  he  would  a  dubious 
piece  of  money.  How  does  the  reviewer  know  so  much? 

60 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

Austrian  premier,  and  the  battle  of  Sadowa  had  been  an 
Austrian  victory,  he  might  have  been  glorified  to  an  equality 
with  Palmerston  and  Disraeli.  The  remarkable  part  of  it  is 
that  editors  should  publish  such  contributions  and  readers 
believe  them.  Those  who  enjoyed  personal  interviews  with 
Bismarck  did  not  find  him  to  be  either  a  flatterer  or  a 
cynic. 

Legislative  assemblies  are  often  dreary  enough,  especially 
to  a  man  of  active  temperament  and  executive  ability.  Bis- 
marck analyzes  the  customary  proceedings  of  the  Frankfort 
Diet  in  a  caustic  and  amusing  manner.  He  writes  to  Frau 
von  Bismarck : 

"  I  am  making  enormous  progress  in  the  art  of  saying  nothing  in 
a  great  many  words.  I  write  reports  of  many  sheets,  which  read  as 
tersely  and  roundly  as  leading  articles ;  and  if  Manteuffel  can  say 
what  there  is  in  them,  after  he  has  read  them,  he  can  do  more 
than  I  can.  Each  of  us  pretends  to  believe  of  his  neighbor  that 
he  is  full  of  thoughts  and  plans,  if  he  would  only  tell ;  and  at  the 
same  time  we  none  of  us  know  an  atom  more  of  what  is  going  to 
happen  to  Germany  than  of  next  year's  snow.  Nobody,  not  even 
the  most  malicious  sceptic  of  a  democrat,  believes  what  quackery 
and  self-importance  there  is  in  this  diplomatizing." 

In  a  similar  strain  Bismarck  spoke  of  the  Frankfort  Diet 
twenty  years  later.  He  was  no  political  pedant,  to  be  charmed 
with  a  show  of  empty  formalities.  We  find,  all  throughout 
his  life,  that  nothing  had  an  interest  for  him  except  what  was 
real  and  veritable,  such  things  as  might  bring  some  good  to 
Prussia,  to  himself,  or  to  some  other  person.  Can  anything 
be  more  irksome  to  such  a  man  than  learning  the  art  of  saying 
nothing  in  a  great  many  words?  Yet  Bismarck  went  through 
this  Frankfort  discipline  diligently  and  effectively,  as  a  soldier 
marches  day  after  day  under  a  hot  sun  on  a  dusty  road.  To 
do  whatever  he  undertook  with  Prussian  thoroughness  and 
precision,  that,  evidently,  was  his  motto. 

His  letters  from  Hungary  are  intensely  interesting,  for  they 
afford  such  a  clear  and  graphic  account  of  that  half-European, 
half-Oriental  land,  with  whose  fortunes  so  many  Americans 

61 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 


have  sympathized.  He  went  there  not  long  after  the  revolu- 
tion had  been  crushed  out,  and  found  a  melancholy  condition 
of  affairs,  Tartar-like  bands  of  robbers  patrolling  the  country, 
so  that  it  was  dangerous  to  venture  far  from  the  cities  without 
a  military  escort.  Many  of  these  may  have  been  Kossuth's 
disbanded  soldiers,  and  no  wonder ;  but  not  a  word  escapes 
Bismarck  in  regard  to  politics,  for,  as  he  says,  his  letters  will 
certainly  be  opened  before  they  reach  their  destination.  He 
likes  the  Hungarians,  however,  and  admires  their  country. 
"  If  you  could  be  here  for  a  moment,"  he  says,  "  and  could 
see  the  silvery  stream  of  the  Danube,  the  dark  mountains  on 
a  pale  red  ground,  and  the  lights  twinkling  up  from  Pesth, 
Vienna  would  sink  in  your  estimation  as  compared  with  it. 
You  see  I  am  also  an  enthusiast  for  nature."  It  would  seem 
as  if  he  might  also  have  been  a  landscape  painter. 

This  was  in  the  summer  of  1852,  and  one  year  later  German 
politics  and  the  quiet  proceedings  of  the  Diet  were  cast  into 
shadow  by  the  threatened  invasion  of  Turkey  by  Russia,  and 
the  rumor  of  an  alliance  between  France  and  England,  a 
novelty  in  international  politics  unheard  of  since  the  Crusade 
of  Richard  Cceur  de  Lion.  The  impression  current  in 
America  at  that  time  that  the  object  of  the  Tsar  was  to 
obtain  an  appanage  for  the  Grand  Duke  Constantine  was  an 
erroneous  one,  arising  from  insufficient  knowledge  of  Oriental 
affairs.  Wars  between  Russians  and  Turks  have  much  the 
same  character  as  the  Crusades.1  The  Sclavonic  inhabitants 
of  Bulgaria  and  Servia  have  always  been  most  grievously 
oppressed  by  the  Turks,  and  the  Russian  people  have  felt 
this  as  the  Germans  did  the  oppression  of  Schleswig  and 
Holstein.  The  Greeks  also  belong  to  their  church,  and  are 
united  to  them  at  least  by  the  bonds  of  religious  sympathy. 
Moreover,  a  great  nation  whose  commerce  is  restricted  to  one 
sea-port  on  the  Baltic  and  another  on  the  Black  Sea  cannot 
be  blamed  for  desiring  better  advantages  in  this  respect. 
Samuel  Johnson,  one  of  our  finest  Oriental  scholars,  satisfied 


1  The  general  in  Tolsto'i's  "  Invaders"  says  to  a  lady,  "  Remember,  I  have 
taken  an  oath  to  fight  the  infidels." 

62 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

himself  that  the  Crimean  War  was  a  popular  war  in  Russia, 
and  that  Nicholas  was  not  more  responsible  for  the  Crimean 
War  than  the  Russian  people  were.  On  the  other  hand,  if 
the  Russian  government  should  once  obtain  possession  of 
Turkey  in  Europe,  it  would  not  be  long  before  it  obtained 
possession  of  Turkey  in  Asia,  and  thus  create  an  empire  of 
semi-civilized  nations  which  would  endanger  the  existence 
of  all  higher  forms  of  civilization,  in  Europe  at  least.  This 
is  one  of  the  possibilities  of  the  future,  and  may  assist  in 
bringing  forward  that  second  decline  and  fall  which  Nei- 
buhr  and  other  historians  have  predicted  for  the  modern 
world. 

What  an  historical  problem  is  this!  How  difficult  to  decide 
the  right  and  wrong,  not  to  say  the  expediency,  of  it.  Cer- 
tain it  is  that  both  parties  to  such  a  conflict  will  be  sure  to 
consider  themselves  in  the  right,  and  feel  justified  in  opposing 
each  other  to  a  bloody  issue.  Nicholas  believed  that  the  time 
had  come  when  Austria  should  reward  him  for  his  support 
in  Hungary,  in  the  Hessian  troubles,  and  in  the  Schleswig- 
Holstein  question.  The  Turkish  problem  concerned  Prussia 
least  of  all  the  great  powers,  and  though  her  king  sent  a  luke- 
warm note  of  protestation,  his  opposition  to  the  movement 
went  no  further.  Nicholas,  however,  might  have  hesitated 
but  for  the  character  of  the  English  ministry  at  that  time, — 
the  ministry  of  Lord  Aberdeen,  who  was  strongly  opposed  to 
foreign  interference.  Here  we  come  upon  an  exceptional 
peculiarity  of  the  English  constitution,  which  causes  its  weak- 
ness in  dealing  with  foreign  affairs,  and  in  the  present  instance 
served  Nicholas  in  the  way  of  a  trap.  The  President  of 
the  United  States  may  change  or  modify  his  policy,  but  he 
and  his  cabinet  cannot  be  turned  out  of  office  within  twenty- 
four  hours.  The  King  of  Prussia  may  change  his  ministry, 
but  his  well-known  character  remains  the  same,  as  well  as  his 
pledges  to  other  governments,  and  both  can  be  counted  on  to 
a  certain  extent.  It  is  not  so  in  England,  and  that  is  the 
reason  why  a  British  alliance  is  worth  so  little  to  other 
nations.  In  the  present  instance  Lord  Palmerston  rose  in 
Parliament,  and  by  a  speech  of  two  hours'  duration  over- 

63 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

turned  the  Aberdeen  ministry.  The  aspect  of  events  was 
wholly  changed  for  Nicholas. 

Louis  Napoleon's  English  alliance  has  been  considered  a 
master-stroke  of  policy,  and  it  certainly  does  credit  to  his 
judgment.  His  motives,  however,  in  this  affair  still  remain 
unknown  to  us.  It  has  been  supposed  that  he  wished  to  give 
prestige  to  the  second  empire  by  brilliant  military  achieve- 
ments ;  and  if  so,  he  succeeded  better  than  might  have  been 
anticipated.  In  the  Crimean  War  the  French  army  carried 
away  all  the  honors.  They  turned  the  Russian  position  at 
the  battle  of  the  Alma,  rescued  the  English  army  when  it  was 
surprised  by  the  Russians  in  a  fog,  and  captured  the  Malakoff 
Tower  while  the  English  were  repulsed  from  the  Redan. 
Whether  Napoleon  III.  took  broad,  statesmanlike  views  of 
the  situation  it  is  difficult  to  say.  Bismarck  asserts  that 
Napoleon  III.  was  not  the  person  to  conceive  great  de- 
signs,— ignorant  of  many  things,  especially  of  geography, 
and  a  man  likely  to  be  plucked  at  an  attorney's  examination. 

In  reading  Louis  Napoleon's  "  Life  of  Julius  Caesar,"  it  is 
easy  to  perceive  what  was  running  in  his  mind :  Napoleon 
Bonaparte  was  the  modern  Julius,  and  in  this  he  was  not  far 
wrong ;  and  Napoleon  III.  was  to  be  the  modern  Augustus. 
To  a  certain  extent  he  succeeded  in  this.  He  remodelled  Paris, 
and  made  it  not  only  the  most  elegant  city  in  the  world,  but 
the  most  thoroughly  constructed.1  He  divided  with  Louis  of 
Bavaria  the  most  judicious  patronage  of  art  since  the  sixteenth 
century,  and  his  internal  administration  was  so  excellent  as  to 
cast  a  doubt  on  Bismarck's  criticism  of  him.  France  was 
never  in  a  more  flourishing  material  condition  than  during  his 
reign. 

It  is  evident,  however,  that  Napoleon  III.  did  not  possess 
"the  piercing  judgment  of  Augustus,"  as  Tacitus  calls  it. 
His  foreign  policy  succeeded  well  for  the  first  ten  years,  but 
after  that  proved  a  miserable  failure.  It  is  easy  to  see  now 
that  his  Mexican  adventure  was  ill-judged  and  badly  carried 


1  The  portion  of  Paris  between  the  Seine  and  the  church  of  La  Madeleine 
may  be  expected  to  last  two  thousand  years. 

64 


LIFE   OF   BISMARCK 

out^ — an  imprudent  attempt  to  graft  monarchical  institutions 
on  the  American  tree, — but  there  were  many  who  perceived 
this  at  the  time.  It  seems  as  if  a  man  with  true  political  fore- 
sight could  not  have  made  such  a  blunder.  Then  his  small 
political  trafficking  in  1866  was,  if  anything,  still  worse.  It 
has  been  supposed  that  Napoleon  III.  was  guided  during  the 
first  half  of  his  reign  by  his  half-brother,  the  Due  de  Morny ; 
but  of  the  Due  de  Morny  we  know  too  little  to  form  a  deci- 
sive opinion.1  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  certain  that  he  had 
the  advantage  of  Cavour's  advice.  Minister  Bancroft  said  to 
General  Grant  in  Berlin,  "  The  three  great  statesmen  of  our 
time  have  been  Bismarck,  Cavour,  and  GortchakorT;"  to 
which  Grant  added  "  Hamilton  Fish."  Whatever  place  may 
finally  be  assigned  to  GortchakofF  and  Fish,  Cavour  certainly 
stands  next  to  Bismarck.  He  was  to  Italy  precisely  what 
Bismarck  has  been  to  Germany,  and,  considering  the  means 
at  his  disposal,  the  results  he  accomplished  were  quite  as  re- 
markable. Both  were  actuated  by  the  same  motives,  and 
based  their  action  on  the  same  political  principles.  That 
Napoleon  III.  was  drawn  into  the  Italian  war  by  Cavour's 
influence  is  well  known,  though  this  was  not,  as  has  been 
represented  in  various  popular  magazines,  contrary  to  Napo- 
leon's interest;  but  Cavour  was  frequently  in  Paris  before 
that,  and  it  is  certain  that  a  corps  of  Sardinian  officers  accom- 
panied the  French  army  to  the  Crimea ;  but,  unfortunately  for 
Louis  Napoleon,  Cavour  and  De  Morny  both  died  before  the 
Mexican  expedition. 

During  the  Crimean  War,  Francis  Joseph  was  in  the  rather 
comical  position  of  a  man  who  suffers  from  a  pain  which  he 
is  endeavoring  to  conceal.  Schwarzenberg  had  made  his  bar- 
gain with  the  Russian  government,  and  the  Austrian  emperor 
did  not  like  to  keep  it.  He  was  indebted  for  his  throne  to 
the  Tsar  Nicholas,  but  he  did  not  like  to  pay  for  this  by  the 
Russian  possession  of  Bulgaria.  The  Austrian  people,  who 
felt  anything  but  gratitude  towards  Nicholas,  as  well  as  Aus- 

1  Bismarck's  story  of  De  Morny's  French  carriages  and  their  sale  at  the  embassy 
in  St.  Petersburg  will  be  remembered.  Bismarck  said  "  he  was  unprincipled,  but 
a  very  good  fellow." 

5  65 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

trian  mercantile  interests,  pressed  powerfully  for  intervention. 
The  Hungarians  especially  were  in  a  great  ferment.  Still, 
Francis  Joseph  was  reluctant  to  break  his  pledge,  and  the 
course  he  adopted  was  characteristic  of  the  man. 

There  was  a  period  during  the  Crimean  War  when  the  allied 
armies  suffered  greatly  from  sickness,  and  the  capture  of 
Sebastopol  appeared  to  be  almost  hopeless.  If  the  army  of 
relief  which  Nicholas  despatched  to  the  beleaguered  city  had 
not  been  buried  alive  in  a  snow-storm,  the  result  might  have 
been  different.  It  was  then  that  Francis  Joseph  and  Count 
Schauenstein  believed  their  opportunity  had  come.  They 
intrigued  in  the  German  Diet  to  obtain  an  united  German 
movement  against  Russia.  Simultaneously  French  and-  Eng- 
lish, envoys  appeared  to  urge  the  intervention  of  Germany, 
and  particularly  of  Prussia,  in  the  interest  of  peace.  Whether 
a  generous  slice  of  Poland  was  offered  as  a  bait  to  Prussia  in 
this  transaction  we  do  not  know,  but  it  is  probable  enough. 
It  was  now  that  Bismarck  won  his  first  diplomatic  triumph. 
He  perceived  the  snare,  and  opposed  the  movement  for  inter- 
vention with  all  the  energy  of  his  nature.  He  was  assisted  in 
this  by  those  central  German  states  on  which  Francis  Joseph 
had  previously  counted ;  for  their  princes  knew  well  enough 
that  they  had  nothing  to  gain  and  much  to  lose  in  the  event 
of  a  Russian  war.  Bismarck  here  established  a  principle 
which  he  ever  afterwards  followed  consistently, — that  Prussia 
should  not  fish  in  troubled  waters,  or  interfere  with  the  affairs 
of  other  nations  so  long  as  it  could  possibly  be  avoided. 
This  was  precisely  the  opposite  of  Louis  Napoleon's  policy. 

Francis  Joseph,  now  baffled  and  thoroughly  alarmed,  con- 
cluded a  defensive  alliance  with  the  Sultan,  which  proved  of 
no  value  to  either  party,  and  only  served  to  exasperate 
Nicholas  against  him.  Bismarck  no  doubt  notice  '  *hi;>  in  his 
observing  way,  and  remembered  it  for  a  future  occasion.  The 
storming  of  the  Malakoff  Tower,  which  has  never  been  ex- 
celled as  a  military  feat,  placed  an  end  to  the  war,  and  the 
humiliated  Tsar  died  of  chagrin.  His  successor,  Alexander 
II.,  the  best  of  all  the  house  of  Romanoff,  and  not  inaptly 
called  by  the  Germans  the  Lincoln  of  Russia,  naturally  re- 

66 


LIFE  OF   BISMARCK 

sorted  to  the  traditional  policy  of  an  alliance  with  Prussia. 
Austria  was  now  isolated  in  Europe,  and  Count  Cavour  was 
just  the  man  to  take  advantage  of  the  fact 

Bismarck's  political  activity,  however,  was  not  limited  to 
the  desultory  proceedings  of  the  Frankfort  Diet.  From  1851 
to  1855  he  was  in  such  constant  request  at  Berlin  that,  he 
says,  in  one  year  he  travelled  not  less  than  ten  thousand 
miles  on  German  railways.  Frederick  William  IV.  wished 
continually  to  consult  with  him  and  use  him  for  numerous 
small  diplomatic  negotiations,  for  which  Bismarck  had  already- 
proved  his  dexterity.  In  one  instance  the  House  of  Peers 
had  set  itself  obstinately  against  the  policy  of  the  Russian 
cabinet ;  and  Bismarck,  not  being  directly  connected  with  the 
king's  council,  was  required  to  bring  them  to  terms  if  he 
could  possibly  do  so.  He  accomplished  this  so  effectively 
that,  although  the  leaders  of  the  different  cliques  in  the  House 
remained  firm,  when  the  vote  came  up  they  found  themselves 
deserted  by  their  followers,  who  all  went  over  to  the  govern- 
ment side.  As  a  rule,  however,  Bismarck  found  that  his 
advice  was  either  unfavorably  received  or  not  acted  upon 
afterwards,  so  that  he  soon  came  to  wonder  why  he  was  so 
often  consulted,  until  he  perceived  at  length  that  this  habit  of 
asking  the  opinion  of  a  variety  of  counsellors  was  a  chronic 
infirmity  of  Frederick  William,  who  could  not  understand  the 
political  situation,  and  was  too  indecisive  even  to  allow  his 
ministers  to  come  to  a  conclusion  for  him.  When  pressed  by 
Manteuffel  to  adopt  a  definite  line  of  policy,  he  would  appeal  to 
Bismarck,  Count  Pourtales,  or  some  other  to  sustain  him  in 
his  opposition  to  -if,  and  thus  maintained  a  continuous  ebb 
and  flow  of  diplomatic  intrigue  at  the  court,  which  was  ex- 
ceedingly harassing  to  all  concerned.  He  treated  his  minis- 
ters, said  T  ^rTiarck,  as  if  he  were  a  schoolmaster  listening  to 
recitations. 

Of  course,  under  such  conditions  the  ship  of  state  could 
only  drift  with  whatever  tide  was  setting  most  strongly. 
Manteuffel  may  not  have  understood  the  situation  clearly,  but 
if  he  had  done  so  he  could  hardly  have  succeeded  in  the 
hands  of  such  a  master ;  and  one  consequence  of  it  was  that 

67 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

by  using  Bismarck  as  a  foil  against  him  the  king  produced  a 
suspicious  feeling  between  them  which  does  not  appear  to 
have  ever  wholly  abated.  Bismarck,  in  his  retrospect  of  these 
court  cabals,  seems  rather  severe  in  his  judgment  on  both 
Frederick  William  IV.  and  Manteuffel ;  for  it  should  always 
be  remembered  that  the  king's  health  was  precarious,  and  that 
he  was  gradually  nearing  the  mental  malady  which  ended  his 
life.  Manteuffel,  also,  was  a  faithful  public  servant,  and  if  he 
did  not  succeed  in  penetrating  the  mists  that  rose  up  around 
Germany  after  the  revolution  of  1848,  this  proved,  in  the  end, 
quite  as  well  for  Prussia  and  Bismarck  himself.  No  wonder 
if  Bismarck  was  impatient  and  vexed,  after  going  repeatedly 
to  Sans  Souci  to  unfold  his  great  designs  before  the  king,  only 
to  find  that  the  whole  project  had  gone  to  water  two  days 
afterwards.  Count  Gerlach,  who  was  Bismarck's  most  faithful 
friend  during  this  period,  speaks  of  Manteuffel  at  one  time  as 
unprincipled  and  untrustworthy,  and  not  long  after  (in  a  fit  of 
penitence)  admits  that  only  Manteuffel  could  hold  the  position 
of  minister-president  for  more  than  four  weeks  at  a  time,  and 
writes  to  Bismarck,  "  Because  of  my  genuine  love  and  esteem 
for  Manteuffel,  I  should  not  like  to  assist  in  bringing  about 
his  fall."  This  of  itself  is  sufficient  to  indicate  the  situation 
of  affairs  previous  to  the  regency  of  William  I.,  or,  as  he  was 
then  denominated,  the  Prince  of  Prussia.  Bismarck's  corre- 
spondence with  Count  Gerlach  is  as  plain,  straightforward, 
and  disinterested  as  that  with  his  wife.  There  is  not  a  trace 
of  personal  ambition  or  personal  animosity  through  the  whole 
of  it,  but  impatience  enough  at  the  manner  in  which  Prussian 
affairs  were  being  conducted,  and  plenty  of  exasperation  against 
those  who  could  not  perceive  what  was  plain  enough  to  his 
own  mind.  Once,  when  he  asked  for  leave  of  absence  to 
visit  his  sick  wife,  Frederick  William  complained  that  Bis- 
marck cared  more  for  his  own  family  than  he  did  for  the 
destiny  of  Prussia.  Bismarck  was  a  royalist  by  profession, 
but  no  king-worshipper,  and  he  has  exposed  the  peculiarities 
and  foibles  of  Napoleon  III.,  Christian  of  Denmark,  the  King 
of  Hanover,  and  even  of  William  I.  with  a  telling  plainness 
of  speech. 

68 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

On  October  23,  1857,  Frederick  William  IV.  resigned  the 
affairs  of  state  to  his  more  vigorous  brother  William,  who 
acted  thenceforward  as  regent  of  the  monarchy.  This,  how- 
ever, did  not  immediately  improve  the  political  situation,  at 
least  according  to  Bismarck's  notion  of  it.  The  regent  sur- 
rounded himself  with  excellent  counsellors,  but  they  were 
divided  in  their  judgment,  and  perhaps  for  the  time  being.it 
was  best  that  they  should  be.  The  princess,  afterwards  Em- 
press Augusta,  imagined  that  she  understood  politics,  and, 
being  a  person  of  energy  and  a  brilliant  talker, — very  per- 
sistent withal  in  carrying  her  point, — she  caused  her  hus- 
band and  his  ministers  from  first  to  last  a  great  deal  of  an- 
noyance. Bismarck  believed  that  she  had  articles  written 
for  the  daily  press  to  represent  her  views,  which  she  after- 
wards placed  on  the  regent's  breakfast-table  as  an  evidence  of 
public  opinion.  She  had  certain  prejudices  which  were  in- 
eradicable. She  liked  the  English  and  Austrians,  but  de- 
spised Louis  Napoleon  as  a  parvenu,  and  disliked  the  Rus- 
sians because  they  lacked  elegant  manners.  As  sometimes 
happens  with  her  sex,  she  easily  persuaded  herself  that  her 
personal  inclinations  were-  identical  with  the  interests  of  the 
Prussian  state.  As  Bismarck  had  already  become  identified  as 
a  determined  opponent  of  Austria,  and  believed  in  conciliating 
the  Russian  government  as  an  offset  to  Austrian  intrigue,  he 
quickly  fell  under  her  displeasure,  and  remained  an  object  of 
aversion  to  her  during  the  rest  of  her  life.  In  after-years, 
when  Bismarck  had  entirely  won  her  husband's  confidence, 
William  I.  sometimes  consulted  with  him  in  regard  to  his 
troubles  with  his  wife,  whom  he  more  than  once  denominated 
as  feuerkopf, — fire-brain.1 

William  I.  does  not  appear  to  have  trusted  Bismarck  in  the 
beginning  to  the  same  extent  that  his  brother  did.  Frederick 
William  recognized  the  entire  loyalty  of  Bismarck's  nature, 

1  Bismarck  says  that  during  the  revolution  of  1848  he  was  approached  by  a 
gentleman  of  the  prince's  household  with  a  proposition  that  Frederick  William 
should  resign,  that  the  Prince  of  Prussia  should  be  set  aside,  and  that  the 
princess  should  become  regent  for  her  son,  then  eighteen  years  old.  This  must 
have  originated  with  Augusta  herself. 

69 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

and  the  frequency  of  their  consultations  shows  that  he  had 
confidence  in  his  judgment,  although  he  could  never  resolve 
to  adopt  the  policy  which  Bismarck  advocated.  The  ex- 
pression attributed  to  him  of  a  "  red-hot  reactionary"  may 
have  resulted  from  one  of  Bismarck's  uncomplimentary  bursts 
of  frankness ;  or  Count  Vitzthum  may  possibly  have  invented 
it.  William  I.  proceeded  more  cautiously,  and  when  he  had 
once  gained  access  to  the  secret  springs  of  Bismarck's  nature 
he  trusted  him  implicitly ;  nor  was  he  ever  disappointed  in 
his  man.  Bismarck  had  expected  that  the  regent  would  give 
him  a  portfolio  in  the  ministry,  and  Bismarck's  friends  sup- 
ported him  for  this;  but  William,  with  rare  good  judgment, 
decided  to  send  him  to  St.  Petersburg,  although  Bismarck 
himself  would  have  preferred  to  have  remained  at  Frankfort. 
William  said,  however,  that  he  considered  the  Russian  mission 
as  the  most  important  post  which  he  had  to  bestow,  and 
added,  "  You  do  not  belong  to  yourself  alone ;  your  exist- 
ence is  bound  up  with  Prussian  history,  and  you  should  do 
as  I  request  you,  even  if  it  is  contrary  to  your  inclination." x 
The  appointment  was  a  fortunate  one,  for  Bismarck  learned 
in  Russia  how  strongly  both  official  and  public  feeling  had 
turned  against  Austria  there  since  the  Crimean  War,  and  this 
served  him  as  a  future  base  of  diplomatic  action,  which  he 
improved  by  a  thorough  knowledge  of  Russian  court  life  and 
the  more  important  personages  concerned  therein. 

Before  leaving  Frankfort,  Bismarck  met  with  an  adventure 
which  must  have  astonished  him  not  a  little,  and  may  have 
had  a  certain  share  in  determining  the  future  policy  of  Prussia. 
Immediately  after  the  announcement  of  his  transfer  to  St. 
Petersburg  he  received  a  letter  from  a  Jew  banker  named 
Levinstein,  informing  him  of  a  lucrative  speculation  which  he 
might  find  for  his  interest  to  consider.  Bismarck  paid  no 
attention  to  the  note,  and  a  few  days  later  Levinstein  called 
on  him  with  a  card  from  Count  Buol-Schauenstein,  and  re- 
quested a  private  interview.  He  then  proceeded  to  explain 
the  nature  of  the  lucrative  speculation,  wrhich  proved  to  be 

1  Bismarck's  Memoirs. 
70 


LIFE   OF   BISMARCK 

nothing  less  than  an  offer  from  the  Austrian  government  to 
represent  the  interests  of  Francis  Joseph  at  the  Russian 
capital  for  a  salary  of  thirty  thousand  thalers  a  year.  This 
was,  of  course,  intended  for  a  bribe,  and  Bismarck  attempted 
to  get  a  statement  of  it  from  Levinstein  in  writing;  but  the 
Jew  was  too  sharp  for  him,  and  equally  pertinacious  in  en- 
deavoring to  effect  a  bargain ;  so  that  Bismarck  was  finally 
obliged  to  lead  him  to  the  staircase  and  threaten  to  pitch  him 
down  headlong  before  he  could  get  rid  of  his  remarkable 
tempter.  The  exposure  of  this  unblushing  attempt  would 
have  created  great  scandal,  and  have  excited  strong  indigna- 
tion in  Prussia  against  the  Austrian  government;  but  Bis- 
marck prudently  kept  it  to  himself,  only  informing  the  regent 
of  it  on  his  way  through  Berlin.  It  may  have  proved  a  good 
card  for  Bismarck  with  his  next  sovereign. 

ST.  PETERSBURG   AND    PARIS. 

The  tendency  of  recent  writers  is  to  underestimate  the  im- 
portance and  ability  of  William  I.,  and  to  represent  him  as 
the  inevitable  shadow  of  royalty  which  accompanied  Bismarck 
in  all  his  undertakings.  General  Hazen,  in  his  report  on  the 
Franco-German  war,  speaks  of  the  Crown  Prince  Frederick 
as  if  he  were  a  man  of  more  intellect  and  ability  than  his 
father.  He  may  have  been  a  more  accomplished  scholar,  and 
he  was  certainly  an  admirable  soldier;  but  the  diary  which 
he  has  left,  and  his  behavior  in  the  Battenburg  affair,  make 
it  only  too  evident  that  he  lacked  good  political  judgment. 
This  was  precisely  what  his  father  possessed, — good  judg- 
ment in  regard  to  men  and  practical  affairs.  It  is  not  so  im- 
portant that  the  chief  magistrate  of  a  nation  should  be  a  man 
of  genius  as  that  he  should  be  a  man  of  character,  able  to 
recognize  character  and  genius  in  others.  To  penetrate 
character  itself  requires  intelligence  of  the  highest  order. 

It  should  be  remembered  that  during  the  first  five  years  of 
William's  sovereignty  Bismarck  was  absent  from  Berlin,  and, 
though  in  frequent  communication  with  the  king,  the  latter 
could  hardly  be  supposed  to  have  enjoyed  the  benefit  of  his 
counsel.  It  was  during  this  time  that  William  reorganized 


LIFE   OF   BISMARCK 

the  Prussian  army,  and  with  the  assistance  of  Von  Moltke  per- 
fected that  military  machine  which  is  universally  admitted  to 
be  without  its  equal.  As  a  tactician,  Von  Moltke  has  never 
been  surpassed,  even  by  Napoleon ;  and  whether  William  L, 
thorough  soldier  as  he  was,  would  have  succeeded  as  a  mili- 
tary leader  we  have  no  means  of  judging.  But  who  was  it 
that  discovered  Von  Moltke  ?  Men  of  rare  executive  ability 
are  not  apt  to  be  popular,  and  the  quiet,  reticent  hero  of 
Sadowa  would  not  have  been  likely  to  attract  the  attention 
of  a  superficial  potentate  like  Francis  Joseph.  Here,  as  in 
Bismarck's  case,  we  recognize  an  innate  similarity  between 
the  men  which  brought  them  together.  There  was  no  blind- 
ing vanity  in  William  L,  but  rather  a  grand  simplicity  of 
nature  which  fitted  him  admirably  for  the  part  he  had  to  play 
in  this  triumvirate.  It  was  not  only  Von  Moltke,  but  through- 
out the  army  and  in  all  branches  of  the  Prussian  government 
he  filled  the  highest  offices  with  the  best  qualified  men.  At 
the  battle  of  Sadowa  he  exposed  himself  so  fearlessly  as  to 
excite  Bismarck's  alarm  for  the  safety  of  his  sovereign, 
though,  as  he  afterwards  remarked,  "  I  had  rather  see  him  so 
than  over-prudent."  At  Gravelotte,  the  most  stoutly  con- 
tested of  the  French  battles,  he  assumed  the  chief  command, 
although  the  movements  on  that  occasion  would  seem  to  have 
been  directed  by  a  council  of  war  held  upon  the  field.  His 
occasional  differences  with  Bismarck  are  sufficient  to  indicate 
that  William  I.  had  a  mind  of  his  own. 

Among  the  hereditary  rulers  of  the  nineteenth  century, 
Dom  Pedro,  of  Brazil,  was  certainly  the  ablest  and  noblest, 
and  next  to  him  stand  William  I.  and  Alexander  II.  If  man- 
liness, modesty,  and  good  judgment  deserve  success,  William 
of  Prussia  may  be  said  to  have  deserved  it,  but  he  was  also 
one  of  the  most  fortunate  men  of  whom  there  is  any  record. 
Endowed  with  a  magnificent  constitution,  he  came  to  the 
throne  at  the  age  of  sixty,  and  yet  lived  to  take  an  active  par- 
ticipation in  the  greatest  events  of  his  country's  history.  His 
temperance  was  such  that  he  preserved  his  mental  and  physical 
vigor  much  beyond  the  average  age  of  man.  He  was  fortu- 
nate in  the  long  life  of  his  estimable  wife,  fortunate  in  his 

72 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

children.  He  never  met  with  a  reverse,  and  until  the  last 
year  of  his  life  was  never  acquainted  with  grief.  There  are 
incidents  in  history  which  seem  like  special  providences,  and 
no  one  knew  so  well  as  Bismarck  how  invaluable  that  life  was 
to  him  and  to  Germany.  Without  its  continuance  he  might 
not  have  been  able  to  place  the  capstone  on  his  edifice.  If 
he  had  been  obliged  to  deal  with  a  visionary  like  Frederick 
III.,  or  with  the  present  incumbent,  all  his  work  might  have 
gone  to  naught. 

The  peculiar  strength  of  the  German  and  Russian  foreign 
policy  resides  in  the  fact  that  their  cabinet  ministers  study 
foreign  affairs  in  the  different  capitals  of  Europe,  and  do  not 
derive  their  knowledge  of  them  at  second  hand.  The  British 
government,  on  the  contrary,  has  a  regular  corps  of  foreign 
diplomats,  who  are  transferred  from  one  court  to  another,  and 
rarely  return  to  England  until  they  retire  from  active  service. 
An  English  premier  rarely  travels  abroad,  except  on  a  pleasure 
excursion  to  Italy  or  Switzerland,  and  most  of  them  have 
known  "little  about  the  character  and  condition  of  foreign 
peoples.  If  Beaconsfield  and  Gladstone  had  comprehended 
Oriental  politics,  the  former  would  not  have  sent  Sir  Louis 
Cavagnari  with  his  escort  of  seventy  Englishmen  to  be  mur- 
dered at  Cabul,  and  the  latter  would  not  have  attempted  to 
pacify  the  Arabs  of  the  Soudan  by  moral  influence  and  the 
help  of  Chinese  Gordon.  Such  instances  may  be  placed 
beside  the  Mexican  speculation  of  Napoleon  III.  Bismarck 
remarked  in  regard  to  the  Afghanistan  muddle  that  treaties 
with  semi-civilized  nations  were  a  waste  of  parchment. 

William  I.  inherited  Bismarck  from  his  brother  as  a  precious 
legacy,  which  he  was  determined  to  make  the  most  of.  The 
latter  had  already  made  one  or  two  visits  to  Paris,  where  he 
found  Napoleon  III.  in  quite  a  friendly  mood  towards  Prussia, 
as  was  natural  enough,  since  he  was  preparing  for  war  against 
Austria.  Early  in  January,  1859,  he  was  designated  as  envoy 
to  St.  Petersburg,  and  set  out  for  that  frozen  capital  in  mid- 
winter, prudently  leaving  his  family  behind  him.  His  journey 
is  memorable,  because  it  seems  to  have  originated  the  ill 
health  which,  combined  with  his  excessive  work,  made  Bis- 

73 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

marck's  life  henceforth  a  penitential  pilgrimage.  The  account 
of  his  journey  is  enough  to  terrify  the  stoutest  traveller.  The 
railway  was  not  yet  finished,  and  travelling  by  stage  through 
the  deep  snow  for  several  nights  in  succession,  he  could 
obtain  no  sleep.  He  wrote  to  his  wife :  "  I  was  outside  all 
night,  and  we  changed  from  one  to  twelve  degrees  Reaumur. 
The  snow  was  so  deep  that  we  literally  remained  sticking  in 
it  with  from  six  to  eight  horses.  In  one  instance  we  were  an 
hour  in  going  twenty  paces.  It  was  impossible  to  sleep  on 
account  of  the  cold."  When  he  reached  the  steam-cars  he  fell 
asleep  at  once,  and  remained  unconscious  for  twenty  hours. 

This  could  not  but  have  evil  consequences  in  a  new  and 
exceptional  situation.  Bismarck  was  ill  all  through  his  first 
season  at  St.  Petersburg ;  suffered  severely  from  rheumatism, 
and  still  worse  from  his  doctors,  who  treated  him  to  large 
doses  of  iodine,  without  the  least  regard  to  its  effect  upon  his 
nervous  system.  This  was  the  first  beginning  of  that  harassing 
insomnia  which  caused  him  so  much  misery  during  the 
Franco-German  war,  and  from  which  he  never  altogether 
recovered.  It  was  the  first  physical  infirmity  from  which  he 
ever  suffered.  With  one  of  the  strongest  physiques  and  a 
constitution  like  seasoned  oak,  he  was  endowed  by  nature 
with  nerves  as  sensitive  as  those  of  a  Correggio  or  a  Men- 
delssohn. Such  a  combination  is  exceptional.  People  with 
sensitive  nerves  have  commonly  sensitive,  if  not  irritable, 
minds.  Bismarck  became  irritable  from  insomnia  and  the 
wear  and  tear  of  business ;  but  originally  he  was  as  cool- 
headed  and  imperturbable  as  President  Lincoln.  During  the 
stormy  debates  of  1847  few  of  his  opponents  equalled  him 
in  sang-froid  and  good  humor.  In  considering  his  life  from 
this  time  forward,  Bismarck's  nervous  condition  should  always 
be  taken  into  account.  As  Wasson  wrote  in  his  admirable 
letters  from  Germany  in  1873,  he  is  a  man  for  whom  one  has 
to  make  allowances.  Even  at  Frankfort  he  was  sometimes 
made  dizzy  by  speaking  in  the  Diet,  so  as  to  be  obliged  to 
go  out  into  the  open  air ;  and  it  is  a  known  physiological  fact 
that  when  a  man  feels  his  nerves  giving  way  within  him  he 
cannot  control  himself  as  he  otherwise  would  do. 

74 


LIFE   OF   BISMARCK 

The  impression  has  been  current,  and  even  circulated  by 
Bismarck's  English  biographer,  that  his  life  in  St.  Petersburg 
was  rather  a  riotous  one;  that  he  drank  slivovitch,  and 
revelled  into  the  morning  hours ;  and  this  notion  has  been 
added  to  by  a  rather  external  letter  from  the  historian  Motley 
concerning  the  entertainments  in  Bismarck's  home  at  Schon- 
hausen.  Motley  had  much  of  Macaulay's  habit  of  heightening 
his  statements  by  a  catalogue  of  nouns,  and  it  is  remarkable 
that  he  should  have  visited  Bismarck  without  having  anything 
more  interesting  to  say  of  him.  Otherwise  we  have  not  been 
able  to  discover  any  better  justification  of  this  libel  than  Bis- 
marck's own  statement,  that  it  was  at  St.  Petersburg  where 
his  constitution  first  began  to  fail  him.  On  the  contrary, 
there  is  good  reason  to  believe  that  he  lived  a  quiet,  sober, 
and  methodical  life  there.  During  the  first  nine  months  he 
suffered  greatly  from  ill  health,  and  was  finally  obliged  to 
return  to  Pomerania  for  rest  and  relaxation. 

He  studied  Russian  and  mastered  it, — no  slight  accom- 
plishment,— so  that  for  several  years  he  was  the  only  person 
in  the  foreign  office  at  Berlin  who  could  speak  and  write  the 
language.  The  troubles  of  thirty  thousand  resident  Prus- 
sians, some  of  whom  were  always  getting  into  difficulty,  in  a 
country  where  only  barbaric  power  prevails,  gave  Bismarck 
business  enough  to  attend  to.  Besides  this,  he  maintained  a 
large  political  correspondence  with  various  Prussian  states- 
men. Court  parties  and  court  ceremonies  were  equally  labori- 
ous to  him.  He  was  obliged  to  work  from  eight  to  fourteen 
hours  a  day.  He  was  glad  of  an  opportunity  to  spend  a 
quiet  afternoon  on  the  palace  veranda  at  Peterhof  with  the 
empress  dowager,  a  genial,  motherly  person,  who  was  knit- 
ting some  kind  of  light  worsted  work,  and  with  whom  he  felt 
very  much  at  home.  He  visited  Moscow,  and  considered  it 
the  handsomest  city  in  Europe,  but,  with  customary  prudence, 
made  no  reflections  on  Napoleon's  expedition.  During  his 
second  winter  he  wrote  to  his  sister :  "  We  have  to  attend  a 
great  many  balls  and  fetes  ;  but  they  only  begin  at  eleven 
o'clock,  and  we  always  leave  at  midnight." 

He  was  on  a  vacation  at  Rheinfeld  when  he  wrote  the  letter 

75 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 


of  condolence  to  his  brother-in-law,  Oscar  von  Arnim,  on  the 
death  of  a  boy  fifteen  years  old,  which  has  endeared  Bismarck 
to  the  hearts  of  German  women  as  much  as  his  great  exploits 
have  exalted  him  in  the  minds  of  German  men.  That  such  a 
letter  should  have  been  published  for  the  purpose  of  giving 
him  popularity  is  out  of  the  question  ;  and  we  cannot  regard 
its  publication  as  unfortunate,  though  the  subject  is  rather  a 
delicate  one.  It  is,  in  truth,  a  confession  of  faith  as  genuine 
as  it  was  spontaneous.  He  wishes  he  could  go  instanter  to 
his  sister  and  her  husband,  but  concludes  that  his  strength 
would  not  be  equal  to  the  journey.  Then  he  says  : 

"  How  do  all  the  little  cares  and  troubles  which  beset  our  daily 
lives  vanish  beside  the  iron  advent  of  real  misfortune  !    And  I  feel 
the  recollections  of  all  complaints  and  desires  by  which  I  have  for- 
jgptten  how  many  blessings  God  gives  us,  and  how  much  danger 
(surrounds  us  without  touching  us,  as  so  many  reproofs.    We  should 
\  not  depend  on  this  world,  and  come  to  regard  it  as  our  home. 
'"Another  twenty  or  thirty  years,  under  the  most  favorable  circum- 
stances, and  we  shall  both  have  passed  from  the  sorrows  of  this 
world ;  our  children  will  have  arrived  at  our  present  position,  and 
will  find  with  astonishment  that  the  life  so  freshly  begun  is  going 
down  hill.     Were  it  all  over  with  us  so,  it  would  not  be  worth 
while  dressing  and  undressing." 

Bismarck  rarely  talked  philosophy,  and  it  is  doubtful  if  he 
even  attended  Hegel's  lectures  at  the  university  in  Berlin. 
He  certainly  was  not  a  disciple  of  Herbert  Spencer  or  of  any 
modern  form  of  materialism,  but  believed  that  man  has  a  soul 
in  him,  for  whose  well-being  he  is  responsible.  Mind  to  him 
did  not  mean  "  a  collocation  of  cerebral  processes,"  but  an 
immortal  spirit.  So  John  Brown  said  in  his  Virginia  prison, 
"  Governor  Wise,  it  is  only  for  a  few  moments  we  remain  on 
this  earth,  and  there  is  a  whole  eternity  beyond."  Thus  have 
heroic  natures  believed  and  prophesied  in  all  times  and 
countries. 

We  do  not  hear  of  Bismarck  as  fond  of  hunting  in  his 
youth,  though  he  may  have  done  more  or  less  of  it  during 
his  bachelor  Kniephof  days.  In  middle  life  he  took  to  it  for 

76 


LIFE  OF   BISMARCK 

the  benefit  of  his  health,  and  as  a  relief  from  the  weight  of 
responsibility  which  pressed  more  and  more  heavily  upon 
him.  He  was  an  expert  shot  with  a  rifle, — an  evidence  of 
the  keenness  of  his  perceptions, — and  could  take  the  heads  , 
off  of  ducks  floating  on  the  water.  In  Russia  he  soon  be- 
came distinguished  as  a  hunter  of  bears,  a  mighty  Nimrod. 
It  was  like  the  schlager  fighting  at  Gottingen  in  his  youth. 
Nothing  requires  more  nerve  than  shooting  a  bear  on  foot, 
and  there  are  few  of  our  Western  huntsmen  who  dare  to  at- 
tempt it.  Unless  the  brute  is  mortally  wounded  at  the  first 
or  second  fire  you  are  lost.  Bismarck  is  credited  with  having 
killed  three  bears  in  rapid  succession.  "  Once,"  he  says,  "  I 
was  in  great  danger  from  a  bear  which  I  could  not  see  dis- 
tinctly, because  he  was  covered  with  snow.  I  wounded  him 
and  he  fell.  I  reloaded  as  quietly  as  possible,  and  shot  him 
dead  as  he  rose  to  his  feet."  Bears  seem  to  be  plentiful  in 
Russia,  and  it  is  to  be  feared  that  they  are  a  heavier  incubus 
on  the  farmers  than  hares  and  foxes  are  in  England. 

Smoothing  down  the  Russian  bear  is  the  special  business^ 
of  a  Prussian  ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg.  Bismarck  did 
not  find  this  difficult,  for  the  current  was  now  running  in  his 
favor  instead  of  against  him,  as  at  Frankfort  and  Vienna. 
Alexander  was  more  than  wise  enough  to  profit  by  the  mis- 
takes of  Nicholas,  and  his  mother's  influence,  also,  was  on 
the  side  of  William  I.  Bismarck  was  just  the  man  to  pro- 
mote a  cordial  understanding  and  feeling  of  security  between 
the  two  governments,  for  to  whomsoever  he  dealt  with  he 
always  gave  the  impression  of  a  veracious  nature.  He  once 
said,  "I  have  never  learned  to  lie,  even  as  a  diplomat."  This 
may  be  doubted,  though  he  may  have  thought  so  at  that 
time;  but  those  who  placed  their  entire  confidence  in  him 
have  never  had  reason  to  regret  it.  A  Boston  lawyer  once 
inquired  of  a  New  York  banker  whether  William  Vanderbilt 
could  be  depended  on  to  tell  the  truth  in  regard  to  his  rail- 
roads, and  the  reply  was,  "  How  can  he  tell  it  ?"  Bismarck 
was  often  placed  in  such  situations.  Surrounded  by  enemies, 
conspirators,  and  imprudent  friends,  how  could  he  tell  the 
truth?  His  principle  appears  to  have  been  to  deal  with 

77 


LIFE   OF   BISMARCK 

others  according  to  the  measure  in  which  they  dealt  with 
him.  To  those  who  trusted  him  he  was  frank  and  friendly, 
but  woe  unto  those  who  tried  to  overreach  him.  He  deceived 
Louis  Napoleon ;  but  was  not  Louis  Napoleon  attempting  to 
deceive  him  f  That  is  the  only  safe  rule  in  politics  or  trade. 
The  photographs  of  Bismarck,  taken  between  1865  and  1870, 
have  all  the  appearance  of  a  substantial,  straightforward  man, 
while  the  portraits  of  Metternich  wear  an  expression  of 
Mephistophelean  cunning,  and  those  of  Louis  Napoleon  have 
the  ingenious,  suspicious  expression  of  a  man  who  lives  by 
his  wits.  Bismarck's  cranium  was  one  of  the  largest,  and  his 
deep-set  eyes  looked  out  from  under  their  frowning  brows  as 
if  they  were  saying,  "  Tell  me  the  truth  now,  or  look  out  for 
yourself."  The  top  of  his  head  was  almost  a  perfect  dome,  a 
fine  subject  for  phrenology. 

The  pay-day  was  now  at  hand,  when  the  Austrian  govern- 
ment was  to  receive  the  first  instalment  of  the  reward  for  its 
Schwarzenberg-Schauenstein  policy.  Almost  on  the  day 
when  Bismarck  set  out  for  St.  Petersburg,  the  King  of  Sar- 
dinia's daughter  was  married  to  Prince  Napoleon  Bonaparte; 
the  press  of  Turin  began  to  talk  of  the  wrongs  of  an  outraged 
Italy ;  and  the  Sardinian  army  was  evidently  being  placed  on 
a  war  footing.  In  reply  to  the  request  of  Francis  Joseph  for 
an  explanation,  Cavour  proposed  a  European  conference  to 
consider  the  condition  of  Italy.  The  Tsar  Alexander  showed 
his  colors  by  supporting  this  proposal ;  but  there  was  nothing 
the  Austrian  cabinet  dreaded  so  much  as  an  exposure  of 
their  methods  of  fleecing  the  Italian  provinces.  War  was 
consequently  declared  against  Sardinia;  but  in  this  way 
Cavour  obtained  the  appearance  at  least  of  a  defensive  atti- 
tude. 

Political  intrigue  usually  goes  hand  in  hand  with  official 
corruption,  and  in  the  campaign  of  1859  we  ^n<^  an  internal 
condition  of  affairs  in  the  Austrian  government  that  might 
well  be  compared  to  its  foreign  policy.  In  several  divisions 
of  the  army  whole  companies  were  found  on  the  pay-roll 
which  had  no  actual  existence ;  enormous  frauds  were  un- 
earthed in  the  commissary  department,  and  much  of  the 

78 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

soldiers'  equipment  was  discovered  to  be  of  the  sort  denomi- 
nated as  shoddy  in  the  first  years  of  our  Civil  War.  The  Aus- 
trian emperor  was  in  a  rage,  but  so  extensive  were  the  pecu- 
lations that  he  found  himself  unable  to  punish  the  offenders. 
No  wonder  that  such  an  army  was  repeatedly  beaten,  and  the 
success  of  the  French  and  Sardinians  was  evidently  more 
owing  to  the  weakness  of  their  opponents  than  to  the  military 
skill  of  their  commanders.  In  fact,  it  soon  became  apparent 
that  the  army  of  Napoleon  III.  had  not  improved  in  efficiency 
since  the  Crimean  War.  The  ill-fed  and  badly  commanded 
Austrian  troops  three  times  repulsed  an  attack  on  the  hill  of 
Solferino,  which  was  finally  captured  by  a  quick  scramble  of 
the  Zouaves. 

There  was  no  reason  why  William  of  Prussia  should  give 
Austria  assistance,  and  the  wonder  is  that  he  and  his  minis- 
ters did  not  take  advantage  of  the  situation  to  improve  the 
position  of  Prussia  in  Germany.  Bismarck  would  probably 
have  done  this. 

If  William  I.  and  his  cabinet  could  have  foreseen  the  im- 
mense advantage  to  Prussia  from  a  liberated  Italy,  they  might 
have  pursued  a  different  course,  but  their  intention  evidently 
was  to  prevent  either  party  in  the  war  from  obtaining  too 
great  an  advantage.  After  the  defeat  of  the  Austrians  at  Sol- 
ferino five  Prussian  army  corps  were  mobilized  and  placed  on 
the  French  frontier,  so  that,  if  they  had  been  directed,  their 
commander  might  have  reached  Paris  before  Napoleon.  The 
movement  was  injudicious,  and  caused  Bismarck  great  anxiety. 
It  might  have  resulted  in  the  evacuation  of  Lombardy  and 
the  loss  of  all  the  Sardinians  had  gained.  Fortunately,  how- 
ever, Francis  Joseph  undertook  the  management  of  the  affair 
himself,  and  was  easily  outwitted  by  Cavour  and  Napoleon. 
The  peace  of  Villafranca  was  hastily  concluded,  in  order  to 
prevent  Prussia  from  acquiring  too  great  importance  in 
European  affairs.  The  only  advantage  which  Napoleon  III. 
gained  from  the  loss  of  twenty  thousand  lives  was  a  narrow 
strip  of  territory  on  the  Mediterranean,  including  the  valu- 
able city  of  Nice.  Napoleon  prudently  declined  Kossuth's 
offer  of  an  uprising  of  the  Hungarians,  as  that  would  certainly 

79 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

have  brought  Russia  into  the  field  of  action,  with  a  general 
European  convulsion. 

On  July  2,  1859,  Bismarck  wrote  to  his  wife: 

"  Our  politics  are  sliding  more  and  more  into  the  Austrian 
groove,  and  if  we  fire  one  shot  on  the  Rhine  the  Italp- Austrian 
war  is  over,  and  in  its  place  we  shall  have  to  see  a  Prusso-French 
war,  in  which  Austria,  after  we  have  taken  the  load  from  her 
shoulders,  will  assist,  or  assist  so  far  as  her  own  interests  are  con- 
cerned. That  we  should  play  a  victorious  part  is  scarcely  to  be 
conceded.  Be  it  as  God  wills !  It  is  here  below  always  a  question 
of  time,  nations  and  men,  folly  and  wisdom,  war  and  peace ;  they 
come  like  waves  and  so  depart,  while  the  ocean  remains."  x 

William  I.  had  no  intention  of  provoking  a  war ;  but  if  Bis- 
marck had  been  minister-president  at  this  time  it  is  possible 
that  the  whole  Austrian-Prussian  problem  might  have  been 
solved  with  less  friction  and  loss  of  life  than  afterwards  hap- 
pened. Prince  Hohenzollern,  who  had  succeeded  Manteuffel, 
was  more  of  a  dilettante  than  a  practical  statesman. 

An  overdose  of  iodine  was  not  the  only  medical  blunder 
which  Bismarck  suffered  from  in  St.  Petersburg.  In  June,  1859, 
he  contracted  a  slight  rheumatism,  and  this  settled  in  his  left 
knee,  which  he  had  injured  two  years  before  by  a  fall  while 
hunting  in  Sweden.  As  he  intended  to  return  to  Berlin  for 
the  summer  months,  and  wished  to  start  in  good  condition, 
he  imprudently  consulted  a  German  doctor  named  Waltz, 
who  had  been  recommended  to  him  by  the  Grand  Duchess 
of  Baden.  This  physician  prescribed  a  plaster,  which  he  as- 
sured the  Prussian  envoy  would  cause  no  inconvenience,  but 
would  fall  off  of  its  own  accord  in  a  few  days.  The  plaster 
contained  cantharides,  which  will  commonly  raise  a  blister  in 
less  than  half  an  hour;  and  Bismarck,  having  gone  to  sleep 
with  it  upon  his  knee,  awoke  towards  morning  in  most  intol- 
erable pain.  On  attempting  to  detach  the  plaster  a  portion 
of  the  flesh  came  off  with  it,  and  it  was  some  years  before  his 

1  Hesekiel's  Biography,  p.  284. 
80 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

leg  recovered  wholly  from  the  effects  of  this  maltreatment. 
The  doctor  blamed  the  apothecary ;  and  on  Bismarck's  sending 
for  the  prescription  the  apothecary  declared  he  had  returned 
it  to  the  doctor.  Bismarck  afterwards  discovered  that  Waltz 
was  the  son  of  a  confectioner  at  Heidelberg,  and  was  known 
as  an  idle  student,  although  he  possessed  the  faculty  of 
making  himself  agreeable  to  ladies  of  rank.  Bismarck  re- 
turned to  Berlin  by  way  of  the  Baltic,  and,  meeting  a  distin- 
guished surgeon  named  Pirogow  on  the  steamer,  consulted 
him  in  regard  to  his  trouble,  but  was  astonished  enough 
when  Pirogow  advised  him  to  have  his  leg  amputated  above 
the  knee.  The  medical  profession  seemed  to  be  in  a  conspir- 
acy against  him,  and  some  of  his  friends  were  of  opinion  that 
Dr.  Waltz's  poisoning  was  not  without  an  object ;  but  Bis- 
marck himself  thought  differently.  Arrived  at  Berlin,  he 
was  soon  sufficiently  improved  by  honest  medical  treatment 
to  walk  and  ride  again,  although  with  some  discomfort. 

In  October  Bismarck  accompanied  the  crown  prince  to 
Warsaw  for  an  interview  with  the  Tsar  Alexander;  after 
which  he  went  to  St.  Petersburg  again,  but  was  obliged  to  re- 
turn to  Berlin  in  the  following  March  (1860)  for  sound  medical 
treatment,  and  sat  there  as  a  delegate  in  the  House  of  Peers. 

The  political  situation  in  Berlin  did  not  please  him  any  better 
than  during  the  last  years  of  Frederick  William  IV.  The 
ministry  was  divided,  and  the  king  indecisive.  Prince  Hohen- 
zollern  was  the  nominal  president,  and  continued  to  be  until 
1862,  but  he  had  long  since  been  outvoted,  and  Count  von 
Schleinitz,  an  adroit  courtier,  who  sided  with  the  queen, 
wielded  the  greatest  influence.  Bismarck  was  invited  to  a 
cabinet  meeting  and  asked  for  his  opinion,  which  he  gave 
only  to  find  himself  opposed  at  every  point  by  Schleinitz, 
who  had  evidently  prepared  himself  for  the  purpose  before- 
hand. Bismarck  was  confident  that  the  Prussian  government 
would  receive  strong  support  from  the  Tsar  if  it  only  asserted 
itself  in  a  spirit  of  manliness  and  independence.  So  long  as 
Prussia  followed  in  the  Austrian  channel,  Alexander  and 
Gortchakoff  would  distrust  her.  The  queen  and  Schleinitz 
believed,  on  the  contrary,  that  the  greatest  danger  to  the  state 
6  81 


LIFE   OF   BISMARCK 

was  to  be  feared  from  a  Franco-Russian  alliance,  and  that  it 
was  important  to  maintain  friendly  relations  with  Austria,  even 
at  the  cost  of  national  self-respect,  in  order  that  Prussia  should 
not  become  isolated.  Von  Roon,  the  Minister  of  War,  and 
the  one  solid  character  in  the  cabinet,  sided  with  Bismarck, 
but  for  the  time  being  the  queen  and  Schleinitz  carried  all 
before  them. 

What  Gerlach  had  been  to  Bismarck  in  his  Frankfort  days, 
Von  Roon  was  to  be  henceforward,  a  friend  implicitly  trusted. 
He  was  also  to  Prussia  what  Carnot  was  to  the  first  French 
^revolution,  the  ablest  military  organizer  of  his  time.  In  the 
autumn  of  1860  Bismarck  returned  to  St.  Petersburg  again, 
and  Roon  helped  him  as  a  friend  at  court,  who,  believing  in 
Bismarck's  future  destiny,  served  him  more  faithfully  than  he 
could  have  served  himself.  Many  of  his  letters  are  dismal 
enough.  The  Landtag  was  ruled  by  the  party  of  Progress, 
whose  aim  was  to  revolutionize  Prussia  after  the  English  pat- 
tern, and  obtain  a  ministry  and  a  premier  from  their  own 
ranks,  without  considering  the  difference  between  England 
and  Prussia,  and  that  the  British  Parliament,  though  nomi- 
nally a  popular  body,  is  in  reality  controlled  by  noblemen  and 
wealthy  land-owners.  The  attitude  of  the  ministry  was  dis- 
heartening to  patriotic  Prussians,  and  discouraging  to  the 
German  national  sentiment ;  so  that  the  position  of  the  gov- 
ernment was  growing  continually  weaker  and  more  embar- 
rassed. The  violence  of  party  feeling  may  be  imagined  from 
the  fact  that  Edwin  ManteufTel,  Roon's  chief  supporter  in  the 
ministry,  became  involved  in  a  duel  with  Twesten,  a  leader  of 
the  Progressists,  and  was  placed  under  arrest  for  it.  Von 
Roon  wrote  to  Bismarck,  July  24,  1861,  "  May  God  help  us  in 
future !  I  can  do  little  more  than  remain  an  honest  man, 
work  in  my  own  department,  and  do  what  is  sensible.  The 
greatest  misfortune,  however,  in  all  this  worry  is  the  weari- 
ness and  languor  of  our  king.  He  is  more  than  ever  under 
the  orders  of  the  queen  and  her  accomplices."  The  marriage 
of  the  Crown  Prince  to  the  Princess  Victoria  of  England  had 
brought  in  a  lively  young  recruit  to  the  queen's  forces,  who 
was  not  long  in  making  her  influence  felt.  It  was  rumored 

82 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

at  this  time  among  the  Hungarian  exiles  in  America  that  the 
Crown  Prince  of  Prussia  had  taken  a  wife  whose  will  was 
stronger  than  his  own.  She  was,  in  fact,  almost  the  counter- 
part of  her  mother-in-law,  and  Prussia  seemed  to  be  verging 
on  petticoat  government. 

King  William,  however,  was  too  much  of  a  soldier  to  per- 
mit this  order  of  affairs  to  continue  indefinitely.  His  queen 
was  a  more  brilliant  talker,  and,  as  Bismarck  says,  an  abler 
critic,  but  William  possessed  what  is  so  often  deficient  in 
gifted  natures,  and  that  is  plain,  practical  sense ;  and  the  inborn 
manliness  of  his  nature  was  of  itself  sufficient  to  provoke  a 
change  in  course  of  time.  The  coronation  took  place  at 
Konigsberg,  in  old  Prussia,  on  October  28,  1861,  and  Bis- 
marck, being  in  attendance,  found  reason  to  suspect  from  the 
queen's  conversation  that  a  radical  divergence  of  opinion  on 
state  affairs  already  existed  between  the  royal  pair.  On  his 
return  to  Berlin,  in  the  spring  of  1862,  he  found  that  the 
queen's  faction  was  no  longer  in  the  ascendant,  but  the  king 
was  still  irresolute,  and  the  confusion  in  his  cabinet  greater 
than  ever.  It  was  one  of  the  phenomena  of  political  exhaus- 
tion. 

Prince  Adolph  of  Hohenlohe  had  succeeded  Prince  Ho- 
henzollern  as  president  of  the  ministry  in  March,  but  he 
found  himself  unequal  to  the  position,  and  frankly  informed 
Bismarck  that  he  would  be  glad  to  have  him  take  it  off  his 
hands.  Bismarck  himself  was  dispirited  and  badly  out  of 
health ;  although  he  had  been  summoned  by  the  king,  little 
attention  was  paid  to  him  on  his  arrival.  Fearing  the  evil 
opinions  which  might  result  from  apparent  idleness,  he  begged 
Count  Bernstorff,  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  either  to  pro- 
cure him  an  office  or  to  accept  his  resignation ;  and  as  a  con- 
sequence of  this  determination  he  was  immediately  appointed 
ambassador  to  France.  On  the  ist  of  June  he  was  received 
at  the  Tuileries. 

The  sudden  transfer  of  the  incorruptible  Bismarck  from 
St.  Petersburg  to  Paris  created  the  liveliest  excitement  at  the 
Austrian  court.  Francis  Joseph  could  not  fail  to  be  con- 
scious that  his  policy  during  the  Crimean  War  was  considered 

83 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

base  ingratitude  by  the  son  of  Nicholas,  and  visions  of  a 
Franco-Russian  alliance,  in  which  Prussia  would  serve  as  the 
mediator,  and  perhaps  as  a  broker  of  whole  provinces,  floated 
before  the  mind  of  Count  Buol.  Prince  Richard  Metternich, 
then  ambassador  at  Paris,  was  immediately  notified  to  make 
the  most  friendly  advances  to  Louis  Napoleon,  and  to  offer 
him  any  form  of  alliance  which  would  be  compatible  with  the 
integrity  of  the  Austrian  empire.  Napoleon,  who  could  not 
understand  the  exact  relation  which  existed  between  Bismarck 
and  Count  Buol,  was  evidently  puzzled  at  this,  and  concluded 
that  the  readiest  means  of  enlightenment  would  be  to  inform 
Bismarck  and  see  what  kind  of  a  counter-move  he  would 
make  to  this  proposition.  So,  on  June  26,  Bismarck  was  in- 
vited to  Fontainebleau,  where  he  and  the  emperor  took  a 
long  walk  together,  and  the  latter  began  by  discussing  the 
advantages  of  an  alliance  between  Prussia  and  France,  to 
which  Bismarck  prudently  replied  that  an  alliance  between 
two  great  nations  must  have  a  definite  object,  and  could  not 
be  based  on  mutual  friendliness,  or  even  on  the  expectation 
of  indefinite  mutual  interests.  Napoleon  then  informed  him 
of  the  Austrian  proposals,  evidently  in  the  hope  that  Bismarck 
would  suggest  an  alternative  which  would  be  more  favorable 
to  French  interests.  He  was  well  aware  that  there  was  no 
way  in  which  Francis  Joseph  could  assist  him  to  territorial 
annexations,  except  through  a  war  with  Prussia  ;  and  with  the 
Mexican  expedition  on  his  hands,  he  was  in  no  condition  to 
undertake  that.  If,  however,  he  could  assist  Prussia  to  a 
stronger  position  in  German  affairs  and  obtain  the  duchy  of 
Luxemburg  for  his  trouble,  much  might  be  gained  at  very 
small  cost.  As  Luxemburg  belonged  to  the  King  of  Hol- 
land by  inheritance,  Bismarck  may  have  thought  the  same, 
but  he  declined  to  commit  himself,  and  returned  to  Paris, 
leaving  Napoleon  III.  as  wise  as  he  was  before. 

Later  in  June  Bismarck  went  to  London,  perhaps  to  allay 
suspicions  of  a  Russo-Prussian  alliance,  and  after  that  on  a 
long  expedition  to  the  Pyrenees  to  recruit  his  health,  which  in 
the  sequel  was  greatly  improved  by  it.  Late  in  August  Von 
Roon  wrote  to  him  that  the  condition  of  uncertainty  in  Berlin 

84 


LIFE   OF   BISMARCK 

still  continued ;  that  the  ministry  was  practically  without  a 
head,  and  that  Bernstorff,  who  had  been  acting  in  that  capacity, 
could  not  decide  whether  to  remain  or  to  take  the  English  mis- 
sion ;  that  he  believed  the  outcome,  however,  would  be  Bis- 
marck's appointment  as  minister-president.  He  added,  "  Con- 
cessions and  compromises  are  not  to  be  thought  of;  least  of 
all  is  the  king  disposed  towards  them."  Bismarck  replied 
that  he  was  ready  to  enter  the  ministry,  or  would  be  con- 
tent to  remain  at  Paris;  but  that  he  wished  above  all  to 
know  definitely  what  the  king  intended  for  him ;  that  he  had 
long  been  separated  from  his  family,  and  that  his  household 
goods  were  scattered  in  various  places.  In  his  whole  corre- 
spondence with  Roon  there  is  not  a  trace  of  personal  am- 
bition, and  this  may  be  taken  as  one  reasqn  why  he  succeeded 
where  others  failed.  Only  six  days  later  he  received  the  fol- 
lowing telegram  from  Berlin : 

"  Periculum  in  mora.     Depechez-vous.1 

"  L'oncle  de  Maurice, 

"HENNING." 

"  Henning"  was  the  middle  name  of  Moritz  Blanckenburg, 
a  nephew  of  Von  Roon,  and  this  form  of  notification  is  signifi- 
cant of  the  secrecy  that  was  required,  in  those  perilous  times, 
for  communications  apparently  simple  in  themselves. 

1  Bismarck's  Memoirs,  i.  203. 


CHAPTER    IV 

MINISTER- PRESIDENT 

ON  Bismarck's  arrival  at  Berlin  he  was  immediately  sum- 
moned by  the  crown  prince  for  an  audience  on  public  affairs, 
and,  supposing  that  this  was  done  with  the  knowledge  of  the 
king,  he  immediately  complied,  although  he  considered  it 
prudent  not  to  commit  himself  on  important  points  to  a  sub- 
ordinate personage.  It  proved,  however,  an  independent 
effort  of  the  prince's  to  gain  information,  and  came  near  ship- 
wrecking Bismarck's  preferment ;  for  the  king  on  hearing  of 
it  said,  "  You  see,  he  is  not  to  be  trusted  either,"  and  it  re- 
quired all  the  earnestness  of  Roon's  nature  to  convince  him 
of  the  contrary.  Whether  this  episode  was  due  to  youthful 
imprudence,  or  to  the  long-headed  calculation  of  Queen  Au- 
gusta, is  a  problem  which  no  evidence  can  help  us  to  solve. 

Bismarck  found  the  king  in  a  most  melancholy  mood.  He 
said,  "  I  will  not  reign  if  I  cannot  do  it  so  as  to  be  answer- 
able to  God  and  to  my  conscience ;  and  I  cannot  do  that  if  I 
am  to  be  dominated  by  the  present  majority  in  Parliament." 
This  referred  to  the  refusal  of  the  Progressists  to  pass  appro- 
priations for  the  maintenance  of  the  army,  and  their  openly 
declared  intention  of  reducing  the  king's  authority  to  a  level 
with  that  of  the  Queen  of  England.  This,  of  course,  was 
revolutionary,  and  could  only  be  met  by  a  counter-revolution. 
Bismarck  perceived  this  at  a  glance,  and  in  the  course  of  a 
lengthy  interview  succeeded  in  persuading  William  I.  that 
such  a  course  was  not  only  honorable  but  necessary  for  the 
interests  of  Prussia,  and  therefore  justifiable.  The  draft  of  a 
letter  of  abdication,  which  the  king  had  on  the  table  before 
him,  was  destroyed  in  Bismarck's  presence. 

It  is  difficult  for  an  American  to  sympathize  with  William  I. 
in  his  struggle  with  the  Prussian  Landtag  at  this  time ;  but 
this  much  is  certain :  if  the  king  had  given  way  before  the 

86 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

majority  in  the  Parliament,  Bismarck  could  never  have  ac- 
complished the  great  work  of  German  unification.  We  see 
the  course  that  history  has  taken,  and  we  credit  those  actors 
in  it  who  have  been  of  service  to  mankind ;  but  it  is  useless 
to  consider  how  things  might  have  been  otherwise.  Only 
those  who  were  living  and  present  at  the  critical  moment  may 
have  been  able  to  judge  of  this.  The  Prussian  Landtag  in 
1862  cannot  be  fairly  compared  with  the  Assembly  of  the 
Third  Estate  in  1789.  Prussia  was  suffering  from  no  heavy 
grievances,  and  its  representatives  had  no  great  wrongs  to 
redress.  The  nation  had  always  been  well  governed,  accord- 
ing to  the  standard  of  the  time ;  it  had  freedom  of  speech, 
popular  education,  and  freedom  of  the  press;  its  laboring 
classes  already  enjoyed  the  advantage  of  one  agrarian  revolu- 
tion, and  were  the  most  prosperous  in  Europe.  If  their  wages 
were  not  so  high  as  in  England,  their  expenses  were  consid- 
erably less.  The  administration  of  internal  affairs  is  of  great  ^ 
importance  in  every  country,  but  in  Prussia  foreign  affairs 
were  and  are  even  more  important  than  internal  affairs ;  for 
the  very  existence  of  the  state  depended  on  the  conduct  of 
them.  This  the  Progressists  could  not  and  would  not  under- 
stand. They  had  no  intention  of  creating  a  republic,  but  they 
wished  to  reform  their  government  after  the  English  pattern, 
in  which,  as  Bismarck  said,  "  the  monarchy  serves  as  a  grace- 
ful cupola  to  the  edifice  of  state  rather  than  as  its  main  sus- 
taining column."  Woe  to  the  country  in  our  time  that  under- 
takes to  imitate  English  institutions ! 

The  United  States  and  Great  Britain  enjoy  exceptional  ad- 
vantages from  their  geographical  positions.  American  poli- 
ticians are  just  beginning  to  find  out  that  international  politics 
is  a  science  by  itself,  and  one  which  heretofore  they  have  had 
small  occasion  to  study.  During  the  Civil  War  our  foreign 
relations  were  so  admirably  managed  by  Secretary  Seward 
that  they  scarcely  attracted  public  attention ;  but  Seward 
spent  nearly  a  year  in  Europe  to  make  a  special  study  of  the 
subject,  and  was,  moreover,  a  statesman  of  rare  ability.  So 
long  as  the  British  government  maintains  its  supremacy  at 
sea,  its  premiers  can  make  blunders  in  foreign  policy  without 

87 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

endangering  the  independence  of  England.  It  is  quite  other- 
wise on  the  continent  of  Europe,  where  nations  and  races  are 
packed  together  like  sardines  in  a  box.  There  a  diplomatic 
mistake  has  to  be  atoned  for  sometimes  by  succeeding  gener- 
ations ;  and  of  all  European  states  Prussia  holds  the  most 
difficult  position,  being  surrounded  by  all  the  others,  with  an 
extended  frontier  to  defend,  for  which  its  population  was  for- 
merly quite  inadequate.  The  experience  of  Poland,  Italy,  and, 
in  ancient  times,  of  the  kingdom  of  Antigonus,  has  shown  that 
such  nations  are  in  danger  of  being  divided  up  between  neigh- 
boring states.  It  is,  therefore,  more  important  in  Prussia  than 
elsewhere  that  men  should  be  at  the  helm  of  government  who 
have  had  training  and  experience  in  foreign  affairs ;  and  this 
can  only  be  obtained,  like  a  sound  knowledge  of  foreign  lan- 
guages, by  residing  a  certain  length  of  time  in  the  capitals  of 
other  countries.  Bismarck  plainly  told  the  leaders  of  the 
Progressists  in  the  Landtag  that  they  were  not  properly 
qualified  to  administer  the  affairs  of  government.  "  You 
wish,"  he  said,  "  to  remodel  our  constitution  according  to  the 
English  pattern ;  but  we  have  not  the  class  of  people  in  Ger- 
many to  draw  upon  for  practical  statesmen  that  they  have  in 
England,  where  they  are  often  bred  to  it  for 'generations." 
Alexander  Hamilton  in  America,  and,  thirty  years  later, 
Hegel  in  Germany,  pointed  out  that,  although  the  corruption 
in  English  elections  was  much  to  be  deplored,  it  had  the  ad- 
vantage of  maintaining  in  office  a  sufficient  number  of  expe- 
rienced statesmen.  This  is  also  true  of  the  United  States 
Senate,  without  any  bribery;  but  the  Prussian  Landtag  in 
1862  was  of  a  different  complexion.  The  Landtag  might  be 
compared  to  the  French  Chamber  of  Deputies  during  the  last 
years  of  the  eighteenth  century,  when  the  French  had  obtained 
their  liberty,  but  knew  not  how  to  make  use  of  it.  English 
parliamentary  government  is  a  growth  of  centuries,  and  can- 
not be  imitated  in  a  few  years.  It  was  a  favorite  saying  of 
Bismarck  that  "  Germany,  once  in  the  saddle,  would  learn  to 
ride ;"  but  it  would  first  have  to  serve  an  apprenticeship. 
The  object  of  the  Progressists  was  not  national,  but  particu- 
larist.  Bismarck,  intensely  practical  as  he  was,  had  always 

88 


c  \.^r 

LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

the  vision  of  a  united  Germany,  powerful  and  respected  by  all 
nations,  floating  before  his  eyes ;  and  to  this  end  his  position 
as  president,  his  devotion  to  the  king,  and  even  his  Prussian 
patriotism  only  served  as  means.  He  was  always  more  of 
a  German  than  a  Prussian,  and  this  the  Progressists  were  not. 
At  the  university  Bismarck  was  republican,  but  he  became  a 
monarchist  because  he  saw  clearly  that  it  was  the  only  prac- 
tical course  for  him.  If,  instead,  he  had  joined  the  Pro- 
gressists, he  might  not  have  been  so  prominent  and  influential 
as  Twesten,  Lasker,  and  other  popular  agitators. 

The  conflict  was  not  more  between  the  king  and  the  Land- 
tag than  between  the  Landtag  and  the  House  of  Peers.  Ac- 
cording to  the  constitution,  the  right  of  raising  taxes  and  of 
granting  recruits  for  the  army  was  vested  in  the  Landtag,  but 
the  House  of  Peers  was  obliged  to  concur  with  its  estimates 
before  they  could  go  to  the  king  for  approval.  The  Landtag 
wished  to  reduce  the  term  of  service  from  four  to  two  years, 
and  cut  down  the  appropriations  for  the  army  accordingly. 
This,  in  the  face  of  Louis  Napoleon's  piratical  policy  and  the 
hostile  attitude  of  the  Austrian  government,  was  altogether 
too  great  a  risk,  and  the  House  of  Peers  returned  the  bill  to 
the  Landtag  for  reconsideration.  The  anger  of  the  majority 
in  the  popular  assembly  was  so  much  the  greater  at  this 
action,  because  it  was  an  exigency  which  they  had  never  con- 
templated. After  a  stormy  debate  they  absolutely  refused  to 
change  the  estimates,  and  thus  a  deadlock  took  place  between 
the  two  legislative  bodies,  which  left  the  government  without 
legal  means  of  raising  taxes  for  its  continued  existence.  The 
king  offered  as  a  compromise  to  reduce  the  army  estimates 
by  four  million  thalers ;  but  beyond  that  he  declared  he  could 
not  go.  The  Landtag  treated  his  message  with  scorn.  Then 
Bismarck  declared  in  full  Senate  that  he  would  govern  without 
appropriations,  and  levy  such  taxes  as  the  exigencies  of  the 
government  required.  Prussia  was  practically  in  a  state  of 
revolution. 

Such  a  condition  of  affairs  had  not  been  contemplated  in 
the  constitution,  and  there  were  no  provisions  that  could  be 
made  to  apply  to  it.  Each  side  considered  itself  in  the  right, 

89 


/ 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

and  when  Bismarck  proceeded  to  make  good  his  promise  he 
was  attacked  with  the  most  violent  abuse  by  the  Progressist 
newspapers,  besides  continually  receiving  letters  with  threats 
of  assassination.  He  may  have  cared  little  for  the  invectives 
of  his  opponents,  but  he  rightly  concluded  that  inflammatory 
editorials  were  stirring  up  the  minds  of  unbalanced  men  to 
desperate  deeds.  The  Prussian  constitution  guaranteed  free- 
dom of  speech,  but  it  had  also  provided  that  in  times  of  great 
public  excitement  the  ministry  might  exercise  a  censorship 
over  the  press.1  Bismarck  had  this  law  enforced  in  a  strin- 
gent manner.  Public  indignation  could  now  find  an  outlet 
only  in  the  Landtag,  where  the  debate  became  continually 
more  acrimonious. 

At  this  juncture  Bismarck's  determination  carried  his  policy 
through  against  the  opposition  of  the  public,  the  parliament, 
the  royal  family,  and  the  majority  of  his  colleagues.  It  was 
a  single  will  pitted  against  the  spirit  of  the  age.  William  I. 
was  never  known  to  retract  a  policy  to  which  he  had  once 
committed  himself,  but  Bismarck  could  only  depend  on  his 
active  support  so  long  as  he  was  within  reach.  On  September 
30,  1862,  the  minister-president  made  a  speech  before  the 
Committee  on  Appropriations  which  has  become  historical. 
He  pointed  out  that  the  very  configuration  of  Prussia,  as  it 
was  then,  necessitated  a  larger  proportionate  military  force  than 
that  of  other  European  nations.  His  expression  was,  "  a  suit 
of  armor  too  large  for  the  weak  body ;"  that  for  its  future  se- 
curity the  Prussian  military  organization  would  have  to  be  ex- 
tended over  all  German-speaking  people ;  and  "  that  in  order 
to  secure  this,  they  must  place  the  greatest  possible  weight  of 
blood  and  iron  in  the  king's  hands."  This  was  the  first  inti- 
mation which  Bismarck  gave  to  the  public  of  his  future  policy, 
and  even  his  most  devoted  adherents  were  startled  by  it. 
"  The  suit  of  armor  too  large  for  the  weak  body,"  and  the 
policy  of  "  blood  and  iron,"  penetrated  to  every  corner  of 
Germany. 


1  Curiously  enough,  a  similar  censorship  was  exercised  in  the  United  States  at 
this  time. 

90 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

The  king  was  at  Baden-Baden  with  his  wife,  and  the  effect 
of  this  speech  on  the  royal  pair  may  be  judged  from  the  fact 
that  the  king  immediately  telegraphed  his  return  to  Berlin, 
and  requested  Bismarck  to  meet  him  on  the  way.  When 
Bismarck  found  him,  quite  alone,  in  an  ordinary  first-class 
coupe,  the  king  seemed  wholly  unnerved,  and  commenced 
with  the  pertinent  question,  "  Where  is  all  this  going  to  lead 
us  ?"  He  then  talked  of  revolutions,  decapitations, — the  fate 
of  Louis  XVI.  and  Charles  I.  Bismarck  judged  correctly 
that  this  mental  condition  was  the  result  of  the  queen's  influ- 
ence, and  knew  how  to  counteract  it.  He  appealed  to  the 
king's  esprit  du  corps  as  a  soldier.  "  What  do  you  wear  a 
sword  for,  your  Majesty  ?  Are  you  afraid  to  die  an  honorable 
death  ?  Your  Majesty  is  bound  to  fight :  you  cannot  capitu- 
late." Arguing  in  this  strain,  he  soon  dispelled  the  witchcraft 
meshes  which  had  been  woven  about  the  old  Hohenzollern ; 
and  by  the  time  the  train  reached  Berlin,  the  king's  mind  was 
prepared  not  only  to  give  his  premier  a  confident  support,  but 
to  show  a  bold  front  to  the  doubtful  and  more  timid  members 
of  the  ministry. 

Bismarck's  position  was  not  without  danger  from  the  stand- 
point of  legal  procedure.  The  Landtag  had  already  passed  a 
resolution,  by  274  to  45,  that  the  ministers  were  responsible 
with  their  persons  and  fortunes  for  unconstitutional  expendi- 
ture. This  meant  for  Bismarck,  in  case  of  failure,  imprison- 
ment and  confiscation.  His  friends  even  advised  him  to  make 
over  the  estate  at  Kniephof  to  his  brother,  in  order  to  prevent 
its  alienation.  To  do  this,  however,  would  have  been  an  evi- 
dence of  weakness,  and  Bismarck  knew  the  importance  of 
preserving  a  confident  tone  to  his  own  party  and  a  bold  front 
to  his  opponents.  He  played  for  the  whole  stake, — a  Napo- 
leonic game, — and  the  more  daring  opposition  papers  had 
already  predicted  that  he  would  yet  be  seen  picking  oakum 
in  felon's  clothes. 

The  disaffection  within  the  royal  family  reached  the  point 
of  insubordination  when  on  June  4,  1863,  the  crown  prince, 
who  had  gone  to  Dantzic  to  hold  a  review  of  the  regiments 
there,  in  reply  to  an  address  by  the  civil  authorities,  expressed 

\ 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

his  regret  that  the  policy  which  his  father  had  adopted  was  at 
variance  with  public  opinion.  Of  the  proceedings  which  had 
brought  this  about  he  knew  nothing ;  he  was  absent,  and  had 
no  part  in  the  deliberations  which  had  led  to  such  a  result. 
Sentiments  like  these,  published  in  the  Dantzic  Times  and 
copied  in  the  London  Times y  were  calculated  to  encourage  a 
more  determined  opposition,  if  not  open  insurrection.  On 
being  requested  by  letter  to  make  an  explanation  of  his  con- 
duct to  the  king,  the  crown  prince  made  the  situation  worse 
by  tendering  the  resignation  of  his  position  in  the  army, 
asking  his  father's  forgiveness,  and  at  the  same  time  persisting 
in  his  opposition  to  the  ministry. 

William  I.  was  furious,  and  Bismarck  was  obliged  to  sum- 
mon up  all  his  diplomatic  talent  to  prevent  a  violent  rupture 
and  such  severe  treatment  of  the  crown  prince  as  the  king 
might  afterwards  repent  of.  "  Let  your  Majesty  decide  noth- 
ing in  anger,"  he  said.1  William  I.,  therefore,  accepted  his 
son's  apology,  declined  his  resignation,  and  cautioned  him 
to  be  more  prudent  in  future.  The  return  which  Bismarck 
received  for  this  magnanimous  consideration  was  a  letter  from 
the  crown  prince,  two  weeks  later,  censuring  the  policy  of  the 
ministry  in  the  strongest  terms :  he  would  entreat  the  king  to 
permit  him  to  take  no  further  part  in  its  proceedings.  This 
was  characteristic  of  the  man,  who,  like  his  mother,  had  rather 
a  brilliant  mind,  but  lacked  clearness  in  his  ideas.  He  never 
had  possessed  a  voice  in  the  councils  of  state,  but  was  re- 
quested to  attend  them  for  the  sake  of  instruction  in  political 
affairs.  An  editorial  in  the  London  Times,  which  congratu- 
lated the  Prussian  people  on  having  so  important  a  cham- 
pion,— a  prince  whose  consort  supported  him  in  his  liberal 
views, — gave  to  this  miserable  affair  an  international  im- 
portance. 

Strange  to  say,  after  the  king's  anger  had  once  cooled 
down,  he  permitted  his  son  to  continue  in  this  wayward 
course  all  through  the  summer ;  but  this  may  have  happened 
because  at  that  season  he  enjoyed  the  protection  of  his 

1  This  is  Bismarck's  statement,  and  it  is  all  we  shall  ever  know. 

92 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

mother's  tongue.  In  August  the  crown  prince  had  an  inter- 
view with  Bismarck  at  Gastein,  where  "  he  spoke  of  his  late 
behavior  as  one  conscious  of  a  native  want  of  independence, 
and  full  of  veneration  for  his  father ;  modestly  and  gracefully 
tracing  his  error  to  its  source  in  his  imperfect  political  train- 
ing." Yet  early  in  September  he  wrote  Bismarck  a  chilling 
letter  in  which  he  declared  himself  the  determined  foe  of  the 
ministry.  Bismarck  obtained  another  audience  with  him 
which  narrowly  escaped  ending  in  an  explosion  of  temper; 
and  then  the  king  took  the  matter  seriously  in  hand.  With 
Bismarck's  assistance  he  made  out  a  schedule  of  directions 
for  his  son's  future  guidance,  by  which  he  made  him  clearly 
to  understand  what  his  proper  position  was  in  the  govern- 
ment, and  the  extent  to  which  he  might  be  permitted  to  criti- 
cise the  ministry  with  due  consideration  for  his  royal  father.1 
The  crown  prince  appears  to  have  accepted  this  as  a  guide 
for  his  future  conduct,  and  to  have  caused  the  ministry  little 
further  annoyance. 

How  long  this  strange  conflict  would  have  continued  be- 
tween a  visionary  majority  and  a  practical  minority,  and  what 
would  have  been  the  final  issue  of  it,  would  be  fruitless  to 
conjecture.  Perhaps  it  was  fortunate  for  Bismarck  that  exter- 
nal politics  came  to  his  assistance,  and  by  developing  his 
diplomatic  skill  and  enlarging  his  reputation,  won  for  him  the 
confidence  of  the  Prussian  people  in  his  management  of 
affairs. 

It  was  not  long  before  his  magnetic  influence  was  felt  in 
the  foreign  affairs  of  Prussia.  He  knew  that  all  that  was 
required  to  make  the  state  respected  abroad  was  a  determined 
attitude  and  a  well-disciplined  army.2  It  was  perhaps  owing 
to  his  resolute  position  that  the  Hessians  were  encouraged  to 
try  conclusions  again  with  their  wicked  old  elector.  It  is  not 
likely  that  Bismarck  fomented  the  slight  disturbances  in  Cassel 
during  the  winter  of  1863, — he  was  much  too  busy  at  home, 

1  Bismarck's  Memoirs,  i.  358. 

2  In  the  light  of  subsequent  events  it  is  almost  impossible  to  understand  the 
suicidal  attitude  of  the  national   assembly.     Prussia  evidently  required  an  army 
equal  in  force  to  that  of  France  or  Austria. 

93 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

— but  at  their  first  appearance  he  sent  a  notification  to  Kur- 
Hessen  that  the  interests  of  Prussia  required  that  he  should 
change  his  ministry,  and  mend  his  ways  in  other  respects. 
Bismarck,  like  Richelieu,  always  began  with  an  attempt  at 
conciliation.  If  that  failed,  his  blow  was  sudden  and  crush- 
ing. Kur-Hessen  looked  for  assistance  from  Austria,  but 
Francis  Joseph  could  no  longer  obtain  the  intervention  of 
Russia,  and  after  Solferino  he  felt  no  desire  to  survey  another 
battle-field.  Kur-Hessen  was  obliged  to  submit,  and  if  Bis- 
marck was  now  unpopular  in  Berlin,  he  was  all  the  more 
popular  among  the  Hessians.  Nor  could  right-minded  men 
all  over  Germany  refuse  him  their  respect  for  this  summary 
act  of  justice.  In  England,  on  the  contrary,  as  Kur-Hessen 
was  related  to  the  English  royal  family,  the  affair  was  repre- 
sented as  a  high-handed  piece  of  Prussian  tyranny. 

The  Italian  revolution  had  also  produced  its  reflection  in 
Poland.  The  insurrections  in  Russian  Poland  were  hopeless 
from  the  beginning  and  easily  suppressed.  As  Bismarck 
always  maintained,  the  liberation  of  Poland  could  only  be 
accomplished  through  a  European  convulsion.  English  edi- 
tors poured  out  their  ink  in  virtuous  indignation  against 
Bismarck  as  the  coadjutor  of  Russian  despotism, — the  real 
grievance  being  a  treaty  with  Alexander,  which  they  rightly 
suspected  might  cover  more  ground  than  the  French  and 
English  cabinets  had  information  of.  Bismarck  knew  that 
England  was  too  much  concerned  with  the  American  ques- 
tion to  run  the  risk  of  a  European  complication,  and  paid  no 
attention  to  the  remonstrances  of  the  British  government. 
Speaking  of  the  Polish  insurrection  of  1863,  Von  Beust  says 
in  his  memoirs  : * 

"  On  the  other  hand,  one  must  remember  what  Bismarck  was  at 
that  time.  The  game,  played  with  such  brilliant  success,  of  mis- 
leading the  world  by  telling  it  sincerely  in  advance  what  he  in- 
tended doing,  was  thus  only  in  its  first  stage  when  both  great  and 
small  states  all  looked  on  him  as  a  restless  spirit,  possibly  dan- 
gerous, but  unlikely  to  remain  long  in  power.  By  the  general 

1  Vol.  i.  p.  221. 
94 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

public,  with  the  exception  of  the  ultra-conservatives,  he  was  not 
only  underestimated,  but  also  thoroughly  disliked.  That  was  the 
time  when,  as  he  said  to  me  during  one  of  our  conversations  at 
Salzburg,  people  spat  on  the  ground  when  he  passed.  Bismarck's 
unpopularity,  however,  was  the  least  of  the  evils  he  had  to  contend 
against.  A  wise  man  does  not  value  popularity  highly,  and  a  brave 
man  never  fears  its  reverse." 

The  course  of  the  Austrian  government  from  1863  to  1866 
can  only  be  ascribed  to  an  infatuation.  The  purblind  Schauen- 
stein  had  been  succeeded  by  an  equally  purblind  Karolyi, 
who  continued  the  anti-Prussian  policy  of  his  predecessors, 
despite  the  loss  of  Lombardy  and  the  alienation  of  the  Rus- 
sian court.  There  is  reason  to  believe  that  Pius  IX.  and  his 
Jesuit  counsellor,  Antonelli,  had  a  hand  in  this,  as  it  is  well 
known  that  they  exerted  an  influence  on  the  French  empress 
and  her  party  previous  to  the  Franco-  German  war.  Prussia 
was  the  only  Protestant  power  on  the  continent,  and  could 
Prussia  once  be  placed  in  the  vocative  some  progress,  at  least, 
would  have  been  gained  by  the  Church  of  Rome  towards  the 
re-establishment  of  its  former  supremacy.  The  Jesuits  ex- 
pelled from  Austria,  France,  and  Spain  during  the  middle  of 
the  eighteenth  century  found  an  asylum  in  the  dominions  of 
Frederick  the  Great,  but  after  the  wars  of  Napoleon  they  had 
returned  to  their  former  habitations,  and  were  as  active  in  in- 
triguing as  ever. 

The  anti-Prussian  policy  was  fratricidal,  and  could  only  end 
by  dividing  the  German  house  against  itself.  Even  Machia- 
velli  could  have  satisfied  Francis  Joseph  on  that  point,  but  the 
Austrian  emperor  and  Karolyi  counted  on  the  internal  dis- 
sensions of  Prussia,  and  felt  confident  of  their  majority  in  the 
Frankfort  Diet.  As  Von  Beust  says,  they  considered  Bis- 
marck the  creature  of  a  day,  who  would  soon  come  to  the 
end  of  his  rope,  and  be  replaced  by  a  more  pliant  and  con- 
ciliatory minister.  They  vainly  believed  that  the  majority  of 
the  Diet  carried  with  it  an  authority  equal  to  its  pretensions. 
The  victories  of  Frederick  the  Great  were  supposed  to  have 
been  due  to  his  exceptional  genius,  and  it  was  not  likely  that 
the  Prussians  would  find  another  general  to  match  him.  The 

95 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

Prussian  army  had  not  seen  active  service  since  1815,  while 
Austrian  veterans  had  fought  in  Italy  and  Hungary.  Foolish 
illusions,  and  not  much  to  the  credit  of  Francis  Joseph,  who 
counted  as  little  on  Prussian  patriotism  as  he  did  on  Von 
Moltke  and  the  needle-gun. 

Von  Moltke  had  assured  Bismarck  that  he  could  crush 
Austria  at  a  moment's  notice :  all  that  he  required  was  a  full 
complement  of  men  for  his  regiments.  Bismarck,  therefore, 
assumed  a  bold  attitude.  He  informed  Count  Karolyi  that 
the  present  behavior  of  Austria  towards  Prussia  was  un- 
friendly, and  if  continued  could  only  result  in  a  suspension  of 
diplomatic  relations.  The  count  replied  that  the  Austrian 
government  could  not  relinquish  its  traditional  influence  on 
the  German  states ;  and  with  this  cool  assertion  of  superiority 
the  negotiation  ended'1 

This  is  Bismarck's  own  statement,  and  if  correct,  Karolyi's 
answer  was  evasive,  and  quite  unlikely  to  promote  a  good 
understanding  between  the  two  governments.  It  is  difficult 
to  obtain  the  truth  in  regard  to  this  international  discussion, 
much  of  which  was  carried  on  by  personal  interviews,  and  is 
now  unsupported  by  documentary  evidence.  We  may  suppose, 
however,  that  Professor  Miiller,  of  Tubingen,  would  be  likely 
to  give  an  unprejudiced  account  of  it;  for  if  any  portion  of 
Europe  can  be  considered  neutral  ground  in  politics  it  is  the 
duodecimo  kingdom  of  Wurtemberg.  As  South  Germans 
the  Wiirtembergers  stand  in  a  certain  dread  of  Prussia,  and 
their  religion  interferes  with  their  being  in  complete  sympathy 
with  Austria,  while  their  immunity  from  invasion  prevents 
that  hostility  towards  the  French  which  is  felt  in  Baden. 
Miiller's  account  of  the  negotiations  between  Bismarck  and 
Karolyi  agrees  substantially  with  that  of  Bismarck's  biog- 
rapher. We  know,  at  least,  what  Bismarck's  propositions 
were  to  the  congress  of  princes  which  Francis  Joseph  sum- 
moned at  Gastein  in  September,  1863,  and  they  cannot  be 
considered  unreasonable,  if  any  concessions  were  to  be  made 
at  all  to  Prussia  in  the  interest  of  peace  and  harmony.  They 


1  Hesekiel's  Biography,  p.  341. 
96 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

were  substantially :  the  agreement  of  Prussia  and  Austria  to 
be  required  for  every  war  not  undertaken  in  defence  of  German 
soil ;  the  perfect  equality  of  Prussia  and  Austria  in  the  gov- 
ernment for  the  arbitration  of  federal  affairs,  and  a  national 
representation  to  the  Frankfort  Diet  of  representatives  chosen 
by  the  different  states  according  to  the  ratio  of  their  popula- 
tion, with  more  extensive  powers  than  those  of  the  present 
delegates.  In  the  Diet  as  then  constituted,  Prussia,  which 
contained  one-third  of  the  population  of  Germany,  had  no 
more  electoral  power  than  Cassel,  which  contained  about  a 
twentieth,  and  Bismarck's  proposed  modification  would  give 
the  largest  state  in  Germany  more  consideration,  though 
never  necessarily  a  majority.  It  would  be  certain  to  break  up 
the  existing  cabal,  and  make  the  formation  of  a  new  one  more 
difficult  than  formerly.  It  was  met  by  Count  Karolyi  by  a 
counter-proposition,  which  had  the  character  of  a  blind  alley, 
leading  nowhere  in  particular,  and  evidently  intended  as  a 
pretext  for  delay.  The  result  of  this  was  that  King  William 
declined  to  attend  the  congress  of  princes  at  Frankfort 
the  following  August,  which  accordingly  dissolved  without 
coming  to  any  definite  conclusions.  The  importance  of  Prus- 
sia in  German  affairs  was  at  last  becoming  manifest.1 

The  quarrel  in  the  Diet  was  mainly  a  question  of  tariff,  but 
there  was  also  an  unlimited  number  of  interstate  regulations 
to  be  considered  from  session  to  session,  and  on  both  these 
subjects  Prussia  was  always  found  in  the  minority.  The  vast 
portion  of  the  Austrian  empire  is  mainly  agricultural,  and, 


1  A  characteristic  instance  in  Austrian  diplomacy  was  the  embassy  of  Von 
Beust  to  Bismarck  at  Baden-Baden,  in  order  to  persuade  William  I.  to  put  in  an 
appearance  at  the  congress.  Bismarck  received  him  cordially,  but  said,  signifi- 
cantly, "  You  have  come  to  drag  us  to  destruction."  Von  Beust  then  suggested 
that  if  William  I.  would  only  come  to  Frankfort  for  a  single  day  and  plead 
indisposition,  the  congress  would  probably  adjourn  on  the  day  following,  but 
Bismarck  was  not  to  be  caught  in  such  a  trap  as  that.  "  What  you  say,"  he  re- 
plied, "  is  probable  enough,  but  not  certain."  Dr.  Busch  was  on  hand  to  note 
down  the  conversation,  portions  of  which  Von  Beust  afterwards  repudiated  as 
pure  inventions  of  the  enemy.  Without  questioning  the  sincerity  of  either 
party  it  is  enough  to  say  that  a  diary  written  at  the  time  is  better  testimony  than 
the  memoirs  of  after  years. 

7  97 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

though  it  was  a  disadvantage  to  the  farmers,  the  government 
wished  to  maintain  moderately  high  duties  on  imports  on 
account  of  the  revenue  which  it  derived  from  them.  The 
same  was  true  of  the  smaller  inland  states,  like  Bavaria,  Wiir- 
temberg,  and  Saxony.  Prussia  was  the  only  large  state 
which  possessed  an  extensive  commerce,  and  its  people  were 
inclined  to  free  trade.  In  such  cases  there  ought  to  be  a 
compromise  if  possible.  The  German  navy,  which  was  of 
some  advantage  to  Prussia,  but  little  enough  to  Austria, 
caused  a  great  deal  of  dissension  during  the  first  session  of 
the  Diet  after  the  revolution  had  subsided,  and  the  majority 
voted  to  dispose  of  it  the  following  year.  Such  grievances 
do  not  seem  of  themselves  sufficient  to  justify  the  resort  to 
arms,  but  continued  during  a  term  of  years  the  evil  increases 
at  compound  interest  until  they  form  an  intolerable  burden. 

Bismarck  followed  up  his  contemptuous  treatment  of  the 
congress  of  princes  by  concluding  with  the  French  govern- 
ment a  commercial  treaty  on  behalf  of  Prussia,  Mecklenburg, 
and  a  few  smaller  states,  equally  advantageous  to  both  parties, 
but  in  direct  violation  of  the  authority  of  the  Diet.  This  was 
practically  nullification,  and  must  inevitably  have  resulted  in 
war  between  Austria  and  Prussia,  or  in  the  secession  of  the 
latter  and  the  formation  of  a  confederacy  with  the  states  that 
adhered  to  it.  In  his  circular  note  of  January,  1863,  to  the 
German  states,  Bismarck  had  said,  "  In  order  to  bring  about 
a  better  understanding  I  took  the  initiative  and  informed 
Count  Karolyi  that,  according  to  my  conviction,  our  relations 
with  Austria  must  unavoidably  change  for  the  better  or  the 
worse.  It  is  the  sincere  wish  of  the  royal  government  that 
the  former  alternative  should  arise; -but  if  we  should  not  be 
met  by  the  imperial  cabinet  with  the  necessary  advances  as 
we  could  desire,  it  will  be  necessary  for  us  to  contemplate  the 
other  alternative  and  prepare  for  it  accordingly"  The  relations 
of  Prussia  and  Austria  were  now  changing  for  the  worse,  but 
Count  Karolyi  found  his  diplomatic  grave  at  the  Frankfort 
congress  of  princes,  which,  without  the  King  of  Prussia, 
proved  to  be  like  a  cart  left  without  its  horse.  His  successor, 
Count  Rechberg,  showed  a  more  conciliatory  disposition  to- 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

wards  the  Prussian  state,  and  it  is  possible,  though  not  prob- 
able, that  he  might  have  succeeded  in  averting  the  impending 
catastrophe,  but  for  an  event  which  unsettled  the  balance  of 
power  in  Germany  and  introduced  a  series  of  changes  of  the 
grandest  character. 


99 


CHAPTER    V 

SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN 

THE  time  of  retribution  was  now  approaching  for  the 
brutality  of  the  Danes  in  their  German  provinces.  Lord  John 
Russell  is  credited  with  having  said  that  he^ievej^  knew  but 
two  persons  who  understood  the  Schleswig-Holstein  ques- 
tion, and  he  evidently  did  not  understand  it  himself.  These 
duchies  ha^d  never  been  an  integral  portion  of  Denmark,  but 
were  inherited  by  a  Danish  king  some  time  during  the  Middle 
Ages,  after  the  manner  of  landed  estates.  Their  inhabitants 
spoke  a  broad  kind  of  German,  and  always  felt  a  lively  an- 
tagonism towards  their  seafaring  neighbors.  Now,  according 
to  English  arid  Danish  law,  political  rights  could  be  inherited 
by  females,  but  according  to  the  German  law  they  could  not. 
We  have  seen  that  in  1848  the  male  line  of  Danish  sovereigns 
became  extinct,  and  acqprding  to  German  usage  the  two 
duchies  would  reve*rt  properly  to  the;Duke  of  Augustenburg, 
but  the  Danes  very  nartfralj^  didmot  agree  to  this.  The 
London  conference,  which  settled  the  question  at  that  time, 
confirmed  the  new  King  of  Denmark's  rjossession  of  Schles- 
wig  and  Holstein,  but  on  condition  that  they  should  not  be 
incorporated  in  Denmark  proper.  The  Duke  of  Augusten- 
burg never  acquiesced  in  this  decision,  nor  would  the  German 
people  have  submitted  to  it,  had  it  not  been  supported  by 
Russia  and  Austria. 

The  new  Danish  king,  Frederick  VII.,  encouraged  by  the 
opposition  of  the  English  ministry  to  Bismarck,  and  em- 
boldened by  the  continued  dissensions  of  Germany,  had  an 
act  of  incorporation  for  Schleswig  passed  by  his  parliament 
in  the  autumn  of  1863,  and  was  on  the  point  of  signing  it 
when  he  suddenly  died ;  and  this  nullification  of  the  London 
congress  was  completed  by  his  successor,  Christian  IX.,  who 
•soon  discovered  the  difference  between  the  professions  of 

100 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

Lord  John  Russell  and  the  heart  of  the  German  people.  The 
Schleswig-Holstein  question  suddenly  became  a  popular 
movement,  like  the  war  of  liberation  in  1813.  Max  Miiller 
has  given  us  in  one  of  his  essays  an  interesting  account  of 
the  campaign  songs  that  were  sung  for  the  liberation  of  the 
two  duchies.1  Even  the  moribund  Diet  at  Frankfort  was 
carried  off  its  feet  in  the  general  enthusiasm,  and,  without 
considering  the  protest  of  the  Austrian  delegate,  passed  reso- 
lutions denouncing  the  action  of  the  Danish  government  as  a 
violation  of  the  treaty  of  London ;  and  as  this  produced  no 
improvement  of  the  situation,  on  the  /th  of  December  the 
Diet  enacted  a  decree  that  the  Kings  of  Saxony  and  Hanover 
should  take  possession  of  Holstein  with  a  force  of  six  thou- 
sand men  each,  and  that  the  Austrian  and  Prussian  govern- 
ments should  maintain  a  reserve  on  the  border  of  the  province 
in  case  the  Saxon  and  Hanoverian  army  should  not  succeed 
in  repulsing  the  Danes.  A  more  ineffectual  and  absurd  ar- 
rangement could  not  well  be  imagined. 

"  To  be  politically  great,"  says  Froude,  "  is  to  recognize  a 
popular  movement,  and  have  the  courage  and  address  to  lead 
it."  What  Bismarck's  plans  were  before  the  Schleswig-Hol- 
stein question  appeared  on  the  stage  will  probably  never  be 
known.  In  the  whirl  of  events  which  followed  he  may  have 
forgotten  them  himself.  We  can  perceive  in  retrospect  that 
his  one  object  was  the  elevation  of  Pjussia  from  the  depressed 
condition  in  which  his  country  was  suffering,  and  he  made 


1  "  GERMAN  HONOR  AND  GERMAN  EARTH. 
"  Spring,  1848. 

"There  came  soldiers  across  the  Elbe, — 
Hurrah,  hurrah,  to  the  North  ! 
They  came  as  thick  as  wave  on  wave, 
And  like  a  field  full  of  corn. 
#         *         #         *         #         •*         # 
Good  day,  ye  Holsten,  on  German  soil ! 
Good  day,  ye  Friesians,  on  the  German  sea, 
To  live  and  to  die  for  German  honor, — 
Thus  wanders  and  marches  the  host." 

Mutter's  Chips,  vol.  iii.  p.  134. 

101 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

everything  else  bend  to  this  purpose.  Great  statesmen,  how- 
ever, do  not  make  definite  plans,  but  suit  themselves  to  cir- 
cumstances as  they  arise.  They  allow  themselves  to  be  ruled 
neither  by  circumstances  nor  by  such  plans  as  they  have 
already  formed,  but  hold  an  even  course  like  a  sea-captain, 
who  pays  more  regard  to  the  safety  of  his  vessel  than  to  the 
time  which  he  spends  upon  his  voyage.  The  statements  that 
have  been  made,  that  Bismarck  predicted  the  course  of  events 
between  1862  and  1866,  are  not  worthy  of  credit,  especially 
as  they  come  from  his  political  opponents.  Count  Vizthum, 
who  was  minister  of  Saxony  to  England  during  this  period, 
says  that  the  leader  of  the  opposition  in  Parliament  informed 
him  that  Bismarck  came  to  London  in  1862  to  explain  his 
future  policy  as  minister-president  to  her  Majesty's  govern- 
ment, with  such  a  statement  of  it  as  it  would  be  easy  enough 
to  write  ten  years  later.  Memoirs  are  always  poor  historical 
evidence ;  but  how  Count  Vizthum  could  expect  a  fairly  in- 
telligent public  to  believe  such  a  transparent  absurdity  as  this 
it  is  not  easy  to  comprehend.  It  presupposes  not  only  that 
Bismarck  was  a  sufficient  fool  to  divulge  his  plans  in  advance 
to  the  friends  of  his  adversaries,  but  that  the  British  ministry 
should  have  been  equally  foolish  in  divulging  them  to  their 
own  adversaries.  Nicht  moglich,  as  the  Germans  say.1 

To  solve  the  Schleswig-Holstein  problem  was  Bismarck's 
immediate  task,  and  it  was  like  walking  Niagara  on  the  tight- 
rope,— one  misstep,  and  he  was  gone  forever.  The  people  of 
Holstein  held  an  enormous  meeting,  in  which  they  offered 
themselves  as  subjects  to  the  Duke  of  Augustenburg,  whose 
title  to  the  duchies  was  now  under  legal  scrutiny.  The 
question  was,  however,  if  the  duke  obtained  possession,  would 
he  be  able  to  support  himself  in  the  new  state  of  Augustenburg 
against  a  Danish  attack?  If  not,  Prussia,  as  his  nearest 
neighbor,  would  inevitably  be  called  upon  to  support  him ; 
and  what  advantage  would  Prussia  derive  from  the  blood  and 

1  In  the  same  category  may  be  placed  Lord  Ampthill's  statement  that  Bis- 
marck told  him  that  he  had  "  always  managed  to  talk  over,  if  not  to  convince, 
his  royal  master."  Bismarck  would  never  have  made  an  English  lord  the  re- 
pository of  so  undiplomatic  a  secret.  The  statement  is  malicious. 

102 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

treasure  expended  for  his  benefit?  Another  problem  was 
whether  the  Saxon  and  Hanoverian  army  could  conquer  the 
two  duchies  from  Denmark,  and  if  so,  what  benefit  would 
Saxony  and  Hanover  derive  from  their  exertion  ?  Nothing 
for  nothing  is  the  principle  in  politics  as  in  law.  Bismarck 
doubted  the  success  of  either  scheme.  If  the  work  was  not 
done  effectually  at  this  time,  it  would  remain  an  open  griev- 
ance and  a  stumbling-block  for  Prussia  in  the  future.  He 
was  determined  to  have  the  affair  settled  once  for  all. 

He  negotiated  with  Rechberg,  who  appears  to  have  been  of 
the  same  opinion,  though  in  fact  there  was  only  one  course  open 
to  him.  Bismarck  told  him  that  if  Austria  would  unite  with 
Prussia,  well  and  good ;  otherwise  Prussia  would  undertake 
the  affair  alone.  It  was  a  game  of  "  heads  I  win,  tails  you 
lose ;"  and  yet  it  could  not  be  said  that  it  was  a  game  of  Bis- 
marck's invention.  The  Diet  (which  was  established  for  Aus- 
tria's benefit)  had  drawn  Austria  into  a  net  from  which  there 
was  no  escape,  except  by  playing  this  game  for  Prussia's  advan- 
tage. In  order  to  have  a  voice  in  the  distribution  of  the  con- 
quered territory  the  Vienna  cabinet  decided  to  join  Prussia  in 
an  invasion  of  the  two  duchies,  though  Rechberg  must  have 
perceived  his  own  fate  before  him  from  that  moment.  A  force 
of  fifty  thousand  men  was  considered  necessary  for  the  pur- 
pose, and  this  in  itself  shows  how  inadequate  were  the  pro- 
visions of  the  Diet.  'The  Danish  army  numbered  between 
thirty  and  forty  thousand. 

There  was  only  one  way  in  which  such  a  campaign  could 
end,  with  two  great  powers  on  one  side  and  a  small  one  on 
the  other.  The  Danes  screamed  aloud  to  England  for  assist- 
ance, but  high-toned  denunciations  of  Bismarck  in  the  London 
papers  were  the  only  succor  they  received.  Nevertheless,  the 
campaign  was  rather  a  difficult  one.  General  Wrangel,  who 
had  fought  against  Napoleon  in  1813,  was  commander  of  the 
allied  forces,  but  the  real  leader  of  the  Prussians  was  Prince 
Frederick  Charles  of  Hohenzollern,  one  of  the  toughest  fight- 
ers of  the  nineteenth  century.1  The  national  assembly  re- 

1  It  is  to  be  regretted  that  his  character  as  a  man  was  not  equal  to  his  ability. 
He  commanded  in  more  than  a  dozen  engagements,  and  always  with  success. 

103 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

fused  to  grant  the  necessary  funds  even  for  this  patriotic  war, 
but  Bismarck  paid  no  attention  to  that.  The  allies  entered 
Schleswig,  the  more  northerly  province,  driving  the  Danes 
before  them.  Finally  the  Danish  commander  made  a  stand 
at  the  two  fortresses  of  Diippel  and  Fridericia,  but  Frederick 
Charles  stormed  the  former,  though  considered  impregnable, 
and  the  latter  was  evacuated.  The  allies  then  advanced  into 
Jutland,  and  occupied  the  mainland  of  Denmark  without 
much  opposition. 

Napoleon  III.  may  have  concluded  that  so  long  as  Prussia 
and  Austria  were  united  it  was  best  for  him  to  keep  as  quiet 
as  possible,  but  the  English  ministry  now  interfered  to  pre- 
vent further  bloodshed,  and  as  the  object  of  the  war  had  been 
accomplished,  there  was  no  reason  why  this  request  should 
not  be  considered.  Another  London  conference  ensued,  but 
came  to  no  good.  In  fact,  the  Danes  were  their  own  worst 
enemies  from  first  to  last.  It  is  surprising  that  Bismarck 
should  have  assented  to  the  proposition  that  the  two  duchies 
should  continue  to  be  attached  to  the  Danish  crown,  with 
permission  to  regulate  their  own  internal  affairs.  Bismarck 
assented  to  it,  but  the  Danish  envoy  would  not.  The  Danes 
considered  themselves  inaccessible  in  their  rock-bound  islands, 
but  Frederick  Charles  crossed  Alsen  Sound  with  his  forces  dur- 
ing the  night  of  June  28  and  succeeded  in  intrenching  himself 
under  the  fire  of  the  Danish  batteries.  ^During  the  course  of 
the  following  day  the  Danes  were  defeated,  their  intrench- 
ments  stormed,  and  they  were  driven  back  to  the  further  ex- 
tremity of  the  island.  The  soldiers  who  performed  these  feats 
had  never  seen  active  service  before,  and  it  was  evident  that  a 
Prussian  was  a  Prussian  still.  Denmark  was  now  reduced  to 
Copenhagen  and  its  adjacent  islands.  Christian  IX.  was  com- 
pelled to  sue  for  peace. 

This  war,  looked  at  from  a  distance,  had  the  appearance  of  a 
cowardly  oppression  of  the  weak  by  the  strong,  and  so  it  was 
considered  in  America  at  that  time,  but  on  close  inspection 
we  find  in  it  a  true  popular  movement  corresponding  to  the 
conquests  of  Naples  and  Sicily  by  Garibaldi.  Professor 
Miiller  states  that  Bismarck  frowned  upon  it  from  the  first, 

104 


- 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

and  this  is  not  unlikely,  for  when  such  a  movement  begins 
there  is  no  predicting  what  course  it  will  finally  take.  Bis- 
marck's reticence,  however,  may  have  been  like  that  of  a  man 
who  sees  an  opportunity  before  him,  on  which  he  desires  to 
wholly  concentrate  himself.  It  was  predicted  as  soon  as  the 
war  was  finished  that  the  victors  would  quarrel  over  the 
booty,  and  nobody  was  surprised  when  this  came  to  pass.  It 
is  difficult  to  decide  from  the  external  facts  of  the  negotiations 
which  followed  whether  Bismarck  wished  to  push  Austria  to 
the  wall  or  not.  He  probably  wished  it,  but  might  have 
hesitated  if  a  common  ground  of  agreement  could  have  been 
discovered.  It  is  doubtful  if  an  arrangement  satisfactory  to 
the  interests  of  both  nations  was  possible. 

Meanwhile  the  useless  Saxon-Hanoverian  army  had  marched 
into  Holstein  without  opposition.  Bismarck  insisted  that  as 
the  Danes  had  now  been  driven  out  there  was  no  occasion  for 
its  remaining  there,  and  requested  the  two  kings  to  withdraw 
their  respective  forces.  As  they  did  not  acquiesce  in  this  im- 
mediately, the  King  of  Prussia  concentrated  strong  bodies  of 
troops  on  the  borders  of  Hanover  and  Saxony,  a  threat  which 
in  due  course  of  time  proved  effectual*  Bismarck's  propo- 
sition that  the  two  duchies  should  be  governed  by  a  mixed 
Austrian  and  Prussian  commission,  while  one  province  was 
occupied  by  Prussian  forces  and  the  other  by  Austrian,  would 
seem  to  have  been  fair,  but  did  not  prove  acceptable  to  the 
Austrian  cabinet.  The  objection  probably  was  that  the  Aus- 
trian troops  thus  employed  would  be  shut  in  by  the  Prussians, 
and  in  case  of  war  between  the  two  nations  would  prove  an 
easy  capture.  The  claims  of  the  Duke  of  Augustenburg  were 
next  considered.  Bismarck,  perhaps  to  gain  time,  employed 
a  number  of  lawyers  to  look  up  his  title,  from  which  it  ap- 
peared that  he  was  heir  to  only  a  portion  of  the  duchies, 
while  the  Duke  of  Oldenburg  was  heir  to  another  portion, 
and  that  the  King  of  Prussia  also  had  a  small  claim.  This 
was  fine  business  for  the  lawyers,  interesting  business,  and 
must  have  paid  them  well,  but  it  did  not  help  the  solution  of 
the  problem. 

The  people  of  Schleswig  and  Holstein,  except  the  gentry 

105 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

of  Lauenburg,  declared  for  the  Augustenburger,  and  he  was 
accordingly  invited  to  Berlin.  It  is  supposed,  with  good 
reason,  that  if  he  had  been  willing  to  make  an  arrangement 
by  which  his  army  would  become  an  integral  portion  of  the 
Prussian  army  (like  that  of  Brunswick,  and,  we  believe,  also 
Mecklenburg)  he  might  have  obtained  the  princely  inheri- 
tance, but  he  was  under  the  influence  of  Austria  and  the 
Frankfort  Diet,  and  would  agree  to  nothing  which  gave 
Prussia  a  political  foothold  in  either  Holstein  or  Schleswig, — 
thus  losing  his  opportunity  forever. 

Just  before  or  after  the  battle  of  Sedan,  Bismarck  gave  an 
off-hand  account  of  his  discussion  with  the  Augustenburger, 
who  was  gallantly  serving  as  an  officer  in  the  Bavarian  army, 
on  the  Schleswig-Holstein  proposals.  "  He  might  have  done 
better  for  himself,"  Bismarck  said,  "  if  he  had  only  been  will- 
ing to  make  a  few  concessions.  We  wanted  no  more  of  him 
originally  than  the  other  princes  conceded  to  us  after  the 
Bohemian  campaign,  but  he  was  obdurate, — and  I  thanked 
goodness  for  it  to  myself, — and  when  I  spoke  of  giving 
Prussia  the  right  to  Kiel  harbor,  he  remarked  that  that  was 
five  square  miles  of  water,  a  statement  which,  of  course,  I 
could  not  deny.  He  would  make  no  military  agreement 
with  us,  and  so  the  negotiation  came  to  an  end  without  a 
result."  It  is  likely  enough  that  the  Duke  of  Augustenburg 
was  afraid  to  accept  Bismarck's  proposition  lest  it  should  in- 
volve him  in  difficulty  with  Austria,  and  he  should  become 
the  centre  of  a  conflict  between  two  forces  much  beyond  his 
power  of  control.  If,  however,  he  had  taken  his  chances  on 
the  side  of  Prussia  he  might  have  done  well  for  himself. 

The  subsequent  course  of  the  Schleswig  and  Holstein  set- 
tlement was  like  that  of  a  river  twisting  and  winding  to  find 
its  way  out  from  a  mountainous  country.  It  is  tedious  to 
follow  it,  and  requires  so  much  patience  that  we  cannot  but 
admire  the  endurance  and  assiduity  of  the  diplomats  who 
were  engaged  in  it  and  struggled  through  it.  It  must  have 
been  specially  trying  to  Bismarck,  with  his  sleepless  nights 
and  a  hostile  parliament  to  contend  with  at  the  same  time. 
He  had,  at  least,  gained  something  for  Prussia  by  taking  the 

106 


LIFE   OF   BISMARCK 

question  out  of  the  Frankfort  Diet  and  placing  it  before 
Francis  Joseph  in  such  a  form  that  he  must  either  accept  or 
reject  the  Prussian  proposals.  Count  Rechberg  was  replaced 
by  Count  Mensdorff-Pouilly,  whose  peculiar  talent  appears  to 
have  been  that  of  procrastination.  There  could  have  been  no 
advantage  to  Prussia  in  dragging  out  the  negotiations  to  such 
a  length,  and  the  fact  proves  either  that  Bismarck  was  not 
desirous  of  precipitating  a  war  or  that  he  found  in  Count 
Mensdorff  a  wary  and  accomplished  tactician. 

After  some  cautious  skirmishing  on  both  sides,  in  Feb- 
ruary, 1865,  Bismarck  sent  a  despatch  to  Count  Mensdorff, 
in  which,  after  taking  notice  of  the  fact  that  the  Austrian  gov- 
ernment had  repeatedly  asserted  that  neither  of  the  pretending 
dukes  (Augustenburg  and  Oldenburg)  could  support  a  claim 
to  the  whole  of  the  two  duchies,  he  goes^on  to  explain  the 
position  of  the  Prussian  government  towards  them  as  follows  : 

"  Both  internally  and  externally  considered,  the  constitution  of 
the  military  system  in  that  important  country,  which  is  our  next- 
door  neighbor,  cannot  but  be  of  the  greatest  interest  for  us.  It  is 
an  imperative  duty  to  make  the  means  of  defence  at  the  disposal  of 
Schleswig-Holstein,  especially  on  the  sea,  as  useful  as  possible  for 
Germany,  and  in  commerce  and  trade  Prussia  and  the  duchies  must 
naturally  be  most  closely  related  to  each  other.  No  one  can  blame 
us  if  we  regard  these  interests  as  of  the  first  importance.  We  are  only 
fulfilling  a  duty  to  Prussia  and  to  Germany  when  we  insist,  before 
proceeding  to  any  definitive  decision,  upon  some  guarantees  for  the 
security  of  these  interests,  and  when  we  declare  our  unwillingness 
to  be  dependent  upon  the  uncertain  good-will  of  a  future  sovereign 
and  his  estates."  x  •  . 

This  communication  may  not  have  been  unexpected,  but  it 
produced  uneasiness  and  ill-feeling  at  Vienna.  It  showed 
only  too  plainly  the  inevitable  drift  of  the  Danish  war,  and 
that  Bismarck  had  no  intention  of  letting  slip  an  opportunity 
which  in  its  natural  course  would  turn  to  the  aggrandizement 
of  Prussia. 


Von  Sybel,  iv.  56. 
107 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

"  Prussia  misjudges  us,"  Mensdorff  complained  to  Baron 
Werther.  "  You  should  not  suppose  that  we  envy  you  any 
aggrandizement ;  only  in  that  case  we  must  obtain  an  equal 
equivalent  for  ourselves.  This  is  indispensable  in  the  present 
state  of  public  opinion  here."  He  then  declared  that  the 
emperor  had  no  partiality  for  the  Augustenburger,  who  had 
several  times  broken  his  word  to  them.  He  then  made  a 
lengthy  statement  to  Bismarck,  which  was  little  more  than  a 
reiteration  of  previous  statements,  ending  with  the  conclusion 
that  there  was  danger  of  open  rupture  between  the  two  nations 
unless  Prussia  adopted  the  Austrian  programme.  "  Our  im- 
perative duty,"  said  Mensdorff,  "  requires  us  to  bring  these 
negotiations  to'  an  end  as  speedily  as  possible."  At  the  same 
time  he  proposed  no  adjustment  of  the  question  which  could 
be  satisfactory  to  the  Prussian  government.  It  is  curious  to 
see  how  both  parties  in  this  discussion  make  use  of  public 
opinion  as  a  loop-hole  of  escape  and  as  a  last  resort  in  argu- 
ment. Public  opinion  in  Austria  would  not  permit  the 
aggrandizement  of  Prussia  without  an  equivalent  to  Francis 
Joseph.  Public  opinion  in  Prussia  could  not  allow  the  sur- 
render of  Upper  Silesia,  which  was  the  only  equivalent  which 
Austria  could  very  well  obtain ; x  for  an  equal  division  of  the 
Elbe  duchies  between  the  two  nations  would  be  too  favorable 
geographically  for  Prussia. 

After  a  good  deal  more  skirmishing,  we  find  Mensdorff 
late  in  April  proposing  a  united  convention  of  the  estates  of 
Schleswig  and  Holstein,  for  the  purpose  of  deciding  their 
own  political  status.  A  discussion  then  ensued  as  to  whether 
the  delegates  should  be  elected  to  the  convention — which 
Bismarck  approved  on  the  ground  of  legality — according  to 
the  law  of  1848,  or  the  more  liberal  regulations  of  1854;  and 
Bismarck  finally  nullified  the  arrangement  by  advocating 
their  election  by  universal  suffrage.  This  was  looked  upon 
in  Vienna  as  an  amendment  intended  to  defeat  the  motion, — 
and  so  it  probably  was.  Nothing  could  be  more  hateful  to 


1  One  difficulty  in  the  way  of  this  was  that  the  Silesians  were  Protestants  and 
strongly  objected  to  being  placed  under  the  Austrian  government. 

1 08 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

Francis  Joseph  than  the  suggestion  of  universal  suffrage. 
The  Duke  of  Augustenburg  still  continued  to  reside  in  Hoi- 
stein,  and  the  joint  motion  of  Austria  and  Prussia  in  the 
Frankfort  Diet  to  have  him  ejected  had  been  voted  down  by 
the  smaller  German  states.  Bismarck  considered  his  with- 
drawal from  the  country  essential  to  a  fair  election,  but  Mens- 
dorff  deprecated  the  use  of  force,  and  would  only  agree  to 
make  an  earnest  protest  to  the  duke  for  this  purpose. 

After  peace  with  Denmark  had  been  declared,  the  govern- 
ment of  the  Elbe  duchies  had  been  placed  in  charge  of  an 
Austrian  and  a  Prussian  general  as  commissioners,  who  -ad- 
ministered affairs  in  a  dictatorial  manner.  As  it  was  not  con- 
sidered expedient  that  this  should  continue,  a  popular  gov- 
ernment was  organized,  having  its  focus  in  Holstein  for  both 
states,  and  administered  by  a  board  of  six  councillors,  while 
the  commissioners  retained  a  right  of  supervision,  and  served 
as  a  court  of  final  appeal.  This  form  of  government  was  satis- 
factory to  the  people  of  Schleswig  and  Holstein ;  but  either 
the  Austrian  commissioner  outwitted  his  Prussian  colleague, 
or  he  was  favored  by  public  opinion,  so  that  of  the  six  coun- 
cillors chosen  five  proved  to  be  partisans  of  the  Augusten- 
burger.  Thus  the  civil  establishment  of  these  two  provinces 
was  rapidly  drifting  into  the  Austrian  channel,  though  the 
fortresses  and  military  establishment  were  mainly  under  Prus- 
sian control. 

On  May  29  King  William  held  a  grand  council  at  the 
Schloss  in  Berlin,  to  consider  the  Schleswig- Holstein  question, 
at  which  all  of  his  ministers,  as  well  as  the  crown  prince, 
were  present.  The  king  presided  and  introduced  the  subject 
by  remarking  that  the  problem  was  a  German  as  well  as  a 
Prussian  question,  and  would  have  to  be  considered  from  both 
points  of  view ;  that  Prussia  had  made  sacrifices  in  the  late 
war  which  required  compensation,  and  that  Austria,  with 
whom  they  had  specially  to  deal,  had  never  been  left  in  doubt 
on  that  point.  Bismarck  followed,  and  called  attention  to  the 
fact  that  previous  to  1864  the  relations  between  Denmark 
and  Prussia  had  been  sufficiently  friendly,  so  that  now  the 
disadvantage  of  a  hostile  neighbor  must  be  added  to  the 

109 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 


loss  of  life  and  expenditure  of  money.  Of  the  various  plans 
proposed  for  the  solution  of  the  problem,  only  two  seemed  to 
him  practicable. 

The  first  was  that  the  two  duchies  should  be  surrendered 
to  the  Duke  of  Oldenburg,  on  condition  that  they  should  pay 
a  war  indemnity  of  eighty  million  thalers  and  place  their 
military  organization  under  the  command  of  a  Prussian 
general.  The  second  was  that  Prussia  should  make  a  formal 
demand  for  the  annexation  of  the  provinces.  This  would 
probably  result  in  a  war  with  Austria ;  but  he  believed  that 
such  a  war  was  unavoidable  so  long  as  the  Austrian  gov- 
ernment persisted  in  its  systematic  policy  of  repressing  the 
interests  of  Prussia.  He  considered  the  European  situation 
was  favorable  for  Prussia  in  the  event  of  such  a  conflict,  and 
if  it  was  to  come  at  all  it  ought  to  come  soon.  Von  Moltke 
gave  his  opinion  that  annexation  was  the  only  salutary  solu- 
tion for  Prussia,  and  the  crown  prince  supported  the  claim 
of  the  Augustenburger. 

It  must  be  admitted  that  the  only  fair  way  to  solve  this 
complicated  problem  would  have  been  for  William  I.  to  have 
surrendered  Upper  Silesia  to  Austria,  and  in  return  to  have 
annexed  the  Elbe  duchies. 

Unfortunately  there  was  another  question  mixed  up  with 
this, — that  of  the  hostile  majority  in  the  Frankfort  Diet,  which 
loaded  it  down  like  a  phantom  rider,  and  prevented  a  settle- 
ment. There  was  witchcraft  in  the  broth.  Even  Bismarck's  first 
proposition,  which  he  had  already  advanced  on  February  22, 
was  not  unreasonable, — all  circumstances  considered, — though 
it  afforded  Prussia  a  decided  increase  of  military  power.  The 
attitude  of  the  crown  prince  was  exceptional,  and  might  be 
explained  by  his  opposition  to  Bismarck,  or  by  the  influence 
of  his  English  wife ;  but  in  itself  it  amounted  to  a  second 
Olmiitz,  a  surrender  of  every  advantage  which  Prussia  might 
have  derived  from  a  successful  campaign. 

Such  a  consultation  at  Berlin  would  not  seem  likely  to  lead 
to  a  peaceable  conclusion,  and  this  feeling  was  increased  by 
the  continued  residence  of  the  Augustenburger  in  Holstein, 
and  certain  public  agitations  there,  intended  to  advance  his 

no 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

interests  and  supposed  to  be  instigated  by  him.  Accord- 
ingly, about  the  middle  of  July,  Bismarck  sent  an  ultimatum 
to  the  Austrian  government,  in  which  he  said : 

"All  negotiations  concerning  the  future  of  the  duchies  are  re- 
fused until  authority  is  established  there  and  all  agitation  done 
away  with.  When  this  is  accomplished,  Prussia  will  be  ready  to 
treat  with  Austria  concerning  the  establishment  of  the  Grand  Duke 
of  Oldenburg  as  sovereign.  The  candidacy  of  Augustenburg  is  en- 
tirely out  of  the  question  for  us,  so  long  as  the  hereditary  prince 
persists  in  his  attitude  of  usurpation." 

This  brought  Francis  Joseph  to  his  senses  for  the  time 
being,  and  a  meeting  of  the  two  monarchs,  with  their  re- 
spective ministers,  was  hastily  arranged  for  the  8th  of  August 
at  Gastein  in  Upper  Austria;  and  there  an  agreement  was 
concluded  to  the  effect  that  Lauenburg  should  be  ceded  to 
Prussia  for  three  million  thalers,  and  that  the  rights  of  Aus- 
tria and  Prussia  in  the  remaining  duchies  should  continue 
undetermined,  though  the  government  of  Holstein  was  to  be 
undertaken  by  Austria,  and  that  of  Schleswig  by  Prussia. 

It  will  be  seen  that  nothing  was  positively  decided  by  this 
arrangement  except  the  disposition  of  Lauenburg.  Count 
Belcredi,  who  had  succeeded  MensdorfT-Pouilly  after  the  ro- 
tary fashion  of  the  Austrian  court,  made  another  suggestion 
for  Upper  Silesia  as  a  settlement  of  outstanding  claims,  but 
William  and  Bismarck  would  not  listen  to  it.  Bismarck  had 
now  the  upper  hand  in  the  game,  and  played  his  cards  ac- 
cordingly. General  ManteufTel,  who  stood  next  to  the  min- 
ister-president in  the  king's  estimation,  was  appointed  gov- 
ernor of  Schleswig,  and  General  Gablenz,  an  equally  astute 
official,  was  nominated  for  Holstein  by  Francis  Joseph.  The 
evident  intention  of  the  two  monarchs  was  to  preserve  the 
peace,  if  possible ;  but  it  was  plain  that  the  arrangement  could 
not  last,  and  the  question  everybody  in  Germany  asked  was, 
What  will  be  the  next  scene  in  this  political  melodrama  ? 

The  stories  that  have  been  circulated  in  regard  to  an  under- 
standing at  this  period  between  Napoleon  III.  and  Bismarck 
have  no  documentary  foundation,  and  are  improbable  in  them- 

iii 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

selves.  There  was  no  necessity  for  such  an  understanding. 
The  fact  was  that  Bismarck  was  better  informed  in  regard  to 
French  affairs  than  Napoleon  himself.  Von  Moltke's  spies 
had  been  everywhere  through  French  territory,  and  had  dis- 
covered that  the  grande  armee  was  a  chimera, — that  Napoleon 
was  not  possessed  at  this  time  of  a  hundred  thousand  effi- 
cient troops,  although  he  supposed  that  he  had  nearly  twice 
as  many.  A  portion  of  the  French  army  was  still  in  Mexico  ; 
enlistments  had  been  discontinued  for  the  sake  of  economy, 
and  gross  frauds  had  been  practised  similar  to  those  in  the 
Austrian  army  previous  to  1859.  Bismarck  knew  that  Napo- 
leon was  not  in  a  position  to  take  the  offensive,  and  it  was  this 
fact  which  made  him  so  bold. 

Unfortunately  for  the  nephew  of  the  great  Napoleon,  the 
latter  had  written  in  his  memoirs,  "  France  is  nothing  without 
Belgium  and  the  Rhine,"  and  this  statement  was  to  Louis 
Napoleon  like  the  words  of  a  gospel.  He  had  accomplished 
much,  but  this  still  remained  to  fill  the  measure  of  his  glory. 
There  has  always  been  a  sentimental  opinion  among  the 
French  that  they  have  a  right  to  the  boundaries  of  ancient 
Gaul,  but  it  is  not  the  same  description  of  right  as  that  which 
Frederick  II.  claimed  to  lower  Silesia,  which  had  been  given 
to  his  ancestors  by  the  treaty  of  Westphalia  and  unjustly  with- 
held from  them  by  the  Austrian  emperors.  It  is  impossible  to 
consider  such  claims  when  they  go  behind  the  Dark  Ages, — 
that  long  period  of  anarchy  and  confusion  from  which  modern 
Europe  emerged.  Napoleon  III.  had  slight  chance  of  accom- 
plishing this  final  object  so  long  as  an  alliance  between  Aus- 
tria and  Prussia  was  possible.  What  he  might  have  done 
safely  enough,  as  Bismarck  remarked  afterwards,1  "  was  to 
have  taken  possession  of  Belgium.  He  had  nothing  to  fear 
except  from  England,  and  not  much  there."  So  long  as  the 
liberal  ministry  were  in  power  at  Westminster  the  British 
government  would  not  have  been  likely  to  interfere  with  him, 
nor  could  the  British  government  have  expelled  the  French 
from  Belgium  without  the  co-operation  of  some  continental 

1  Bismarck  in  the  Franco-Prussian  War. 

112 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

power.  The  Belgians  speak  French,  and  it  requires  an  expe- 
rienced foreigner  to  distinguish  a  citizen  of  Brussels  from  a 
Parisian.  The  province  would  have  been  five  times  as  valu- 
able to  France  as  Rhenish  Prussia,  but  Napoleon  did  not  see 
this  opportunity.  His  eyes  were  fixed  on  the  German  quar- 
rel, which  he  hoped  to  take  advantage  of  to  get  possession 
of  Luxemburg  and  Cologne. 

After  the  Gastein  convention  Bismarck  was  rewarded  with 
the  title  of  count,  which,  at  least,  placed  him  on  an  equality 
with  most  of  his  colleagues.  To  men  of  the  grand  sort  such 
honors  are  small  compensation.  It  did  not  help  to  remove 
the  difficulties  before  him,  and  the  following  winter  (1866) 
was  the  toughest  of  his  life.  He  felt  the  impending  conflict, 
and  all  Germans  felt  it,  as  we  felt  the  same  thing  in  America 
during  the  last  months  of  Buchanan's  administration.  The 
Progressists  in  the  National  Assembly  gave  him  more  diffi- 
culty than  ever, — men  infatuated  with  an  idea,  and  that  an 
impracticable  one:  intoxicated  with  it  as  they  might  have 
been  with  brandy.  They  would  pass  no  appropriations,  and 
Bismarck  was  in  the  same  position  as  Julius  Caesar  when  he 
borrowed  of  every  banker  in  Rome  in  order  to  obtain  the 
consulship.  It  did  not  require  a  Bismarck  to  foresee  that 
such  a  course  was  ruin  both  to  himself  and  to  the  king  unless 
he  should  meet  with  complete  success.  The  royal  family 
perceived  this,  and  opposed  him  as  energetically  as  the  Na- 
tional Assembly.  The  queen  may  have  been  influenced  by 
her  near  relationship  to  the  Augustenburger,  but  this  was  not 
likely  to  have  affected  the  crown  prince. 

The  king,  however,  remained  firm,  and  Bismarck  received 
strong  support  from  Von  Moltke,  the  chief  of  staff,  and  Von 
Roon,  the  scarcely  less  distinguished  minister  of  war.  These 
were  the  men  whom  William  I.  trusted  before  all  others,  and 
they  knew  those  state  secrets  which  were  not  divulged  even 
in  the  royal  family,  and  which  Bismarck  counted  on  for  suc- 
cess. His  consultations  with  Moltke  and  Roon  in  the  garden 
adjoining  his  house  in  Berlin  during  the  spring  of  1866  de- 
cided some  of  the  most  important  events  of  modern  times. 
The  great  marshal  and  the  great  chancellor  never  became 
8  113 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

warm  friends,  and  yet  they  acted  together  for  the  most  part 
in  such  perfect  concert  that  it  might  have  been  supposed  that 
they  had  only  one  purpose  and  one  mind. 

Meanwhile  the  situation  in  Holstein  and  Schleswig  was  be- 
coming gradually  worse.  The  Holstein  nobility  seem  to 
have  disliked  the  Austrian  government,  and  many  of  them 
signed  a  petition  to  William  I.  to  have  the  province  incorpo- 
rated with  Prussia.  Bismarck  may  have  instigated  this,  but 
they  certainly  would  not  have  done  it  at  his  bidding.  At  the 
same  time  the  Austrians  encouraged  demonstrations  for  the 
Augustenburger,  and  when  the  wife  of  his  eldest  son  went  on 
a  journey  through  the  province  ovations  were  tendered  to  her 
at  the  railway  stations,  with  expressions  of  the  liveliest  political 
sympathy.1  This  contagion  spread  over  the  border  of  Schles- 
wig, but  did  not  develop  there  to  any  considerable  extent; 
a  fact  which  indicates  that  it  was  encouraged  by  General 
Gablenz,  the  Austrian  commander  in  Holstein,  and  repressed 
by  General  Manteuffel,  who  commanded  in  Schleswig.  Both 
sides  were  intriguing,  and  the  advantage  was  in  favor  of 
Austria,  but  this  very  fact  gave  Prussia  a  diplomatic  advan- 
tage. The  petition  of  a  few  nobles  came  to  nothing,  while 
the  agitation  in  favor  of  the  Augustenburger  continued. 

The  Altona  incident  may  be  taken  as  an  example  of  the 
whole  affair.  The  leaders  of  the  Augustenburg  party  ar- 
ranged for  a  grand  mass-meeting  at  Altona,  in  Holstein,  for 
the  23d  of  January,  1866,  at  which  noted  speakers  from 
Frankfort,  Hesse,  and  Bavaria  were  to  be  present.  The  pros- 
pectus of  the  meeting  was  openly  circulated  in  both  duchies, 
and  General  Manteuffel  notified  General  Gablenz  that  it  was 
contrary  to  the  treaty  of  Gastein,  and  requested  him  to  inter- 
fere, to  prevent  it.  Gablenz  promised  to  do  this,  but  after- 
wards permitted  the  rally  to  take  place  on  condition  that  no 
definite  resolutions  should  be  adopted  by  the  assembly.  This 
technical  point  was  adhered  to,  but  several  of  the  speakers 
made  violent  attacks  on  the  Prussian  government,  and  the 


1  Von  Sybel,  iv.  291. 
114 


LIFE   OF   BISMARCK 

meeting  dissolved  with  three  rousing  cheers  for  the  Duke  of 
Augustenburg.1 

To  Bismarck  this  was  like  a  challenge  to  fight.  Not  only 
the  convention  of  Gastein  had  been  openly  disregarded,  but  a 
high  Prussian  official  had  been  hoodwinked  in  order  to  carry 
out  this  revolutionary  scheme.  Bismarck  wrote  to  the  Prus- 
sian ambassador  at  Vienna  three  days  later  with  the  request 
that  he  should  bring  his  statement  to  the  notice  of  Francis 
Joseph :  "  The  Altona  meeting  has  been  held  under  the  pro- 
tection of  the  Austrian  double-eagle,  and  has  been  permitted 
to  make  exactly  the  same  attacks  upon  Prussia  that  the 
Frankfort  Confederate  Diet  ventured  to  make,  and  on  ac- 
count of  which  the  free  city  received  a  rebuke  from  Austria. 
Prussia  cannot  suffer  Holstein  to  become  in  this  way  a  home 
of  revolutionary  sentiments,  nor  that  pledge  to  deteriorate 
which  was  confidently  placed  in  Austria's  hands  at  the  Gas- 
tein treaty.  Such  occurrences  as  these,"  continued  the  de- 
spatch, "  cannot  help  weakening  and  subverting  that  feeling 
which  his  Majesty  has  long  and  fondly  cherished, — the 
conviction  that  the  two  German  powers  naturally  belong 
together." 

The  manner  in  which  MensdorfT  treated  this  frank  and 
manly  despatch  was  characteristic  of  Austrian  diplomacy. 
He  represented  to  Werther,  the  Prussian  ambassador,  that  he 
was  greatly  concerned  at  the  Altona  incident,  was  dissatisfied 
with  the  conduct  of  Gablenz,  and  had  already  sent  a  reproof 
to  him  for  his  action  on  that  occasion.  Having  administered 
this  sop  to  William  L,  a  week  later  he  sent  a  despatch  to 
Bismarck  which  contained  the  following  statement : 

"  Prussia  has,  in  making  her  complaint  about  the  Altona  meet- 
ing, evidently  forgotten  that  it  was  her  own  government  that  once 
rejected  the  proposal  of  Austria  to  bring  forward  in  the  Confedera- 
tion a  motion  prohibiting  all  such  meetings  throughout  Germany. 
Austria  recognizes  her  duty  only  so  far  as  to  preserve  the  substance 
of  the  treaty  undiminished.  Moreover,  the  conduct  of  the  Austrian 
government  in  Holstein  depends  only  upon  its  own  promptings,  etc. 

1  Von  Sybel,  iv.  303. 
"5 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

The  same  independence  is  also  recognized  and  conceded  to  the 
royal  Prussian  government  in  Schleswig." 

This  asserted  in  substance  that  while  Francis  Joseph  ex- 
pected Prussia  to  respect  the  convention  of  Gastein,  he  in- 
tended to  administer  the  affairs  of  Holstein  according  to  the 
understanding  of  the  Frankfort  convention  of  1864,  or,  prac- 
tically, in  any  manner  that  suited  his  interest.  The  despatch 
was  at  once  an  assertion  of  the  Gastein  treaty  and  a  repudia- 
tion of  it,  and  proves  conclusively  that  if  the  convention  was 
a  temporary  makeshift  on  the  part  of  Bismarck,  it  was  not 
considered  more  seriously  by  the  Austrian  government.  If 
Bismarck  had  been  intriguing  in  Holstein,  Mensdorff  was 
quite  ready  to  meet  him  half-way  in  that  line  of  business. 
We  do  not  hear  of  any  complaint  of  Bismarck  in  this  contro- 
versy, and  it  is  quite  possible  that  the  petition  of  the  Holstein 
nobility  was  a  mere  offset  to  the  incipient  stages  of  the  Au- 
gustenburg  agitation.  General  Manteuffel,  whose  character, 
in  spite  of  his  name,  vies  with  that  of  Von  Moltke,  governed 
Schleswig  in  an  exceptional  manner,  and  if  there  was  a  party 
to  the  Gastein  convention  who  wished  for  peace,  and  sincerely 
desired  to  observe  it,  it  was  the  old  King  William  I.  Men  of 
his  time  of  life  are  not  inclined  to  go  to  war,  and  his  reluc- 
tance to  do  so  is  admitted  by  Bismarck  himself. 

What  an  opportunity  this  would  have  been  for  Cavour !  But 
Cavour  Avas  sleeping  in  dull,  cold  marble,  and  his  successor, 
the  wily  La  Marmora,  was  a  man  of  a  different  stamp.  He 
played  fast  and  loose  with  Bismarck,  and,  feeling  himself 
indispensable,  tried  to  obtain  more  than  the  lion's  share. 
Bismarck  would  hear  of  no  claim  beyond  Venetia  for  Italy  as 
the  reward  of  a  successful  campaign  ;  the  Italian  Tyrol  was  not 
to  be  thought  of.  Then  La  Marmora  intrigued  at  the  Aus- 
trian court,  hoping  to  frighten  Francis  Joseph  by  the  threat 
of  a  Prussian  alliance.  Then  the  Roumanian  revolution 
occurred,  and  he  advised  with  Louis  Napoleon  as  to  the  pos- 
sibility of  an  exchange  of  Venetia  for  Roumania  on  the  part 
of  Austria.  Napoleon  thought  this  might  be  possible,  and 
issued  a  circular  note  to  the  powers ;  but  here  the  Tsar  Alex- 

116 


LIFE  OF   BISMARCK 

ander  interfered  and  set  down  his  foot  that  the  thing  should 
not  be  done, — he  would  first  go  to  war.  Bismarck  was  well 
aware  of  all  this,  endured  it,  and  worried  through  it  all  as  a 
lawyer  does  with  a  lucrative  but  unreliable  client;  and  when 
La  Marmora  discovered  at  length  that  he  could  not  have  his 
cake  and  eat  it  too,  he  came  round  to  Bismarck's  position ;  and 
on  April  8,  1866,  an  offensive  and  defensive  alliance  between 
the  Prussian  and  Italian  governments  was  signed  by  Bismarck 
and  the  Italian  envoy  at  Berlin.  This  may  be  considered  the 
commencement  of  the  war  between  Prussia  and  Austria. 


117 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE    CAMPAIGN    OF    1 866 

NEGOTIATIONS  with  Italy  involved  also  negotiations  with 
Napoleon  III.,  whom  Bismarck  might  otherwise  have  left  as 
much  out  of  his  account  as  he  did  the  English  ministry. 
There  was  a  perpetual  alliance  between  the  Italian  and  French 
governments,  and  Victor  Emmanuel  held  to  it  with  a  chival- 
rous fidelity  which  shames  the  diplomacy  of  his  premier.  He 
would  take  no  step  forward  without  asking  Napoleon's  ad- 
vice, so  that  consulting  the  French  oracle  came  to  be  like 
consulting  the  oracle  of  Delphi.  As  a  consequence  every 
move  on  the  Berlin  chess-board  which  affected  the  govern- 
ment at  Florence  produced  an  almost  immediate  counter- 
move  at  Paris.  According  to  all  accounts  Napoleon  was 
amiability  itself;  he  approved  of  the  cession  of  Venetia  to 
Italy,  and  the  retention  of  the  two  duchies  by  Prussia,  with- 
out suggesting  any  special  compensation  for  France  and  him- 
self; but  Bismarck  was  too  well  acquainted  with  Louis  Napo- 
leon to  place  any  great  confidence  in  this.  On  one  occasion 
Napoleon  hinted  to  Baron  Goltz,  the  Prussian  envoy,  that  a 
slight  consideration  for  his  good-will  would  be  acceptable, 
and  Goltz  explained  to  him  the  difficulty  of  changing  the 
German  frontier,  though  a  matter  immaterial  to  Prussia,  on 
account  of  the  strong  national  sentiment  in  Germany,  and 
Napoleon  replied,  "  You  have  done  your  country  a  great  ser- 
vice in  clearing  up  any  misunderstandings  in  that  respect." 
Bismarck's  despatch  to  Goltz  of  February  20  speaks,  at  all 
events,  in  no  uncertain  tone : 

"Although  I  quite  agree  with  your  Excellency  that  after  a  rup- 
ture with  Austria  had  already  taken  place  we  could  hardly  secure 
the  support  of  France  upon  other  than  very  onerous  conditions,  yet 
it  seems  to  me  as  difficult  as  it  would  be  dangerous  to  take  such 

118 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

measures  as  might  induce  the  emperor  to  make  a  declaration  that 
would  in  any  way  offer  us  certain  guarantee.  If  the  views  of  the 
emperor  are  to  be  looked  upon  as  a  definite  factor  in  our  political 
calculations,  they  must  be  formulated  with  due  authority.  We  can- 
not be  satisfied  with  promises  that  are  simply  morally  binding ;  and 
even  if  the  emperor  could  be  induced  to  declare  in  definite  form 
his  possible  intentions,  it  would  be  only  with  the  understanding 
that  the  king  would  also  be  willing  to  do  the  same."  * 

This  shows  conclusively  that  up  to  that  date  no  territorial 
bargain  had  been  transacted  with  Napoleon  III. ;  nor  is  there 
any  evidence  that  one  was  made  afterwards.  Bismarck's  last 
interview  with  the  "  disinterested  friend"  was  at  Biarritz  the 
preceding  October,  and  in  his  lengthy  report  of  it  to  the  king 
there  is  not  a  definite  statement  of  Napoleon's  that  any  one 
can  take  hold  of,  except  a  plain  disavowal  of  any  intention  to 
take  possession  of  Belgium. 

Louis  Napoleon  does  not  appear  in  Bismarck's  report  either 
as  a  sagacious  man  or  a  person  of  much  force.  He  after- 
wards, however,  volunteered  a  shrewd  suggestion  that  the 
Schleswig-Holstein  problem  was  not  a  sufficient  excuse  to 
place  before  the  w6rld  for  going  to  war  with  Austria ;  that  the 
Prussian  government  should  appear  to  be  actuated  by  a  more 
important  principle.  This  placed  Bismarck  in  the  position  of 
a  man  who  is  obliged  to  show  his  hand  in  order  to  prevent 
distrust,  and  who,  if  he  committed  himself,  would  either  be 
obliged  to  adhere  to  some  specified  plan  or  incur  the  odium 
of  a  broken  agreement.  His  reply  was,  that  the  Prussian 
government  desired  a  reorganization  of  German  affairs  which 
would  make  Germany  independent  of  the  Austrian  empire  and 
Austrian  influence ;  that  he  wished  to  form  a  confederation 
of  the  North  German  states,  with  their  military  affairs  in  the 
control  of  Prussia,  and  a  South  German  confederation,  with 
Bavaria  for  its  military  leader.  Such  a  plan  was  well  adapted 
to  secure  the  French  emperor's  approval,  for  Bavaria  had  been 
the  ally  of  Napoleon  I.  and  Louis  XIV. ;  her  proclivities  were 
antagonistic  to  Prussia,  and  the  Frankfort  confederation  would 

1  Von  Sybel,  iv.  82. 
119 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 


be  replaced  by  three  distinct  political  unities.  Bismarck, 
however,  was  better  informed  in  regard  to  the  internal  affairs 
of  Bavaria,  and  had  reason  to  believe  that  in  a  national  emer- 
gency he  could  count  on  the  support  of  her  government. 

Although  the  French  minister  of  foreign  affairs,  Drouyn 
de  1'Huys,  had  .informed  Baron  Goltz  that  France  required 
no  compensation  worth  mentioning,  yet  when  the  treaty 
of  the  alliance  between  Italy  and  Prussia  had  been  signed, 
Napoleon  began  to  fear  that  the  latter  might  derive  too 
good  a  bargain  from  it.  .  The  forces  on  either  side  were 
very  nearly  equal,  and  if  the  Prussians  were  better  soldiers 
than  the  Austrians,  the  Austrians  were  better  than  the 
Italians ;  but  the  geographical  position  of  Austria  placed  that 
country  between  two  fires,  and  he  may  have  remembered, 
also,  that  the  Prussian  troops  were  armed  with  breech-loading 
rifles,  a  weapon  in  which  he  himself  had  great  confidence. 
He  therefore  reopened  the  negotiations  with  La  Marmora  in 
regard  to  a  peaceable  cession  of  Venetia,  which  he  thought 
might  now  be  obtained,  in  return  for  the  withdrawal  of  Italy 
from  the  Prussian  alliance.  He  believed  that  in  this  way 
Prussia,  also,  might  be  forced  to  cede  Silesia  to  Austria,  and 
be  compensated  for  this  severe  loss  by  the  annexation  of 
Schleswig  and  Holstein.  As  it  was  certain  that  William  I. 
would  never  give  up  Silesia  without  a  bitter  struggle,  this 
plan  evidently  included  an  alliance  between  France  and  Aus- 
tria for  that  purpose,  the  result  of  which,  it  was  anticipated, 
would  be  a  crushing  defeat  for  Prussia  and  the  loss  of  her 
territory  on  the  west  bank  of  the  Rhine.  Fortunately  for 
both  Italy  and  Prussia,  there  was  a  king  behind  La  Marmora 
who  had  never  yet  broken  his  word,  and  who  considered  a 
political  alliance  as  a  sacred  obligation.  La  Marmora  replied 
accordingly  that  he  considered  it  a  matter  of  duty  and  national 
honor  not  to  break  loose  from  Prussia,  especially  as  the  Prus- 
sian government  was  preparing  for  war,  and  had  declared  to 
the  powers  that  it  would  invade  Austria  if  Austria  attacked 
Italy.  Victor  Emmanuel  maintained  the  same  position,  even 
after  the  offer  of  Venetia  had  been  made,  without  taking 
Silesia  into  consideration.  Such  was  the  difference  between 

120 


LIFE  OF   BISMARCK 

these  two  sovereigns;  but  the  plan  of  Napoleon  was  a 
chimerical  one,  and  might  have  finally  resulted  in  the  union 
of  South  Germany  with  Prussia  against  France,  as  in  1870. 

Before  the  war  began  there  was  still  another  slight  pacific 
ruffle  on  the  troubled  waters  of  German  diplomacy.  Baron 
Gablenz,  a  brother  of  General  Gablenz,  and  a  member  of  the 
Berlin  Chamber  of  Deputies,  thought  he  had  hit  upon  a  plan 
for  solving  the  Schleswig-Holstein  question  and  preventing 
the  impending  conflict.  It  was,  in  brief,  that  the  two  duchies 
should  be  formed  into  a  state  under  the  authority  of  a  Prussian 
prince;  that  Prussia  should  pay  five  million  thalers  for  the 
harbor  of  Kiel,  and  the  duchies  twenty  millions  more  for  a 
war  compensation ;  that  Austria  should  have  the  supreme 
command  of  the  South  German  troops,  and  Prussia  of  the 
North  German  forces.1  This  would  seem  to  be  the  most 
sensible  course  yet  suggested,  and  General  Gablenz  advised 
his  brother  to  submit  it  to  Count  Mensdorff.  Thus  fortified, 
Baron  Gablenz  went  to  Vienna  to  consult  Mensdorff,  who 
promised  that  the  Austrian  cabinet  would  consider  his  propo- 
sition seriously  if  he  would  first  obtain  the  King  of  Prussia's 
approval.  The  baron  hurried  back  to  Berlin.  It  was  the  1st 
of  May,  and  eighty  thousand  Austrian  troops  were  already 
assembled  on  the  frontier  of  Silesia.  Bismarck  had  no  hopes 
of  peace,  but  he  spoke  favorably  of  Gablenz's  plan  to  Wil- 
liam I.,  who  cordially  approved  it.  Gablenz  returned  to 
Mensdorff,  who  this  time  referred  him  to  Francis  Joseph 
himself.  "  There  must  be  some  reasons  why  these  satisfac- 
tory propositions  were  not  made  before  they  could  be  no 
longer  of  service,"  said  the  politic  emperor,  and  there  the 
matter  ended.  Could  better  proof  be  obtained  of  the  unwill- 
ingness of  the  Austrian  court  to  come  to  a  reasonable  agree- 
ment ? 2 

Amid  all  this  wilderness  of  barren  and  unprofitable  diplo- 
macy, there  is  one  voice  that  sounds  clear  and  true, — the 

1  Von  Sybel,  iv.  247. 

2  Von  Beust  says  (Memoirs,  i.  324), "  Although  Mensdorff  severely  condemned 
all  the  despatches  that  aggravated  the  situation  and  prepared  the  war,  he  was 
weak  enough  to  sign  them." 

121 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

voice  of  Bismarck.  He  occasionally  hedges  in  his  state- 
ments, as  a  diplomat  may,  but  they  are  always  worth  having, 
and  more  often  he  goes  frankly  and  directly  to  the  point. 
Take,  for  instance,  this  passage  from  his  directions  to  Baron 
Goltz  in  regard  to  a  possible  arrangement  with  Napoleon  III.: 

"The  lack  of  honesty  towards  Austria,  of  which  France  would 
possess  the  means  of  convicting  us  at  any  moment,  would  not  only 
cost  us  the  confidence  of  Austria  for  a  long  time  to  come,  but  would 
as  well  bring  upon  us  the  condemnation  of  the  people  and  the 
governments  throughout  Germany.  It  would  excite  great  distrust 
of  us  in  the  mind  of  England,  who  would  see  herself  indirectly 
threatened  through  us  upon  that  side  where  she  is  fond  of  counting 
upon  our  help  in  the  event  of  a  great  conflict.  It  would  also  cool 
down  our  relations  with  Russia.  We  should  be  isolated  from  the 
other  powers  and  dependent  upon  France  alone. ' ' x 

It  was  no  cynic  of  human  nature  like  the  Edinburgh  re- 
viewer that  wrote  such  a  statement,  but  one  who  knew  that 
the  only  sound  basis  of  politics,  as  of  mercantile  affairs,  is 
honesty  and  mutual  confidence.  His  photograph,  taken  at 
this  time,  gives  the  impression  of  a  determined,  clear-sighted, 
and  veracious  man.  The  cautious  crow's-foot  in  the  corner 
of  his  eye  shows  that  he  is  capable  of  dissimulation,  but  the 
manly  expression  forbids  our  mistaking  him  for  a  trickster. 
One  element,  at  least,  we  can  always  eliminate  from  Bismarck's 
motives,  and  that  is  personal  ambition.  He  admits,  in  one 
of  his  letters,  that  he  is  sometimes  swayed  by  personal  feel- 
ing, but  this  admission  is  in  his  favor.  If  a  man  has  personal 
ambition  he  shows  it  as  a  boy,  either  in  his  studies,  his  exer- 
cise, or  in  a  desire  to  perform  exceptional  feats.  We  hear  of 
nothing  like  this  in  Bismarck's  youth.  He  was  always  inter- 
ested in  politics,  and  often  wearied  his  boon  companions  at 
Kniephof  with  long  dissertations  on  political  subjects ;  but 
though,  as  one  of  the  landed  gentry,  his  entrance  into  political 
life  was  an  easy  one,  he  made  no  effort  in  that  direction  until 
the  public  excitement  in  1847  roused  him  to  unusual  exer- 


1  Von  Sybel,  iv.  83. 

122 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

tion.  When  his  king  called  him,  he  answered,  "  I  am  ready ;" 
but  in  his  letters  he  always  speaks  with  the  same  nonchalance 
of  his  appointment  to  the  Diet  at  Frankfort,  his  mission  to 
St.  Petersburg,  and,  finally,  his  elevation  to  the  highest  po- 
sition in  the  state.  He  does  not  appear  to  have  cared  for 
money,  except  to  supply  the  needs  of  his  family,  and  his  life 
at  Schonhausen  and  Varzin  was  that  of  a  quiet  country  gen- 
tleman. 

I  have  always  held  this  opinion  of  Bismarck,  and  I  was 
greatly  pleased  to  find  it  confirmed  by  the  statement  of  Baron 
Von  der  Pfordten,  the  wisest  of  Bavarian  ministers,  in  1866, 
and  the  one  man  outside  of  Prussia  who  seems  to  have  under- 
stood the  Berlin  sphinx.  Although  an  opponent  of  Bismarck 
to  a  certain  extent,  he  could  not  help  respecting  him.  "  They 
make  a  great  mistake,"  he  said  to  Prince  Reuss,  "  who  at- 
tribute personal  ambition  to  Bismarck.  He  is  the  incarnation 
of  the  Prussian  state.  He  is  no  opponent  of  Austria  on  prin- 
ciple ;  on  the  contrary,  he  would  be  glad  to  join  hands  with 
her,  but  always  on  the  condition  that  she  will  not  forever  be 
placing  obstacles  in  the  way  of  a  justifiable  Prussian  policy. 
This  is  a  thoroughly  German  idea,  and  just  for  this  reason  I 
place  confidence  in  that  man  who  is  its  chief  representative." x 
Von  der  Pfordten  had  listened  to  Bismarck's  discussion  of 
the  German  problem,  and  believed  in  his  plans ;  and  this 
kernel  of  Prussian  sentiment  in  Bavaria  at  that  time  is  signifi- 
cant, and  proved  of  great  importance  in  the  events  that 
followed. 

Such  was  the  judgment  of  an  enlightened  Bavarian,  and  we 
can  place  it  beside  the  action  of  a  mean,  bigoted  Communist. 
As  compared  with  the  first  portion  of  the  nineteenth  century, 
the  latter  half  has  shown  a  decided  tendency  to  social  de- 
moralization. James  Russell  Lowell  was  confident  that  he 
perceived  it,  in  both  Europe  and  America,  twenty-five  years 
ago.  He  judged  of  it  by  the  literature  which  people  were 
reading,  and  from  the  conversation  of  people  whom  he  met. 
It  has  shown  itself  in  various  ways,  but  in  none  so  distinctly 

1  Despatch  of  Prince  Reuss,  April  10,  1 866. 
123 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

as  in  the  tendency  to  assassination.  During  the  eighteenth 
century  and  the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth  assassination  was 
hardly  known.  There  were  two  attempts  on  the  life  of  Napo- 
leon, which  is  not  surprising,  considering  the  excitement  of 
those  times ;  but  since  1850  two  Presidents  of  the  United  States 
and  a  President  of  the  French  Republic,  as  well  as  a  number 
of  minor  officials,  have  been  assassinated,  and  attempts  have 
been  made  on  the  life  of  almost  every  sovereign  in  Europe. 
Such  a  condition  of  affairs  was  never  known  before  in  Christian 
countries,  not  even  during  the  sixteenth  century.  In  fact,  the 
men  who  perpetrated  these  outrages  were  not  Christians,  but 
atheists,  the  natural  product  of  the  atheistic  philosophy  of 
the  present  day.  It  is  the  result  of  infinite  self-conceit,  of  a 
man  becoming  a  god  unto  himself.  Such  were  the  characters 
of  Wilkes  Booth  and  Guiteau,  though  they  did  not  belong  to 
the  Communists.  To  assassinate  a  Caligula  or  a  Commodus, 
monsters  of  depravity,  is  honorable ;  but  he  who  assassinates 
a  man  of  good  character  like  the  Tsar  Alexander,  because  he 
represents  a  different  set  of  political  principles  from  the  as- 
sassin, becomes  a  Caligula  himself.  The  Nihilists  are  the 
cobras  of  modern  society. 

Charles  Cohen,  the  would-be  assassin  of  Bismarck,  has 
been  spoken  of  as  a  high-minded  but  fanatical  youth ;  but  I 
can  discover  nothing  in  him  but  a  base  and  degraded  soul, 
the  fit  companion  of  Booth  and  Ravaijlac.  He  belonged  to 
the  Internationals,  and  no  doubt  was  urged  on  to  the  busi- 
ness. So  much  may  be  said  in  extenuation  for  his  crime.  It 
was  on  the  /th  of  May,  1866,  that  he  came  up  behind  Bis- 
marck on  the  Unter  den  Linden  and  fired  two  shots  at  him. 
One  of  these  went  through  Bismarck's  coat,  and  the  other 
may  have  missed  him  as  he  turned  round.  He  sprang  at 
Cohen,  but  before  he  could  reach  him  the  latter  fired  another 
shot,  which  is  supposed  to  have  glanced  off  Bismarck's  ribs. 
He  fired  once  or  twice  again  while  he  was  in  Bismarck's 
clutches,  and  yet  Bismarck  escaped  without  even  a  trouble- 
some wound.  It  was  reported  in  Vienna  that  Bismarck  was 
protected  by  a  shirt  of  mail,  and  if  so,  he  showed  remarkable 
foresight ;  but  his  friends  have  denied  this,  though  the  fact 

124 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

was  no  discredit  to  him.  Cohen  had  provided  himself  with 
a  dose  of  poison,  which  he  swallowed  soon  after  being  taken 
to  prison.  Bismarck's  escape  seemed  miraculous,  and  did 
much  to  establish  popular  confidence  in  him,  while  the  Prus- 
sian people  realized  how  nearly  they  had  lost  so  valuable  a 
man.  There  were  few  persons  of  note  in  Berlin  who  did  not 
call  to  congratulate  him  that  evening. 

The  startling  sensation  which  went  through  Europe  at  the 
criminal  attempt  of  this  ruffian  soon  subsided  in  the  exciting 
events  that  followed.  La  Marmora's  reply  to  Napoleon  III. 
was  politely  received,  but  its  effect  must  have  been  irritating 
to  an  exceptional  degree ;  for  it  placed  the  emperor  in  the 
position  of  a  man  who  had  been  caught  cheating  at  cards. 
Neither  was  the  news  from  Berlin  such  as  to  afford  him  con- 
solation. As  Bismarck  saw  the  game  before  him  more  and 
more  clearly,  he  became  more  confident  and  obdurate.  Bene- 
detti,  who  had  become  celebrated  as  Louis  Napoleon's  man 
of  business,  wrote  to  him  in  May  from  Berlin  that  the  chief 
obstacle  to  an  understanding  was  the  sentiment  of  the  whole 
Prussian  nation,  which  firmly  opposed  surrender  of  the  small- 
est portion  of  German  soil,  either  their  own  or  of  any  other 
state.  "  I  know  of  no  one,"  he  wrote,  "  besides  Count  Bis- 
marck, that  has  any  idea  of  the  possibility  that  the  cession  of 
territory  to  France  might  lie  in  the  interests  of  Prussia,  and 
even  he  would  consent  only  to  a  change  that  would  more  or 
less  improve  the  line  of  the  frontier."  Bismarck  was  wise 
enough  to  be  willing  to  make  a  small  sacrifice  for  the  sake  of 
a  great  good ;  but  this  public  sentiment  in  regard  to  the  invio- 
lability of  German  territory  is  another  evidence  of  the  strong 
current  that  was  running  in  favor  of  German  national  unity. 

Napoleon  had  now  been  foiled  by  his  own  weapons,  and 
the  "  disinterested  friend"  determined  to  play  a  bolder  and 
more  reckless  game.  Emissaries  from  Pius  IX.,  who  was 
now  becoming  greatly  alarmed  for  the  States  of  the  Church, 
were  at  work  with  the  empress,  and  Eugenie  gave  her  femi- 
nine opinion  that  in  case  of  Italian  success  there  was  grave 
danger  that  the  influence  of  Victor  Emmanuel  would  supplant 
that  of  her  husband  in  "  the  orient."  At  the  same  time  an  inci- 

125 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

dent  occurred  which  greatly  assisted  in  facilitating  Napoleon's 
sudden  change  of  base.  Thiers,  the  French  Warwick,  who 
undid  Louis  Philippe,  made  a  speech  in  the  French  assembly 
which  might  be  characterized  as  the  essence  of  political  mean- 
ness. He  denounced  the  alliance  between  Prussia  and  Italy  as 
likely  to  strengthen  both  nations ;  France  had  the  first  position 
in  European  affairs,  and  the  way  for  France  to  be  strong  was 
to  keep  other  nations  weak.  Italian  unity  was  as  dangerous 
as  German  unity  would  be.  The  aim  of  Prussia  evidently  lay 
in  the  direction  of  German  consolidation.  It  was  the  duty  of 
the  French  government  to  prevent  Italy  from  taking  part  in 
the  cursed  war  which  was  then  approaching. 

Louis  Napoleon  has  never  been  credited  with  such  a  cyni- 
cal statement  as  this,  and,  in  truth,  his  previous  policy  had 
been  of  a  much  more  liberal  character ;  but  if  he  had  insti- 
gated Thiers's  speech  it  could  not  have  better  served  his  pur- 
pose. The  applause  from  the  opposition  benches  was  drowned 
by  the  supporters  of  the  government,  and  this  declaration  of 
French  superiority  was  telegraphed  all  over  the  world.  In 
order  to  attest  the  project  he  had  been  fostering  so  zealously, 
Napoleon  now  proposed  a  peace  congress  to  settle  the  affairs 
of  Germany  in  a  manner  agreeable  to  other  nations.  He  com- 
municated his  plan  to  Lord  Clarendon,  the  English  foreign 
minister,  who,  as  party  feeling  in  London  was  running  strong 
against  Prussia,  readily  assented  to  it.1  Alexander  and  Victor 
Emmanuel  also  expressed  their  assent,  and  it  may  seem  sur- 
prising that  Bismarck  should  have  done  so ;  but  there  was 
nothing  he  would  have  liked  better  at  this  time  than  to 
expose  the  political  programme  of  Austria  in  contrast  with  his 
own  before  a  congress  of  the  great  powers.  Exactly  how 
the  congress  was  expected  to  rearrange  German  affairs  re- 
mains in  doubt.  Napoleon  must  have  sketched  out  a  plan  of 
some  kind  for  Clarendon  and  La  Marmora.  It  is  certain  that 
Italy  would  not  have  consented  to  it  without  the  cession  of 

1  It  was  at  this  time  that  the  New  York  Nation  spoke  of  Bismarck  as  the 
most  reckless  political  gambler  that  ever  sat  at  the  helm  of  state,  and  predicted 
that  he  would  be  duped  by  Napoleon  III., — a  reflection  of  English  public 
opinion. 

126 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

Venetia,  and  equally  certain  that  Austria  would  have  required 
compensation  for  this.  That  Napoleon  proposed  to  have 
Silesia  restored  to  Austria,  and  Prussia  compensated  with  the 
kingdom  of  Saxony,  is  a  Prussian  supposition,  which  still  re- 
quires confirmation.  The  Austrian  reply  to  the  circular  note 
was  characteristic ;  it  was  that  Austria  would  take  part  in  the 
congress  only  on  condition  that  none  of  the  powers  repre- 
sented should  be  expected  to  cede  territory  which  had  been 
guaranteed  by  existing  treaties.  This  was,  of  course,  a  nulli- 
fication of  the  original  project,  and  killed  it  dead.1  No  won- 
der if  Count  Belcredi,  the  successor  of  Mensdorff,  dreaded  to 
face  Bismarck  before  an  international  congress. 

It  was  now  the  last  of  May,  and  trade  in  Germany  was  at 
a  stand-still.  The  political  atmosphere  was  sultry  and  oppres- 
sive, like  the  death-like  calm  which  precedes  the  tornado. 
People  wished  the  war  would  begin,  rather  than  remain  in 
this  state  of  suspense.  Von  Moltke  argued  that  every  day's 
delay  was  to  the  advantage  of  Austria,  but  certain  diplomatic 
formalities  had  to  be  gone  through  with  before  the  challenge 
to  arms  was  made.  It  is  amusing  to  read  at  this  stage  of 
proceedings  how  each  party  tried  to  cast  the  responsibility  of 
hostilities  on  the  other.  Neither  wished  to  appear  before  the 
world  as  the  aggressor.  "  Hypocrisy,"  said  Wendell  Phillips, 
11  is  the  homage  which  vice  pays  to  virtue."  In  the  seven- 
teenth century  princes  and  cabinets  did  not  trouble  themselves 
much  about  such  formalities,  and  Louis  XIV.  marched  his 
troops  into  Strasburg  without  a  day's  warning.  As  a  matter 
of  fact,  the  war  was  the  result  of  a  mutual  understanding,  and 
its  responsibility  went  back  to  the  first  Frankfort  Diet  after 
the  revolution  of  1848.  The  true  responsibility  of  it  rested 
with  Prince  Schwarzenberg  and  his  imperial  pupil.  It  had  been 
gradually  coming  on  ever  since  Bismarck  had  asked  the  Aus- 
trian delegate  for  a  light  for  his  cigar, — a  light  which  at  length 
produced  a  terrible  conflagration. 

Louis  Napoleon  cuts  a  sorrowful  figure  during  these  last 

1  Von  Beust  says  Austria  declined  the  congress  proposed  by  Napoleon  III.,  or, 
what  amounted  to  the  same  thing,  accepted  it  with  such  restrictions  that  it  never 
came  to  pass.  Memoirs,  i.  290. 

127 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

days  of  peace.  His  intrigues  at  the  court  of  Vienna  were 
incessant,  but  the  exact  form  which  they  took  will  never  be 
known.  Baron  Goltz  discovered  that  interviews  between 
Napoleon  and  the  Austrian  envoy  at  Paris  were  of  daily 
occurrence,  and  it  was  reported  to  Bismarck  from  Rome  that 
the  French  ambassador  was  as  frequent  a  visitor  at  the  Vati- 
can. At  the  same  time  the  Duke  of  Saxe-Coburg  also  showed 
Bismarck  a  letter  from  Count  Belcredi,  in  which  it  was  stated 
that  Francis  Joseph  had  arrived  at  a  complete  understanding 
with  Napoleon  III.,  and  if  Prussia  went  to  war  she  would  have 
to  deal  not  only  with  Austria  but  with  France.  Professor 
Miiller  says,  "  It  is  uncertain  what  Napoleon  was  to  acquire 
in  accordance  with  this  carefully  guarded  treaty,  but  it  is  not 
likely  that  Austria,  which  has  not  scrupled  in  times  gone  by 
to  sacrifice  German  territory,  would  have  hesitated  to  cede 
the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine,  if  by  so  doing  she  could  defeat 
her  hated  rival."1  Von  Sybel's  statement,  that  finally  Prince 
Napoleon  telegraphed  to  the  King  of  Italy  that  Bismarck  had 
made  a  secret  agreement  with  Francis  Joseph — a  telegram 
which  Victor  Emmanuel  immediately  reported  to  Count  Use- 
dorn  at  Berlin,  and  which  Bismarck  pronounced  an  infernal 
lie — is  by  no  means  incredible,  but  needs  to  be  supported  by 
documentary  evidence.2 

It  is  interesting  to  note  the  successive  steps  by  which  Prus- 
sia and  Austria  reached  a  collision.  On  June  I  Belcredi  ap- 
pealed to  the  Diet  at  Frankfort  for  a  final  settlement  of  the 
Schleswig-Holstein  question.  Bismarck  then  declared  that 
this  was  contrary  to  the  Gastein  convention,  and  an  order  was 
sent  to  ManteufTel  to  march  his  troops  into  Holstein  and  form 
a  government  there  in  conjunction  with  the  Austrian  com- 
mander, according  to  the  status  previous  to  Gastein.  Gablenz 
refused  to  co-operate  with  ManteufTel  and  retired  to  Altona. 
ManteufTel  marched  in  with  twenty  thousand  men  and  estab- 
lished a  government  of  his  own,  and  Bismarck  issued  a  circu- 
lar to  the  German  princes,  a  far-reaching  act  of  statesmanship, 


1  Miiller's  Political  History,  p.  331. 
a  Von  Sybel,  iv.  473. 
128 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

in  which  he  outlined  the  proposition  of  a  German  national 
union,  based  on  popular  suffrage,  with  Prussia  for  its  military 
leader.  In  regard  to  this  circular  he  wrote  to  the  Duke  of 
Saxe-Coburg : 

"  The  propositions  contained  in  the  outline  are  in  no  case  ex- 
haustive, but  are  the  results  of  the  necessary  consideration  of  various 
influences  with  which  a  compromise  must  be  made,  infra  muros  et 
extra.  But  if  we  can  bring  even  these  to  their  actual  realization, 
then  one  portion,  at  least,  will  be  accomplished  of  the  task  of  ren- 
dering harmless  that  net  of  historical  boundaries  which  runs  through 
Germany;  and  it  is  unfair  to  expect  that  one  generation  or  one 
man,  even  my  most  gracious  sovereign,  should  in  a  day  make  good 
what  generations  of  our  ancestors  have  in  the  course  of  centuries 
spoiled." 

The  essence  of  Bismarck's  plan  consisted  of  the  following 
points : 

"Exclusion  of  Austria;  creation  of  a  confederate  marine;  di- 
vision of  the  military  command,  Prussia  taking  the  north  and 
Bavaria  the  south ;  a  parliament  to  be  elected  by  the  people  on  the 
basis  of  a  universal  suffrage,  and  which  should  have  the  functions 
already  specified  above  and  sharply  defined ;  and,  finally,  the 
regulations  of  the  future  relations  with  German  Austria  by  means 
of  a  special  treaty. ' ' * 

The  present  organization  of  Germany  was  established  sub- 
stantially on  this  basis. 

At  that  time,  however,  it  was  a  revolutionary  act.  On  the 
nth  of  June  the  Austrian  delegate  moved  in  the  Diet  at 
Frankfort  that  the  whole  army  of  the  confederation  should  be 
mobilized  in  order  to  bring  Prussia  to  terms,  and  on  the  I4th 
the  Diet,  by  a  vote  of  nine  to  six,  declared  war  against  Prus- 
sia. The  only  princes  who  supported  Prussia  in  this  emer- 
gency were  the  Dukes  of  Oldenburg,  Mecklenburg,  and  of  the 
Saxon  duchies  and  Luxemburg ;  but  the  free  cities  also,  ex- 
cept Frankfort,  took  the  same  side,  and  the  people  of  North 

1  Von  Sybel,  iv.  484. 
9  129 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

Germany  showed  their  political  tendencies  in  an  unmistakable 
manner.  The  chambers  of  Cassel,  Nassau,  and  Darmstadt 
refused  to  appropriate  money  for  the  campaign.  In  the  Han- 
over assembly  a  resolution  was  passed  in  favor  of  neutrality, 
and  the  people  of  Leipsic  petitioned  the  King  of  Saxony  to 
follow  a  similar  course.  Bismarck  issued  a  manifesto  to  the 
governments  of  Saxony,  Hanover,  Cassel,  and  Nassau,  prom- 
ising them,  if  they  would  dismiss  their  forces  and  remain  at 
peace,  that  their  rights  and  the  integrity  of  their  territories 
would  be  respected.1 

The  war  of  1866  closely  resembled  in  its  political  bearing 
the  war  which  had  just  been  finished  in  the  United  States.  In 
both  instances  the  nucleus  of  strife  originated  in  the  political 
fallacy  that  a  sovereignty  can  exist  within  a  sovereignty.  Even 
Abraham  Lincoln,  who  denied  the  right  of  secession  and  was 
always  true  to  his  principles,  spoke  in  1859  of  Massachusetts 
as  "  a  sovereign  State."  Four  years  of  bloody  warfare  were  re- 
quired to  knock  that  notion  in  the  head.  "  Sovereignty,"  said 
Bismarck  afterwards  in  the  German  Reichstag,  "  is  a  unit  and 
must  remain  a  unit, — the  sovereignty  of  law."  The  Austrian 
motion  in  the  Diet  for  the  mobilization  of  forces  was,  in  fact, 
unconstitutional.  It  properly  required  a  committee  of  inves- 
tigation to  inquire  into  the  facts  of  the  case  and  make  a  report 
on  the  subject  before  it  could  be  legally  adopted ;  but  it  was 
part  of  Bismarck's  strategy  to  allow  it  to  pass  with  a  simple 
protestation  on  the  part  of  Prussia,  for  he  was  right  glad  to 
have  the  old  confederate  government  place  itself  on  record  in 
that  way. 

There  is  a  story  which  came  to  me  through  a  Prussian 
naval  officer  that  on  the  evening  of  June  15,  1866,  Bismarck 
was  at  a  small  party  in  Berlin,  when  a  royal  messenger  entered 
and  delivered  a  letter  to  him.  As  he  was  writing  the  reply  a 
young  lady  said  to  him,  "  Let  me  read,  Count  Bismarck,  what 
important  thing  you  are  writing,"  and  he  covered  the  paper 
with  his  hand.  When  the  messenger  had  left  the  room  Bis- 

1  This  should  be  borne  in  mind  in  connection  with  Bismarck's  course  of 
procedure  after  the  war  was  finished. 

130 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

marck  rose  and  said  quietly  to  the  company,  "  I  trust  it  is  for 
the  best,  but  to-morrow  we  fight." x 

An  investigation  of  the  genesis  of  war  in  civilized  countries 
might  prove  a  more  profitable  study  than  the  present  discus- 
sion of  free  trade  and  protection.  Von  Hoist  has  done  some- 
thing towards  it  in  his  elaborate  analysis  of  the  slavery 
question  in  America.  Generally  speaking,  wars  are  sent  to 
mankind  for  their  political  sins,  and,  as  a  rule,  it  is  the  right 
that  conquers,  though,  as  in  private  families,  the  innocent 
suffer  with  the  guilty.  It  must  be  admitted  that  the  wars 
which  have  taken  place  since  1855,  with  the  exception  of  the 
Servia-Bulgarian  and  Greco-Turkish  wars,  have  been  greatly 
to  the  advantage  of  civilization.  If  we  consider  the  ancient 
world,  it  is  evident  from  the  victories  of  Pyrrhus  over  the 
Romans,  even  such  as  they  were,  that  if  the  Greeks  had  not 
degenerated  after  that  time  they  would  not  have  become  the 
tributaries  of  Rome.  If  the  Italians  had  remained  as  brave 
as  they  were  in  the  time  of  Marius,  it  is  not  likely  that  their 
country  would  have  been  overrun  by  Goths  and  Vandals. 
The  Saxons  were  conquered  by  the  Normans  because  they 
had  become  sluggish  and  effeminate ;  and  if  the  Poles  had 
possessed  an  efficient  government,  with  a  well-disciplined 
army,  in  the  last  century,  it  is  not  probable  that  their  country 
would  have  been  divided  up  among  neighboring  states.  The 
Prussian  idea  is  that  it  does  every  man  good  to  be  a  soldier ; 
and  Sumner's  theory  that  a  first-rate  military  organization 
tends  to  promote  warfare  between  nations  is  not  supported 
by  facts.  Two  vigorous  rival  nations  like  the  French  and 
English,  always  likely  to  misunderstand  each  other,  cannot 
exist  side  by  side  without  some  sort  of  military  organization ; 
and  if  one  increases  it,  the  other  must  do  so  likewise.  The 
army  of  Frederick  the  Great  maintained  peace  in  Europe  for 
thirty  years,  a  longer  period  than  had  ever  been  known  be- 
fore. War  is,  after  all,  not  so  very  much  wors^e  than  peace. 
A  week  in  one  of  our  largest  city  hospitals  is  nearly  equal  to 


1  According  to  Hesekiel,  Bismarck  received  the  royal  order  in  his  own  garden 
about  midnight. 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

a  battle-field ;  and  the  fishermen  who  are  drowned  every  year, 
the  railway  navvies  who  are  killed,  and  the  other  casualties  in 
dangerous  employments  constitute  a  startling  sum  total.  It 
is  said  that  in  China  men  and  women  throw  themselves  into 
the  rivers  every  night  to  avoid  starvation.  People  rarely 
starve  to  death  in  prosperous  America,  but  thousands  lose 
their  lives  every  year  in  the  effort  to  gain  a  living.  War 
takes  away  from  men  the  fear  of  death,  and  every  one  who 
dies  makes  room  for  some  other  in  this  crowded  world,  and 
the  life  of  a  soldier  is  better  than  that  in  a  cotton-mill. 

"  He  alone  deserves  his  freedom  and  his  life 
Who  daily  conquers  it  in  strife. ' ' * 

What  Garibaldi  was  to  Cavour,  Von  Moltke  was  to  Bis- 
marck. Without  Bismarck  the  most  famous  general  of  his 
time  might  never  have  been  heard  of  beyond  the  limits  of 
Germany;  but  without  Von  Moltke,  Bismarck  might  never 
have  accomplished  those  great  plans  which  continually  urged 
him  onward.  Among  military  inventors  Von  Moltke  stands 
next  to  Napoleon  and  Frederick,  and  it  is  admitted  that  both 
as  a  strategist  and  as  a  tactician  he  has  never  been  surpassed. 
No  other  general  except  Napoleon  has  won  such  decisive 
victories,  and  even  the  hero  of  Austerlitz  might  have  been 
surprised  at  the  capture  of  an  army  of  one  hundred  and  thirty 
thousand  men.  Whether  he  could  have  accomplished  such 
feats  as  Wellington  at  Waterloo,  Frederick  at  Leuthen,  or 
Napoleon  in  his  Italian  campaigns,  cannot  be  determined,  for 
he  never  found  himself  placed  in  like  emergencies. 

Von  Moltke  had  not  at  this  time  developed  that  system  of 
tactics  for  which  he  will  always  be  remembered, — a  method 
of  deploying  troops  so  as  to  capture  his  adversary,  as  it  were, 
in  a  net.  The  strategy  of  his  campaign  in  1866  can  best  be 
appreciated  by  considering  the  complications  which  it  in- 
volved, and  tl^e  absolute  certainty  with  which  his  dispositions 
effected  their  purpose.  He  had  six  different  armies  to  deal 
with,  varying  from  twenty  thousand  to  two  hundred  and  fifty 

1  Faust,  Part  ii.,  Act  v. 
132 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

thousand  men.  The  main  Austrian  army,  under  General 
Benedek,  was  extended  from  Cracow  to  the  right  bank  of  the 
Elbe,  in  Bohemia.  Prince  Clam-Gallas  protected  the  valley  of 
the  Iser,  a  branch  of  the  Elbe,  with  a  force  of  sixty  thousand 
men,  much  too  weak  for  the  purpose.  The  Bavarian  army 
of  forty-five  thousand  men  was  mobilized  on  the  Danube. 
The  Darmstadt-Nassau-Wurtemberg  army  of  nearly  fifty 
thousand  men  occupied  the  valley  of  the  Main ;  and  the 
Hanoverian  army  of  twenty  thousand  men  threatened  Bran- 
denburg on  the  west.  Within  seven  weeks  after  the  declara- 
tion of  war  these  enormous  forces  were  either  captured  or 
dispersed  by  the  Prussian  troops. 

Moltke's  first  object  was  to  corner  the  Hanoverian  army 
and  render  it  innocuous.  He  conjectured  that  its  commander 
would  endeavor  to  form  a  junction  with  the  Austrians,  and, 
having  the  advantage  in  celerity,  directed  a  force  of  ten  thou- 
sand men  to  Eisenach,  to  take  possession  of  the  route  to 
Bavaria.  A  similar  force  was  directed  from  the  Rhine  against 
Hesse-Cassel,  which  served  the  double  purpose  of  capturing 
the  obstinate  old  Elector  and  preventing  a  junction  between 
the  Hanoverians  and  the  army  on  the  Main.  General  Falken- 
stein,  with  a  single  army  corps,  marched  up  the  Main,  de- 
feated the  army  of  the  confederation,  and  drove  it  back  into 
Wiirtemberg.  Another  Prussian  army  corps  marched  into 
Saxony,  and,  having  taken  possession  of  Dresden  and  Leipsic, 
proceeded  to  operate  against  the  forces  in  Bavaria,  apparently 
with  orders  to  avoid  an  engagement,  if  possible.  Although 
Von  der  Pfordten  considered  Austria  an  essential  ingredient 
in  German  nationality  to  counterbalance  Prussia,  the  Bavarian 
government  acted  at  this  time  in  a  rather  indecisive  manner, 
and  evidently  preferred  to  avoid  a  collision  with  Prussia,  if 
possible. 

Von  Moltke  also  judged  correctly  that  General  Benedek 
would  remain  on  the  defensive.  His  plan  of  campaign  has 
been  compared  to  the  Waterloo  campaign,  but  it  is  more  like 
that  of  Marengo.  Following  in  the  steps  of  Frederick  the 
Great,  he  directed  Prince  Frederick  Charles,  with  the  right 
wing  and  centre  of  the  main  Prussian  army,  to  enter  Bohemia 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

from  the  north,  while  the  crown  prince  with  the  left  wing 
marched  parallel  to  it  on  the  east  side  of  the  Giant  Mountains. 
According  to  this  plan,  in  case  General  Benedek  should  in- 
vade Silesia  it  was  expected  that  the  crown  prince's  army 
would  be  able  to  sustain  the  attack  until  Prince  Frederick 
Charles  should  come  to  his  rescue.  This,  however,  was  not 
considered  likely ;  and  if  the  Austrian  forces  remained  in  Bo- 
hemia they  would  be  obliged  to  concentrate  somewhere  on 
the  line  of  the  Elbe,  in  which  case  the  crown  prince  would 
fall  upon  their  flank,  as  Desaix  did  at  Marengo.  Such  a 
plan,  if  carried  out  successfully,  would  prove  fatal  to  the 
Austrian  cause. 

The  numbers  engaged  on  each  side  were  nearly  equal, — 
that  is,  about  two  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  men.  On  the 
27th  of  June  Prince  Frederick  Charles  entered  Bohemia. 
There  was  a  slight  conflict  at  Hunerwasser,  and  a  pretty  stiff 
battle  at  Miinchengratz  with  Clam-Gallas,  in  both  of  which 
the  Prussians  were  successful.  The  battles  of  Nachod,  Ska- 
litz,  Burkersdorf,  and  Schweinschadel  were  gallantly  won  by 
Prussian  generals  of  division,  but  General  Gablenz  defeated 
the  Prussians  at  Trautenau.  He  might  have  defeated  them 
again  at  Burkersdorf  but  for  an  unfortunate  despatch  to  re- 
treat from  General  Benedek.  It  does  not  require  much 
knowledge  of  military  affairs  to  realize  the  immense  mischief 
which  such  orders  might  occasion.  General  Benedek  was  a 
splendid  fighter,  and  was  credited  with  having  saved  the 
Austrian  army  from  a  rout  at  Solferino.  He  was  given  the 
chief  command  in  1866  according  to  a  popular  demand,  but 
it  is  stated  that  he  did  not  consider  himself  fitted  for  the  posi- 
tion. In  contrast  with  his  categorical  method  let  us  compare 
the  following  extract  from  Von  Moltke's  directions  to  the 
crown  prince  and  Prince  Frederick  Charles : 

"If  the  initiative  is  taken  on  our  part  an  occasion  may  easily 
arise  for  attacking  the  enemy  in  separate  bodies  with  superior  num- 
bers, and  for  following  up  the  victory  in  another  direction  from 
that  assigned.  But  the  uniting  of  all  the  forces  for  the  decisive 
blow  must  always  be  kept  in  view.  The  commanders-in-chief 
must,  therefore,  from  the  moment  they  come  face  to  face  with  the 

134 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

enemy,  act  according  to  their  own  judgment  and  the  requirements 
of  circumstances ;  and  at  the  same  time  they  must  always  consider 
their  relations  with  the  other  army  associated  with  them."  x 

Why  could  not  Napoleon  have  given  a  similar  order  to 
Grouchy  in  the  Waterloo  campaign?  An  American  who 
called  on  Von  Moltke  during  the  siege  of  Paris  found  nothing 
in  his  room  but  a  table,  a  chair,  and  a  map  of  France.  It  was 
by  this  constant  simplification  that  he  attained  such  breadth 
and  clearness  in  his  ideas. 

In  three  days  the  Prussians  had  won  five  battles  equal  to 
those  of  Frederick  in  the  second  Silesian  war.  The  Berliners 
were  wild  with  joy,  and  Bismarck  suddenly  became  the  most 
popular  man  in  the  country.  Such  is  human  nature,  and  such 
the  effect  that  may  always  be  depended  upon  as  the  result  of 
military  success.  Bismarck  had  calculated  on  this  only  too 
exactly.  Long  since,  in  his  consultations  with  the  king,  he 
had  said,  "  We  must  repose  our  confidence  in  the  ancient 
spirit  of  Prussia, — in  its  military  spirit."  William  I.,  Bis- 
marck, and  Von  Moltke  went  at  once  to  the  scene  of  action, 
for  they  knew  that  the  great  crisis  had  now  arrived, — a  turn- 
ing-point in  the  history  of  Europe.  On  the  2d  of  July  they 
reached  the  head-quarters  of  Prince  Frederick  Charles,  near 
Gitschin,  and  at  a  council  of  war  it  was  decided  to  attack  the 
Austrians,  who  were  posted  beyond  Sadowa,  on  the  following 
day.  Communication  was  established  with  the  crown  prince, 
who  promised  to  reach  the  field  of  battle  by  noon. 

The  Austrian  officers  had  become  satisfied  in  the  recent 
encounters  of  the  superiority  of  the  needle-gun,  and  advised 
General  Benedek  against  continuing  the  war,  but  the  emperor 
encouraged  Benedek  to  fight  where  he  stood,  and  at  the  same 
time  promised  him  the  support  of  the  army  in  Italy,  which 
had  already  defeated  the  Italians  at  Custozza  on  the  24th  of 
June.  Benedek  had  collected  over  two  hundred  thousand 
men  between  Koniggratz  and  Sadowa,  and  held  a  strong  po- 
sition on  a  range  of  hills  south  of  the  latter  place.  He  had 
the  advantage  of  Von  Moltke  by  nearly  eighty  thousand  men, 

1  Von  Sybel,  v.  120. 
135 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

and  he  hoped  to  crush  him  before  the  crown  prince  could 
arrive  on  the  ground. 

The  battle  of  Sadowa,  fought  on  the  3d  of  July,  is  an  oft- 
repeated  tale.  Never  since  the  conflict  between  Bajazet  and 
Timour  had  such  large  forces  been  opposed  to  each  other, 
and  yet  the  loss  of  life  was  not  nearly  equal  to  that  at 
Waterloo,  Leipsic,  or  Gettysburg.  The  Austrian  soldiers, 
encouraged  by  the  presence  of  a  commander  in  whom  they 
had  confidence,  maintained  the  fight  from  early  morning  till 
one  o'clock,  and  their  desperate  rushes  against  the  Prussian 
lines  explained  the  tactics  by  which  Benedek  expected  to  win 
the  game.  This  was  an  imitation  of  the  French  tactics  of 
1859,  and,  like  the  attack  by  columns,  is  wholly  ineffectual 
against  repeating  fire-arms.  Fransecky's  division  of  Branden- 
burgers  and  Magdeburgers  suffered  so  severely,  however,  from 
these  attacks  that  every  seventh  man  in  it  was  either  killed  or 
'  wounded.  Every  one  has  heard  of  Bismarck's  solicitude  for 
the  old  white-haired  king,  who  sat  on  his  horse  like  a  marble 
statue,  unmindful  of  the  shells  which  flew  screaming  past 
him,  and  how  Bismarck's  keen  eye  was  the  first  to  discover 
the  approach  of  the  crown  prince's  army. 

By  this  time  most  of  Benedek's  generals  of  division  were 
fighting  the  battle  on  their  own  account,  and  without  much 
regard  for  the  commands  of  their  superior.  This  was  another 
natural  consequence  of  Schwarzenberg's  policy,  and  there 
could  be  no  worse  condition  for  an  army  in  which  to  receive 
an  unexpected  attack.  The  crown  prince,  as  fearless  as  his 
father,  directed  his  forces  perpendicularly  to  the  Austrian 
right  wing,  which  was  almost  immediately  thrown  into  con- 
fusion. If  Benedek  had  ordered  the  retreat  at  once,  and  pro- 
tected it  in  person  at  the  head  of  his  reserves,  he  might  even 
then  have  preserved  his  army  for  another  battle.  Instead  of 
doing  this,  he  wasted  his  reserves  in  a  vain  attempt  to  recover 
the  captured  positions  ;  so  that  when  the  final  break  came  his 
decimated  regiments  had  no  chance  to  reorganize.  The  re- 
treat soon  became  a  rout,  and  full  twenty  thousand  Austrians 
were  taken  prisoners.  It  has  been  estimated  that  if  the  crown 
prince  had  followed  up  his  advantage  with  an  energy  equal  to 

136 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

that  of  Gneisenau  at  Waterloo,  the  greater  portion  of  the 
Austrian  army  would  have  been  captured. 

The  honor  of  the  victory  belongs  specially  to  Von  Moltke, 
who  planned  the  movements  of  both  Prussian  armies,  and 
held  his  regiments  in  hand  during  the  battle  like  men  upon  a 
chess-board ;  and  next  to  him  to  General  Fransecky,  who  sus- 
tained the  severest  attacks  of  the  day  without  asking  for  the 
reinforcements  which  he  knew  were  not  to  be  had.  Von 
Sybel  states  that  the  king  took  command  in  person ;  but  if  he 
had  actually  directed  the  movements  of  the  army,  Bismarck 
would  not  have  warned  him  against  exposing  himself  to 
danger.  Bismarck,  as  he  tells  us  himself,  went  to  rest  that 
night  under  a  shed  by  the  roadside. 

It  was  not  only  a  victory  of  Prussia  over  Austria,  of  the 
needle-gun  over  the  musket,  but,  as  in  the  time  of  Frederick 
the  Great,  it  was  a  victory  of  efficient  government  over  mis- 
government;  of  reality  over  sham  ;  of  plain  dealing  over  pre- 
tension ;  'of  progress  over  stagnation;  of  free  schools  over 
ignorance ;  of  Protestantism  and  religious  freedom  over  Ca- 
tholicism and  intolerance ;  of  modern  ideas  over  mediaeval 
traditions ;  and,  one  might  almost  say,  of  veracity  over  dis- 
simulation. Among  those  who  were  killed  on  the  hills  of 
Sadowa  might  be  recounted  the  Prussian  party  of  progress, 
which  never,  at  least,  showed  its  head  again  conspicuously. 
Progress  was  discovered  to  be  in  the  direction  which  Bismarck 
had  pointed  out,  and  in  the  place  of  the  Progressists  arose  a 
new  party  in  all  parts  of  Germany,  the  National  Liberals,  who 
gave  Bismarck  and  his  plans  an  enthusiastic  support  until 
the  great  work  he  had  undertaken  was  fairly  accomplished. 

In  1808  Napoleon  wrote  to  his  brother  Joseph,  "  To  win  a 
victory  is  nothing ;  to  know  how  to  make  use  of  it  is  every- 
thing." Bismarck  knew  this  as  well,  and  he  recognized  the 
fact  that  Sadowa  had  upset  the  balance  of  power  in  Europe, 
and  that  there  would  be  nothing  but  confusion  until  it  was 
re-established  upon  an  enduring  basis.  He  realized  that  his 
severest  struggle  had  yet  to  come ;  that  every  court  in  Europe 
would  be  filled  with  jealousy  at  the  advantage  which  Prussia 
had  gained,  and  that  his  work  now  must  be  to  prevent  this 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

from  taking  the  form  of  a  European  coalition  which  would 
wrest  from  Prussia  her  momentary  supremacy.  To  consoli- 
date that  power  and  render  it  as  impregnable  as  possible 
was  the  sufficient  labor  of  a  lifetime,  and  to  this  he  now 
dedicated  himself.  The  destiny  of  Prussia,  however,  was,  as 
we  have  seen,  always  associated  in  his  mind  with  the  destiny 
of  Germany  as  a  whole.  They  were  two  similar  ideas,  one  of 
which  included  the  other,  and,  as  with  President  Lincoln 
after  the  war  for  the  Union,  the  interests  of  the  states  that 
had  been  subjugated  were  as  serious  a  concern  with  him  as 
those  of  Prussia  itself.  The  statesman  who  sees  deep  into 
the  future  is  not  likely  to  be  elated  by  success,  and  in  the  day 
of  triumph  Bismarck  was  the  one  cool  head  among  those 
about  him,  who  knew  how  to  restrain  the  eagerness  of  friends 
and  guard  against  the  machinations  of  enemies. 

The  civilized  world  was  electrified  at  the  news'  of  Sadowa, 
and  Napoleon  III.  was  astounded.  He  could  not  have  been 
more  so  if  a  mine  had  exploded  in  the  Tuileries.  He  had 
been  playing  with  fire  till  his  fingers  were  burnt.  The  oppo- 
sition in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  knew  enough  of  what  was 
transpiring  to  be  aware  that  he  had  encouraged  Prussia  in 
this  bold  stroke,  and  would  be  sure  to  fling  it  in  his  teeth. 
Let  him  turn  as  he  would,  the  defeat  of  the  Italians  and  the 
negotiations  with  Count  Belcredi  for  the  cession  of  Venetia 
were  the  only  support  he  had  to  grasp  at,  and  this  was  fragile 
enough.  England  was  just  now  occupied  with  one  of  her 
frequent  party  revolutions,  and  the  Tsar  was  as  imperturbable 
as  a  Russian  bear.  The  French  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs 
is  supposed  to  have  advised  a  bold  game  of  bluff, — a  rather 
dangerous  game  to  play  against  Bismarck,  as  Drouyn  de 
1'Huys  discovered  afterwards  to  his  cost.  Count  Lavalette, 
on  the  contrary,  warned  Napoleon  that  his  army  was  in  no 
condition  to  encounter  the  victorious  Prussians,  and  that  he 
had  better  keep  on  the  shady  side  of  fortune. 

Bismarck  was  not  surprised,  though  William  I.  may  have 
been,  on  the  5th  of  July  to  receive  a  telegram  from  Napoleon 
III.  offering  his  services  as  a  mediator,  and  requesting,  in  the 
interests  of  European  peace  and  harmony,  that  they  should 

138 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

explain  how  they  proposed  to  make  use  of  their  good  for- 
tune. Von  Sybel's  statement,  that  the  king,  on  reading  this 
despatch,  made  a  memorandum  of  the  terms  of  peace  with 
Austria,  which  agreed  substantially  with  those  which  were 
finally  adopted,  does  not  accord  with  Bismarck's  own  ac- 
count,— namely,  that  he  was  obliged  to  make  his  utmost  exer- 
tions at  this  time  in  opposing  a  project  for  the  annexation  of 
northern  Bohemia.1  It  was  decided  to  meet  the  advances  of 
Napoleon  in  a  friendly  spirit,  but  his  interference  in  German 
affairs  was  to  be  politely  discouraged.  The  king  wrote  an 
autograph  letter  to  his  dear  brother  of  France,  and  a  despatch 
was  sent  to  Baron  Goltz  to  observe  a  respectful  but  firm  at- 
titude towards  the  French  government  Von  Beust  believes 
that  Napoleon  would  have  pursued  a  more  decisive  policy  at 
this  critical  moment  but  for  a  painful  malady  from  which  he 
was  suffering,  though  he  admits  at  the  same  time  that  there 
was  a  strong  party,  headed  by  Prince  Napoleon,  who  were 
opposed  to  this. 

Meanwhile  Venetia  had  been  surrendered  to  France  by  the 
Austrian  government,  in  the  hope  that  Napoleon  could  use  it 
as  a  make-weight  to  detach  Italy  from  the  Prussian  alliance, 
and  thus  enable  Francis  Joseph  to  withdraw  a  hundred  thou- 
sand soldiers  for  the  defence  of  Vienna.  To  the  astonish- 
ment of  both  parties  concerned,  this  move  produced  exactly 
the  opposite  effect  from  what  was  expected.  Victor  Emmanuel 
had  lost  all  confidence  in  his  former  ally,  and  had  already 
decided  in  his  own  mind  to  have  nothing  more  to  do  with 
him.  In  spite  of  the  persuasions  of  La  Marmora,  the  adroit, 
facile  man  to  whom  the  disaster  of  Custozza  had  chiefly  been 
owing,  the  King  of  Italy  sent  a  prompt  declination  of  the 
province  of  Venetia  to  Napoleon,  and  ordered  his  generals  to 
invade  Venetia  and  take  every  advantage  of  the  fortunate 
change  in  affairs. 

The  truth  was  that  Bismarck,  guided  by  his  clear  sense  of 


1  Bismarck  wrote  :  "  It  is  I  who  have  the  thankless  task  of  pouring  water  into 
the  foaming  wine,  and  of  pointing  out  the  fact  that  we  do  not  live  alone  in  Eu- 
rope, but  with  three  neighbors." 

139 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

the  situation,  had  fairly  turned  Italy  around  on  its  axis,  and 
the  Italians  themselves  were  fully  conscious  of  this.  There 
was  some  competition  in  the  carrying  trade  of  the  Mediter- 
ranean between  Italy  and  France,  but  the  antagonism  in 
material  affairs  was  very  slight.  In  what  might  be  called  im- 
material affairs,  however,  in  regard  to  the  temporal  power  of 
the  pope,  there  was  broad  enough  ground  for  disagreement. 
Louis  Napoleon  served  a  double  purpose  in  sending  Oudinot 
to  suppress  the  Roman  republic  in  1849  J  ^  was  f°r  h^s  interest 
that  the  republic  should  be  suppressed,  and  he  also  won  over 
to  his  party  the  strong  moral  influence  of  the  Catholic  clergy. 
From  the  earliest  times  it  had  been  the  policy  of  the  popes 
to  keep  Italy  divided,  in  order  to  prevent  the  growth  of  any 
political  power  which  might  neutralize  their  own.  The  anath- 
emas which  Dante  hurled  at  Boniface  VII.  were  succeeded 
by  the  cold-blooded  analysis  of  Machiavelli,  whom  the  terrors 
of  the  Inquisition  could  not  prevent  from  attributing  the  mis- 
fortunes of  his  native  country  to  the  temporal  power  of  the 
popes.  It  is  true  that  for  some  centuries  the  spiritual  au- 
thority of  the  popes  was  the  main  protection  of  Italian  inde- 
pendence ;  but  this  had  ceased  to  be  of  any  avail  long  before 
Machiavelli's  time,  and  political  intrigue  had  taken  its  place. 
Memories  of  the  grandeur  of  the  Roman  empire  were  still 
cherished  among  the  Italians,  and  Mazzini,  the  Italian  apostle 
of  regeneration,  had  preached  that  Italy  never  could  be  lifted 
out  of  the  mire  except  through  national  unity.  Whatever  he 
had  been  in  the  past,  the  pope  now  appeared  as  an  obstacle 
to  Italian  progress,  while  Bismarck  seemed  like  an  agent 
divinely  ordained  for  the  purpose.  It  was  only  a  Protestant 
power  that  could  cordially  co-operate  with  the  Italian  king 
and  his  cabinet,  and  between  Prussians  and  Italians  there  was 
neither  material  rivalry  nor  mental  antagonism.  Hegel  and 
other  German  writers  on  politics  were  studied  by  Italian 
statesmen  during  the  period  of  reorganization  in  1870,  and 
the  influence  of  German  ideas  on  the  present  Italian  govern- 
ment is  plainly  perceptible.  Italy  is  the  natural  ally  of 
Prussia. 

Thus  the  Venetian  manoeuvre  proved  a  failure.     Neither 

r4o 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

could  Napoleon  III.  prevent  the  Prussian  army  from  ad- 
vancing on  Vienna.  The  Austrian  government,  emboldened 
by  Napoleon,  asked  for  a  truce,  but  made  no  offers  for  peace. 
Von  Moltke  pushed  aside  the  army  of  Benedek,  who  had 
been  superseded  by  the  Archduke  Albert,  and  besieged  it  in 
Olmutz.  An  attempt  to  rouse  the  Hungarians  completely 
failed,  They  would  only  come  to  the  support  of  the  govern- 
ment under  the  guarantee  of  a  state  constitution.  Finally, 
when  the  outposts  of  the  Prussians  came  within  sight  of 
Vienna,  the  emperor  applied  to  William  I.  for  a  cessation  of 
hostilities.  Bismarck  now  desired  moderation,  but  in  this 
wise  conclusion  he  found  himself  opposed  by  the  king,  who 
considered  his  terms  of  peace  humiliating  to  Prussia,  while 
Von  Moltke  and  most  of  the  generals  urged  an  attack  on 
Vienna.  William  L,  however,  was  finally  won  over  by  the 
crown  prince,  who  suddenly  found  himself  on  the  same  ground 
as  Bismarck,  and  gave  the  minister-president  a  magnanimous 
support.1 

' • 

1  Bismarck's  account  of  this  affair  in  his  Memoirs  makes  a  charming  incident, 
creditable  to  both,  but  especially  to  the  crown  prince. 


141 


CHAPTER    VII 

BISMARCK   ENLARGES   PRUSSIA 

IN  the  negotiations  that  followed  after  Sadowa,  the  inter- 
vention of  Napoleon,  although  it  caused  Bismarck  continual 
anxiety,  was  actually  of  service  to  him  in  the  way  of  miti- 
gating the  severity  of  the  Prussian  conditions.  Neither  did 
his  cool  head  neglect  the  opportunity  of  notifying  the  Tsar  in 
regard  to  passing  events.  Napoleon's  action  naturally  caused 
an  irritation  in  St.  Petersburg,  which  was  not  without  its  in- 
fluence in  Vienna.  Finally,  on  the  26th  of  July,  the  prelimi- 
naries were  agreed  upon  at  Nicolsburg,  though  the  actual 
treaty  between  Prussia  and  Austria  was  not  signed  for  more 
than  three  weeks  later.  The  indemnity  required  of  Austria — 
about  twenty-five  million  thalers — was  comparatively  insig- 
nificant, and  the  Danes  in  Northern  Schleswig  were  allowed 
to  decide  by  a  free  ballot  whether  they  should  belong  to 
Denmark  or  Germany.  For  the  rest,  Austria  was  to  with- 
draw from  the  German  confederation  and  from  all  inter- 
ference in  German  affairs.  Venetia  was  to  be  surrendered 
to  Italy,  of  course,  and  with  it  a  strip  of  territory  was  re- 
quired to  rectify  the  boundaries  of  Silesia.  Saxony  was 
obliged  to  pay  a  small  indemnity  and  place  its  fortresses  in 
the  hands  of  the  King  of  Prussia.  Napoleon  was  unable  to 
obtain  the  right  for  Saxony  to  join  the  South  German  Con- 
federation, which  was  part  of  his  programme ;  but  he  suc- 
ceeded in  preserving  for  King  John  his  territory  intact. 
Whoever  has  read  Bismarck's  memorial  to  William  I.  on 
July  27  must  realize  that  he  was  the  one  who  is  properly  to 
be  credited  with  moderation,  and  that  the  opposition  against 
him  was  such  as  only  a  strong  man  could  have  overcome.1 

For  the  rest,  the  South  German  states  were  required  to  pay 

1  Von  Sybel,  v.  339. 
142 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

an  indemnity — probably  that  which  Austria  was  unable  to 
pay — and  form  a  military  confederation  under  the  leadership 
of  Bavaria.  In  regard  to  Nassau,  Hanover,  and  Cassel,  with 
its  obstinate  old  Elector,  Bismarck  kept  his  promised  word. 
The  reigning  princes  were  to  be  deposed  and  their  territories 
incorporated  in  Prussia,  but  the  reigning  families  were  to 
retain  their  estates,  or,  as  happened  in  the  case  of  Hanover, 
receive  a  monetary  compensation.  Darmstadt  was  to  be 
divided  into  two  portions,  of  which  Prussia  was  to  absorb 
the  northerly  part.  The  other  North  German  states  were  to 
form  a  close  confederation  with  Prussia,  having  the  King  of 
Prussia  for  their  military  commander. 

Thus  the  two  portions  of  Prussia  were  united,  and  the 
nation  as  a  whole  strengthened.  We  have  seen  how  inef- 
fective the  forces  of  the  smaller  German  states  proved  during 
this  campaign.  In  fact,  North  Germany  was  to  become 
Prussia,  and  with  a  population  of  nearly  thirty-five  millions — 
seven  times  as  great  as  in  the  Seven  Years'  War — it  could 
bid  defiance  to  any  power  in  Europe.  The  division  of  Ger- 
many into  three  parts  was  calculated  to  remove  the  appre- 
hensions of  Louis  Napoleon  in  regard  to  the  balance  of 
power;  though  Bismarck  foresaw,  as  he  afterwards  stated, 
that  South  Germany  would  finally  attach  itself  to  the  Prussian 
confederation  as  a  piece  of  iron  is  attracted  to  the  magnet. 
William  I.  wrote  to  his  nephew,  the  Tsar,  who  expressed  grave 
apprehensions  lest  Bismarck's  bold  stroke  should  prove  inju- 
rious to  the  monarchical  principle,  a  very  manly  letter,  in 
which  he  said : 

"  I  was  obliged  to  regard  the  sentiments  of  my  people  and  my 
army,  and  to  adopt  such  measures  as  would  insure  the  country 
against  the  return  of  a  state  of  things  similar  to  that  through  which 
we  have  just  passed.  To  leave  to  those  sovereigns  a  portion  of 
their  territory  would  have  occasioned  a  dismemberment  of  the 
states  that  would  have  been  more  distressing  to  the  inhabitants  than 
anything  else. 

"  You  fear  a  German  parliament  and  revolution.  Believe  me, 
nothing  has  done  more  harm  to  monarchical  principles  in  Germany 
than  the  existence  of  these  small  and  powerless  dynasties,  who  pro- 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

long  their  life  at  the  expense  of  national  interest,  \vho  perform  their 
duties  as  sovereigns  very  unsatisfactorily,  and  who  compromise  the 
reputableness  of  monarchical  principles  just  as  a  numerous  and  in- 
digent nobility  bring  reproach  upon  the  dignity  of  the  aristocracy. 
Public  opinion  is  thoroughly  convinced  that  these  small  monarchies 
naturally  and  necessarily  stand  in  opposition  to  national  interests. 
In  the  event  of  a  fresh  crisis  the  decadence  of  national  institutions 
would  have  occasioned  the  most  serious  dangers. ' ' x 

It  is  interesting  to  view  this  subject  from  the  monarchical 
stand-point,  and  King  William's  statement  has  the  cogency  of 
a  sincere  belief  that  the  work  he  was  doing  was  for  the  good 
of  Germany.  Bismarck  discovered  soon  after  that  it  was  not 
the  monarchical  principle  which  troubled  the  Tsar  so  much 
as  the  desire  to  obtain  a  share  for  himself  in  the  surprising 
good  fortune  of  his  royal  uncle  at  Berlin. 

Great  men  who  act  in  harmony  with  universal  laws  accom- 
plish many  things  indirectly  and  unintentionally  which  are  of 
advantage  to  the  human  race.  The  successors  of  Alexander 
the  Great  established  an  immense  trade  between  Europe  and 
India  which  never  came  to  an  end  until  the  discovery  of  the 
South  Cape ;  and  Caesar's  conquest  of  Gaul  may  be  said  to 
have  opened  a  door  for  civilization  to  walk  into  Northern 
Europe.  So  Bismarck's  attack  on  Austria  was  at  least  as 
great  an  advantage  to  that  empire  as  to  Prussia  itself.  The 
defeat  at  Sadowa  was  the  finest  piece  of  good  fortune  that  had 
ever  happened  to  Francis  Joseph.  What  advantage  to  him 
or  to  Austria  was  the  Frankfort  Diet  or  the  German  con- 
federation ?  No  revenues  were  derived  from  it,  and  it  gave 
him  no  assistance  in  the  Italian  war  of  1859,  while  it  must 
have  caused  him  continued  anxiety  and  perplexity.  It  was 
merely  the  advantage  of  a  name  and  of  a  certain  facility  for 
political  intrigue, — two  very  dubious  advantages.  The  con- 
tinual change  of  ministry  in  the  Vienna  cabinet  from  1859 
to  1866  was  an  outward  manifestation  of  the  confusion  which 
reigned  within.  Austria  was  placed  in  a  false  political  posi- 

1  Von  Sybel,  v.  449. 
144 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

tion, — like  a  man  who  enters  politics  without  any  actual  talent 
for  them, — and  as  soon  as  this  came  to  an  end  the  empire  and 
its  rulers  suddenly  found  themselves  at  peace  internally  and 
at  harmony  with  the  rest  of  the  world.  Bismarck  was  never 
more  far-sighted  than  when  he  told  Count  Karolyi  categori- 
cally in  1862  that  Austria's  centre  of  gravity  was  not  in  Ger- 
many, but  at  Buda-Pesth. 

The  immediate  condition  after  Sadowa  was  discouraging 
enough.  The  treasury  was  empty,  and  the  government  had 
no  credit.  The  pay  of  the  highest  officers  was  in  arrears,  and 
Von  Beust  was  not  even  remunerated  for  the  expense  of  his 
embassy  to  Paris.  An  attempt  to  borrow  several  millions 
from  the  Catholic  Church  resulted  only  in  the  gratuity  of  one 
hundred  thousand  dollars  for  the  care  of  wounded  soldiers. 
The  affairs  of  private  individuals  were  not  much  better  than 
those  of  the  government.  An  expectation  of  revolution  in 
Hungary,  the  insubordination  of  the  Croats,  and  the  Prussian 
occupation  of  Bohemia  had  reduced  traffic  to  its  lowest  and 
most  inevitable  conditions.  Force  had  always  been  required 
to  hold  the  empire  together,  and  its  discordant  elements 
seemed  on  the  point  of  disintegration. 

In  this  crisis  a  wise  counsellor  came  to  the  assistance  of 
Francis  Joseph,  and  this  was  King  John  of  Saxony.  Edu- 
cated in  an  hereditary  antagonism  to  the  Prussian  govern- 
ment, King  John  was  nevertheless  one  of  the  best  Germans 
of  his  time,  and  during  his  life  Saxony  was  in  a  very  flour- 
ishing condition ;  as,  for  that  matter,  it  still  continues  to  be. 
He  was  a  king  in  the  old  Homeric  sense,  and  it  was  said  of 
him  that  he  had  rather  go  without  his  own  breakfast  than 
that  the  meanest  of  his  subjects  should  suffer  for  it.1  He  had 
long  been  aware  of  the  evils  from  which  Austria  was  suffer- 
ing, and  knew  more  about  them  than  Francis  Joseph  could 
know.  He  now  went  to  him,  and  said,  as  we  may  suppose, 
"  I  wish  to  lend  you  my  best  man.  Von  Beust  is  the  right 
person  to  bring  order  for  you  out  of  this  chaos."  What  argu- 

1  He  was  often  to  be  seen  at  the  university  attending  lectures  on  history  and 
literature,  so  plainly  dressed  that  only  those  well  acquainted  with  his  face  could 
recognize  him. 

10  145 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

ments  he  used  on  the  occasion  have  not  transpired,  but  no 
doubt  King  John  added  some  plain  remarks  on  the  necessity 
of  an  honest  and  efficient  public  service. 

It  is  interesting  to  notice  the  transmigration  of  French  lib- 
eral ideas  to  Saxony  through  the  alliance  with  the  first  Napo- 
leon, and  their  further  transplantation  to  Vienna  by  Von  Beust. 
It  was  only  a  Saxon  or  Bavarian  statesman  who  could  have 
accomplished  this  in  the  right  way,  so  opposed  was  it  to  all 
the  traditions  of  Austrian  statecraft.  We  cannot  enter  here 
into  the  details  of  the  complicated  but  harmonious  system 
which  Von  Beust  evolved  out  of  what  might  be  called  the 
dregs  of  Metternich.  Let  it  suffice  to  say  that  he  satisfied 
the  Hungarians  with  a  well-devised  local  government,  and 
with  an  equal  representation  in  the  Imperial  Diet ;  he  pacified 
the  Czechs  with  a  different  system,  which  united  them  more 
closely  to  the  central  power,  and  arranged  for  the  Croats  and 
other  ignorant  Sclavonic  tribes  a  government  suited  to  their 
intelligence.  These  different  systems  he  united  in  a  compre- 
hensive government  machine,  which,  considering  the  diverse 
materials  of  which  it  is  composed,  has  worked  in  an  admir- 
able manner  till  the  present  time.  In  all  departments  of  the 
state  he  introduced  such  economy  and  efficiency  that  the 
Austrian  government,  from  being  one  of  the  most  corrupt 
and  tyrannical  in  Europe,  became  so  improved  during  his 
ministry  that  its  superior  was  not  to  be  found  among  consti- 
tutional monarchies.  A  thorough  liberal  in  religion,  he  intro- 
duced religious  toleration,  and  the  Jesuits,  who  had  been 
expelled  by  Prince  Kaunitz  one  hundred  years  before,  and 
had  returned  again  under  the  dogmatic  regime  of  Metternich, 
were  once  more  sent  about  their  business.  In  this  he  was 
assisted  by  a  popular  uprising  against  priestcraft  in  general, 
and  the  Austrian  church  became  nationalized  in  the  same 
manner  that  French  Catholicism  had  been  long  since.1 

Thus  by  Bismarck's  diplomacy  and  Von  Moltke's  victory 
Venetia  and  Italy  were  liberated ;  Germany  received  a  consti- 


1  An  American  resident  at  Innsbruck  said  to  me  in   1869,  "  The  day  of  the 
priests  is  done  in  Austria." 

146 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

tutional  government ;  Jesuitism  was  suppressed,  and  Francis 
Joseph  permitted  to  enjoy  the  remainder  of  his  life  in  peace 
and  tranquillity.  The  Hungarian  exiles  were  recalled,  and 
Hungary  received  greater  advantages  than  were  demanded  in 
1848.  Bismarck  may  be  credited  with  having  a  direct  hand 
in  the  liberation  of  H  ungary,  for  he  wrote  to  Baron  Goltz  in 
regard  to  Napoleon's  offer  of  mediation  that  the  Hungarian 
constitution  ought  to  be  one  of  the  conditions  of  peace.1 
Whether  he  did  this  because  it  would  please  the  Hungarians, 
or  because  he  thought  it  would  weaken  Austria  and  make 
her  government  more  dependent  on  Prussia,  must  remain  a 
matter  of  opinion.  There  was  small  room  for  sentiment  in 
Bismarck's  politics,  though  we  sometimes  meet  with  touches 
of  it ;  but  he  evidently  believed  in  the  modern  principle  that 
language  and  race  should  decide  nationality  as  far  as  pos- 
sible. That  the  Croats  and  Galicians  should  become  inde- 
pendent in  this  manner  was  plainly  impracticable. 

During  all  this  time  Napoleon  III.  was  twisting  and  writh- 
ing like  a  man  who  is  trying  to  escape  from  some  kind  of  a 
trap.  After  his  autocratic  intervention  on  July  5,  and  his 
indignation  at  the  King  of  Italy  on  the  8th,  he  sent  for  Baron 
Goltz  on  the  I  ith  and  talked  to  him  in  a  pitiful  strain  of  the 
services  he  had  rendered  the  King  of  Prussia,  and  of  the 
friendly  feeling  he  had  for  him.  If  Prussia  and  Italy,  he  said, 
were  to  persist  in  their  opposition  they  would  expose  him  to 
deep  humiliation.  However,  he  did  not  expect  any  cession 
of  territory,  but  only  to  have  his  wishes  respected  in  the  con- 
clusion of  peace.  On  the  I3th  again  he  notified  Goltz  that 
some  cession  of  territory  on  the  Rhine  would  be  indispen- 
sable, perhaps  the  boundaries  of  1814,  to  efface  the  memory 
of  Waterloo.  Goltz  had  been  an  admirer  of  the  empress,  and 
she  also  had  an  interview  with  him, — much  like  a  lovers' 
quarrel, — in  which  she  argued  the  case  for  France  with  femi- 
nine vehemence.2  The  French  court  was  divided  into  oppos- 

1  Von  Sybel,  v.  288. 

2  The  episode  of  the  Prussian  secretary  of  legation  at  Washington  may  be 
remembered  in  this  connection.     Attractiveness  to  the  fair  sex  is  considered  one 
of  the  qualifications  of  a  continental  envoy. 

147 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

ing  factions,  and  the  emperor,  in  his  frail  health,  was  dragged 
this  and  that  way  by  them.  Drouyn  de  1'Huys,  bold  and 
confident,  imagined  himself  a  second  Bismarck,  and  that  he 
could  accomplish  great  things  if  he  only  had  free  rein.  He 
was  supported  in  this  by  the  empress,  who  was  instigated  by 
the  emissaries  of  the  pope ;  for  now  that  Victor  Emmanuel's 
alliance  with  France  was  exchanged  for  one  with  a  Protestant 
power,  Pius  IX.  could  see  plainly  that  his  temporal  authority 
depended  on  a  slight  support.  On  the  other  side,  Lavalette 
and  Prince  Napoleon  saw  the  situation  more  clearly,  and 
greatly  dreaded  stirring  up  such  adversaries  as  Bismarck  and 
Von  Moltke,  whom  they  recognized  for  what  they  really 
were, — two  geniuses,  such  as  only  appear  once  or  twice  in  a 
century. 

Prince  Napoleon,  the  son  of  Jerome,  and  the  only  member 
of  the  Bonaparte  family  who  resembled  the  great  Napoleon 
in  appearance,  is  credited  with  having  shown  the  white  feather 
at  the  Crimea,  but  in  the  present  emergency,  and  consistently 
until  the  surrender  at  Sedan,  he  chose  a  position  which 
showed  good  political  judgment  so  far  as  the  affairs  of  France 
were  concerned.  He  even  went  so  far  as  to  seek  an  audience 
with  Baron  Goltz,  and  to  do  what  he  was  able  in  the  way  of 
furthering  a  speedy  settlement  between  Prussia  and  Austria. 

"  'If  you  do  not  enter  Vienna,'  he  said,  significantly,  'the  em- 
peror will  willingly  favor  you  in  your  other  conditions.'  Then  he 
wrote  a  memorial  to  the  emperor,  in  which  he  said,  '  We  must  expect 
that  if  Herr  von  Bismarck  is  threatened  by  France  at  his  back,  he 
will  play  out  his  last  high  card  and  come  forth  no  longer  as  a  Prus- 
sian, but  as  a  German,  and  will  call  out  the  ardent  passions  of  all 
Germany  by  proclaiming  the  imperial  constitution  of  the  revolu- 
tionary parliament  of  1849.  In  what  a  position  would  he  thus 
place  us  !  What  would  then  be  our  motive  for  engaging  in  a  war 
against  Prussia  and  all  Germany  ?'  "  * 

It  is  noteworthy  that  Bismarck  used  this  same  argument  to 
the  Tsar  Alexander  four  weeks  later.  It  contains  the  pith  of 

1  Von  Sybel,  v.  296. 
148 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

the  matter,  and  is  a  rare  contrast  to  Thiers's  statement  that 
the  way  for  France  to  be  strong  was  to  keep  her  neighbors 
weak.  The  Parisians  might  call  Prince  Napoleon  "  Plon- 
plon"  or  whatever  they  pleased,  but  there  were  few  among 
them  who  showed  such  good  judgment.  The  French  editors 
kept  up  a  continual  clamor  at  this  time,  creating  as  much  con- 
fusion as  possible,  instead  of  allowing  the  dust  to  settle  so  that 
people  could  see  the  political  prospect  clearly.  Newspapers 
seem  occasionally  like  a  necessary  evil.  The  emperor  finally 
agreed  to  Bismarck's  terms  of  peace,  and  then,  just  as  they 
were  to  be  signed,  he  sent  Benedetti  to  make  new  demands 
for  territory  on  the  Rhine. 

On  his  return  to  Berlin,  Bismarck  went  through  the  ova- 
tions customary  on  such  occasions  with  the  stolidity  of  a  non- 
commissioned officer  on  parade.  He  had  too  many  cares  on 
his  mind  to  respond  freely  to  the  popular  enthusiasm.  He 
had  settled  accounts  with  Austria  for  a  time,  but  France, 
Italy,  and  Russia  still  remained  to  be  considered,  as  well  as 
the  relations  of  Prussia  with  the  South  German  states,  and 
the  organization  of  a  North  German  confederation.  The 
manner  in  which  he  played  off  the  governments  of  these 
countries  against  one  another  in  the  negotiations  that  fol- 
lowed, and  without  any  real  duplicity  on  his  own  part,  is 
remarkable  enough.  He  received  a  donation  from  the  indem- 
nity fund  of  three  hundred  thousand  thalers,  or  less  than  half 
as  much  as  was  voted  by  the  British  Parliament  to  the  Duke 
of  Wellington  for  defeating  two  of  Napoleon's  marshals. 

Ten  days  after  the  conclusion  of  peace  at  Nicolsburg, 
Benedetti  appeared  in  Berlin  with  a  formulated  demand  from 
the  French  government  for  territory  on  the  Rhine.  This  was 
made  in  writing,  and  included  Rhenish  Bavaria,  Rhenish 
Hesse,  and  the  fortress  of  Mainz,  as  well  as  the  boundaries 
of  1814,  with  a  favorable  outlook  in  the  direction  of  Luxem- 
burg for  the  future.1  The  demand,  though  imprudent,  was 
not  so  very  unreasonable,  since  the  districts  named  had  for 
twenty  years  been  included  in  French  territory ;  but  even  if 

1  Muller's  Political  History,  p.  357. 
149 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

Bismarck  could  have  persuaded  William  I.  to  agree  to  it,  the 
result  must  have  been  a  serious  antagonism  between  Prussia 
and  Bavaria,  which  could  only  be  healed  by  compensating 
Bavaria  in  some  other  direction.  In  fact,  the  Prussian  gov- 
ernment had  no  right  to  surrender  Bavarian  territory,1  and 
that  Napoleon  should  have  demanded  it  was  a  natural  but 
clumsy  blunder,  for  it  placed  a  card  in  Bismarck's  hand  which 
he  could  play  with  telling  effect  at  any  future  time.  In  re- 
spect to  Bismarck's  reception  of  Benedetti,  the  account  given 
by  Von  Sybel,  who  was  well  acquainted  with  Bismarck,  is 
more  likely  to  be  correct  than  the  brusque  treatment  attrib- 
uted to  him  by  others.  The  laconic  "  Good,  it  is  war,  then," 
does  not  form  an  essential  part  of  Prussian  history ;  neither 
does  the  statement  that  Napoleon  would  be  obliged  to  go  to 
war  in  order  to  save  his  throne,  which  would  indeed  make 
him  appear  in  a  ridiculous  light.  Benedetti  threw  out  a  hint 
of  this  kind  at  the  close  of  the  interview,  but  on  his  own  re- 
sponsibility, not  as  coming  from  Napoleon.  Otherwise  the 
interview  was  a  lengthy  one,  though  Bismarck  firmly  and 
decisively  refused  to  entertain  the  French  proposals.  "  If 
you  force  us  into  a  war,"  he  said,  "  we  will  make  peace  with 
Austria  and  the  South  German  states,  and  invade  France 
with  six  hundred  thousand  men,  and  we  will  take  Alsace  and 
Lorraine  away  from  you."  This  was  the  end  of  the  game  of 
bluff,  and  also  the  end  of  Drouyn  de  THuys's  political  career. 
He  sent  in  his  resignation  a  few  days  after  Benedetti's  return 
to  Paris,  and  has  never  been  heard  from  since. 

After  this  General  Manteuffel  was  despatched  to  St.  Peters- 
burg, in  order  to  smooth  down  the  Russian  bear.  Manteuffel 
was  a  soldier-statesman  of  the  old  Prussian  school,  and  much 
more  conservative  than  Bismarck  himself.  He  was  just  the 
man  to  sympathize  with  Alexander  in  his  reactionary  moods. 
The  Tsar  received  him  rather  coolly,  and  stated  that,  in  spite 
of  his  friendliness  for  King  William,  he  was  much  displeased 


1  Bestowing  a  piece  of  the  Rhineland  on  the  house  of  Wittelsbach  was  a 
shrewd  device  in  the  Congress  of  Vienna,  for  it  wholly  changed  the  traditional 
policy  of  Bavaria. 

150 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

with  Bismarck's  revolutionary  proceedings.  The  deposition 
of  a  king  and  two  grand  dukes  was  a  dangerous  innovation, 
aimed  directly  against  the  divine  right  of  kings,  and  calcu- 
lated to  undermine  the  royal  authority  in  all  countries.  An 
interview  with  GortchakofF  led  to  a  similar  discussion,  which 
the  Russian  minister  suddenly  changed  to  a  conversation  on 
the  peace  of  Paris  and  the  Russian  restrictions  on  the  Black 
Sea.  Manteuffel  judged  from  this  exactly  where  the  shoe 
pinched,  and  sent  a  telegraphic  summary  to  Bismarck,  who 
now  appeared  as  firmness  itself.  "  We  have  agreed,"  he  said, 
"  to  grant  favorable  conditions  to  Wiirtemberg  and  Darm- 
stadt, out  of  consideration  for  Russia,  but  we  can  give  no 
attention  to  scruples.  Pressure  from  abroad  will  drive  us  to 
the  proclamation  of  the  imperial  constitution  of  1849.  If 
there  is  to  be  a  revolution,  we  shall  prefer  to  make  it  our- 
selves." At  the  same  time  he  gave  Manteuffel  to  understand 
that  when  the  right  occasion  arose  for  abrogating  the  Black 
Sea  restrictions  Prussia  would  be  ready  to  support  her  northern 
ally.  Friendly  letters  between  the  king  and  the  Tsar  con- 
cluded the  Russian  difficulty. 

The  South  German  states  had  now  to  be  dealt  with,  and 
here  the  French  demands  of  August  5  served  Bismarck  as  a 
two-edged  sword.  The  king  wished  to  annex  Bavarian  Fran- 
conia, — the  region  from  which  the  Franks  formally  set  out  to 
conquer  Gaul, — but  Bismarck  was  prudently  opposed  to  this, 
because  it  would  aggravate  the  ill  feeling  of  the  Bavarians 
towards  Prussia,  and  arouse  an  antagonism  which  might  not 
subside  for  a  hundred  years.  He  accordingly  used  Bene- 
detti's  proposals  as  an  argument  with  William  I.  in  favor  of  a 
more  conciliatory  policy,  and  with  the  Bavarian  court  for  the 
purpose  of  obtaining  a  military  alliance. 

The  peace  preliminaries  between  Prussia  and  Austria  had 
left  the  South  German  states  wholly  independent,  but  it  had 
practically  left  them  defenceless,  and  they  now  began  to  realize 
this.  The  Grand  Duke  of  Baden,  who  was  personally  friendly 
to  Prussia,  saw  plainly  enough  that  Napoleon  III.  could  now 
take  possession  of  his  country  without  opposition.  No  por- 
tion of  Germany  had  suffered  so  much  from  French  invasions 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

as  Baden,  and  he  applied  at  once  for  admission  into  the 
Prussian  confederation.  Bismarck  proved  to  him  that  such 
a  departure  would  tend  to  aggravate  their  relations  with 
France,  and  be  contrary  to  the  understanding  with  Austria 
and  Russia ;  but  he  intimated  that  there  was  another  method 
by  which  the  desired  result  might  be  attained. 

The  meeting  between  Bismarck  and  Von  der  Pfordten  was 
a  memorable  one.  There  was  no  German  statesman  whom  the 
Prussian  minister  respected  so  much.  He  explained  to  Von 
der  Pfordten  the  king's  ultimatum  for  Franconia,  and  for  a 
war  indemnity  of  thirty  million  florins.  Then  he  showed  him 
the  proposition  of  Napoleon  III.,  signed  by  Drouyn  de 
1'Huys,  for  the  surrender  of  Rhenish  Bavaria  to  France,  and 
offered  him  his  choice  between  the  cession  of  Franconia  and 
an  offensive  and  defensive  alliance  with  Prussia.  It  is  easy  to 
imagine  Von  der  Pfordten's  decision,  and  it  is  said  that  the  two 
prime  ministers  embraced  each  other  after  the  German  fashion. 
The  same  arrangement  was  concluded  with  Baden  ;  and  Wiir- 
temberg,  lying  between  the  two  states,  followed  as  a  matter  of 
course.  The  "  puffy"  old  Duke  of  Darmstadt,  who  depended 
for  his  immunity  on  the  friendship  of  the  Tsar,  and  for  his 
income  from  the  gambling  hells  of  Hesse-Homburg,  was  also 
brought  to  a  realizing  sense  of  his  dependence  on  Prussia  by 
Napoleon's  proposals  of  August  5. 

This  was  Bismarck's  master-stroke,  for  it  gave  William  I. 
the  command  of  all  the  German  forces,  excepting  those  in 
Austria.  Von  Beust  has  denounced  it  in  his  Memoirs  as  an 
infraction  of  the  peace  preliminaries  and  the  treaty  of  Prague, 
which  was  signed  ten  days  later,  without  the  least  suspicion 
on  the  part  of  the  Austrian  or  French  governments  of  Bis- 
marck's military  convention.  He  compares  Bismarck  to  Mac- 
chiavelli,  and  calls  it  a  piece  of  unheard-of  duplicity.  Von 
Beust  did  not  realize,  apparently,  that  Napoleon's  territorial 
demands  after  the  signing  of  the  preliminaries  had  upset  the 
political  basis  on  which  the  peace  conditions  were  grounded ; 
that  if  the  South  German  states  were  in  any  way  dissatisfied 
with  the  conditions  of  the  treaty  of  Prague,  they  had  suffi- 
cient time  to  enter  their  protest  against  them.  There  was 

152 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

nothing  in  the  treaty  which  precluded  the  South  German 
states  from  making  alliances  wherever  they  could  find  them ; 
and  though  the  alliance  of  Prussia  differed  from  other  mili- 
tary alliances  in  placing  the  South  German  troops  under  the 
command  of  Prussian  officers,  this  was  considered  essential, 
in  order  that  they  should  be  properly  instructed  in  Von 
Moltke's  tactics,  and  so  that  the  German  army  could  act  to- 
gether as  a  whole.  The  best  evidence  of  the  success  of  this 
policy  is  that  the  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony,  who  fought 
against  Prussia  at  Sadowa,  was  soon  after  placed  in  com- 
mand of  a  whole  army  corps  of  the  confederation ;  nor  is  it 
credible  that  Bismarck  exerted  undue  pressure  on  the  South 
German  states  in  this  matter,  for  in  that  case  their  ministers 
could  have  easily  blocked  his  game  by  notifying  Louis  Napo- 
leon.1 

The  peace  of  Prague,  with  whose  terms  we  are  already 
familiar,  closed  the  last  scene  in  this  great  historical  drama. 

1  "In  1849  was  the  time  to  do  what  Bismarck  did  in  1866  in  the  South 
German  governments, — to  treat  the  Italian  states  with  consideration,  but  to  in- 
sist on  their  binding  themselves  by  treaty  to  a  state  of  dependence  on  Austria." 
—  Von  Heusf,  i.  361. 


153 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE  NORTH  GERMAN  CONFEDERATION 

THE  chief  obstacle  to  parliamentary  government  in  Ger- 
many lies  in  the  national  characteristic  which  is  called  par- 
ticularism. "  Every  German,"  said  Bismarck,  "  has  an  idea 
of  his  own,  which  he  holds  on  to  like  a  nugget  of  gold." 
This  prevents  their  fusing  together  in  political  parties,  as  the 
English  and  Americans  do,  and  it  is  natural  that  the  better 
educated  they  are  the  more  prominent  this  peculiarity  ap- 
pears. The  old  map  of  Germany — large  states  and  small 
states,  states  separated  by  other  states,  and  states  within 
states — was  a  very  good  picture  of  the  German  mind.  The 
tendency  of  national  unity  has  been  to  diminish  the  number 
of  political  parties  in  Germany,  but  they  are  still  numerous, 
and  their  description  is  bewildering.  At  the  same  time  the 
Germans  have  a  national  impulse, — an  idea  of  their  destiny  as 
a  nation, — and  this  unites  them  at  times,  so  that  they  seem  to 
act  almost  like  one  man,  after  which,  having  accomplished 
the  special  work  in  hand,  they  relapse  into  particularism 
again.  This  is  especially  true  of  the  Prussians. 

After  the  peace  of  Prague,  Bismarck  found  his  country- 
men in  this  unified  condition.  The  National  Assembly  passed 
his  budget  with  but  few  dissenting  votes,  and  when  a  com- 
mittee from  the  House  waited  on  the  king  to  announce  this 
fortunate  event,  his  Majesty  remarked  that  he  hoped  that  the 
preceding  disagreement  between  himself  and  his  people  would 
never  happen  again.  It  never  has  happened  since,  and  this 
goes  far  to  prove  that  the  era  when  Bismarck  first  accepted 
the  presidency  was  a  revolutionary  one,  a  bloodless  conflict 
between  the  people  and  their  government,  in  which  the  gov- 
ernment for  once  was  in  the  right,  and  exceptional  measures 
were  justifiable. 

The  army  appropriations,  although  somewhat  increased, 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

passed  both  Houses  without  difficulty.  The  Prussian  gov- 
ernment does  not  communicate  state  secrets  to  the  National 
Assembly,  but  enough  of  the  attitude  of  Napoleon  was  gen- 
erally known  to  stir  Prussian  patriotism  to  its  depths.  Great 
confidence  was  felt  in  Bismarck's  political  wisdom,  and  the 
current  of  popular  prejudice  was  now  in  his  favor,  as  in  the 
struggle  with  Austria  he  was  obliged  to  contend  against 
it. 

The  National  Assembly  made  short  work  of  the  annexation 
of  Cassel,  Hanover,  Nassau,  Lower  Darmstadt,  and  Frank- 
fort; for  the  conservatives  wished  to  do  this  in  order  to 
strengthen  the  government's  military  power,  and  the  oppo- 
sition because  they  expected  to  recruit  their  ranks  with  dis- 
satisfied delegates  from  those  states.  In  this  matter  Bismarck 
appeared  to  great  advantage  in  comparison  with  a  numerous 
body  of  members,  who  advocated  the  incorporation  of  all 
North  Germany  in  the  Prussian  state,  without  regard  to  the 
fear  of  God  or  the  opinion  of  the  world  at  large.  Nothing 
could  be  more  unprincipled  than  such  a  proposition,  and  Bis- 
marck answered  it  in  a  telling  speech,  in  the  course  of  which 
he  said :  * 

"  So  far  as  our  confederate  allies  are  concerned,  we  have  had 
only  few,  and  those  were  weak;  yet  not  only  our  duty,  but  also 
wisdom,  bids  us  to  keep  our  word  even  to  the  smallest  of  them. 
The  more  unsparingly  Prussia  shows  that  she  can  sweep  her  enemies 
from  the  map  of  Germany,  the  more  exact  must  she  be  in  fulfilling 
her  promises  to  her  friends.  It  is  precisely  in  South  Germany  that 
the  belief  in  our  political  honesty  will  be  of  great  importance." 

The  sovereigns  of  those  petty  states,  of  whom  William  I. 
wrote  to  the  Tsar  that  they  were  as  injurious  to  the  monarchi- 
cal principle  as  an  indigent  nobility  was  to  the  cause  of  aris- 
tocracy, could  not  complain  that  Bismarck  had  not  warned 
them  in  time  what  the  consequences  would  be  of  giving  their 
support  to  Austria ;  but  he  now  proved  himself  better  than  his 
word  in  offering  them  a  liberal  pecuniary  compensation  for 

1  Von  Sybel,  v.  494. 
155 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

the  loss  of  their  titles  and  landed  estates.  The  Landtag  was 
indisposed  to  grant  this,  though  the  revenues  from  the  an- 
nexed territories  would  more  than  compensate  for  it  in  the 
difference  between  a  national  system  and  a  provincial  system 
of  government,  and  Bismarck  was  obliged  to  exert  all  the  in- 
fluence he  could  bring  to  bear  in  order  to  carry  the  measure 
through.  Great  sympathy  was  felt  for  the  King  of  Hanover, 
on  account  of  his  blindness ;  but  this  treatment  was  much 
more  considerate  than  the  first  Napoleon's  had  been  on  similar 
occasions  in  disposing  of  conquered  territory. 

The  organization  of  the  North  German  "confederation,  which 
differed  but  little  from  the  Prussian  state  itself,  introduced  a 
new  element  into  German  politics,  that  of  universal  suffrage ; 
and  in  this  Bismarck  was  opposed  not  by  the  Progressists, 
but  by  some  of  his  most  faithful  supporters  in  the  National 
Assembly.  Seven  years  later  Dr.  Frederick  Kapp,  author  of 
"  The  Hessians  in  America,"  and  secretary  of  the  Prussian 
Landtag,  spoke  of  it  as  the  iron  chancellor's  one  serious  mis- 
take. Bismarck's  belief  was  that  if  the  laboring  classes  felt 
that  they  had  a  direct  influence  in  the  government,  they 
would  be  more  loyal,  patriotic,  and  contented  for  it,  and 
would  serve  to  counterbalance  the  influence  of  those  local 
politicians  who  were  always  looking  to  sectional  advantages. 
In  the  old  Germanic  theory  of  government  the  king,  the  no- 
bility, and  the  commons  were  compared  to  the  three  sides  of 
a  triangle,  which  mutually  support  and  restrain  one  another. 
It  was  supposed  that  the  nobility  and  the  commons  would  be 
sure  to  restrain  the  king  from  extravagant  and  tyrannical  ac- 
tions ;  that  the  king  would  unite  with  the  commons  to  restrain 
the  rapacity  of  the  nobles ;  and  that  the  king  and  the  nobility 
would  be  able  to  prevent  popular  revolutions.  It  may  have 
been  this  mediaeval  idea  to  which  Bismarck  reverted  in  his 
mind;  but  the  laboring  classes  form  in  reality  a  fourth  division 
of  the  body  politic,  which  have  to  be  considered  in  a  different 
way.  The  modern  world  differs  essentially  from  the  mediaeval 
in  its  accumulation  of  wealth  and  the  consequent  opportunity 
for  luxurious  living.  The  tiller  of  the  soil  in  the  Middle  Ages 
might  envy  the  social  advantages  of  the  baron,  but  it  was  a 

156 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

hopeless  envy,  for  he  knew  it  would  be  impossible  for  him  to 
fill  the  same  position.  At  the  present  day  the  case  is  dif- 
ferent: men  care  little  for  titles  if  they  can  only  obtain  means 
for  luxurious  living  and  the  education  of  their  children.  It 
is  this  which  makes  socialism  so  dangerous  at  the  present 
time,  and  will  make  it  more  dangerous  in  the  time  to  come. 
Thus  far  Bismarck's  suffrage  law  has  not  answered  his  expec- 
tations, but  its  ultimate  effect  still  remains  to  be  unfolded. 

The  organization  of  the  North  German  confederation  was 
not  a  difficult  task,  since  it  merely  applied  the  principles  of 
Prussian  polity  to  a  few  smaller  states.  Delegates  to  the 
North  German  Reichstag  were  elected  on  the  I2th  of  Feb- 
ruary, 1 867,  and  on  the  24th  they  met  together  in  the  king's 
palace  at  Berlin,  where  William  I.  opened  the  assembly  with 
a  congratulatory  speech  full  of  confidence  in  the  future  of 
Germany,  and  with  great  expectations  of  German  civilization. 
A  number  of  unfriendly  delegates  from  Saxony,  Hanover, 
and  Darmstadt  made  this  legislative  body  more  difficult  to 
deal  with  than  the  Prussian  Landtag  had  proved  to  be,  but 
after  seven  weeks'  discussion  the  government  constitution  was 
adopted  with  a  few  simple  changes,  and  the  assembly  dis- 
solved. 

In  the  general  congratulations  of  this  period  we  hear  of 
only  one  dissatisfied  person,  and  that  was  the  Crown  Prince 
of  Prussia.  From  being  a  firm  adherent  of  constitutional 
methods  during  the  storm  and  stress  of  Schleswig-Holstein, 
he  suddenly  changed  his  tone  and  now  appeared  as  the  advo- 
cate of  arbitrary  power.  He  informed  Bismarck  that  there 
were  too  many  kings  in  Germany, — his  father  was  the  only 
real  king, — and  the  others  ought  to  be  reduced  to  the  dig- 
nity of  grand  dukes.  When  Bismarck  suggested  that  it  might 
be  difficult  to  persuade  them  to  agree  to  this,  he  replied  that 
they  must  be  made  to  agree  to  it.1  Bismarck  may  have  con- 
cluded that  the  crown  prince's  duties  as  commander  of  the 
second  army  did  not  give  him  sufficient  occupation. 

1  Von  Sybel,  however,   does    not  give   his  authority   for  this  conversation, 
though  it  agrees  with  a  later  statement  in  the  crown  prince's  diary. 

157 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

After  all  other  affairs  had  been  satisfactorily  arranged,  a 
peculiar  difficulty  arose  in  respect  to  the  settlement  with 
Saxony.  On  the  occasion  of  Von  Beust's  retirement  from  the 
Saxon  ministry  King  John  wrote  him  a  cordial  and  gracious 
letter  of  regret,  expressing  his  appreciation  of  Von  Beust's 
long  service  in  the  Saxon  government,  and  of  his  valuable 
assistance  during  the  perilous  period  through  which  the  state 
had  lately  passed.  This  letter  Von  Beust  afterwards  inju- 
diciously published  in  Vienna,  where  it  served  to  make  him 
popular,  but  at  the  same  time  aroused  a  hostile  feeling  to 
King  John  at  the  Prussian  court.  Von  Beust  had  been  the 
ablest  and  most  outspoken  of  the  opponents  of  Prussia  at  the 
Frankfort  Diet,  and  this  letter  was  considered  in  the  light  of 
an  incendiary  document  calculated  to  excite  ill  feeling  be- 
tween Prussia  and  the  South  German  states.  The  King  of 
Saxony  was,  therefore,  called  to  account  for  it,  and  bluntly 
informed  by  Bismarck  that  he  should  consider  himself  fortu- 
nate not  to  share  the  fate  of  the  King  of  Hanover.  As  the 
irritation  excited  by  Von  Beust's  letter  subsided  after  a  time; 
as  the  Prussian  demands  were  also  mitigated ;  and  as  King 
John  had  public  opinion  everywhere  on  his  side,  the  negotia- 
tions were  finally  concluded  by  Bismarck  with  the  payment 
of  a  moderate  indemnity  and  the  transfer  of  the  Saxon  for- 
tresses. 

THE   LUXEMBURG   INTRIGUE. 

Napoleon  III.  realized,  after  the  refusal  of  his  demand  for 
more  territory  in  August,  that  Bismarck  was  not  the  man  to 
be  caught  with  chaff  or  intimidated  by  threats.  He  saw 
plainly  enough  that  if  he  was  to  obtain  any  portion  of  Rhen- 
ish Prussia  or  Bavaria  he  would  have  to  do  it  by  force  of 
arms.  He  began  at  once  to  reorganize  the  French  army,  and 
recalled  the  troops  which  were  supporting  Maximilian  in 
Mexico.  Meanwhile  a  design  occurred  to  him,  or  to  his 
counsellors,  by  which  he  might  make  an  entering  wedge  into 
Prussian  territory  by  a  little  expenditure  of  French  gold.  The 
duchy  of  Luxemburg,  situated  between  Lorraine  and  Rhenish 
Prussia,  belonged  by  hereditary  right  to  the  King  of  Holland, 

158 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

but  as  a  part  of  the  German  confederation  it  had  since  1849 
been  garrisoned  by  Prussian  troops.  Napoleon  now  thought 
of  purchasing  the  King  of  Holland's  right,  if  the  Prussian 
government  would  only  agree  to  withdraw  its  garrison,  and 
then  Benedetti  was  again  despatched  to  Berlin  to  sound  Bis- 
marck on  the  subject. 

There  are  conflicting  statements  in  regard  to  the  negotia- 
tions which  followed.  Professor  Miiller  affirms  that  Bismarck 
treated  the  proposal  in  a  dilatory  manner, — that  is,  he  deferred 
it  from  time  to  time  by  such  pretexts  as  are  customary  in  diplo- 
matic circles.  Benedetti  afterwards  claimed  that  he  drew  up  a 
treaty,  at  Bismarck's  dictation,  between  Prussia  and  France, 
which  included  the  purchase  of  Luxemburg  from  the  King  of 
Holland,  and  the  consolidation  of  Belgium  with  France,  in  re- 
turn for  an  offensive  and  defensive  alliance.  If  Benedetti  al- 
lowed himself  to  be  fooled  in  this  manner  he  was  a  most  unskil- 
ful ambassador,  for  the  possession  of  Belgium  by  Napoleon 
would  have  irritated  the  British  government  very  greatly,  and 
have  alarmed  the  King  of  Holland  still  more.  The  latter  would 
hardly  be  inclined  to  yield  his  rights  in  Luxemburg  to  a  power 
whom  he  would  be  obliged  to  face  on  the  Rhine  and  Scheldt. 
This  was  supplementing  Luxemburg  with  a  right  which  would 
be  likely  to  defeat  the  project,  and  it  is  certain  that  if  Bismarck 
agreed  to  it  at  any  time,  the  fact  was  not  mentioned  by  the 
King  of  Holland  in  the  subsequent  negotiations.  The  ap- 
proval of  his  sovereign  was  a  side-door  through  which  Bis- 
marck could  always  retreat  from  any  temporary  agreement. 
It  is  by  no  means  improbable  that  Benedetti  afterwards  made 
up  the  story  about  Belgium  in  order  to  excite  prejudice 
against  Prussia  in  Holland  and  England;  but,  as  the  case 
stands  now,  there  is  no  way  of  determining  anything  about 
it.  Napoleon's  adherents,  and  a  number  of  German  writers 
also,  have  always  insisted  that  Benedetti  was  brutally  de- 
ceived. 

The  action  of  the  Prussian  government,  as  soon  as  the 
matter  came  before  the  world,  was  prompt  and  decisive 
enough.  In  February,  1867,  the  subject  was  communicated 
to  the  King  of  Holland  by  the  French  ambassador,  and  he  at 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

once  agreed  to  the  proposition,  provided  Napoleon  would 
guarantee  his  country  against  Prussian  encroachment.  This 
was  also  for  Napoleon's  interest,  and  as  Benedetti  had  given 
out  the  impression  in  Paris  that  Bismarck  was  ready  to  fall 
into  line,  Baron  Goltz  was  notified  that  if  Prussia  would  with- 
draw the  troops  which  garrisoned  Luxemburg  the  existing 
tension  between  the  two  governments  might  be  considered  at 
an  end. 

Bismarck,  however,  promptly  and  decisively  declined  to  do 
this,  and  a  resolution  introduced  into  the  North  German 
Reichstag  to  the  effect  that  neither  Luxemburg  nor  any  other 
German  territory  should  be  ceded  to  a  foreign  power  was  car- 
ried through  with  enthusiasm.  How  dangerous  the  game 
was  which  Napoleon  was  playing  maybe  judged  from  the  fact 
that  a  strong  party  in  Berlin,  with  Von  Moltke  at  its  head, 
advocated  war  with  France  as  the  only  effectual  method  of 
stopping  the  political  machinations  from  that  quarter.  Bis- 
marck, however,  saw  another  method  of  playing  check  to 
Napoleon  again,  and  considered  it  too  soon  after  the  Austrian 
campaign  to  depend  on  the  cordial  support  of  the  South 
German  states. 

Between  these  two  parties  the  king  finally  decided  in  favor 
of  peace.  That  he  should  have  been  averse  to  war  at  his 
time  of  life  is  not  surprising,  though  he  no  doubt  considered 
peace  the  wiser  course. 

The  convention  of  great  powers  which  decided  the  political 
relations  of  Belgium  and  Holland  in  1839  had  guaranteed  in 
that  treaty  the  independence  of  Luxemburg.  Bismarck  was 
aware  of  this,  and  he  now  appealed  to  the  governments  of 
Austria,  Russia,  and  Great  Britain  to  carry  out  its  provisions. 
This  speedily  resulted  in  a  conference  at  London,  to  which 
Napoleon  III.  and  the  King  of. Holland  were  invited,  nor 
could  they  decline  to  send  representatives.  The  French 
envoy  argued  that  Prussia  had  already  violated  the  treaty  by- 
maintaining  a  garrison  in  Luxemburg ;  but  the  conference 
finally  decided  that  the  King  of  Holland  had  no  right  to  dis- 
pose of  the  duchy  as  if  it  were  his  own  personal  property, 
and  William  I.  was  requested  to  withdraw  his  troops  from  it, 

160 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

which  was  accordingly  done.  Von  Beust's  attempt  at  a 
compromise,  by  proposing  that  the  strip  of  French  terri- 
tory, from  five  to  ten  miles  in  width,  which  was  ceded  to  Bel- 
gium after  Waterloo,  should  be  restored  to  France,  only 
served  to  arouse  great  indignation  among  the  Belgians.  The 
neutrality  of  Belgium  was  guaranteed  for  the  future,  but 
Luxemburg  was  permitted  to  enter  into  the  Zollverein,  or 
German  customs  union. 

This  was  in  May,  1867,  and  Louis  Napoleon  had  been  out- 
witted three  times  within  ten  months.  The  French  court 
was  furious,  and  Napoleon  III.  openly  declared  that  Count 
Bismarck  had  hocussed  him.  Why  he  should  make  such  a 
confession,  for  which  no  one  would  be  likely  to  pity  him,  can 
only  be  explained  by  his  wishing  to  excite  the  Parisians  to  a 
higher  pitch  of  animosity  against  Prussia.  However,  the 
international  exposition,  which  was  designed  to  attract  public 
attention  from  the  mistakes  of  1866,  and  give  the  appearance 
of  external  magnificence  to  the  hollow  shell  of  the  Second 
Empire,  was  now  coming  on,  and  Napoleon  was  obliged  to 
repress  his  resentment  until  after  that  had  passed.  All  the 
crowned  heads  of  Europe  must  be  invited  to  it,  as  well  as 
their  prime  ministers,  and  such  a  love-feast  as  they  must  have 
had  there  does  not  often  happen  in  this  world. 

It  was  more  like  a  battle-field  than  a  love- feast.  They  were 
all  more  or  less  in  danger  of  assassination,  and  no  one  knew 
this  better  than  Bismarck.  It  has  been  affirmed  that  he  did 
not  wish  to  go,  not  so  much  from  fear  of  death  as  from  the 
chance  of  having  his  plans  all  brought  to  naught  by  the  stray 
bullet  of  a  fanatic.  •  Then  the  idea  of  making  himself  agree- 
able to  a  man  whom  he  cordially  despised,  like  the  French 
emperor,  must  have  been  highly  distasteful  to  him.  The 
whole  business  was  full  of  pretence  and  hypocrisy, — a  grand 
piece  of  political  clap-trap.  No  one  would  suspect  Napoleon 
of  conniving  at  unlawful  machinations  against  the  persons  of 
his  enemies,  but  it  was  not  impossible  that  some  desperate 
Bonapartist  might  try  to  immortalize  himself  in  that  manner. 
The  lot  fell,  however,  to  the  Tsar  Alexander,  who  was  shot 
at  and  missed,  by  a  Polish  exile,  while  riding  in  the  pro- 
ii  161 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

cession, — an  event  not  likely  to  startle  him  into  a  more  favor- 
able policy  towards  French  annexation  on  the  Rhine.  Bis- 
marck rode  beside  Gortchakoff  in  the  procession,  and  had 
ample  opportunities  to  discuss  points  of  mutual  interest  in 
the  policy  of  their  respective  governments. 

The  secret  arrangement  between  William  and  Alexander 
has  never  been  revealed,  and  probably  never  will  be,  but  the 
fact  that  such  was  made,  some  time  between  1867  and  1870, 
is  not  to  be  questioned.  It  is  referred  to  indefinitely  in  Hese- 
kiel's  biography  of  Bismarck,  which  was  published  previous 
to  the  Franco-German  war,  and  referred  to  by  Alexander  in 
the  telegram  sent  to  William  I.  on  hearing  of  the  Austro- 
German  alliance,  "  Your  Majesty  seems  to  have  forgotten  the 
promises  of  1870."  Dr.  Frederick  Kapp  said  in  1873,'  "  Bis- 
marck's great  move  which  upset  Napoleon's  calculations  was 
the  bargain  he  made  with  Gortchakoff.  He  said,  '  If  you  will 
leave  us  to  deal  with  France  now,  we  will  show  you  a  good 
turn  in  the  time  that  is  coming.'  "  This  mutual  arrangement 
was  carried  out  to  perfection,  so  that  Von  Beust,  though  he 
noticed  GortchakofTs  coolness  towards  him  and  Napoleon, 
was  even  led  to  believe  that  Russia  was  favorable  to  an  alli- 
ance between  France  and  Austria.  The  Tsar  had  no  objec- 
tions against  setting  a  trap  for  the  author  of  the  Crimean 
War  to  fall  into,  provided  this  also  agreed  with  the  interests 
of  the  Russian  empire ;  but  if  he  was  to  serve  as  a  protector 
to  Prussia  in  the  war,  he  expected  recompense  for  it.  In 
what  shape  was  he  to  receive  this  ? 

It  could  not  have  been  simply  a  revocation  of  the  Black 
Sea  restrictions.  That  by  itself  would  not  have  been  enough. 
Von  Beust  asks,  "  Why  should  the  Tsar  depend  on  Prussia 
for  a  revocation  of  the  treaty  of  Paris,  when  Austria  offered 
to  arrange  this  for  him  in  1867?"  The  reason  is  plainly  be- 
cause Austria  could  not  bid  high  enough  for  the  Tsar's 
friendship.  Alexander  was  not  a  Solomon,  but  he  was  too 
wise  to  join  a  coalition  against  Prussia,  which  would  finally 
result  to  his  own  disadvantage.  No  wonder  that  Gortchakoff 


1  In  conversation  with  the  writer. 
162 


LIFE   OF   BISMARCK 

was  cool  towards  Von  Beust.  It  is  clear  from  Dr.  Kapp's 
remark  that  in  1873  Bismarck's  debt  to  the  Tsar  had  not  yet 
been  liquidated  in  spite  of  the  Black  Sea  reversion.  Alex- 
ander has  been  popularly  credited  with  being  a  peace-loving 
Tsar,  but  it  was  natural  that  he  should  desire  to  regain  the 
ground  which  his  father  had  lost ;  also,  perhaps,  to  liberate 
the  Christian  states  which  are  situated  between  the  Balkans 
and  the  Danube  from  Turkish  rule.  It  would  not  have  been 
for  Austria's  interest  to  encourage  this  programme.  It  was 
Louis  Napoleon's  fatal  delusion  that  he  could  persuade  Alex- 
ander to  withdraw  from  the  Prussian  alliance. 


BUILDING   THE   REICH. 

Bismarck  returned  to  Berlin  after  the  exposition  to  take  up 
his  work  again  of  strengthening  the  German  confederation. 
His  policy  now  was  a  defensive  one ;  to  establish  a  central 
government  for  the  German  people  which  should  not  only  rest 
on  a  firm  basis,  but  prove  advantageous  and  give  satisfaction  to 
the  component  parts  of  this  extensive  system.  This  was  his 
first  principle,  and  his  second  was  to  avoid  foreign  complica- 
tions. At  what  time  he  became  interested  in  the  writings  of 
Alexander  Hamilton  is  uncertain,  but  it  is  known  that  he 
held  them  in  very  high  estimation,  and  had  a  professorship 
established  in  one  or  more  German  universities,  for  instruction 
in  the  federative  principle  of  government,  as  elaborated  by 
that  rare  American  genius.  It  is  even  affirmed  by  his  friends 
that  Bismarck  considered  Hamilton  the  greatest  statesman 
of  the  last  hundred  years ;  and  it  is  certain  that  the  federal 
principle  is  the  only  one  by  which  national  unity  can  be 
made  to  harmonize  with  local  and  sectional  interests.  We 
may  begin  to  appreciate  the  debt  which  we  owe  to  Hamil- 
ton in  America,  when  we  consider  that  both  Germany  and 
Austria  have  been  reconstructed,  and  in  a  manner  regen- 
erated, by  the  principles  which  he  enunciated.  France  and 
Italy,  being  homogeneous  nations,  do  not  require  its  appli- 
cation, but  who  can  doubt  that  Gladstone  would  have  suc- 
ceeded better  in  dealing  with  the  Irish  question  if  he  had 

163 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

been  willing  to  accept  a  lesson  from  statesmen  on  this  side 
the  Atlantic  ? ' 

Bismarck,  like  a  good  architect,  did  not  attempt  to  build 
his  edifice  too  rapidly.  For  this  reason  he  had  left  the  Schles- 
wig-Holstein  question  still  open  until  a  favorable  moment 
should  come  for  its  final  settlement.  It  will  be  remembered 
that  by  a  provision  of  the  treaty  of  Prague  the  people  of 
North  Schleswig  were  permitted  to  decide  by  a  majority  vote 
whether  they  should  belong  to  Denmark  or  to  Prussia.  The 
question  was  not  a  very  important  one,  for  the  province  is 
small  and  its  inhabitants  chiefly  farmers.  There  seems  to 
have  been  all  through  this  period  a  peculiar  obstinacy  in  the 
Danish  government,  which  was  the  cause  of  serious  losses  to 
the  state, — in  the  present  instance,  with  the  Copenhagen  cabi- 
net refusing  to  accede  to  Bismarck's  proposition  that  the 
voting  should  take  place  under  the  auspices  of  a  mixed 
Prussian  and  Danish  commission.  The  Danish  government 
insisted  that  the  people  of  North  Schleswig  could  do  their 
own  voting  without  any  assistance  from  Prussia;  to  which 
Bismarck  coolly  replied  that  the  voting  should  not  take  place 
except  under  well-regulated  conditions.2 

This  gave  the  French  emperor  another  opportunity  to  inter- 
fere,— in  behalf  of  the  oppressed  Danes.  He  was  politely 
informed,  however,  that  the  stipulations  of  the  peace  of  Prague 
only  concerned  Prussia  and  Austria,  and  that  there  was  no 
occasion  for  his  taking  further  interest  in  the  subject. 

Bismarck's  next  move  was  to  conclude  a  commercial  treaty 
with  the  South  German  states.  After  the  first  excitement  of 
Sadowa  and  the  military  alliance,  a  reaction  had  set  in  at 
Munich  and  Stuttgart  against  Prussia.  The  Bavarian  nobility 

1  Dr.  Kapp  once  said,  "  I  look  upon  Hamilton  as  a  greater  statesman  than 
Bismarck.     When  I  first  went  to  New  York  I  wanted  to  know  about  American 
politics,  and  I  was  advised  to  read  Jefferson  ;  but  I  soon  found  that  all  those 
Tammany  fellows  were  quoting  Jefferson,  so  then  I  changed  to  Hamilton,  and 
then  I  discovered  where  the  United  States  government  came  from."     Jefferson 
was  always  opposed  to  centralization. 

2  Which  side  was  right  in  this  discussion  is  uncertain,  for  we  do  not  know  the 
Danish  account  of  it ;  but  Bismarck's  demand  would  seem  to  have  been  rea- 
sonable. 

164 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

were  connected  by  marriage  and  other  social  ties — always  a 
powerful  factor  in  political  organizations — with  the  Austrian 
nobility  and  gentry.  At  the  same  time  the  priests,  acting 
under  orders  from  the  Vatican,  started  up  an  anti-Prussian 
agitation  among  the  common  people,  so  that  Americans  trav- 
elling in  Bavaria  were  surprised  at  the  violent  antipathy  to  the 
North  German  confederation,  not  knowing  the  source  from 
whence  it  arose.  It  was  natural  that  the  appointment  of 
Prussian  officers  to  important  commands  in  the  military 
service  should  give  offence ;  though  this  was  indispensable  if 
the  army  was  to  be  reorganized  in  an  efficient  manner.  Von 
der  Pfordten,  who  always  remained  faithful  to  what  he  con- 
sidered the  true  interests  of  Germany,  and  who  had  among 
other  trials  the  giddy  young  king  to  deal  with,  found  it  diffi- 
cult to  maintain  his  ground. 

In  Baden,  on  the  other  hand,  there  was  an  active  move- 
ment favorable  to  Prussia,  and  Bismarck  found  no  difficulty 
in  having  the  whole  army  of  the  Palatinate  placed  under  the 
command  of  a  Prussian  general,  who  was  only  responsible  to 
the  Grand  Duke.  He  likewise  obtained  the  appointment  of  a 
Prussian  professor  at  Heidelberg  to  lecture  on  the  French  Rev- 
olution, the  wars  of  Napoleon,  and  the  federal  system  of  govern- 
ment as  applied  to  national  unity.  In  Wurtemberg  public  sen- 
timent was  like  the  man  who  could  not  agree  with  his  neigh- 
bors. The  Swabians  were  always  at  odds  with  the  Bavarians, 
but  disliked  the  Prussians  even  more.  Situated  close  to  Swit- 
zerland, they  had  imbibed  much  of  the  spirit  of  the  freedom- 
loving  mountaineer, — an  influence  plainly  perceptible  in  the 
verses  of  their  national  poet,  Schiller.  They  were,  perhaps, 
less  favorably  inclined  towards  the  Prussians  out  of  opposition 
to  the  people  of  Baden,  and  this  feeling  extended  as  well  to 
the  nobility  and  to  the  government.  According  to  the  treaty 
of  Prague  the  South  German  states  were  permitted  to  form  a 
confederation  of  their  own,  if  they  preferred  to  do  so,  and 
Von  der  Pfordten  made  some  tentative  negotiations  with  this 
end  in  view.  It  was  found,  however,  that  Baden  much  pre- 
ferred to  join  the  North  German  confederation,  and  that  the 
Wurtembergers  were  quite  as  reluctant  to  place  their  military 

165 


LIFE  OF   BISMARCK 

force  at  the  disposal  of  a  Bavarian  general.    Professor  Miiller, 
himself  a  Wurtemberger,  says : 

"  A  confederation  embracing  not  more  than  eight  or  nine  mil- 
lions, and  set  between  three  great  powers,  would  be  unable  to 
stand  on  its  own  feet  and  pursue  an  independent  policy.  It  would 
be  sure  to  become  the  sport  of  foreign  intrigue, — now  begging 
favors  in  Paris  or  Vienna,  now  asking  succor  from  Berlin,  and  dis- 
appearing with  the  first  storm  that  swept  the  face  of  Central 
Europe. ' ' 

It  was  openly  declared  in  the  Wurtemberg  assembly  that 
if  the  kingdom  was  to  be  coalesced  with  any  political  body  it 
should  be  with  a  strong  power  like  Prussia,  and  not  with  a 
weak  one  like  Bavaria.  There  was  good  sense  in  this,  such 
as  any  one  could  understand,  and  it  showed  the  inevitable 
tendency  in  which  German  politics  were  drifting. 

Bismarck  perceived  that  events  were  taking  such  a  shape 
as  he  would  like  to  have  them,  but  he  knew  that  time  was 
required  to  ripen  this  movement  in  the  South  German  gov- 
ernments, and  that  any  decided  interference  on  his  part  might 
only  result  in  the  gathering  of  green  fruit.  Meanwhile  he 
had  a  cure  in  hand  for  the  unsettled  condition  of  their  affairs, 
and  this  was  a  commercial  treaty.  The  three  inland  states, 
separated  by  hundreds  of  miles  from  the  sea,  were  obliged  to 
depend  on  their  neighbors  for  the  transportation  of  imports. 
Baden  could  obtain  this  traffic  through  France,  but  likewise 
possessed  the  power  of  exacting  a  duty  from  the  other  two. 
Bavaria  could  import  through  Austria,  but  by  a  longer  route, 
and  necessarily  with  more  expense.  Bismarck  could  obviate 
this  difficulty  by  conferring  on  the  South  German  states  the 
same  advantages  of  the  Zollverein  enjoyed  by  the  North 
German  confederation.  Already  on  June  3  he  had  held  a 
conference  with  Von  der  Pfordten,  Varnbuler,  and  the  Baden 
minister  at  Berlin,  in  which  he  proposed  the  adoption  of  uni- 
form measures  for  imports  and  the  regulation  of  national  cus- 
tom-houses for  all  the  German  states  excepting  Austria.  Such 
an  advantageous  measure  was  eagerly  snapped  at,  and  on  Bis- 
marck's return  from  Paris  it  was  agreed  that  the  southern 

166 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

states  should  send  delegates  to  the  North  German  parliament, 
in  number  according  to  the  ratio  of  their  population,  who 
should  vote  on  all  commercial  questions  which  came  before 
the  house,  but  not  on  political  questions. 

Here  was  German  national  unity  established  in  respect  to 
military  service  and  commercial  rights,  and  yet  it  could  not 
be  said  that  the  peace  of  Prague  had  been  violated  or  that  the 
South  German  states  had  not  acted  of  their  own  free  will.  To 
constitute  Germany  a  nation  there  only  remained  to  empower 
the  representatives  of  Wiirtemberg,  Bavaria,  and  Baden  with 
full  authority  to  vote  on  all  subjects  that  came  before  the 
Reichstag,  and  to  give  the  formality  of  a  title  to  the  whole.  The 
French  might  growl  at  this,  and  the  Bavarian  nobility  howl  at 
Bismarck,  but  every  merchant  and  shopkeeper  in  Munich  and 
Stuttgart  was  now  a  Prussian  at  heart,  and  the  industrial 
classes  of  South  Germany  were  rapidly  forming  a  solid  pha- 
lanx to  resist  foreign  interference.  The  industrial  interests  of 
these  states  did  not  differ  essentially  from  those  of  Prussia, 
but  in  the  old  Frankfort  Diet,  with  delegates  appointed  by 
the  sovereigns,  there  was  less  opportunity  for  a  free  expression 
of  opinion. 

The  elections  in  1867  showed  a  cordial  endorsement  of 
Bismarck's  policy.  The  Conservatives  retained  their  usual 
strength  in  Prussia,  while  the  opposition  lost  more  than  thirty 
seats,  which  were  mostly  won  by  the  National  Liberals,  and 
it  was  noticed  that  the  representatives  from  the  annexed  dis- 
tricts of  Hanover,  Cassel,  and  Schleswig-Holstein  belonged 
nearly  all  to  this  new  party.  With  three  legislative  bodies, 
the  Prussian  Landtag,  the  North  German  Reichstag,  and  the 
National  Customs  Union,  to  deal  with,  Bismarck  had  his 
hands  more  than  full  of  legislative  business,  and  how  he 
could  have  carried  it  through  seems  wonderful  enough. 

This  second  North  German  Reichstag  might  be  compared 
with  the  earlier  sessions  of  the  American  Congress,  before 
partisan  spirit  and  trade  politics  had  debased  and  cheapened 
our  legislative  currency.  It  was  composed  for  the  most  part 
of  patriotic  men,  who  gave  their  time  and  strength  for  the 
good  of  their  country,  and  who  met  together  to  establish,  in 

167 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

all  sincerity,  the  foundation  of  a  new  era  in  German  history. 
Nevertheless  it  was  rather  a  difficult  legislative  body  to  deal 
with  for  this  very  reason.  Von  Beust  considered  the  English 
and  Belgian  the  only  successful  parliamentary  governments 
in  Europe,  because  in  those  countries  there  are  two  political 
parties,  either  of  which  is  ready  and  able  at  any  time  to  as- 
sume the  management  of  public  affairs.  In  the  German, 
Austrian,  and  Italian  parliaments  such  parties  do  not  exist, 
for  they  would  have  no  opportunity  to  assume  the  direction 
of  affairs.  As  they  have  no  opportunity  for  executive  action, 
so  there  is  no  party  discipline, — little  or  no  subordination  of 
the  individual.  The  more  high-minded  men  are,  the  less 
willing  they  are  to  subordinate  their  opinions  to  the  judg- 
ment of  others,  and  the  more  likely  to  resent  external  inter- 
ference as  an  infringement  of  personal  liberty.  The  earnest 
desire  of  the  Reichstag  of  1868  to  do  their  work  in  the  most 
thorough  and  effective  manner  resulted  in  a  continuous  cross- 
fire of  amendments  and  counter-amendments  to  every  meas- 
ure which  was  proposed,  and  this  not  only  seriously  impeded 
the  progress  of  public  business,  but  sometimes  resulted  in 
perverting  the  character  of  the  legislation  in  such  a  way  as  to 
defeat  the  very  object  for  which  it  was  intended.  There  was 
a  constant  tendency,  especially  among  the  National  Liberals, 
for  parties  to  resolve  themselves  into  separate  groups,  and  the 
smaller  the  group  the  more  uncompromising  and  difficult  to 
reason  with.  It  was  only  a  Bismarck  or  a  Gladstone  that 
could  finally  have  succeeded  in  dealing  with  such  a  political 
body ;  the  latter  by  his  oratorical  skill  and  rare  tact  in  har- 
monizing conflicting  elements,  and  the  former  through  his 
logical  understanding  of  the  situation  and  his  inflexible  deter- 
mination to  make  others  perceive  this  also.  Bismarck  was 
the  Olympian  schoolmaster  of  the  Reichstag. 

One  of  the  first  questions  which  came  before  the  North 
German  assembly  was  a  measure  in  regard  to  the  deposed 
King  of  Hanover,  who  was  well  known  to  be  making  use  of 
the  gratuity  of  the  Prussian  government  to  support  a  Hanove- 
rian legion  in  France  with  the  funds  he  had  thus  been  supplied 
with,  and  his  adherents  could  congratulate  themselves  on  the 

168 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

fact  that  Prussia  was  providing  them  with  the  means  to  make 
war  against  the  North  German  confederation.  Bismarck  had 
inquired  of  Queen  Victoria,  who  very  properly  took  an  interest 
in  the  fortunes  of  her  relative,what  sum  would  be  sufficient  for 
the  exiled  king  to  live  on  an  equality  with  an  English  prince, 
and  she  had  replied  that  a  hundred  thousand  pounds  a  year 
would  be  enough.1  Bismarck  had  exceeded  this  somewhat, 
but  prudently  had  retained  in  the  Prussian  exchequer  the 
principal  from  which  this  income  was  derived.  Besides  the 
support  of  a  body  of  troops  in  France,  it  was  notorious  that 
certain  German  newspapers  were  subsidized  by  the  ex-king  to 
stir  up  an  agitation  against  the  new  confederation. 

Bismarck,  in  his  appeal  to  the  Prussian  Landtag  for  funds 
to  remunerate  the  deposed  sovereigns,  had  laid  special  stress 
on  the  point  that  their  acceptance  of  the  money  would  give 
to  the  transaction  the  legal  character  of  a  bargain,  which 
would  be  likely  to  invalidate  any  future  claims  they  might 
make  to  their  former  possessions.  The  King  of  Hanover, 
however,  after  receiving  the  gratuity,  declined  to  make  any 
formal  renunciation  of  his  sovereignty ;  but  Queen  Victoria, 
in  the  English  negotiations  on  the  subject,  with  great  good 
sense,  held  to  Bismarck's  position,  declaring  that  this  was  of 
little  consequence,  since,  by  accepting  the  money,  he  would 
be  bound  in  honor  not  to  interfere  with  the  North  German 
confederation.  Duke  Adolph,  of  Nassau,  who  had  received 
nine  million  thalers  in  return  for  the  confiscation  of  his  terri- 
tory, accepted  the  conditions  under  which  it  was  offered  to 
him  and  gave  the  Prussian  government  no  further  trouble. 

The  behavior  of  the  King  of  Hanover,  on  the  contrary, 
placed  Bismarck  in  a  peculiar  position.  As  the  Reichstag 
was  not  in  session  at  the  time  the  convention  with  Queen 
Victoria  was  concluded,  the  Minister  of  Finance  had  taken  the 
required  funds  from  a  loan  authorized  in  1866  for  army  ex- 
penditures ;  and  it  was  necessary  now  to  obtain  the  sanction 

1  August  Belmont  once  stated  that  he  did  not  know  how  he  could  spend  more 
than  a  hundred  thousand  dollars  a  year,  and  Froude  said,  "  There  are  million- 
aires in  New  York  who  have  the  income  of  an  English  prince,  but  they  are  by 
no  means  so  extravagant." 

169 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

of  this  act  by  a  vote  of  the  Reichstag.  In  the  face  of  the 
Hanoverian  legion  it  was  rather  difficult  to  do  this.  There 
were  complaints  of  ministerial  arbitrariness,  a  breach  of  trust, 
and  misplaced  confidence,  without  allowing  for  the  exceptional 
conditions  under  which  the  transaction  had  taken  place.  The 
government  was  in  a  position  not  unlike  that  of  a  man  who 
has  made  purchases  with  borrowed  money  and  is  unable  to 
repay  it.  Bismarck  made  as  little  as  possible  of  the  Hano- 
verian legion,  and  enlarged  on  the  advantage  to  Germany  of 
appearing  before  the  great  powers  in  a  magnanimous  light ; 
so  that,  with  the  help  of  the  Hanoverians  and  Schleswig- 
Holsteiners,  the  bill  was  finally  passed. 

It  was  not  long,  however,  before  the  same  subject  came  up 
again.  The  inimical  proceedings  of  the  King  of  Hanover  had 
been  placed  beyond  question,  and  Bismarck  wished  the  treaty 
with  him  to  be  reversed,  and  the  income  which  had  been 
guaranteed  in  it  divided  between  a  secret-service  fund  and  a 
fund  for  a  local  assembly  in  Hanover  for  the  transaction  of 
business  peculiar  to  that  province.  These  two  measures  were 
introduced  separately,  and  met  with  vigorous  opposition  on 
all  sides.  The  National  Liberals  supported  the  confiscation, 
but  wished  to  have  the  property  of  the  King  of  Hanover 
turned  over  to  the  Prussian  state  for  the  amelioration  of 
taxes.  The  Conservatives,  on  the  other  hand,  objected  to  the 
Hanoverian  state  assembly  as  a  luxury  that  would  only  be 
enjoyed  by  that  province,  whereas  the  various  provinces  of 
the  old  kingdom  of  Prussia  possessed  no  such  advantage. 
Dr.  Windhorst,  the  Hanoverian  clerical,  denounced  the  con- 
fiscation of  King  George's  funds  as  a  violation  of  the  sacred 
rights  of  monarchy. 

The  Liberals,  however,  found  satisfaction  in  the  advocacy 
of  a  state  assembly,  as  they  foresaw  it  would  make  an  enter- 
ing wedge  in  the  direction  of  local  self-government,  and  they 
finally  concluded  that  this  was  more  important  than  the  ques- 
tion of  a  secret-service  fund.  The  Conservatives,  to  whom 
the  favor  of  royalty  was  as  a  second  nature,  were  brought  to 
terms  by  William  I.,  who  realized  as  well  as  Bismarck  the 
advantage  at  that  moment  of  conciliating  the  Hanoverians, 

170 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

who  may  be  said  to  constitute  the  heart  of  Germany.  In  this 
way  both  bills  were  finally  passed ;  but  Bismarck  incurred  the 
displeasure  of  the  Conservatives,  who  considered  him,  as  po- 
litical parties  are  apt  to  do  in  such  cases,  as  trying  to  curry 
favor  with  the  Liberals,  and  as  having  intrigued  against  them 
with  the  king.  His  two  principal  speeches  on  the  Hanover 
question  were  soon  afterwards  translated  into  English,  and 
there  is  not  much  eloquence  in  them,  but  a  cogent,  logical 
statement  of  the  case  in  hand.  "  No  motive/'  he  said  in  the 
last  of  them,  "  except  personal  ambition  could  have  induced 
a  king  whose  dominions  separated  the  two  portions  of  Prussia, 
and  whose  good  will  it  was  therefore  for  the  interest  of  our 
government  to  conciliate,  to  join  hands  with  the  enemies  of 
Prussia." 

The  constitution  of  the  North  German  confederation  had 
been  framed  with  rather  too  exalted  a  view  of  human  nature. 
It  was  supposed  that  the  true  representatives  of  the  German 
people  would  always  behave  and  act  like  gentlemen,  and, 
while  there  was  no  rule  by  which  a  member  of  the  Reichs- 
tag could  be  suspended,  as  in  the  House  of  Commons,  for 
unseemly  conduct  or  improper  language,  it  was  expressly 
provided,  under  Article  LXXXIV.,  that  members  of  neither 
house  should  be  called  to  account  for  their  votes  or  for  any 
expression  of  opinion.  Von  Sybel  says,  "  The  idea  prevailed 
that  within  the  circle  of  the  nation's  representatives  the  public 
humiliation  consequent  upon  the  call  to  order  following 
upon  a  breach  of  decorum  would  be  an  all-sufficient  means 
to  insure  justice  and  propriety  of  behavior."  x  Truly,  it  is 
important  in  politics  to  consider  the  ideal,  for  without  that 
there  can  be  no  sure  progress ;  but  it  is  equally  important  to 
remember  that  human  nature  changes  but  little  from  one 
generation  to  another,  and  is  at  best  a  variable  and  uncertain 
commodity. 

An  illustration  of  this  had  already  arisen  in  the  preceding 
session.  A  deputy  named  Twesten  in  the  present  parliament 
had  criticised  with  unmeasured  severity  the  Prussian  police 

1  Von  Sybel,  vi.  344. 
171 


LIFE   OF   BISMARCK 

and  courts  of  justice;  and  another  deputy  named  Frentzel,  one 
of  the  remaining  Progressists,  had  brought  serious  charges 
against  the  chief  of  the  Konigsberg  police.  In  both  in- 
stances these  gentlemen  had  indulged  in  plenty  of  loud-voiced 
rhetoric  without  producing  any  sufficient  testimony  to  sub- 
stantiate their  statements,  and  Count  Lippe,  the  minister  of 
justice,  brought  a  legal  action  against  them  for  libel  on  the 
government.  The  two  deputies  were  tried  before  the  Superior 
Court,  and  were  acquitted  on  the  ground  that  Article 
LXXXIV.  permitted  full  expression  of  opinion  in  the  assem- 
bly; but  on  appeal  to  the  Supreme  Court  this  judgment  was 
reversed,  and  a  decision  rendered  of  the  highest  importance 
in  its  definition  of  the  right  and  limitation  in  freedom  of  speech. 
It  was  held  by  the  Supreme  Bench  that  an  opinion  could  only 
be  construed  in  the  sense  of  a  process  of  reasoning,  and  that 
mere  vague  assertions,  unsupported  by  documentary  evidence, 
could  not  properly  form  an  opinion,  and  might  be  held  as 
reprehensible  in  a  parliament  as  in  a  court-room.  This  marks 
the  exact  difference  between  freedom  of  opinion  and  license 
of  speech,  a  point  which  people  often  find  it  difficult  to  deter- 
mine. 

The  immediate  consequence  was,  however,  that  the  Cham- 
ber of  Deputies  passed  a  resolution  declaring  that  the  pro- 
ceedings of  the  Supreme  Court  were  unconstitutional,  and 
protested  against  their  validity.  Count  Lippe  on  his  part  en- 
tered a  protest  against  this  action  as  an  infringement  on  the 
supreme  tribunal  of  the  land,  and  a  conflict  between  the 
Landtag  and  the  Supreme  Court  ensued,  which  continued 
till  near  the  close  of  the  session.  The  court's  decision  had 
excited  great  popular  indignation,  and  was  made  use  of  as 
an  electioneering  argument.  In  November,  1867,  Lasker  in- 
troduced a  bill  requiring  that  the  legal  construction  of  Article 
LXXXIV.  should  be  accepted  as  unrestricted  freedom  of 
speech,  which  was  passed  by  a  narrow  majority  in  the  Land- 
tag, but  defeated  in  the  upper  chamber.  Bismarck,  how- 
ever, considered  it  best  in  this  instance  to  take  the  popular 
side.  The  sentence  of  Twesten  and  Frentzel,  which  had 
been  two  years'  imprisonment,  was  reduced  to  a  small  fine, 

172 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

and  the  point  at  issue  permitted  to  remain  in  abeyance.  The 
Landtag  showed  a  patriotic  spirit  in  passing  appropriations 
for  the  army,  and  for  those  novel  expenditures  which  are  re- 
quired for  the  establishment  of  a  new  governmental  system. 

THE    BREWING   OF   THE   STORM 

Old  Marshal  Niel  was  intrusted  by  Napoleon  with  the  re- 
organization of  the  French  army,  which  he  effected  in  rather 
too  antiquated  a  manner.  The  infantry  were  armed  with  the 
chassepot  rifle,  which  proved  to  be  a  better  weapon  than  the 
needle-gun,  but  their  tactics  were  not  adapted  to  the  use  of  it. 
Marshal  Niel  adhered  to  the  old  Napoleonic  methods,  which 
the  French  naturally  supposed  could  not  be  improved  on. 
He  did  not  consider  sufficiently  the  influence  which  modern 
inventions,  especially  the  improvement  in  fire-arms,  might 
have  on  them.  He  did  not  recognize  that  heavy-armed 
cavalry,  such  as  was  so  effective  under  the  command  of 
Murat,  could  no  longer  make  a  sustained  charge  against  the 
firing  of  modern  projectiles ;  and  he  either  retained  or  intro- 
duced a  complicated  series  of  evolutions,  quite  at  variance 
with  the  principle  asserted  by  Frederick  the  Great,  that 
nothing  which  is  not  simple  is  of  any  use  in  war.  He  estab- 
lished large  central  depots  of  military  stores,  which  were  found 
inconvenient  when  the  war  finally  came,  and  caused  delay  by 
creating  a  traffic  blockade  on  the  railways.  It  was  at  this 
time  that  the  world  began  to  hear  something  of  a  deadly 
machine  invented  by  the  French  emperor  himself,  which  was 
expected  to  surpass  all  others  in  its  destructive  effect  on  ranks 
of  infantry. 

Metternich's  policy  was  dogmatic,  Bismarck's  rational,  and 
Louis  Napoleon's  empirical.  Dogmatic  politics,  starting  on 
a  basis  of  things  as  they  are,  always  succeed  most  easily  for 
a  time,  but  finally,  as  they  are  not  suited  to  the  progressive 
wants  of  mankind,  end  in  revolution.  A  rational  policy  is 
the  only  sound  one, — a  policy  based  on  a  knowledge  of 
human  nature  and  progressive  development, — but  involves 
the  necessity  of  a  perpetual  conflict  between  the  different 
classes  of  society, — the  governing  and  the  governed, — such 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

as  we  meet  with  in  the  history  of  Rome  before  the  time  of 
Marius,  and  in  England  since  the  time  of  James  II.  This  is 
the  proper  and  healthy  condition  for  a  nation  to  continue  in ; 
and  though  it  sometimes  approaches  to  a  social  revolution,  it 
is  really  the  best  preventive  against  revolutions.  The  struggle 
between  the  centrifugal  and  the  centripetal  forces  of  society 
keeps  the  body  politic  in  a  healthy  condition,  and  affords 
room  for  those  popular  impulses  to  expand  in,  which  finally 
take  the  form  of  national  progress.  An  empirical  policy, 
which  is  neither  consistent  with  any  set  of  political  dogmas 
nor  allows  sufficient  scope  for  popular  movements,  necessarily 
results  in  a  series  of  makeshifts.  It  is  like  leaping  one  ditch 
after  another,  and,  though  it  may  succeed  with  skilful  man- 
agement for  a  time,  it  is  sure  to  end  at  last  in  complete  and 
utter  ruin. 

The  failure  of  the  second  French  empire  was  inherent  in 
the  condition  of  the  French  people.  For  the  last  hundred 
years  France  has  been  the  head  centre  of  the  liberal  move- 
ment in  Europe;  but  France  is  still  a  Catholic  country. 
There  is  a  political  contradiction  in  this,  which  has  resulted  in 
intermittent  revolutions.  Catholicism  belonged  to  the  earlier 
mediaeval  period,  when  ignorance  was  the  rule  and  education 
the  rare  exception,  and  it  still  continues  well  suited  to  the  in- 
tellectual capacity  of  ignorant  persons.  The  invention  of 
printing  necessarily  brought  with  it  a  more  enlightened  and 
spiritual  faith.  There  is  an  element  of  progress  in  the  Church 
of  Rome,  but  it  is  too  slow  and  too  much  embarrassed  by 
old  traditions  to  keep  pace  with  the  march  of  events.  An 
educated  man  in  a  Catholic  country,  therefore,  finds  himself 
in  a  position  of  outward  antagonism  to  his  inner  life,  and  if 
he  breaks  through  this  he  finds  himself  in  that  element  of 
disbelief  which  we  call  scepticism.  Either  condition  is  weak- 
ening intellectually,  and  places  him  at  a  disadvantage  with  the 
man  who  has  a  real  faith  which  he  can  express  freely  in  out- 
ward action.  This  is  the  reason  why  French  literature  in  the 
nineteenth  century  compares  so  unfavorably  with  English  and 
German  literature.  The  average  Frenchman  of  to-day  is 
either  a  philosophical  materialist  or  a  lukewarm  Romanist, 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

just  as  either  his  mental  tone  or  external  conditions  happen 
to  decide  for  him. 

It  is  true  that  the  French  take  their  religion  very  lightly, 
but,  while  this  affords  them  an  opportunity  for  intellectual 
progress,  it  has  a  decidedly  weakening  effect  on  character. 
The  Gallic  race  is  light-hearted  and  cheerful.  In  many  phases 
of  life  the  French  appear  to  great  advantage  beside  their 
more  stolid  neighbors  in  England  and  Germany ;  but  light- 
heartedness  is  not  inconsistent  with  profound  religious  feeling. 
Of  all  the  sects  of  Protestants,  the  Huguenots  were  the  most 
impassioned,  and  the  strong  religious  convictions  of  their 
opponents  are  indelibly  expressed  in  the  sermons  of  Bossuet 
and  the  poetry  of  Racine.  It  was  this  moral  and  intellectual 
intensity  which  brought  about  the  grand  epoch  in  French 
literature,  and  produced  those  noble  old  Frenchmen  of  whom 
Lafayette  was  one  of  the  last  examples.  What  a  change  to 
the  time  when  the  funeral  of  Victor  Hugo,  the  Dickens  of 
French  novelists,  was  made  a  public  orgy  in  the  streets  of 
Paris ! 

This  contradiction  is  illustrated  to  perfection  in  Louis 
Napoleon's  Italian  policy.  Beaconsfield  affirmed  in  his  last 
novel  that  during  Garibaldi's  invasion  of  the  papal  states 
Napoleon's  inclination  was  really  on  the  side  of  the  insur- 
gents ;  and  it  is  known  that  he  was  for  some  time  wavering 
in  his  decision.  Yet  he  suppressed  the  Roman  revolution 
of  1848  in  order  to  obtain  the  support  of  the  French  Ultra- 
montanes,  though  in  doing  so  he  offended  his  former  confed- 
erates and  risked  assassination  by  the  Orsini  bomb.  Then  in 
1859  ne  undertook  the  campaign  in  Lombardy  in  the  interest 
of  French  liberalism.  In  1868  again  he  defended  the  pope 
against  Garibaldi,  and  compelled  the  Italians,  in  order  to 
realize  their  aspiration  for  national  unity,  to  seek  the  alliance 
of  a  Protestant  power.  On  the  other  hand,  in  order  to  gratify 
the  frivolity  of  his  subjects,  which  arises  from  their  lack  of 
religious  seriousness,  he  was  obliged  to  make  a  continual 
effort  in  the  way  of  scenic  diversion.  He  was.  continually 
afraid  of  being  outvoted  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  of  rev- 
olution, and  assassination.  During  the  last  seven  years  of 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

his  reign  Louis  Napoleon  was  in  the  position  of  a  man  who  is 
riding  two  horses,  which  may  separate  at  any  time  and  let  him 
fall  between  them.  Benedetti  spoke  seriously  enough  to  Bis- 
marck when  he  said,  on  the  5th  of  August,  1866,  "There  is 
too  much  danger  that  if  Napoleon  does  not  obtain  proper 
compensation  it  will  cost  him  his  throne." 

While  strengthening  the  internal  condition  of  his  kingdom, 
and  preparing  himself  for  a  contingency  towards  which  events 
were  rapidly  drifting  him,  Napoleon  looked  abroad  for  the 
possibility  for  an  alliance  which  might  serve  him  when  the 
final  struggle  came.  The  British  government,  weakened  by 
internal  dissensions  and  always  loath  to  take  an  interest  where 
the  ultimate  advantage  might  accrue  in  a  large  measure  to 
another  country,  he  knew  well  enough  would  give  him  no 
assistance.  He  had  a  permanent  defensive  and  offensive  alli- 
ance with  Victor  Emmanuel,  but  the  sentiment  of  the  Italian 
people  was  turning  against  him,  and  of  all  governments  in 
Europe  at  this  time  the  Italian  was  the  one  most  dependent 
on  popular  support.  He  had  mortally  offended  Francis  Jo- 
seph, but  still  he  hoped  that  self-interest  and  hatred  of  Bis- 
marck might  counterbalance  the  grudge  of  Solferino  at  the 
Austrian  court.  He  therefore  attempted  to  build  up  an 
Austro-Italian  alliance  out  of  such  poor  material  as  was  still 
left  to  him, — a  doubtful  undertaking,  and  a  crazy  structure  to 
depend  on  if  he  succeeded  in  erecting  it. 

Von  Beust  is  here  of  great  value  to  us,  for,  though  he  some- 
times hedges  like  Bismarck  in  his  assertions,  and  tries  to  give 
a  favorable  Austrian  color  to  them,  the  sound  character  of  the 
man  is  beyond  question.  Already  during  the  Luxemburg 
difficulty  the  Due  de  Gramont  had  proposed  an  alliance  to 
him  in  case  of  war  with  Prussia,  with  the  offer  of  Silesia  or 
an  equivalent  in  South  Germany.  He  says : 

"I  replied  by  pointing  out  that  the  emperor,  having  millions  of 
German  subjects,  could  not  make  an  alliance  for  the  purpose  of 
diminishing  German  territory.  I  cannot  recollect  whether  I  re- 
peated in  this  despatch  the  idea  which  I  have  repeatedly  expressed 
to  the  Due  de  Gramont,  and  to  which  he  alludes  in  his  answer  of 
January,  1873,  but  I  remember  the  idea  itself  very  distinctly.  It 

176 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

could  not  be  our  task  to  attack  Germany  any  more  than  it  is  our 
duty  to  protect  her.  The  field  of  action  to  which  our  interests 
pointed,  and  where  all  the  races  in  the  empire  could  fight  without 
aversion,  was  the  East. ' ' x 

This  reply  must  have  been  as  unpleasant  to  the  Due  de 
Gramont  as  some  of  Bismarck's  replies  were  to  the  French 
emperor.  Von  Beust  had  a  number  of  reasons  for  this  decli- 
nation, of  which  the  first  and  foremost  was  the  character  of 
Napoleon  himself.  "  We  had  to  consider  a  double  danger," 
he  says,  "  when  considering  such  a  proposition, — the  possi- 
bility of  Napoleon  coming  to  an  agreement  with  Prussia  at 
our  cost,  and  his  leaving  us  to  enjoy  the  evil  effects  of  his 
alliance."  Then,  Von  Beust  did  not  like  the  idea  of  having  his 
internal  reforms  suspended,  and  perhaps  thwarted  altogether, 
by  the  exigencies  and  perhaps  catastrophes  of  a  colossal 
war.  In  the  third  place,  it  was  doubtful  if  the  Hungarians, 
who  were  now  quasi  independent,  would  support  a  coalition 
against  Bismarck,  whom  they  naturally  looked  upon  as  their 
best  friend.  Moreover,  the  agitation  in  the  Danubian  princi- 
palities, which  had  commenced  with  the  assassination  of  the 
Prince  of  Roumania,  appeared  to  be  on  the  increase,  and  was 
a  source  of  grave  anxiety  to  the  Vienna  cabinet. 

In  August  Napoleon  and  Gramont  made  a  visit  to  Francis 
Joseph  at  Salzburg  to  condole  with  him  on  the  murder  of  his 
brother  Maximilian  by  those  Mexican  devils,  and  it  is  note- 
worthy that  the  imperial  party  was  severely  hissed  at  the  rail- 
way station  of  Augsburg,  in  Bavaria,  on  their  way  thither.  This 
ought  to  have  been  a  note  of  warning  to  Napoleon  as  signifi- 
cant of  the  disposition  of  the  people  of  South  Germany.  To 
a  more  alert  mind  than  his  it  would  have  been  sufficient  to 
change  the  whole  current  of  his  policy,  but  he  knew  that  the 
Bavarian  nobility  were  on  his  side,  and  neglected  to  consider 
the  effect  of  Bismarck's  popular  elections.  Augsburg  is  the 
financial  centre  of  Southern  Germany,  and  it  was  Bismarck's 
Zollverein  from  which  the  hisses  originated. 

Maximilian  was  in   a   measure  Louis  Napoleon's  victim, 

1  Von  Beust's  Memoirs,  ii.  172. 

12  I77 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

though  he  finally  lost  his  life  through  an  excess  of  chival- 
rous devotion  to  his  Mexican  adherents.  The  meeting,  there- 
fore, could  not  have  been  a  very  cordial  one.  Francis  Joseph 
had  reason  to  be  pleased  with  the  removal  of  his  brother  to  a 
distant  scene  of  action,  but  he  showed  true  fraternal  feeling 
and  deep  concern  at  the  approach  of  his  unhappy  fate.  It  is 
not  likely,  therefore,  that  there  was  more  than  a  formal  dis- 
cussion of  politics  at  Salzburg,  though  Prussian  government 
organs  undoubtedly  made  the  most  of  the  meeting  there. 
Von  Beust  says : 

"  We  arrived  at  the  conclusion  that  it  was  our  joint  task  to  ob- 
serve minutely  the  stipulations  of  the  peace  of  Prague,  but  to  avoid 
on  both  sides  any  interference  in  German  affairs.  It  was  especially 
agreed  that  France  should  refrain  from  any  measures  or  manifesta- 
tion of  a  threatening  nature,  while  Austria  should  limit  herself  to 
preserving  the  sympathies  of  South  Germany  by  developing  a 
liberal  and  truly  constitutional  system. ' '  * 

This  amounted  to  nothing  more,  apparently,  than  leaving 
things  as  they  were.  In  the  following  October,  when  Francis 
Joseph  visited  the  Paris  Exposition,  Von  Beust  had  an  inter- 
view with  the  Prussian  envoy,  and  they  agreed  in  thinking 
that  the  best  means  of  avoiding  a  collision  with  France 
"  would  be  to  consolidate  South  Germany  so  as  to  present  a 
united  front  to  the  foreigner."  Between  the  two  evils  of  as- 
sisting Napoleon  or  remaining  outside  the  German  confeder- 
ation the  Austrian  emperor  evidently  preferred  the  latter. 

In  the  summer  of  1868  Napoleon  renewed  his  proposals  for 
a  Franco-Austro-Italian  alliance.  The  discussion  of  the  sub- 
ject was  protracted  for  more  than  a  year,  and  the  most  that 
the  Austrian  government  was  willing  to  admit  was  that  in 
case  of  complications  with  Russia,  and  Prussia's  giving  Russia 
countenance  and  support,  Austria  would  be  willing  and  ready 
to  take  part  with  France  in  a  war  against  Germany ;  but  such 
an  unequal  conflict  as  that  might  prove  had  no  charm  for 
Napoleon  III. 

1  Von  Beust's  Memoirs,  ii.  36. 
178 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

Old  political  stagers  predicted  that  the  campaign  of  1866 
would  have  its  reflection  in  a  number  of  small  insurrections  in 
various  parts  of  Europe,  and  so  it  proved.  The  Panslavic 
agitation  continued  to  seethe  and  ferment,  but  did  not  come 
to  the  surface  of  events  till  ten  years  later.  The  Cretan  insur- 
rection began  in  the  winter  of  1867,  and  Garibaldi's  invasion 
of  the  papal  territory  took  place  the  following  summer. 

The  first  of  these  was  so  favorable  to  the  interests  of  Prus- 
sia that  we  might  almost  suspect  that  Bismarck  had  instigated 
it,  though  he  could  only  have  done  so  through  the  mediation 
of  the  Russian  court.  It  would  be  interesting  to  know  what 
he  thought  about  the  Cretans  and  Turkish  affairs  in  general, 
but  he  gave  no  more  sign  than  the  Speaker  of  the  House  of 
Commons  does  in  regard  to  the  subject  of  debate.  However, 
he  readily  agreed  with  the  British  ministry  in  favoring  a 
friendly  attitude  towards  the  Cretans  at  Constantinople ;  but 
Napoleon  followed  the  example  of  Austria  in  taking  an  oppo- 
site course,  which  practically  left  the  Sultan  to  act  as  he 
pleased. 

The  first  six  months  of  1867  in  Italy  proved  an  anxious 
period  for  both  Bismarck  and  Napoleon.  The  sudden  acqui- 
sition of  Venetia,  against  all  expectation,  had  filled  the  Italians 
with  an  enthusiastic  longing  for  their  ancient  capital,  but 
Prussia  could  do  nothing  for  them  in  that  direction.  The 
nation  was  not  in  a  condition  to  cope  with  France,  and  its 
acquisition  depended  on  either  the  good- will  of  Napoleon  or 
such  an  internal  condition  of  French  affairs  as  to  render  his 
interference  impossible.  This  latter  alternative  does  not 
appear  to  have  occurred  to  Victor  Emmanuel's  counsellors, 
and  there  were  those  among  them  who  were  willing  to  join  in 
an  attack  upon  Prussia  if  Napoleon  would  only  permit  them 
to  march  into  Rome.1  It  is  doubtful  if  the  king  would  ever 
have  consented  to  this,  and  the  pressure  of  events  soon  turned 
the  political  current  in  the  opposite  direction.  Ratazzi,  who 
had  succeeded  La  Marmora,  informed  Napoleon  that  the  sit- 
uation was  critical,  and  that  he  feared  the  patriotic  ardor  of 

1  Von  Sybel,  vol.  vi.  ch.  iv. 
179 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

the  Italians  would  soon  find  an  outlet  in  one  way  or  another. 
Napoleon  felt  himself  in  the  same  position,  and  attempted  to 
effect  a  compromise  with  Pius  IX.,  but  met  with  such  an  ob- 
stinate refusal  that  for  a  time  he  allowed  matters  to  take  their 
natural  course.  In  Florence  the  uncertainty  of  opinion  was 
so  great  that  two  ministries  resigned  in  less  than  four  months. 

The  natural  course  of  events  in  Italy  meant — Garibaldi. 
Rome  was  his  game,  and  he  was  ready  to  spring  upon  it  as 
soon  as  the  leash  which  held  him  was  loosened.  An  invasion 
of  the  states  of  the  Church  by  his  "  sons  of  freedom"  followed 
as  a  matter  of  course,  and  it  is  said  that  Napoleon  was  never 
so  distracted  in  his  mind  as  on  this  occasion.  He  gave  orders 
and  countermanded  them  a  number  of  times,  but  finally  de- 
cided to  support  the  pope.  The  battle  of  Mentana  followed, 
and  Garibaldi's  forces  were  dispersed  by  the  effective  use  of 
the  chassepot,  but  the  same  fusillade  killed  Napoleon's  influ- 
ence in  Italy.  The  French  alliance  continued  as  an  empty 
form,  but  it  was  worse  than  nothing,  for  it  served  to  encourage 
an  expectation  which  could  never  be  realized.  The  chassepot, 
however,  had  done  its  whole  duty,  and  the  superiority  of  the 
Prussians  at  Sadowa  was  now  fully  explained. 

The  continued  interference  of  France  in  the  affairs  of  so 
many  other  nations  had  now  aroused  a  general  feeling  of  exas- 
peration at  European  courts,  and  Napoleon's  attempt  to  shift 
the  responsibility  of  the  pope's  temporal  authority  from  his 
own  shoulders  by  a  conference  of  the  powers  met  with  small 
favor,  and  finally  died  a  lingering  death  amid  great  volumes 
of  diplomatic  correspondence.  The  sympathy  in  England, 
both  Tory  and  Liberal,  was  with  the  Italian  government. 
Von  Beust,  having  a  controversy  with  the  pope  himself  over 
the  concordat,  had  no  desire  to  increase  the  pope's  influence 
by  strengthening  his  position,  and  Bismarck  was  non-com- 
mittal. In  the  summer  of  1868,  as  Marshal  Niel  repre- 
sented to  Napoleon  that  it  was  folly  to  make  war  on  Prus- 
sia without  a  substantial  ally,  the  emperor  bestirred  him- 
self again  to  bring  about  the  triple  alliance  with  Austria  and 
Italy,-but  Von  Beust  had  his  hands  full  without  attempting  to 
pull  Napoleon's  chestnuts  out  of  the  fire,  and  Victor  Em- 

180 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

manuel,  though  expressing  the  most  cordial  sentiments  to- 
wards his  imperial  friend  and  benefactor,  would  only  join  the 
proposed  alliance  on  terms  which  were  a  practical  nullification 
of  it.  These  were  that  the  French  garrison  should  be  with- 
drawn from  Rome,  and  the  possession  of  the  Italian  Tyrol 
guaranteed  in  case  of  a  successful  termination  of  the  war. 
Napoleon  must  have  perceived  from  this  only  too  clearly 
what  he  had  to  expect  from  Victor  Emmanuel. 

In  this  perplexity,  and,  as  it  were,  grasping  at  straws,  he 
turned  to  Isabella,  the  disreputable  Queen  of  Spain.  The  influ- 
ence of  the  pope  in  European  politics  would  never  have  been 
one-half  of  what  it  actually  has  been  if  it  were  not  for  the  influ- 
ence of  the  priests  on  queens  and  empresses.  Isabella,  who 
governed  by  means  of  one  of  the  most  tyrannical  of  prime 
ministers,  was  no  doubt  informed  by  him  that  it  would  be  im- 
possible to  drag  her  impoverished  country  into  a  war  with 
Germany,  but  that  there  would  be  no  difficulty  in  providing 
for  the  protection  of  Pius  IX.  with  forty  thousand  Spanish 
bayonets.  This  would  have  relieved  Napoleon  from  further 
embarrassment  in  that  direction,  and  enabled  him  to  add  the 
troops  in  Rome  to  his  effective  force  upon  the  Rhine ;  but  the 
covenant  had  been  no  sooner  agreed  upon,  in  September, 
1868,  when  suddenly  the  Spanish  revolution  took  place;  the 
queen  and  her  minister,  Gonzalez  Bravo,  were  defeated  at  the 
battle  of  Alcolea,  and  Isabella  obliged  to  fly  for  succor  to  the 
man  who  had  expected  assistance  from  her.  Such  a  buga- 
boo had  Bismarck  become  to  the  French  people  that  he  was 
accused  by  the  Parisian  journals  of  having  instigated  and 
abetted  this  Spanish  revolution ;  though  he  was  opposed  to 
revolutions  on  principle,  and  the  compact  between  Napoleon 
and  Isabella  was  not  discovered  till  many  years  afterwards.1 

It  is  noteworthy  that,  although  Napoleon  III.  professed  to  be 
the  champion  of  popular  rights  and  the  principle  of  nationality, 
all  the  popular  movements  of  this  period,  excepting  the  cam- 
paign of  1859,  were  unfavorable  to  him,  and  equally  to  the 
advantage  of  Bismarck,  who  never  pretended  anything  of  the 


1  Von  Sybel,  vi.  411  ;  also  Heeling's  Memoirs,  iii.  360. 
181 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

sort.  The  conclusion  is  unavoidable  that  Bismarck  was  act- 
ing in  harmony  with  the  laws  of  nature,  or  human  nature, 
and  that  Louis  Napoleon  was  contending  against  them.  The 
condition  of  France  in  1868  is  a  fair  example  of  the  result  of 
a  government  based,  like  that  of  Napbleon  L,  on  prestige  and 
popularity.  When  Marshal  Niel,  a  genuine  old  soldier,  at- 
tempted to  reorganize  the  French  army,  he  found  such  oppo- 
sition to  his  plans,  both  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  and 
among  his  colleagues,  that  it  became  simply  an  impossible 
task.  The  French  people  believed  that  they  had  only  to  rise 
up  in  their  might,  as  they  did  in  1/93,  and  demolish  the  Prus- 
sians. Thiers,  Favre,  and  other  opponents  of  the  government, 
who  had  attacked  Napoleon  in  the  Chambers  for  permitting 
Bismarck  to  build  up  a  strong  German  power,  were  now  as 
vehemently  opposed  to  granting  appropriations  for  an  increase 
of  the  army,  while  the  newspapers  of  both  parties  maintained 
a  continuous  clamor  against  the  odious  Prussians.  It  is  sup- 
posed also  that  Marshal  Niel's  colleagues  in  the  ministry  se- 
cretly undermined  his  efforts  to  create  a  strong  military 
establishment  for  fear  of  the  ascendency  which  this  might 
give  him.  The  consequence  was  that  the  appropriations  were 
largely  reduced,  and  a  force  of  three  hundred  thousand  men 
was  the  most  the  marshal  could  report  to  Napoleon  at  the 
close  of  the  year. 

Sparta,  Rome,  and  Prussia  are  the  three  military  nations 
of  history, — that  is,  as  compared  with  others.  Napoleon 
L  made  France  a  nation  of  soldiers  during  his  time,  but  after 
Waterloo  this  came  to  an  end.  Frederick  the  Great  so  or- 
ganized the  Prussians  during  his  reign  that  with  seven  millions 
of  population  he  was  able  to  maintain  himself  and  preserve 
the  peace  in  Europe  for  thirty  years.1  Scharnhorst  originated 
the  present  Prussian  military  system,  which  has  been  devel- 
oped not  only  into  the  most  effective  but  the  most  equitable 
that  has  ever  been  devised.  It  was  a  decided  improvement 
on  the  French  system  of  the  First  Empire,  and  it  was  evi- 


1  He  wrote  to  the  King  of  France,  "  Not  a  shot  is  fired  on  the  continent 
without  my  permission." 

182 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

dently  what  upset  Napoleon's  calculations  in  1813.  Every 
able-bodied  youth  at  the  age  of  eighteen  is  obliged  to  report 
himself  to  the  authorities  for  service.  The  sons  of  counts  and 
barons  are  obliged  to  do  this,  the  same  as  common  peasants. 
Wealthy  young  men,  however,  are  permitted  the  advantage  of 
serving  for  only  two  years  if  they  will  contribute  to  their  own 
maintenance  during  the  time.  As  all  others  serve  for  four 
years,  this  is  not  abstractly  just,  but  probably,  on  the  whole, 
better  for  the  state.  At  the  expiration  of  four  years  they  go 
into  the  Landwehr,  or  reserves,  and  are  required  to  drill 
six  weeks  each  year  for  six  years  longer.  The  officers  are 
to  a  large  extent  taken  from  the  titled  classes,  and  are  re- 
quired to  be  highly  educated  men,  so  that  a  refined  esprit  du 
corps  is  preserved  in  the  profession.  In  the  autumn  the  sol- 
diers are  relieved  from  discipline,  and  take  part  in  gathering 
the  crops. 

Although  a  large  army  is  always  something  of  a  burden 
to  a  nation,  the  German  system  certainly  has  a  number  of 
advantages.  It  trains  up  young  men  in  the  most  healthy  and 
orderly  of  all  modes  of  life  just  at  the  time  when  they  are 
liable  to  contract  idle  and  dissipated  habits,  so  that  it  may  even 
be  affirmed  that  the  time  devoted  to  their  country  in  this  way 
is  no  loss,  but  doubled  or  even  trebled  in  the  average  du- 
ration of  German  life.  It  also  effects  an  unconstrained  inter- 
course between  the  different  classes  of  society,  by  which  the 
higher  are  induced  to  respect  the  more  humble,  and  the  less 
educated  to  acquire  something  of  the  culture  of  those  who 
have  been  more  fortunate ;  and,  as  Von  Moltke  discovered,  it 
teaches  them  all  to  speak  good  Hanoverian  German,  so  that 
dialects  and  provincialisms  are  now  dying  out. 

If  we  now  contrast  this  with  the  Napoleonic  system,  it  is 
easy  to  foresee — if  we  did  not  already  know  it — the  issue  of 
the  impending  struggle  between  France  and  Prussia.  The 
French  army  was  recruited  by  the  old  method  of  conscription, 
and  the  unfortunate  persons  enrolled  in  this  manner  were 
obliged  to  serve  from  ten  to  fifteen  years.  Those  who  had 
the  means  to  purchase  a  substitute  were  certain  to  do  so,  and 
thus  the  real  burden  fell  almost  entirely  upon  the  laboring 

183 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

classes.  The  system  was  just  and  fair  only  in  the  sense  that 
a  lottery  is  just  and  fair.  There  are  no  braver  soldiers  than 
the  French ;  but  a  man's  devotion  to  his  couatry  will  always 
be  more  or  less  influenced  by  the  way  in  which  he  is  treated 
by  his  country, — if  we  except  such  rare  instances  as  Aristides 
and  Mazzini.  The  more  prosperous  classes  were  supposed 
to  be  organized  into  a  national  militia ;  but,  though  the  service 
was  made  obligatory,  various  ways  were  discovered  of  es- 
caping from  it,  and  Marshal  Niel  found  his  most  difficult 
obstacle  in  attempting  to  give  a  sufficient  consistency  to  the 
National  Guard,  so  that  it  might  serve  to  garrison  the  for- 
tresses. The  young  aristocrats  of  Paris  stubbornly  objected 
to  anything  like  discipline,  and  ridiculed  the  Prussians  as 
Bismarck's  drudges,  low-bred  fellows  who  ate  with  their 
knives.  There  was  actually  more  equality  in  monarchical 
Germany  than  in  democratic  Paris.1  The  average  intelli- 
gence of  the  French  army  officers  was  also  of  a  lower  grade 
than  the  German.  There  was  not,  perhaps,  so  much  favoritism 
in  the  appointments  as  there  was  formerly  in  the  English 
army,  but  there  had  been  numerous  promotions  for  bravery 
on  the  field  of  battle  which  went  much  beyond  the  actual 
deserts  of  the  individual.  French  generals  were  captured  in 
the  campaign  of  1870  so  ignorant  that  they  could  not  write 
their  names. 

THE   ROUMANIAN   QUESTION. 

How  easily  a  person  in  Bismarck's  position  accomplishes 
what  he  undertakes,  if  he  only  comprehends  the  situation,  is 
shown  by  the  denouement  of  the  Roumanian  complication  in 
1868.  After  the  Roumanian  revolution  of  1866,  Napoleon, 
of  course,  wished  to  increase  his  prestige  by  originating  the 
appointment  of  a  prince  to  fill  the  vacant  throne,  and,  perhaps 
to  bring  Prussia  into  closer  relations  with  his  policy,  he  pitched 
upon  Prince  Charles  Anthony,  of  Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, 
a  twelfth-century  relative  of  the  Prussian  king.  He  was, 
however,  much  more  nearly  connected  with  Napoleon  him- 

1  Paris  has  been  republican  certainly  since  1830.  The  support  of  the  Second 
Empire  came  chiefly  from  the  country  districts. 

184 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

self,  since  his  mother  was  a  princess  of  the  Murat  family. 
He  was  at  the  time  an  officer  in  the  Prussian  army,  and  as 
such  a  subject  of  William  L,  who  disapproved  of  the  appoint- 
ment as  likely  to  result  in  political  complications,  but  recog- 
nized the  young  man's  right  to  accept  the  position  if  he 
thought  best.  Bismarck  held  the  same  opinion  at  first,  but, 
on  finding  that  Austria  and  England  were  opposed  to  it,  he 
changed  his  mind  and  advised  the  prince  to  accept. 

Louis  Napoleon's  man  of  business  in  this  affair  was  a  Rou- 
manian named  Joan  Bratianu,  who  accordingly  obtained  a 
plebiscite  of  the  Roumanian  people  (after  the  French  fashion) 
in  favor  of  Prince  Charles ;  and  the  prince,  after  being  smug- 
gled through  Austria  in  disguise,  was  seated  with  eclat  on 
his  precarious  throne.  Being  a  Prussian  officer  through  and 
through,  he  naturally  wished  to  introduce  the  Prussian  mili- 
tary system  in  his  principality,  and  one  of  the  first  acts  of  his 
government  was  to  negotiate  with  William  I.  for  forty  thou- 
sand needle-guns.  These,  however,  could  not  be  had  at  once, 
owing  to  the  danger  of  an  attack  by  France ;  and  meanwhile 
Bratianu,  who  was  prime  minister  and  a  brilliant  but  visionary 
man,  had  evolved  a  scheme  of  his  own  for  enlarging  the  boun- 
daries of  Roumania  in  imitation  of  Garibaldi's  conquest  of 
Naples.  Incendiary  movements,  of  which  Prince  Charles  must 
have  been  entirely  innocent,  were  set  on  foot  on  the  borders 
of  Bulgaria  and  Transylvania.  It  is  possible  that  these  may 
have  been  instigated  at  the  Russian  court,  but  that  Bismarck 
could  have  had  nothing  to  do  with  them  is  evident  from  the 
events  which  followed.  About  the  same  time  a  consignment 
of  needle-guns,  which  had  been  forwarded  through  Russia  in 
order  not  to  attract  the  attention  of  Von  Beust,  were  discov- 
ered by  Austrian  spies.  Von  Beust  immediately  notified  Na- 
poleon, who  informed  the  Gladstone  ministry,  and  a  great 
howl  was  raised  over  this  fresh  instance  of  Bismarck's  insidi- 
ous machinations. 

The  howling  of  the  French  press  did  not  trouble  Bismarck, 
for  he  knew  that  the  louder  they  howled  the  stronger  and 
more  deep-rooted  would  become  the  sentiment  for  national 
unity  among  the  German  people ;  but  when  the  Hungarian 

185 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

press  began  to  complain  of  the  faithlessness  of  their  Prussian 
allies,  and  to  talk  about  the  integrity  of  the  empire  of  the 
Danube,  he  recognized  that  the  right  time  for  intervention 
had  come.  He  directed  the  Prussian  minister  at  Bucharest, 
on  the  22d  of  November,  1868,  to  demand  of  Prince  Charles 
the  immediate  dismissal  of  the  Bratianu  ministry,  and  when 
this  was  complied  with  the  whole  disturbance  came  suddenly 
to  an  end.  Whatever  may  be  said  or  thought  about  the  agi- 
tation on  the  Bulgarian  border,  it  is  incredible  that  Bismarck 
should  have  intended  to  irritate  the  Hungarians,  or  the  Tsar 
to  offend  Francis  Joseph,  by  the  disorders  in  Transylvania. 
Bismarck  recognized  the  true  origin  of  the  difficulty  and  re- 
moved it  with  a  stroke  of  his  pen. 

The  Cretan  revolution  had  now  been  dragging  along  for  a 
year  with  hopeless  prospects,  and  there  was  danger  that  Greece 
would  become  involved  in  the  struggle  to  its  own  ruin.  Von 
Beust  would  have  liked  much  to  have  had  it  suppressed,  but 
his  hands  were  tied  for  the  time  being,  and  he  could  only  in- 
fluence the  French  cabinet  in  the  same  direction.  Gladstone 
had  favored  the  Cretans,  and  Bismarck  was  not  unfriendly  to 
them ;  but  the  latter  now  saw  that  of  two  great  calamities  one 
was  sure  to  happen, — either  Greece  itself  would  be  crushed 
by  the  Turkish  army,  which  was  assembled  on  the  borders 
of  Thessaly,  or  that  there  would  be  an  Oriental  convulsion 
like  that  of  1854.  He  accordingly  laid  the  case  before  Alex- 
ander, and  persuaded  him  to  see  it  in  its  true  light.  He  then 
proposed  to  Napoleon  and  the  Sultan,  a  European  conference 
for  a  pacific  solution  of  the  problem.  This  all  parties  con- 
cerned readily  agreed  to,  and  with  it  closed  the  year  1868. 


186 


CHAPTER    IX 

THE   FRANCO-GERMAN   WAR 

FRENCH  authorities  are  altogether  silent  on  the  subject,  but 
it  is  well  known  in  Germany  and  Spain  that  the  proposition 
to  place  Prince  Leopold  of  Hohenzollern  on  the  Spanish 
throne  originated  in  the  summer  of  1869.  It  was  Salazar,  a 
Spanish  minister  of  the  provisional  government,  who  first 
made  the  proposal,  and  Dr.  Busch  gives  a  circumstantial  ac- 
count of  an  interview  on  the  subject  between  Benedetti  and 
Bismarck,  wherein  the  former  pointed  out  the  critical  situa- 
tion of  affairs  which  might  result  from  it;  in  reply  to  which 
Bismarck  made  a  counter-proposition,  which  must  have 
pleased  Benedetti  still  less.  He  suggested  that  Prince  Fred- 
erick Charles,  nephew  to  William  I.,  and  one  of  the  ablest 
generals  in  Europe,  would  make  a  more  suitable  candidate,  if 
only  his  religion  did  not  interfere  to  prevent  it.  Unemployed 
princes  have  been  commonly  ready  and  willing  enough  to 
change  their  religion  for  the  sake  of  a  throne ;  but  Benedetti 
did  not  suggest  this,  and  there  was  otherwise  a  grim  humor 
in  Bismarck's  proposition  which  he  may  have  laughed  at  after- 
wards himself.  If  there  was  a  man  in  Europe  who  could  dis- 
cipline the  Spaniards  and  train  them  up  in  the  way  they  should 
go,  it  was  the  red  Frederick ;  and  if  the  Cortes  had  offered 
him  the  Spanish  throne,  it  is  safe  to  presume  he  would  either 
have  done  this  or  died  in  the  attempt. 

It  is  rather  suspicious  that  about  this  same  time  Marshal 
Niel  submitted  to  Napoleon  III.  the  plan  of  a  campaign  for 
the  invasion  of  Germany.  According  to  the  statement  that 
has  been  made  of  this  plan  the  French  army  was  to  follow 
the  line  of  the  Main,  and  having  once  defeated  the  forces  op- 
posed to  it  the  left  wing  was  to  unite  with  a  division  from 
Holland,  which  was  expected  to  join  in  this  raid  for  conquest ; 
the  centre  was  to  instigate  a  revolution  in  Hanover  and  Hesse, 

187 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

and  the  right  wing  was  to  detach  Wurtemberg  and  Bavaria 
from  the  Prussian  alliance.  This  was  a  bold  design,  but  one 
which  could  have  succeeded  only  through  exceptional  good 
fortune.  The  probability  is  that,  even  if  successful  in  their 
first  attack,  the  French  invading  divisions  would  have  been 
overpowered  by  the  Prussian  reserves,  for  it  was  part  of  Von 
Moltke's  strategy  to  retain  his  best  troops  for  such  an  emer- 
gency. Whether  it  was  intended  to  act  upon  this  plan  at  once 
we  do  not  know,  for  Marshal  Niel  died  on  August  13,  and  his 
successor,  General  Leboeuf,  made  wholly  different  arrange- 
ments. 

Prince  Leopold,  like  Prince  Charles  Anthony,  was  more 
closely  connected  with  the  Bonaparte  family  than  with  the 
royal  family  of  Prussia,  but  he  was  also  an  officer  in  the 
Prussian  army,  and  considered  William  I.  as  his  liege  lord 
and  the  head  of  the  house.  In  the  autumn  of  1869  he  was 
first  interrogated  by  Salazar  in  regard  to  accepting  the  Span- 
ish throne,  and,  after  a  consultation  with  King  William,  de- 
clined the  offer.  William  I.  was  always  strongly  opposed  to 
it  or  to  any  measure  which  would  have  a  tendency  to  promote 
a  war  with  France.  Underneath  the  documents  in  the  national 
archives,  and  such  confidential  letters  as  have  been  preserved, 
there  is  always  an  undercurrent  in  national  diplomacy  which 
never  comes  to  the  surface.  It  is  possible  that  Napoleon  III. 
suggested  the  candidacy  of  Prince  Leopold,  in  order  to  set 
him  up  as  a  man  of  straw,  to  serve  as  a  pretext  in  the  way  he 
finally  did ;  or  it  is  possible  that  the  nomination  was  instigated 
by  Bismarck  in  order  to  establish  a  strong  position  in  the  rear 
of  France,  which  might  at  least  serve  to  divert  the  enemy's 
attention.  Much  more  likely  is  it  that  Serrano,  Salazar,  and 
the  other  Spanish  leaders,  having  become  thoroughly  sick  of 
the  Bourbon  and  Hapsburg  families,  had  concluded  to  apply 
for  a  scion  of  royalty  from  a  house  that  had  long  since  proved 
its  virtue,  intelligence,  and  capacity  for  government.  The  at- 
tempt to  establish  another  Bonaparte  dynasty  in  Spain  would 
have  been  injudicious  for  a  number  of  reasons,  especially  since 
the  intriguing  resident  of  the  Tuileries  would  then  have  a 
continual  excuse  for  interfering  in  the  affairs  of  the  Spanish 

188 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

government.  With  respect  to  Germany  no  such  complica- 
tions would  be  likely  to  result.  There  were  neither  conflicting 
interests  nor  allied  interests  between  the  two  countries,  and 
Leopold  on  the  throne  of  Philip  II.  would  have  been  as  far 
removed  from  Prussian  influence  as  it  was  possible  to  be  on 
the  continent  of  Europe. 

Another  incident  in  this  rather  uneventful  year  was  the 
reaction  against  Prussia  in  Bavaria  and  Wurtemberg.  The 
greatest  of  statesmen  cannot  alter  the  character  of  human 
nature,  and  the  haughty  bearing  of  Prussian  officers  in  those 
countries  produced  an  effect  like  that  of  the  first  Napoleon's 
subordinates  in  the  Confederation  of  the  Rhine.  There  was 
great  rejoicing  in  Munich  when  a  Prussian  captain,  for  once, 
became  intoxicated  and  disgraced  himself  generally.  The 
Jesuits  took  advantage  of  this  to  increase  the  agitation  as 
much  as  possible,  and  Bavarian  newspapers  were  loud-voiced 
in  their  protestations  against  Prussian  tyranny  and  their  desire 
for  French  intervention.  In  Wurtemberg  the  ebb-tide  was  so 
strong  that  not  one  National  Liberal  was  elected  to  the  Ger- 
man Customs  Union. 

This  only  served,  however,  to  mislead  Louis  Napoleon, 
who  made  the  common  mistake  of  supposing  that  a  majority 
of  votes,  and  the  opinions  of  editors,  represent  the  real  politi- 
cal force  of  a  country.  There  is  quite  likely  to  be  in  such 
cases  among  the  more  influential  men  a  reserved  opinion 
which  holds  a  steady  and  determined  course,  while  the  popu- 
lar excitement  foams  itself  away  without  producing  any  defi- 
nite result.  Von  der  Pfordten  and  Varnbiiler  knew  all  the 
time  on  which  side  their  true  interests  lay,  and  realized  as 
well  the  strong  clutch  which  Bismarck  had  upon  their  gov- 
ernments. While  the  chambers  at  Stuttgardt  resounded  with 
the  eloquence  of  anti-Nationalists,  Von  Suckow,  the  Wurtem- 
berg chief  of  staff,  was  quietly  arranging  in  Berlin  the  course 
which  he  and  his  forces  should  pursue  to  make  a  junction 
with  Von  Moltke  in  case  of  a  French  invasion.  In  Baden 
the  enthusiasm  rose  to  such  a  pitch  that  it  caused  Bismarck 
no  slight  anxiety,  lest  the  excitable  Germans  of  the  Palatinate, 
who  are  really  Burgundians,  should  bring  on  a  collision  with 

189 


LIFE   OF   BISMARCK 

France  through  an  excess  of  patriotism.  For  the  second 
time  he  was  obliged  to  decline  the  request  made  by  the  Baden 
minister  for  permission  to  join  the  North  German  confeder- 
ation, and  the  vote  of  the  chambers  for  an  exceptional  appro- 
priation of  two  million  florins  to  introduce  the  Prussian  mili- 
tary system  was  treated  by  Parisian  journals  as  if  it  had 
been  an  open  declaration  of  war.  In  the  North  German 
Reichstag  Lasker  introduced  a  bill  for  the  purpose  of  bringing 
all  the  jurisdiction  of  German  citizens  within  the  province  of 
legislative  authority,  and,  surprising  as  it  may  seem,  this 
extravagant  proposition,  which  would  have  placed  even  the 
judges  of  the  courts  at  the  mercy  of  political  parties,  passed 
the  lower  house,  but  was  rejected  by  the  Bundesrath.  A  bill 
to  establish  a  central  board  of  jurisdiction  for  mercantile 
affairs  passed  both  houses,  but,  in  opposition  to  Bismarck's 
wishes,  who  preferred  to  have  it  located  in  Berlin,  the  Reichs- 
tag decided  to  establish  it  at  Leipsic.  Thus  it  appears  that 
the  minister-president  could  not  always  have  his  own  way, 
even  when  his  influence  was  at  its  highest  ascendency. 

That  Bismarck  still  earnestly  wished  to  remain  at  peace 
with  France  is  evident  from  a  peculiar  little  piece  of  diplomacy 
which  seems  like  rather  small  business  for  so  great  a  man,  but 
which,  nevertheless,  must  be  admitted  to  have  been  intended 
for  the  public  good.  He  dictated  a  letter  to  Dr.  Busch  with 
directions  that  it  should  be  published  in  a  paper  at  Cologne,  as 
pretending  to  emanate  from  a  Parisian  liberal.  Similar  letters 
were  published  in  the  New  York  Tribune  about  the  same  time, 
so  that  we  may  judge  that  it  did  not  misrepresent  the  liberal 
feeling  and  opinion  in  France.  A  French  professor,  visiting 
in  America  in  the  summer  of  1868,  said,  "They  are  all  for 
fight  in  Paris,  and  Napoleon  encourages  it,  because  he  hopes 
in  that  way  to  get  rid  of  the  National  Assembly."  In  this 
letter  Bismarck  said : 

"  The  urgent  desire  of  every  sincere  supporter  of  constitutional- 
ism in  France  may  be  thus  summed  up :  Let  us  have  no  new 
diversion  abroad  just  now,  no  new  phenomenon  cropping  up  in  the 
foreign  political  horizon,  which  may  be  turned  to  account  not  as  a 

190 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

real  motive,  but  as  a  pretext  for  howling  down  the  youthful  exist- 
ence of  constitutionalism  in  France,  or  for  turning  public  attention 
to  foreign  complications.  The  emperor,  as  we  believe,  is  in 
earnest  with  his  experiment,  but  the  people  in  his  immediate 
entourage  and  the  tools  he  uses — who  are  all  greedily  yearning  for 
some  event  that  may  give  them  a  chance  of  diverting  the  emperor 
from  a  groove  they  hold  in  abomination — are  very  numerous,  and, 
in  virtue  of  the  roots  they  have  struck  into  his  eighteen  years  past, 
much  more  powerful  than  people  fancy  abroad.  Whosoever  has 
constitutional  development  at  heart  can  now  only  wish  most  ear- 
nestly that  no  change  may  take  place  in  the  foreign  relations  of 
France  which  may  in  any  way  lead  to  the  reaction  wished  for  by 
the  opponents  of  any  and  every  constitution  in  France." 

After  the  surrender  at  Sedan,  Napoleon  always  asserted 
that  he  had  been  forced  into  the  war;  and  though  Bismarck 
remarked  that  the  emperor  was  not  so  innocent  as  he  pre- 
tended, there  can  be  little  doubt  that  during  this  later  stage 
of  the  French  mania  he  would  have  been  glad  to  resist  the 
current  of  public  opinion  and  court  intrigue,  if  he  had  been 
able  to  do  so.  Looked  at  from  this  side,  one  can  feel  a  good 
deal  of  commiseration  for  him ;  but  it  was  the  inevitable  result 
of  a  habit  which  had  become  chronic  with  him  to  meddle  in 
the  affairs  of  other  countries.  He  had  sown  the  wind,  and 
now  the  tornado  was  coming.  Who  could  tell  what  course  it 
would  take  ?  and  Louis  Napoleon  realized  only  too  acutely 
how  powerless  he  was  to  control  the  forces  which  he  had 
conjured  up. 

The  state  of  public  feeling  in  1870  may  be  best  estimated 
by  the  irritation  that  was  caused  in  Paris  by  the  appropriation 
of  five  million  thalers  by  the  German  Reichstag  towards 
boring  the  St.  Gothard  tunnel,  which  would  give  Germany 
direct  communication  with  Italy,  independent  of  France  or 
Austria.  Bismarck  was  quick  to  perceive  the  advantage  of 
this  for  the  future  interests  of  his  country,  and  that  it  would 
be  equally  certain  to  withdraw  large  traffic  from  the  Mont 
Cenis  tunnel  of  Napoleon;  but  not  less  than  six  or  seven 
years  would  be  required  for  its  completion,  and  who  could 
tell  what  political  changes  might  take  place  within  that  time  ? 

191 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

Nevertheless,  it  was  looked  upon  as  another  of  Bismarck's 
insidious  designs,  to  which  there  seemed  to  be  no  limit. 

When  the  British  Parliament  was  opened  in  the  spring  of 
1870,  Gladstone,  in  the  name  of  the  queen,  congratulated  the 
nation  that  the  prospects  of  peace  were  never  more  favorable 
for  Europe  than  at  that  moment.  Napoleon  sent  a  similar 
message  to  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  at  Paris.  What  else 
could  they  say  ?  In  France  and  Germany  there  was  such 
deep-seated  unrest  that  even  the  sound  of  a  church-bell 
seemed  to  every  man  like  a  call  to  arms.  If  the  beating  of 
a  drum  was  heard  in  the  Boulevard  des  Italiens,  every  man 
dropped  his  work  and  ran  to  the  sidewalk.  The  political  at- 
mosphere was  sultry ;  yet  the  sun  might  continue  to  rise  and 
set  in  peace,  as  it  had  done  for  so  long. 

What  pretext  Napoleon  would  have  found  for  commencing 
hostilities  but  for  the  Spanish  candidature  cannot  even  be 
imagined.  It  would  have  been  more  honest  for  him  to  have 
sent  a  declaration  to  William  I., — "  Luxemburg  or  war;"  but 
he  wished  to  have  an  apparent  justification,  no  matter  how 
slight  it  might  be,  to  place  before  the  world.  There  have 
been  numerous  accounts  of  this  important  transaction,  but 
they  all  come  to  much  the  same  result.  It  is  certain  that  the 
Spanish  throne  was  offered  to  Prince  Leopold  twice  at  least 
before  he  accepted  it,  and  that  King  William  earnestly  en- 
deavored to  persuade  him  to  relinquish  the  idea ;  but,  as  in 
the  case  of  the  Prince  of  Roumania,  he  felt  that  he  had  no 
right  to  go  beyond  this.  In  General  Hazen's  invaluable 
book,1  "  The  School  and  the  Army  in  Germany  and  France," 
there  is  a  verbal  statement  by  Bismarck  himself,  which  in  this 
connection  is  of  great  interest,  since  it  brings  the  man  so 
vividly  before  us.  Generals  Sheridan,  Burnside,  and  Hazen 
were  commissioned  by  President  Grant  to  make  a  report  on 
the  Franco-German  war ;  and  Sheridan,  with  the  true  instinct 
of  military  genius,  went  straight  to  the  Prussian  head-quarters. 

It  is  now  nearly  thirty  years  since  his  statement  was  made 


1  This   is   not  intended,  however,  as   an   endorsement  of  General   Hazen's 
attacks  on  General  Townsend  and  the  United  States  Engineer  Corps. 

192 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

to  these  generals,  and,  allowing  for  a  slight  variation  through 
General  Hazen's  memory,  no  evidence  has  come  to  light 
which  vitiates  any  portion  of  it.  Bismarck  says  nothing  in  it 
of  the  supposed  insult  to  King  William  by  Benedetti,  but 
keeps  to  the  main  point,  which  is,  after  all,  that  the  French 
government  insisted  upon  making  the  candidacy  of  Prince 
Leopold  a  casus  belli  after  that  candidacy  had  been  revoked 
and  could  only  be  considered  a  past  event.  Bismarck  saw 
that  what  Napoleon  wanted  was  war,  and,  if  so,  Napoleon 
should  have  it.  His  firmness,  calmness,  moderation,  and 
clear-sightedness  at  this  time  show  forth  in  bold  relief  against 
the  frothy  ebullition  of  Napoleon's  court.  The  Empress  Eu- 
genie is  reported  to  have  exclaimed,  "  This  is  my  war.  With 
God's  help  we  shall  subdue  the  Protestant  Prussians." 

The  precise  order  of  events,  as  narrated  by  Miiller,  was 
nearly  as  follows :  On  July  4  the  French  government  sent  a 
telegram  of  inquiry  to  the  foreign  office  at  Berlin,  to  know 
what  position  Prussia  would  take  in  regard  to  the  candidacy 
of  Leopold,  and  a  reply  was  returned  that  King  William  had 
no  interest  whatever  in  Spanish  affairs.  At  the  same  time  the 
Due  de  Gramont  requested  Baron  von  Werther,  who  had  suc- 
ceeded Von  Goltz  at  Paris,  to  inform  William  I.  that  Napoleon 
expected  him  to  prevent  Leopold  from  accepting  the  Spanish 
throne.  In  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  Gramont  announced 
that  France  would  not  permit  a  neighboring  nation  to  upset 
the  European  balance  of  power  by  uniting  two  thrones  in  one 
royal  family.  On  July  9  Benedetti  had  an  audience  with 
King  William  at  Ems,  in  which  he  assumed  that  Prussia  was 
responsible  for  the  nomination  of  Prince  Leopold,  and  the 
king  denied  any  such  responsibility  or  control  over  the  action 
of  the  prince.  He  added, — what  must  occur  to  every  sen- 
sible person, — that  it  was  to  the  government  at  Madrid,  and 
not  at  Berlin,  to  which  Napoleon  ought  to  apply  on  this  sub- 
ject.1 It  does  not  appear  that  this  had  been  thought  of  at  Paris 
at  all.  On  July  12  the  withdrawal  of  Prince  Leopold  was 
announced  to  the  European  courts  by  a  despatch  from  his 

1  Dr.  Busch,  ii.  53. 
13  J93 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

father's  castle  at  Sigmaringen,  and  this  certainly  ought  to 
have  removed  all  pretext  for  a  quarrel  between  France  and 
Prussia.  This  it  was  generally  supposed  to  have  done ;  and 
Bismarck  noticed  that  Von  Moltke's  face,  which  had  com- 
menced to  brighten  with  a  sort  of  internal  light  at  the  pros- 
pect of  active  service,  now  became  old  and  wrinkled  again. 

Louis  Napoleon  was  distracted  between  doubts  and  fears, 
and  worried  continually,  but  the  war  party  had  the  upper  hand, 
and  he  was  carried  along  like  a  chip  on  the  tide.  The  very  next 
day  Gramont  informed  Von  Werther  that,  in  order  to  resume 
cordial  relations  with  Prussia,  it  was  essential  that  William  I. 
should  make  a  distinct  avowal  to  Napoleon,  to  the  effect  that 
when  he  empowered  Leopold  to  accept  the  Spanish  throne  he 
had  no  intention  of  doing  injury  to  the  interests  of  France,  or 
to  offer  any  offence  to  the  French  nation, — that  is,  in  sub- 
stance, that  William  I.  should  make  a  public  apology  for  the 
act  of  a  third  person  which  he  had  never  encouraged.  Baron 
Werther,  instead  of  reporting  this  message  to  the  king,  pru- 
dently notified  Bismarck  in  regard  to  it,  and  he,  with  his 
usual  tact,  telegraphed  the  baron  to  take  a  short  leave  of 
absence.  Having  been  foiled  in  this  direction,  the  Due  de 
Gramont,  who  appears  to  have  managed  the  whole  affair, 
sent  word  to  Benedetti  at  Berlin  to  demand  King  William's 
definite  approval  of  Prince  Leopold's  declination,  and  to  give 
an  assurance  that  no  member  of  the  Hohenzollern  family 
should  again  become  a  candidate  for  the  Spanish  throne. 
Benedetti  accordingly  took  the  next  train  to  Ems,  and  went 
through  with  this  programme  in  a  conspicuous  and  embar- 
rassing manner.  The  king,  of  course,  refused  to  give  any 
pledge  for  his  future  action  in  any  matter  whatever,  and  upon 
Benedetti's  requesting  a  subsequent  interview,  William  I. 
refused  to  see  him.1 

*  This  is  the  despatch  of  the  Due  de  Gramont  to  Benedetti  in  regard  to  the 
interview  at  Ems,  according  to  the  statement  of  Jules  Favre,  July  17,  1870: 
"  Make  a  last  attempt  with  the  king;  tell  him  that  we  confine  ourselves  to  asking 
him  to  forbid  the  Prince  of  Hohenzollern  reconsidering  this  question  in  the 
future.  The  king  must  say,  '  I  do  forbid  it.'  And  he  must  authorize  you  to 
write  to  me,  or  charge  his  ministers  or  ambassadors  to  let  me  know  what  he 

194 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

This  was  an  insult,  and  evidently  intended  for  one.  To 
have  given  such  a  pledge  would  have  made  William  I.  the 
vassal  of  Napoleon,  and  would  have  degraded  him  in  the 
opinion  of  all  Germany.  He  did  not,  however,  immediately 
request  Benedetti's  recall,  though  the  French  allege  that  he 
insulted  Benedetti  by  not  recognizing  him  at  the  railway  sta- 
tion on  leaving  Ems.  He  at  once  telegraphed  to  Bismarck, 
who  was  with  Von  Moltke  in  Berlin. 

The  king  sent  a  brief  account  of  the  interview  with  Bene- 
detti, and  authorized  Bismarck  to  publish  a  similar  statement 
if  the  cabinet  thought  best.  Von  Moltke  and  Von  Roon,  so 
Dr.  Busch  states,  did  not  consider  the  situation  a  critical  one, 
but  Bismarck  thought  otherwise,  for  he  realized  that  this 
publication  would  make  Napoleon  III.  appear  ridiculous  be- 
fore the  civilized  world.  Bismarck's  version  of  it  runs  as 
follows : 

"  EMS,  July  13,  1870. — When  the  intelligence  of  the  hereditary 
Prince  of  Hohenzollern's  renunciation  was  communicated  by  the 
Spanish  to  the  French  government,  the  French  ambassador  de- 
manded of  his  Majesty  the  King  at  Ems  that  the  latter  should  au- 
thorize him  to  telegraph  to  Paris  that  his  Majesty  would  pledge 
himself  for  all  time  to  come  never  again  to  give  his  consent  in  case 
the  candidature  of  Prince  Hohenzollern  should  be  renewed.  Upon 
this  his  Majesty  refused  to  receive  the  French  ambassador  again, 
and  sent  his  aide-de-camp  in  attendance  to  tell  him  that  his  Majesty 
had  nothing  further  to  communicate  to  the  ambassador." 

It  has  been  repeatedly  stated  that  Bismarck  gave  an  inten- 
tional force  and  cogency  to  his  version  of  the  Ems  telegram 
not  to  be  found  in  the  original,  and  prejudiced  writers  have 
made  superhuman  efforts  to  hold  Bismarck  responsible  on 

says.  That  will  suffice.  And,  in  fact,  if  the  king  has  no  reserve,  this  will  be 
for  him  only  a  secondary  question  ;  but  for  us  it  is  a  very  important  one  ;  the 
king's  word  alone  can  constitute  a  sufficient  guarantee  for  the  future. 

"  I  have  ground  for  believing  that  the  other  cabinets  think  us  just  and  mod- 
erate. 

"  The  Emperor  Alexander  supports  us  warmly.'''1 — "Government  of  the  Na- 
tional Defence,"  p.  253. 

195 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

this  slender  basis  for  the  war  of  1870.  The  telegram  from 
Ems,  however,  has  lately  been  made  public,1  and  a  compari- 
son with  Bismarck's  statement  proves  that,  although  the  latter 
was  somewhat  condensed,  he  has  not  swerved  a  hair's  breadth 
from  the  sense  of  the  despatch  received  through  Councillor 
Abeken.  William  I.  evidently  desired  to  consult  Bismarck 
before  publishing  an  account  of  the  interview  with  Benedetti, 
but  the  idea  of  giving  it  publicity  must  have  been  his  own. 
If  he  had  hesitated  before,  he  now  saw  clearly  that  the  time 
for  action  had  arrived.  At  that  moment  he  and  the  Prussian 
people  were  one. 

This  publication  had  the  effect  which  Bismarck  expected, 
and  which  also  was  what  the  French  government  most  de- 
sired. All  Paris  was  in  an  uproar,  and  the  newspapers  printed 
"  On  to  Berlin"  in  the  largest  capitals.  The  final  declaration 
of  war  was  not  made,  however,  till  the  ipth  of  July,  and  the 
intermediate  time  was  spent  by  Bismarck  in  futile  negotiations 
with  the  English  ministry  for  arbitration^  and  in  a  confidential 
arrangement  with  Alexander  II.,  who  providentially  happened 
to  be  at  Ems  in  company  with  King  William.  The  behavior 
of  the  British  cabinet  was  simply  mercenary,  and  Bismarck 
always  expressed  himself  in  regard  to  it  in  a  very  decided 
manner.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  Gladstone  himself 
would  have  liked  to  preserve  peace,  and  it  would  have  been 
much  to  the  honor  of  England  had  he  done  so ;  but  he  could 
not  withstand  the  pressure  of  the  British  commercial  interest, 
which  forms  the  strongest  element  in  the  English  Liberal 
party.  Dr.  Kapp  said,  "  We  appealed  to  England  to  prevent 
war,  but  they  preferred  to  let  it  go  on,  in  order  to  make  money 
out  of  it."  The  British  envoy  at  Berlin  was  directed  to  advise 
the  Prussian  government  to  the  effect  that  King  William 
should  make  a  suitable  apology  to  the  French  Emperor,- — 
little  less  in  itself  than  an  additional  insult.  This  was  about 
what  Bismarck  anticipated,  and  he  did  not  concern  himself 
further  on  the  subject. 

After  all,  what  cause  of  complaint  had  France  against  the 
Prussian  government?  The  North  German  Confederation 

1  Bismarck's  Memoirs,  ii.  97. 
196 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

contained  a  population  of  about  thirty  millions,  and  South 
Germany  some  fifteen  millions  more.  The  population  of 
France  was  nearly  forty  millions,  including  Algeria.  What 
was  there,  then,  for  the  French  to  be  alarmed  at?  If  the 
French  government  had  a  right  to  form  an  alliance  with  Italy, 
why  should  not  William  I.  possess  the  same  right  to  ally  him- 
self with  the  South  German  states  ?  In  what  manner  was  the 
German  confederation  dangerous  to  French  interests  or 
French  independence?  The  Moniteur  of  July  8  said,  in  an 
attempted  explanation  of  the  French  position : 

"  Our  policy  towards  Spain  must  be  a  moderate  one,  but  we  are 
upon  quite  another  footing  with  Prussia.  This  power,  self-deluded 
by  its  first  successes,  seems  to  think  it  can  acquire  preponderance 
and  even  rule  throughout  Europe.  The  time  has  come  to  put  an 
end  to  such  pretensions.  The  question  must  be  enlarged  ;  Prince 
Leopold's  renunciation  is  no  longer  sufficient.  The  least  we  can 
demand,  the  least  that  will  now  satisfy  us,  will  be  the  formal  recog- 
nition and  enforcement  in- word  and  spirit  of  the  Prague  treaty." 

Truly  this  is  not  a  strong  statement.  It  might  be  asked  in 
this  connection  how  the  policy  of  the  Prussian  government 
had  differed  during  the  past  twenty  years  from  that  of  the 
French  government.  Both  had  made  war  upon  Austria,  and 
I  both  had  formed  alliances  with  Italy.  If  Prussia  had  annexed 
Schleswig-Holstein,  France  had  annexed  Savoy.  If  the 
Prince  of  Roumania  and  the  proposed  candidate  for  the  Span- 
ish throne  were  distantly  related  to  the  King  of  Prussia,  they 
were  more  closely  connected  with  the  house  of  Bonaparte. 
If  Bismarck  had  interfered  with  the  internal  affairs  of  German 
states,  was  not  Napoleon  perpetually  doing  the  same  ?  One 
.might  suppose  that  two  equally  balanced  powers, side  by  side 
"on  the  map  of  Europe,  would  be  more  likely  to  keep  the 
peace  through  mutual  respect  and  dread  of  one  another  than 
if  one  was  decidedly  more  powerful  than  the  other.  It  is  a 
rare  instance  when  either  individuals  or  nations  apply  the 
same  rules  to  themselves  which  they  do  to  other  people,  and 
the  French  had  long  since  ceased  to  be  capable  of  this.  The 
oft-repeated  principle  of  Thiers,  that  if  France  wished  to  be 

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LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

strong  she  must  keep  her  neighbors  weak,  was  captivating  to 
the  Parisians. 

It  is  often  difficult  to  distinguish  between  national  vanity 
and  that  consciousness  of  a  nation's  solidarity  which  forms 
the  basis  of  patriotism,  for  the  two  merge  into  each  other ; 
but  when  a  people  continually  speaks  of  itself  as  the  "  first 
nation  of  the  universe,"  as  the  French  have  done  since  the 
time  of  Louis  XIV.,  we  may  safely  affirm  that  they  have 
more  vanity  than  self-respect.  General  Hazen  reports  that 
reading-books  were  discovered  in  the  French  school-rooms  in 
which  France  was  plainly  declared  to  be  the  first  of  all  nations, 
and  represented  as  the  birthplace  pf  all  great  men,  as.  well  as 
the  source  of  all  discoveries  and  inventions.  French  children 
were  educated  in  these  notions,  so  that  they  became  to  them 
like  a  religion.  Thiers's  history  of  the  first  Napoleon  is  full 
of  this  patriotic  glorification,  and  even  Guizot,  in  his  "  History 
of  Civilization,"  does  not  hesitate  to  place  France  above  all 
other  countries  as  the  type  of  what  a  civilized  nation  should 
be.  During  the  campaign  of  1870,  Bismarck  suggested  that 
the  different  personages,  who  were  responsible  for  the  war  and 
so  much  bloodshed,  should  all  be  brought  into  court  and 
placed  in  the  prisoner's  dock  together, — first,  the  old  Napo- 
leon ;  then  M.  Thiers,  who  wrote  his  history ;  the  Empress 
Eugenie,  the  Due  de  Gramont,  Pius  IX.,  and  others.  Behind 
them  all,  however,  might  be  placed  the  French  habit  of  self- 
glorification,  which  both  of  the  Napoleons  had  played  upon, 
and  which  Napoleon  III.  especially  had  cultivated  as  the  most 
efficient  means  of  preserving  his  popularity.  His  official 
newspapers  in  Paris  were  not  only  claqueurs  for  himself,  but  for 
the  French  people  also.  There  is  plenty  of  national  vanity  in 
Germany,  England,  and  America ;  but  we  do  not  find  states- 
men like  Bismarck  and  Gladstone,  or  historians  like  Macaulay 
and  Von  Sybel,  giving  utterance  to  such  fulsome  adulation  as 
that  referred  to  from  Thiers  and  Guizot. 

THE   CAMPAIGN   OF    1870 

In  the  light  of  subsequent  events,  Napoleon  III.  appears 
like  a  self-deluded  man  rushing  upon  destruction;  but  in  July, 

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LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

1870,  he  counted  upon  eventualities  which  might  have  misled 
many  another.  In  the  first  place,  he  felt  a  sort  of  maternal 
confidence  in  his  own  invention, — the  mitrailleuse, — which 
was  expected  to  concentrate  a  more  severe  fire  on  some  par- 
ticular point  of  the  enemy's  line  than  any  other  form  of  mili- 
tary weapon  in  existence.  With  this  and  the  traditional  dash 
of  the  French  soldier  he  expected  to  gain  a  success  at  the 
outset,  and  establish  his  lines  on  Prussian  territory.  He  was 
confident  that  in  that  case  Austria,  Bavaria,  and  Denmark 
would  fall  to  and  attack  his  enemy  in  the  rear,  while  Victor 
Emmanuel,  wishing  to  be  on  the  winning  side,  would  also  lend 
a  helping  hand  tOj  the  vivisection  of  Prussia.  The  Bavarian 
newspapers  gave  him  good  reason  for  this  confidence.  The 
Vaterland  asserted  that  the  Bavarian  chambers  would  not 
vote  a  single  gulden  for  the  mobilization  of  the  army  to  assist 
Bismarck  in  furthering  his  unrighteous  schemes.  There  was 
the  same  popular  opposition  among  the  democrats  of  Wur- 
temberg  and  the  imperialists  of  Vienna ;  but  Napoleon  had 
not  counted  on  Alexander  II.  and  Von  Beust  and  Von  der 
Pfordten1  and  Von  Moltke.  He  judged  by  general  principles, 
and  was  as  ignorant  of  the  precise  situation  in  foreign  cap- 
itals as,  according  to  Bismarck,  he  was  of  geography.  To 
the  request  of  the  younger  Metternich,  who  was  Austrian 
envoy  at  Paris,  as  to  what  answer  he  should  make  to  Napo- 
leon's entreaty  for  an  Austrian  army  of  observation  in  Bohe- 
mia, Von  Beust  replied  with  such  icy  coldness  as  to  preclude 
all  possibility  of  aid  from  that  quarter.  Almost  simultane- 
ously with  the  Ems  telegram,  Von  Beust  wrote  to  Metternich  : 

"  I  consider  it  paramountly  important  that  the  Emperor  Napoleon 
and  his  ministers  should  not  entertain  the  erroneous  impression  that 
they  can,  at  their  own  good  pleasure,  drag  us  with  them  beyond 
the  limits  of  our  engagements,  to  the  disregard  of  our  own  vital 
interests.  They  make  much  too  bold  in  talking  confidently  about 
a  corps  of  observation,  to  be  stationed  by  us  in  Bohemia.  The 
duke  has  no  right  whatsoever  to  count  upon  any  such  measure  on 

1  Von  Bray  had  succeeded  Von  der  Pfordten,  but  his  policy  towards  Prussia 
still  continued  in  Bavaria. 

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LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

our  part.  All  that  we  have  undertaken  is  not  to  ally  ourselves  to 
any  other  power  without  giving  France  due  notice.  ...  It  is  alleged 
that  Prussia  will  provoke  war  unless  she  will  withdraw  the  Hohen- 
zollern  candidature.  On  this  point  I  will  speak  quite  frankly.  If 
war  be  inevitable,  it  is,  above  all,  owing  to  the  attitude  assumed  by 
France  from  the  very  inception  of  the  difficulty.  Her  first  an- 
nouncements do  not  in  the  least  partake  of  a  diplomatic  character, 
but  practically  constitute  a  declaration  of  war  against  Prussia, 
couched  in  terms  that  have  aroused  amazement  throughout  Europe, 
and  justified  the  conviction  that  she  has  made  up  her  mind  before- 
hand to  war  at  any  price  ..." 

Napoleon  III.  was  like  a  stock-gambler  who  is  always  ready 
to  make  friends  with  his  last  enemy  if  he  can  gain  something 
by  it;  but  Francis  Joseph  was  made  in  a  different  mould, — an 
implacable  Hapsburger.  He  admired  and  hated  Bismarck, 
but  he  detested  Napoleon.  He  perhaps  recollected  the  policy 
of  Metternich  in  1813,  to  allow  France  and  the  allies  to  get 
well  into  the  struggle  before  he  interfered.  Napoleon  III.  re- 
membered that  Austria  was  in  the  rear  of  Prussia;  but  he 
forgot  that  Hungary  was  in  the  rear  of  Austria.  Von  Beust 
asserts  in  his  Memoirs  that  Russia  exerted  no  pressure  on 
Austria  at  this  juncture,  and  there  really  does  not  seem  to 
have  been  much  need  of  it.  Von  Bray  and  his  colleagues 
carried  his  bill  for  a  war  credit  through  the  Bavarian  chambers, 
in  spite  of  the  Ultramontanes  and  the  Vaterland  paper.  The 
greatest  triumph  of  Bismarck's  policy  appeared  in  Saxony, 
where  the  crown  prince,  who  had  fought  so  gallantly  against 
the  Prussians  at  Sadowa,  led  a  whole  German  army  corps 
to  the  campaign  against  France.  Private  soldiers  may  some- 
times be  made  to  fight  against  their  inclination,  but  the  com- 
manding general  must  have  his  precincts  swept  clean  of  sus- 
picion. At  the  same  time  it  was  reported  to  the  associated 
press  that  Victor  Emmanuel  had  telegraphed  to  the  French 
government  that  any  attempt  to  assist  France  in  the  present 
emergency  could  only  result  in  his  losing  his  crown.  Napo- 
leon must  have  left  the  Tuileries  with  a  heavy  heart. 

Von  Moltke's  face  grew  young  again  at  the  prospect  of 
having  a  crack  at  the  "  red  legs,"  as  the  French  soldiers  were 

200 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

commonly  designated.  He  was  better  informed  concerning 
the  condition  of  the  French  army  than  Napoleon  was,  and 
felt  confident  of  success.  The  Crown  Prince  of  Prussia  says, 
in  his  diary,  under  date  of  July  15  : 

"  Bismarck  informed  me  that  he,  with  Roon  and  Moltke,  would 
go  with  me  to  Brandenburg  to  meet  the  king.  On  the  way  he  ex- 
pressed with  great  clearness  and  proper  seriousness,  free  from  his 
favorite  little  jests,  his  view  of  the  peculiarities  of  our  situation  with 
France,  so  that  it  became  clear  to  me  that  he  and  Moltke  do  not 
desire  concessions  for  the  sake  of  peace,  which  is  already  impos- 
sible, considering  the  strength  and  position  of  the  French  army. 
The  king  was  surprised  at  our  arrival,  and  during  the  rest  of  the 
journey,  after  he  had  heard  Bismarck's  statement,  he  had  nothing 
substantial  to  oppose  to  the  urgency  of  ordering  immediate  mobili- 
zation." 

There  can  be  no  question  that  the  crown  prince  took  an 
active  interest  in  the  great  events  of  1 870,  and  did  his  full  share 
in  what  was  accomplished  at  that  time.  The  Reichstag  emu- 
lated the  French  assembly  in  the  unanimity  with  which  it 
voted  a  war  credit  of  a  hundred  and  twenty  million  thalers. 
'So  do  whole  nations  join  in  the  chase  when  the  dogs  of  war 
are  let  loose. 

Professor  Miiller  and  General  Hazen  have  both  given  an 
erroneous  impression  of  the  forces  engaged  on  either  side  in 
1870,  by  the  manner  in  which  they  have  stated  them.  The 
latter  expresses  his  surprise  that  Napoleon,  with  armies 
amounting  to  three  hundred  thousand  men,  should  have  de- 
liberately waged  war  against  a  force  of  twice  that  magnitude ; 
while  Muller  speaks  of  the  number  of  Germans  finally  engaged 
in  the  conflict  as  over  eleven  hundred  thousand.  Leaving 
out  of  account  that  Napoleon  expected  that  the  South  Ger- 
man troops  would  fight  with  him,  instead  of  against  him,  the 
German  army  at  the  commencement  of  hostilities  numbered 
about  five  .hundred  thousand  men ;  and  as  Bazaine's  army 
at  Metz  numbered  one  hundred  and  seventy  thousand,  and 
one  hundred  and  twenty-five  thousand  French  soldiers  sur- 
rendered at  Sedan,  it  is  evident  that  there  must  have  been 
nearly  one  hundred  thousand  more  stationed  at  Paris,  Stras- 

201 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

burg,  and  other  fortresses,  besides  the  Garde  Mobile.  Dur- 
ing the  siege  of  Paris  enormous  armies  were  recruited  on  the 
Loire  and  Rhone,  and  as  at  this  period  of  the  conflict  the 
Germans  were  everywhere  outnumbered,  it  seems  probable 
that  France  finally  placed  in  the  field  as  large,  though  by  no 
means  so  well  disciplined,  a  force  as  her  rival. 

The  first  conflict  took  place  at  Saarbrucken,  on  the  2d  of 
August,  and  is  memorable  for  the  melodramatic  despatch 
which  Napoleon  sent  to  Eugenie  concerning  their  intrepid 
boy,  whose  "  coolness  under  fire  made  veterans  weep."  The 
town  was  held  by  a  single  Prussian  regiment,  which  was 
driven  out  by  General  Frossard's  army  corps  after  a  hot  skir- 
mish. The  German  victories  of  Spicheren  and  Worth,  how- 
ever, followed  on  the  4th  and  5th  instant.  Spicheren  was  a 
remarkable  battle,  fought  by  the  colonels  of  German  regi- 
ments without  any  general  commander.  At  Worth  the  Crown 
Prince  of  Prussia  gave  MacMahon  a  crushing  defeat,  as  he  well 
might  with  an  army  of  a  hundred  thousand  against  fifty  thou- 
sand men.  At  Vionville x  Prince  Frederick  Charles  fought  a 
desperate  battle  against  a  French  army  twice  as  large  as 
his  own.  At  nightfall  he  remained  master  of  the  field,  but 
gained  no  other  advantage.  The  battle  was  remarkable  for 
two  cavalry  charges,  one  of  which  was  fully  equal  to  the 
charge  of  the  six  hundred  at  Balaklava.  Bismarck's  two 
sons  took  part  in  the  first  charge,  and  the  eldest,  Herbert,  es- 
caped in  a  miraculous  manner.  One  bullet  struck  his  watch, 
another  went  through  his  coat,  and  a  third  wounded  him  in 
the  thigh.  His  brother  William  came  out  of  this  fiery  gulf 
unharmed,  and  brought  with  him  a  wounded  comrade,  whom 
he  threw  upon  a  horse  at  the  risk  of  being  captured  himself. 
The  second  charge  on  the  left  wing  was  even  more  terrible. 
Out  of  eight  squadrons  of  cavalry  only  three  returned  to  the 
German  lines.  The  rest  were  left  upon  the  field, — a  portion 
also  captured, — but  they  succeeded  in  protecting  the  German 
flank  until  reinforcements  could  arrive. 

Von  Moltke  now  concentrated  all  the  force  he  could  bring 

1  Also  called  "  Mars  la  Tour." 
202 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

together  against  Metz,  and  Bazaine  took  up  a  strong  position 
similar  to  Wellington's  ground  at  Waterloo,  but  covering  a 
much  wider  extent,  with  his  right  wing  resting  on  Metz  and  his 
left  extending  to  the  village  of  St.  Hubert  on  the  northwest. 
His  effective  force  numbered  about  one  hundred  and  forty  thou- 
sand men,  and  that  of  Von  Moltke  one  hundred  and  seventy- 
five  thousand.  The  struggle  which  followed  can  only  be  com- 
pared to  the  battles  of  Borodino  and  Leipsic,  though  the 
losses  on  either  side  were  not  so  great.  William  I.  and  Bis- 
marck arrived  on  the  ground  at  noon,  and  witnessed  the 
engagement.  The  French  Zouaves,  who  had  served  in  Alge- 
ria and  stormed  the  hill  at  Solferino,  declared  that  they  had 
never  seen  such  fighting  as  there  was  at  Gravelotte. 

The  German  head-quarters  were  stationed  at  Gravelotte, 
from  which  the  battle  has  derived  its  name.  The  strength  of 
the  French  position,  partially  fortified,  is  supposed  to  have 
counterbalanced  the  advantage  of  numbers  on  the  German 
side.  Canrobert  commanded  on  the  right,  Bazaine  in  the 
centre,  and  Frossard  on  the  left. 

Von  Moltke's  plan  was  first  to  attack  the  enemy's  right 
wing,  and  then,  finally,  to  turn  the  left  wing  by  a  flanking 
movement,  conducted  by  the  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony,  with 
a  simultaneous  attack  on  Frossard's  front.  The  movement 
against  Canrobert  failed,  and  the  flanking  movement  occupied 
so  much  time  that  the  Berlin  guards,  who  attempted  the  front 
attack  too  soon,  were  fearfully  cut  up  and  obliged  to  retire. 
The  Prussian,  cavalry  that  accompanied  them  succeeded  in 
breaking  the  French  squares,  but  suffered  as  severely  as  the 
French  squadrons  at  Worth.  It  was  considered  essential  to 
sacrifice  Prussian  troops  if  possible,  where  sacrifices  had  to  be 
made,  in  order  to  prevent  the  allied  German  states  from  feel- 
ing that  their  soldiers  were  made  use  of  for  Prussia's  interest. 

Encouraged  by  his  success  in  repulsing  the  enemy,  Bazaine 
decided  to  take  the  offensive,  and  late  in  the  afternoon  began 
a  well-planned  and  determined  attack  on  the  German  centre. 
The  French  fought  more  bravely  than  in  any  previous  engage- 
ment, and  for  some  time  the  issue  of  the  battle  remained  in 
doubt,  but  they  were  finally  repulsed  by  drawing  together  a 

203 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

large  number  of  field-pieces  at  the  critical  point.  Von  Moltke 
followed  this  up  by  an  assault  on  the  extreme  right  and  left 
of  the  French  positions,  and,  though  the  attack  on  Canrobert 
did  not  meet  with  much  success,  the  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony 
finally  captured  the  most  important  of  Frossard's  positions, 
and  by  nightfall  Bazaine  found  himself  with  only  one  outlet 
of  escape,  and  that  in  the  direction  of  Metz.  During  the 
night  the  French  abandoned  their  remaining  positions,  and 
the  following  day  retired  within  the  fortress.  The  German 
loss  at  Gravelotte  was  something  over  eighteen  thousand  men, 
of  whom  nearly  five  thousand  were  killed  outright, — an  excep- 
tionally large  proportion.  The  French  loss  was  not  much 
over  twelve  thousand,  so  that  it  is  evident  that  they  did  not 
fight  so  bravely  here  as  at  Leipsic  and  Waterloo.  Bazaine, 
although  defeated,  is  admitted  to  have  shown  good  military 
skill. 

During  Bazaine's  attack  on  the  Prussian  lines  both  William 
I.  and  Bismarck  were  again  in  danger,  for  the  former  was  too 
much  absorbed  in  watching  the  course  of  the  battle  to  con- 
sider his  personal  safety.  On  the  following  day  Count  Her- 
bert was  carried  on  a  mattress  to  his  father's  quarters,  where 
they  made  a  bed  for  him  on  the  floor.  His  wound  was  pain- 
ful, but  not  dangerous.  After  he  had  been  sent  home  to 
recuperate,  his  father  said,  "  I  trust  now  that  I  shall  be  able 
to  save  that  fellow."  He  was  evidently  proud  of  both  his 
sons,  and  related  to  several  persons  how  William  had  helped 
a  wounded  comrade  on  to  a  horse  and  led  him  from  the  field. 
Before  the  close  of  the  war  both  the  young  Bismarcks  were 
promoted  to  lieutenancies. 

Two  nephews  of  Von  Moltke  were  also  serving  at  this  time 
in  the  ranks.  There  is  no  other  instance  in  modern  history 
where  the  near  relatives  of  such  important  personages  have 
fought  as  common  soldiers.  It  is  this  impartiality  which  in- 
spires the  Prussian  people  with  such  confidence  in  their  gov- 
ernment. 

In  the  grave  rejoicing  over  this  victory  at  the  Prussian 
head-quarters  Bismarck's  diplomatic  habit  never  deserted  him. 
He  directed  Dr.  Busch  to  send  a  despatch  to  Berlin  as  follows  : 

204 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

"In  the  battle  before  Metz,  August  18,  the  Saxons  distinguished 
themselves  by  their  usual  bravery,  and  contributed  most  essentially 
to  the  attainment  of  the  object  of  the  German  commander.  To 
bring  the  Saxon  army  corps  into  the  field  very  long  marches  from 
the  right  to  the  extreme  left  wing  had  been  made  the  day  before, 
and  even  on  the  i8th  itself.  In  spite  of  these  fatigues,  they  at- 
tacked with  extraordinary  energy,  drove  the  enemy  back,  and  com- 
pletely fulfilled  the  duty  they  were  charged  with,  thus  preventing 
the  enemy  from  escaping  towards  Thionville.  Their  losses  in  these 
actions  amounted  to  twenty-two  hundred  men." 

Bismarck  was  evidently  desirous  to  conciliate  the  Saxons 
and  inspire  them  with  a  more  national  feeling,  but  the  Prus- 
sians bore  the  brunt  of  the  struggle,  and  the  Dresdeners  still 
continued  to  abuse  him  for  the  next  ten  years. 

SEDAN 

At  the  outset -of  the  war  Napoleon  had  extorted  a  promise 
from  Victor  Emmanuel  that  he  would  respect  the  territory 
of  Pius  IX.  so  long  as  hostilities  might  continue.  After  the 
battle  of  Worth,  Prince  Napoleon  was  despatched  to  Italy  to 
obtain  assistance  on  any  terms  that  should  be  demanded,  even 
if  it  was  the  possession  of  Rome  itself.  The  Italian  cabinet, 
however,  could  see  plainly  from  this  that  Napoleon  was  in  a 
very  tight  place,  and  that  Rome  was  practically  theirs  as  soon 
as  they  chose  to  take  it.  Prince  Napoleon  was  therefore  put 
ofT  with  the  plea  of  a  pretended  consultation  with  Von  Beust. 
This  required  several  days,  and  the  consequence  was  that 
Prince  Napoleon  was  obliged  to  remain  in  Italy  all  winter. 
If  Von  Beust  had  little  inclination  for  a  French  alliance  in 
July,  he  had  still  less  in  August,  with  the  prospect  of  another 
invasion  of  Bohemia ;  and  the  French  opposition  papers 
treated  Prince  Napoleon's  embassy  as  if  he  had  deserted  his 
country  in  her  hour  of  need,  though  it  was  not  difficult  to 
imagine  the  occasion  for  it. 

Bismarck,  meanwhile,  was  en  rapport  with  the  governments 
of  Great  Britain  and  other  powers.  He  knew  of  Prince 
Napoleon's  mission  and  how  to  counteract  it  with  an  equally 
good  offer.  After  the  battle  at  Gravelotte  he  sounded  the 

205 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

great  powers  in  regard  to  the  annexation  of  Alsace  and  Lor- 
raine. He  did  not  expect  favorable  replies  from  them  at  this 
time,  but  he  wished  to  inform  them  what  they  might  look  for 
in  case  the  German  successes  continued.  August  28  he  dic- 
tated an  official  letter  on  the  subject  to  the  government  organ 
in  Berlin,  indicating  the  policy  which  William  I.  and  his  min- 
isters intended  to  pursue,  and  closing  with  this  statement  in 
regard  to  the  restoration  of  those  German  provinces  which 
had  been  treacherously  seized  on  in  the  seventeenth  century : 

"  He  who  sincerely  desires  peace  on  the  continent  of  Europe, 
he  who  wishes  that  nations  should  lay  down  their  arms,  and  that 
the  plough  should  prevail  over  the  sword,  must  wish  above  all  that 
the  neighbors  of  France  on  the  east  may  secure  this  position,  for 
France  is  the  only  disturber  of  peace,  and  will  remain  so  as  long  as 
she  has  the  power." 

It  is  doubtful  if  any  one  in  Germany — and  certainly  no  one 
in  Berlin — imagined  that  the  Alsatians  would  make  any 
decided  objection  to  this  transfer  of  their  nationality.  Their 
names  are  German,  and  most  of  them  could  speak  German. 
Though  they  had  long  been  accustomed  to  French  domina- 
tion, and  were  French  themselves  by  association,  they  had  at 
first  been  greatly  incensed  at  this.  To  some  one  '  who  sug- 
gested that  a  slice  of  France  might  be  added  to  Rhenish 
Prussia,  Bismarck  replied,  "We  do  not  want  too  many 
Frenchmen  in  Germany." 

Dr.  Moritz  Busch  has  given  a  faithful  account  of  Bis- 
marck's sayings  and  proceedings  during  the  campaign  of 
1870,  and  much  of  it  is  instructive  and  valuable  to  us.  WTe 
miss,  however,  the  penetrating  force  and  broad  generalization 
of  statement  which  make  the  remarks  of  the  first  Napoleon 
so  magnetic  and  impressive.  Bismarck  is  admitted  to  have 
been  the  wiser  man  of  the  two,  but  he  was  not  in  a  position  to 
speak  out  his  mind  so  freely.  There  were  some  truths  which 
even  Napoleon  at  the  height  of  his  power  could  not  venture 


1  Name  not  given,  but  he  must  have  been  an  important  personage,  perhaps 
self-important. 

206 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

to  speak ;  but  Bismarck  was  obliged  to  be  doubly  cautious, 
for  he  had  not  only  the  ear  of  the  public  on  one  side,  ready 
to  catch  up  and  report  whatever  he  might  say,  but  on  the 
other  side  the  royal  family  had  also  to  be  considered.  It  was 
a  shrewd  statement  Von  Beust  made,  that  it  was  generally 
better  for  an  ambassador  to  see  too  little  than  to  see  too 
much.1  It  would  not  do  even  for  Bismarck  to  appear  to  be 
too  knowing,  and  as  a  natural  consequence  he  made  a  prac- 
tice of  disguising  his  genius  in  the  dress  of  trivial  conversa- 
tion. He  told  anecdotes  of  Humboldt,  Metternich,  and  other 
past  actors  on  the  German  stage,  amusing  enough,  but  not  of 
exceptional  value.  General  Sheridan,  to  whom,  as  an  Ameri- 
can, he  might  perhaps  have  spoken  more  freely,  found  him  a 
great  talker,  but  not  memorable  for  bright  and  characteristic 
sayings.  Bismarck  talked  about  small  matters  to  change  the 
current  of  his  mind  and  to  avoid  speaking  of  more  important 
ones.  He  acquired  this  habit  at  Frankfort  in  the  days  of  the 
musty  old  Diet,  and  found  it  useful  ever  afterwards. 

We  do  not  hear  of  profound  reflections  on  European 
politics,  but  we  know  from  Dr.  Busch  that  Bismarck  occa- 
sionally conversed  with  him  in  a  higher  strain  than  was  his 
usual  wont,  and  it  is  just  these  colloquies,  which  we  should 
most  like  to  know,  that  his  secretary  prudently  declines  to 
favor  us  with.  He  talked  philosophy  on  his  way  to  the 
battle  of  Sedan,2  as  such  a  man  might  to  prevail  over  the 
demon  which  accompanies  extravagant  success;  and  there 
are  other  incidents  as  terse  and  significant  in  their  way  as 
those  recorded  of  old  Dr.  Johnson.  One  such  happened  just 
before  the  battle  of  Beaumont,  while  the  troops  were  hurrying 
forward  to  take  up  their  allotted  positions  in  the  field.  Bis- 
marck was  giving  some  directions  to  Privy  Counsellor  Abeken, 
who  sent  the  famous  telegram  from  Ems,  and  in  the  midst  of 
his  statement  Prince  Charles  of  Hohenzollern  rode  by  with 

1  In  reference  to  Prince  Richard  Metternich,  who  was  wholly  surprised  at  the 
breaking  out  of  the  Franco-German  war. 

a  Bismarck  carried  with  him  to  the  French  campaign  a  book  called  "  Daily 
Refreshments  for  Believing  Christians,"  and  he  had  a  clerk  in  his  employ  named 
Engel  (angel). 

207 


LIFE   OF   BISMARCK 

his  negro  lackey  in  oriental  costume.  Abeken  followed  this 
phenomenon  with  his  eyes,  and  failed  to  hear  what  Bismarck 
was  saying.  The  count  lost  patience  and  exclaimed,  "  Listen 
to  what  I  have  to  tell  you,  Mr.  Privy  Counsellor,  and  for 
God's  sake  let  princes  be  princes.  We  are  talking  business 
here."  Then,  after  he  had  finished  with  Abeken,  he  remarked, 
"  Our  old  friend  is  quite  carried  away  if  he  sees  anything  be- 
longing to  the  court ;  but,  after  all,  I  could  not  do  without 
him."  To  Bismarck  princes  evidently  were  princes,  and  they 
were  nothing  more.  The  undisguised  use  which  Bismarck 
made  of  newspapers,  at  this  and  other  times,  to  circulate 
opinions  and  statements  favorable  to  his  policy  was  one  of 
his  peculiarities ;  so  much  the  honester  and  better  that  it  was 
undisguised. 

Von  Moltke  left  Prince  Frederick  Charles  to  besiege  Metz, 
and,  having  united  with  the  crown  prince,  set  forward  on  the 
road  to  Paris.  His  army  had  been  largely  reinforced  from 
Germany,  and  amounted  to  more  than  two  hundred  thousand 
men  in  all.  The  whole  northeast  of  France  was  rilled  with 
German  soldiers.  At  Verdun,  half-way  between  Metz  and 
Chalons,  Von  Moltke  first  heard  that  the  French  army  was  at 
the  north  of  him,  and  he  considered  this  move  to  his  ad- 
vantage, as  he  could  now  descend  perpendicularly  on  Mac- 
Marion's  communications.  There  were  a  number  of  small 
engagements  along  the  line  of  the  Meuse,  in  all  of  which  the 
French  were  compelled  to  retreat.  On  August  30  a  French 
army  corps  was  surprised  at  breakfast  near  Beaumont  by  the 
German  heavy  artillery,  and,  having  been  severely  bombarded, 
were  attacked  by  German  infantry  and  driven  off  in  great  con- 
fusion. MacMahon,  having  thus  been  already  foiled  in  his 
plan,  withdrew  his  outposts  and  concentrated  his  forces  around 
the  fortress  of  Sedan.  The  star  of  the  Bonapartes  was  evi- 
dently setting. 

This  was  the  worst  plan  that  MacMahon  and  Napoleon 
could  have  pursued.  If  they  had  made  a  precipitate  retreat 
towards  Paris  a  large  portion  of  their  army  might  have  been 
saved.  The  siege  of  Paris  would  have  followed  as  a  matter 

208 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

of  course,  but  its  chances  of  success  would  have  been  con- 
siderably lessened,  and  Louis  Napoleon  would  have  remained 
on  his  throne,  at  least  until  peace  was  declared.  Sedan  is  a 
Vauban  fortress,  built  on  rising  ground  in  a  valley,  and  nearly 
surrounded  by  lofty  hills.  Before  the  invention  of  rifle  pro- 
jectiles it  was  calculated  to  sustain  a  siege  of  a  year's  dura- 
tion, but  with  the  improved  ordnance  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury an  enemy  can  command  it  from  the  heights  on  every  side. 
Metz  was  impregnable,  but  Sedan  proved  a  strategic  trap. 

The  town  lies  in  the  centre  of  a  natural  amphitheatre, 
through  which  winds  the  sluggish  Meuse  to  its  meeting  with 
the  Sambre,  on  which  Bliicher  was  defeated  in  1815.  About 
the  same  distance  to  the  southwest  is  the  city  of  Laon,  where 
Bliicher  defeated  the  first  Napoleon.  On  the  1st  of  Septem- 
ber MacMahon  formed  his  line  of  battle  in  the  concave  order 
on  a  range  of  low  hills  behind  the  fortress  and  town,  his  left 
wing  drawn  around  to  the  river,  and  his  right  wing  stretching 
off  towards  the  west.  He  had  blown  up  the  bridge  crossing 
the  river  at  Sedan,  but  the  Germans,  having  control  of  Stenay, 
marched  down  both  sides  of  it,  and  planted  batteries  on  the 
heights  to  the  east  and  south.  William  I.  and  Bismarck,  with 
a  large  retinue  of  princes  and  officers,  took  possession  of  a 
stubble-field  on  a  hill  about  one  mile  from  the  town, — a  spot 
still  exhibited  to  tourists.  The  king  went  round  to  the  dif- 
ferent groups,  saying,  "  Gentlemen,  spread  yourselves,  and  do 
not  attract  the  enemy's  fire  by  standing  too  close  together." 
Von  Moltke  and  the  German  staff,  with  whom  was  General 
Sheridan,  occupied  a  lower  position  on  a  declivity  nearer  the 
scene  of  action.  The  army  of  the  crown  prince  was  on  the 
opposite  side  of  the  Meuse.  As  the  battle  progressed  the 
German  line  extended  itself  continually  to  the  left,  and  to 
withdraw  attention  from  this  movement  Von  Moltke  directed 
a  vigorous  attack  on  the  left  wing  of  the  enemy.  It  was 
unfortunate  for  the  French  that  Marshal  MacMahon  was 
wounded  early  in  the  engagement ;  and  his  successor,  General 
Wimpfen,  does  not  appear  to  have  understood  the  character 
of  this  enclosing  movement.  From  the  first  the  French  suf- 
fered more  than  the  Germans,  being  exposed  to  an  almost 
14  209 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

concentric  artillery  fire,  and  it  was  not  until  General  Wimpfen 
had  repulsed  the  enemy  on  his  left  wing  that  he  seems  to 
have  realized  the  situation  his  army  was  in.  He  then  brought 
forward  his  least  injured  regiments  on  the  right  for  a  des- 
perate attempt  to  break  through  the  cordon  of  the  crown 
prince.  Here  he  arranged  an  attack  of  infantry  supported  by 
cavalry  at  about  half-past  two  P.M.  Bismarck,  from  his  stand- 
point on  the  eastern  side  of  the  Meuse,  could  see  the  blue 
and  red  lines  of  the  French  advancing  and  falling  back  again 
under  the  destructive  fire  of  the  Prussians.  Then  came  the 
cavalry  charges, — a  magnificent  spectacle.  Twice  they  came 
on,  but  never  reached  the  Prussian  lines.  "  The  beggars  are 
too  weak,"  cried  Sheridan,  who  had  begun  to  sympathize 
with  the  hard  position  of  the  French  army.  The  king  could 
see  through  his  field-glass  that  the  ground  was  covered  with 
the  bodies  of  horses  and  men. 

After  this  Von  Moltke  ordered  a  gradual  advance  along  the 
whole  line,  and  in  the  course  of  an  hour  the  French  troops 
had  everywhere  fallen  back  to  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the 
town  and  fortress.  This  placed  them  more  at  the  mercy  of 
the  German  shells  than  before,  so  that  MacMahon's  army  was 
fast  becoming  a  demoralized  mob.  Then  Napoleon,  wishing 
to  prevent  further  bloodshed,  ordered  a  white  flag  to  be  raised 
over  the  fort,  and  the  firing  ceased.  "  This  must  be  a  proud 
day  for  you,  Mr.  Chancellor,"  remarked  one  of  the  foreign 
attaches  to  Count  Bismarck.  "  I  have  nothing  to  do  with 
this,"  quickly  replied  the  latter;  "it  is  the  king  and  Von 
Moltke  who  are  to  be  congratulated  here.  That  the  South 
Germans  fight  with  us,  not  against  us,  may  be  something  to 
my  credit,  but  I  have  nothing  to  do  with  military  affairs." 
When  some  one  inquired  if  the  French  emperor  was  not  with 
the  army  which  was  about  to  surrender,  Bismarck  said,  "  I 
doubt  it.  Napoleon  is  not  very  wise,  but  he  knows  too  much 
to  be  in  Sedan."  It  was  not  long  before  an  officer  arrived  to 
inform  the  king  that  Napoleon  was  in  the  fortress. 

General  Wimpfen  now  appeared  with  Von  Moltke  to  ar- 
range terms  of  capitulation.  Napoleon  wished  permission  for 
his  troops  to  march  over  the  Belgian  frontier  and  be  disarmed 

210 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

there,  but  this  could  not  be  granted.  William  I.  said,  "This 
is  indeed  a  great  success,"  and  gave  his  two  hands  to  Von 
Moltke  and  the  crown  prince,  adding,  "  I  thank  you  both  for 
what  you  have  contributed  towards  this  victory."  He  then 
thanked  Bismarck  also,  and  drew  him  aside  for  a  lengthy 
conversation,  which  produced  a  slight  expression  of  displeas- 
ure on  the  face  of  the  crown  prince,  more  noticeable  from 
the  gladness  of  those  around  him.1  The  capture  of  a  live 
emperor,  however,  was  not  an  every-day  occurrence,  and  re- 
quired serious  diplomatic  consideration.  How  he  should  be 
received,  how  he  should  be  disposed  of,  and  how  his  capture 
would  affect  the  relations  of  Prussia  with  other  governments, 
were  points  on  which  only  Bismarck  could  be  consulted.  He 
advised  the  king  to  avoid  an  interview  with  Napoleon,  and 
that  he  had  better  return  to  Stenay,  where  he  could  find  more 
comfortable  quarters.  Afterwards  Bismarck  said,  that  if  the 
emperor  were  to  break  his  parole  and  escape  over  the  Belgian 
frontier  it  might  be  quite  as  well  for  all  parties  concerned. 
From  being  the  first  monarch  in  Europe,  Louis  Napoleon  had 
suddenly  become  a  white  elephant,  whom  nobody  wanted. 

Bismarck  was  awakened  at  an  early  hour  on  September  2 
with  the  information  that  Napoleon  desired  a  personal  inter- 
view with  him  at  Donchery.  Mounting  his  horse,  he  rode 
down  the  hill  alone  to  meet  Napoleon,  who  was  in  a  carriage 
with  three  French  generals.  Bismarck  says,  "  I  had  a  revolver 
in  my  belt,  and  his  eye  rested  on  it  for  a  moment."  What 
was  Napoleon  III.  thinking  of  in  that  instant  ?  Was  it  the 
possibility  of  suicide  ?  Bismarck  took  off  his  hat,  though 
contrary  to  rule  on  such  occasions,  and  they  went  together 
into  a  weaver's  cottage,  a  yellow  house  with  white  shutters, 
Venetian  blinds  on  the  upper  story,  and  a  slated  roof.  Napo- 
leon was  friendly  enough,  as  Bismarck  said  afterwards ;  com- 
plained that  he  had  been  forced  into  the  war ;  wished  for  an 
interview  with  King  William ;  wished  for  more  favorable 
terms,  which  he  would  negotiate  on  a  political  basis.  Bis- 

1  In  one  way  or  another  Bismarck  was  evidently  a  thorn  in  the  side  of  the 
crown  prince.  No  wonder  he  speaks  so  frequently  of  the  old  monarch's  health 
in  the  letters  to  Frau  von  Bismarck. 

211 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

marck  informed  him  that  the  terms  of  the  surrender  had  been 
negotiated  by  Von  Moltke,  and  were  not  within  his  province ; 
that  the  king  was  at  an  inconvenient  distance,  and  that  as  he, 
Napoleon,  was  now  a  prisoner  of  war,  political  negotiations 
could  only  be  carried  on  with  the  de  facto  government  of 
France.  He  assured  Napoleon  of  considerate  treatment,  and 
offered  him  his  own  lodging  for  the  night.1 

Napoleon's  friendliness  may  have  been  owing  in  a  measure 
to  the  insults  he  had  received  from  his  own  soldiers.  He  felt 
now  that  his  life,  at  least,  was  safe,  and  perhaps  the  wheel  of 
fortune  might  again  turn  in  his  favor.  The  French  prisoners 
also  took  their  captivity  in  a  light-hearted  manner,  and  the 
wounded  Frenchmen  made  friends  with  their  companions  in 
the  German  hospitals.2 

Bismarck,  having  disposed  of  the  emperor  and  sent  his  sec- 
retary to  distribute  five  hundred  cigars  among  wounded  sol- 
diers, went  in  search  of  his  younger  son,  and  suddenly  came 
upon  "  Count  Bill,"  who  was  a  large,  athletic  fellow,  carrying 
a  French  pig  in  his  arms,  evidently  for  the  benefit  of  the  mess- 
room  table.  On  seeing  his  father  he  dropped  the  pig  and 
fell  into  his  arms.  Bismarck  thought  the  French  officers 
must  have  been  astonished  to  behold  a  German  general  em- 
bracing a  private  soldier.  His  son  explained  that  he  had 
found  driving  a  pig  very  troublesome,  and  finally  concluded 
that  it  would  be  much  easier  to  carry  it. 

Von  Moltke  is  the  only  high  German  official  who  is  re- 
ported to  have  shown  a  decided  elation  at  the  victory  of 
Sedan.  He  may  have  felt  that  his  life's  work  was  nearly  fin- 
ished, for  serious  resistance  was  no  longer  to  be  expected. 
That  he  had  overcome  the  enemy,  with  the  advantage  of 
numbers,  discipline,  and  courage  on  his  side,  was  not  sur- 


1  This  promise  was  faithfully  kept.      Napoleon  was  sent  to  Wilhelmshohe 
through  Belgium  the  next  day  in  a  close  carriage  to  avoid  the  humiliation  of  his 
being  exposed  to  the  gaze  of   German  soldiers.      During  his  confinement  in 
Prussia  he  was  handsomely  treated, — very  differently  from  the  treatment  of  Napo- 
leon I., — and,  according  to  the  American  opinion,  much  better  than  he  deserved. 
W.  Muller  has  made  a  mistake  here ;  Busch  was  on  the  ground. 

2  Dr.  Busch,  i.  103. 

212 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

prising,  but  that  all  the  movements  of  that  vast  army  should 
have  been  directed  with  such  precision,  and  been  so  invariably 
successful,  was  a  record  for  the  future  historian  which  the 
greatest  commanders  might  have  envied  him.  The  first  Na- 
poleon himself  might  have  been  astonished  at  the  capture  of 
an  army  of  one  hundred  and  twenty  thousand  men.  He  went 
on  his  Russian  campaign  with  nearly  half  a  million  soldiers, 
and  the  only  advantage  he  gained  over  the  enemy  was  the 
indecisive  victory  of  Borodino.  Von  Moltke  was  always  the 
model  of  what  a  soldier  should  be, — as  Emerson  says, 

"  Grave,  chaste,  contented  though  retired, 
And  of  all  other  men  desired. ' ' 

When  some  one  asked  a  Prussian  officer,  many  years  after 
these  events,  why  Von  Moltke  had  not  been  made  a  prince, 
as  Bismarck  was,  he  replied,  "  Von  Moltke  does  not  care  for 
it  himself,  and  we  all  feel  that  it  would  add  nothing  to  his 
reputation."  He  has  been  compared  to  Wellington,  who  was 
also  a  man  rather  difficult  to  find  fault  with ;  but  he  made  war 
on  a  grander  scale  than  Wellington,  and  was  more  decidedly 
a  man  of  genius,  though  perhaps  not  as  forcible  a  character. 
That  they  were  both  of  a  reserved  temperament  does  not  imply 
that  they  were  cold-hearted  or  indifferent  to  the  welfare  of 
their  fellow-men.  Von  Moltke  was  probably  the  most  popu- 
lar German  of  his  time.1  It  was  not  without  reason  that  he 
was  called  "  the  thinker  of  battles." 


1  The  writer  saw  Von  Moltke  on  the  floor  of  the  Prussian  Landtag  in  1873. 
He  was  of  rather  slender  build,  broad-shouldered  but  thin,  with  aquiline  feat- 
ures and  a  much-wrinkled  face ;  eyes  like  a  falcon's.  His  eyes  were  supposed 
to  resemble  Frederick  the  Great's ;  Caesar  also  had  falcon  eyes.  He  wore 
silver  epaulets  and  a  broad  red  stripe  on  his  pants.  When  he  saluted  an  ac- 
quaintance he  bowed  low  and  came  up  again  very  erect. 


213 


CHAPTER    X 

THE   SIEGE    OF    PARIS 

WILLIAM  I.  and  Bismarck  looked  at  each  other  after  Napo- 
leon III.  had  been  transported  to  Germany.  What  next? 
They  had  not  long  to  wait  for  news  and  political  changes. 
The  Second  Empire  had  only  existed  by  the  support  of  the 
army,  and  now  that  that  was  gone,  it  collapsed  like  a  railway 
speculation.  In  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  there  was  the 
greatest  confusion ;  the  rabble  of  Paris  broke  into  the  legis- 
lative halls  and  intimidated  the  ministry,  who  requested  the 
establishment  of  a  committee  of  defence,  while  the  radical 
leaders  demanded  the  deposition  of  the  Bonaparte  dynasty. 
Finally  Gambetta,  Favre,  and  a  majority  of  the  assembly  left 
the  hall,  and,  escorted  by  an  immense  crowd,  held  a  meeting 
at  the  Hotel  de  Ville,  where  a  republic  was  proclaimed  and  a 
provisional  government  constituted,  with  a  committee  of  pub- 
lic safety  and  General  Trochu  for  president,  an  officer  whose 
chief  distinction  at  this  time  was  that  he  had  not  been  in  favor 
with  Napoleon.  Thiers  prudently  declined  to  serve  on  this 
committee,  among  whose  members  there  were  several  avowed 
Socialists.  Before  these  proceedings  were  concluded  the 
empress  had  already  left  the  Tuileries  and  was  on  her  way  to 
England.  The  committee  immediately  made  arrangements 
for  levying  fresh  armies, — one  in  Brittany,  another  on  the 
Loire,  and  a  third  in  Provence.  Jules  Favre,  the  French 
compeer  of  Wendell  Phillips,  with  two  others,  were  appointed 
on  an  embassy  to  confer  with  Bismarck  in  regard  to  an  armis- 
tice and  an  honorable  peace,  if  that  could  be  obtained. 

Bismarck  held  the  opinion  that  Victor  Emmanuel  was 
ready  to  sell  his  soul  for  Rome,  and  it  is  certain  that  an  Ital- 
ian envoy,  Count  Vimercati,  was  in  consultation  with  Napo- 
leon at  Metz  previous  to  the  battle  of  Saarbriicken.  Victor 
Emmanuel  finally  kept  his  word  to  both  parties  in  this 

214 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

conflict ;  and,  though  after  the  defeat  at  Worth  he  resisted  a 
strong  pressure  from  the  Italian  Liberals  to  take  possession  of 
the  Eternal  City,  after  Sedan  he  considered  his  engagement 
no  longer  binding,  and  accordingly  marched  in  with  a  suffi- 
cient force  to  overawe  Pius  IX.  Great  was  the  rejoicing  of 
the  Roman  citizens  at  the  downfall  of  the  priests'  temporal 
power,  and  a  plebiscite,  taken  immediately  afterwards  through 
the  States  of  the  Church,  resulted  in  an  almost  unanimous 
approval  of  consolidation  with  the  Italian  government.  Few 
more  important  events  than  this  have  taken  place  during  the 
nineteenth  century,  and  here  again  we  recognize  the  harmony 
of  Bismarck's  policy  with  the  essential  needs  of  his  time. 

Nevertheless,  at  the  moment  Bismarck  treated  the  matter 
with  cool  indifference.  "  We  might  have  done  something  for 
the  pope,"  he  said, "  if  he  had  been  willing  to  do  more  for  us. 
Nothing  for  nothing  is  the  only  rule  that  one  can  act  on  in 
such  cases."  He  may  have  thought  at  the  moment  that  the 
Italians  were  getting  more  than  they  deserved,  and  this  feel- 
ing must  have  been  increased  when  Garibaldi,  carried  off  his 
feet  with  the  name  of  a  republic,  landed  at  Marseilles  with  a 
shipload  of  Carbonari  to  assist  the  French  in  driving  the 
Germans  out  of  their  country.  A  change  in  the  form  of  gov- 
ernment did  not  make  the  war  less  unjustifiable,  and  Gari- 
baldi, without  being  aware  of  it,  was  now  enlisting  in  the 
pope's  service  and  doing  the  pope's  work.1  It  was  true  he 
may  have  suspected  that  on  the  conclusion  of  peace  the  King 
of  Prussia  would  replace  Louis  Napoleon  on  his  throne,  but 
Bismarck's  attitude  towards  the  government  in  Paris  must 
have  soon  dispelled  this  illusion. 

In  fact,  Bismarck  always  favored  republicanism  in  France 
from  the  first.  If,  as  has  been  stated,  he  did  so  from  an  expec- 
tation that  the  extravagances  of  the  new  government  would 
bring  republicanism  into  disrepute,  the  result  has  not  an- 
swered this  calculation ; 2  but  it  is  certain  that  he  once  said 

1  The  German  hegemony  in  Europe  is  still  the  only  support  of  Italian  unity. 

2  One  reason  may  have  been  to  justify  King  William's  proclamation  before 
the  battle  of  Worth,  that  he  came  to  make  war  against  the  French  government, 
and  not  the  French  people. 

2I5 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

to  Dr.  Busch,  "  I  am  by  temperament  a  republican,  but  my 
belief  in  God  makes  me  a  monarchist,"  a  statement  which  it  is 
difficult  to  understand,  except  by  supposing  that  he  considered 
it  prudent  to  qualify  the  assertion  in  some  way.  He  may  have 
heartily  wished  at  times  for  a  German  republic  of  which  he 
could  be  president,  impossible  as  he  knew  this  to  be.  At  all 
events,  when  the  German  ambassador  at  Paris  advocated  the 
support  of  a  coup  d'etat  for  the  restoration  of  the  Bonapartes, 
Bismarck  set  himself  firmly  against  it,  although  such  a  change 
would  have  been  for  the  interest  of  Germany  as  well  as  the 
monarchical  principle;  for  nothing  could  be  more  improb- 
able than  that  either  Napoleon  III.  or  his  son  would  under- 
take another  campaign  on  the  Rhine.  At  the  present  time 
Germany  has  more  to  fear  from  republican  France  than  it 
might  from  a  Bourbon  or  Bonaparte  dynasty.  Here  Bismarck 
appears  again  in  alliance  with  the  tendencies  of  his  age. 

The  German  army  now  began  to  extend  its  lines  towards 
Paris,  and  Bismarck  issued  a  circular  to  the  powers,  stating 
the  terms  on  which  the  king  and  his  ministers  were  willing 
to  conclude  peace, — nothing  less  than  the  retrocession  of 
Alsace  and  Lorraine,  or,  as  the  Germans  call  these  provinces, 
Elsass  and  Lothringen. 

The  great  powers  could  make  little  objection  to  this,  as 
they  would  certainly  have  done  the  same  under  like  con- 
ditions. Considering  the  success  of  the  German  armies,  it 
was  looked  upon  as  a  modest  demand.  In  like  circumstances 
the  first  Napoleon  would  have  annexed  the  half  of  France. 
It  is  known  that  Bismarck  favored  this  demand,  but  he  was 
willing  to  leave  out  Metz  and  its  surrounding  territory  for  the 
sake  of  an  earlier  agreement,  but  Von  Moltke  and  the  Prussian 
staff  would  not  hear  of  this.  They  considered  the  fortress 
of  Metz  essential  to  a  scientific  frontier  for  Germany.  If 
Bismarck  had  opposed  these  terms  the  result  would  have 
been  the  same.  The  current  of  feeling,  not  only  in  the  army 
but  throughout  Prussia,  would  have  been  too  strong  for  any 
one  man  to  resist  it. 

The  provisional  government  at  Paris  replied  with  a  mani- 
festo, in  which  the  expression,  "  not  one  inch  of  territory,  not 

216 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

one  stone  of  our  fortresses,"  has  become  proverbial.  The 
idea  of  dismembering  France,  even  to  this  extent,  had  never 
been  dreamed  of  before,  and  excited  the  greatest  indignation. 
It  was  another  illustration  of  how  impossible  it  was  for  the 
French  to  place  themselves  in  the  position  of  other  people. 
If  the  Prussians  had  been  defeated  in  an  equally  decisive 
manner  they  would  have  been  obliged  to  surrender  the  left 
bank  of  the  Rhine  as  a  matter  of  course.  Even  if  the  pro- 
visional government  had  thought  best  to  accede  to  this  sacri- 
fice to  prevent  further  bloodshed,  it  is  not  likely  that  public 
opinion  would  have  supported  it ;  but  there  was  good  reason 
why  Favre,  Gambetta,  and  their  associates  should  desire  to 
continue  the  war. 

Bismarck  had  reached  Ferrieres  and  was  quartered  on  the 
country  residence  of  the  Rothschilds  about  the  middle  of 
September,  when  Sir  Edward  Malet,  the  British  envoy  at 
Paris,  came  to  him  as  an  intermediary,  and  wished  to  know 
if  the  Prussian  government  would  treat  with  the  Paris  com- 
mittee as  the  de  facto  government  of  France ;  and  Bismarck's 
reply  was,  that  he  was  ready  to  consider  terms  of  peace  with 
any  government  that  would  obtain  the  substantial  support 
of  the  French  people.  This  was  sufficient  guarantee  of  the 
republic  before  the  world,  and  showed  that  Bismarck  had 
no  intention  of  interfering  with  the  domestic  affairs  of 
France. 

Jules  Favre  came  to  Ferrieres  on  the  iQth  and  2Oth  of 
September  in  order  to  negotiate  an  armistice, — presumably  to 
hold  elections  for  the  establishment  of  a  new  government,  but 
also,  doubtless,  to  gain  time  for  military  preparations.  Bis- 
marck tried  to  explain  to  him  that  as  an  armistice  would  be 
an  advantage  to  the  French,  the  Germans  should  also  receive 
corresponding  advantages,  and  suggested  the  surrender  of 
Strasburg  and  Toul  in  return  for  it;  but  Favre  either  could 
not  or  would  not  recognize  this  fact,  and  expatiated  on  the 
sufferings  of  his  country  and  the  advantage  to  Germany  of  a 
speedy  conclusion  of  the  war.  He  insisted,  however,  that  it 
was  impossible  to  make  territorial  concessions  to  Prussia.  Bis- 
marck spoke  of  Strasburg  as  the  western  gate  of  Germany, 

217 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

"  the  key  to  their  house,"  and  that  its  possession  was  essential 
for  the  future  security  of  the  German  nation. 

Favre  [in  his  own  account].  Then  it  is  Alsace  and  Lorraine. 

Bismarck.  I  have  not  spoken  of  Lorraine ;  but  as  for  Alsace,  I 
am  very  decided.  We  regard  it  as  indispensable  for  our  defence. 

Favre.  Such  a  sacrifice  would  inspire  France  with  sentiments  of 
vengeance  and  hatred,  leading  by  a  fatal  necessity  to  anothe^war. 
Alsace  intends  to  remain  French.  She  might  be  ruled,  but  cannot 
be  assimilated.  The  province  will  always  be  an  embarrassment 
and  perhaps  a  source  of  weakness  to  Germany. 

Bismarck.  I  do  not  deny  that  \  but  in  any  case,  even  if  we  treat 
your  nation  in  a  generous  manner,  she  will  always  be  plotting 
against  Germany.  Your  people  will  never  become  reconciled  to 
Sedan  any  more  than  they  are  to  Waterloo. 

Favre  attempted  to  show  Bismarck  that  he  ought  to  recog- 
nize that  the  progress  of  industry,  the  creation  of  railroads, 
the  interchange  and  complication  of  commercial  interests, 
would  tend  in  future  to  render  war  more  and  more  improb- 
able. The  present  war  was  a  severe  lesson  to  France,  and  all 
the  more  so  because  the  French  people  had  been  dragged  into 
it  against  their  will.  Bismarck,  however,  denied  this,  affirm- 
ing that  the  French  had  desired  the  war  and  supported  the 
emperor  in  proclaiming  it.  Favre's  reiteration  that  the  war 
was  the  exclusive  work  of  Napoleon  III.  was  promptly  denied 
by  Bismarck,  and  certainly  was  not  a  fair  statement.  Neither 
was  Bismarck  mindful  of  the  Duke  of  Brunswick  in  1792, 
when  he  declared  that  Germany  never  made  war  upon  France. 
Favre  believed  that  there  was  but  one  means  of  pacifying  the 
French  people  and  of  uniting  the  two  nations,  by  relinquishing 
the  old  policy  of  conquest  and  military  glory,  and  by  adopting 
that  of  liberty  and  the  fraternity  of  nations.  In  conclusion, 
Bismarck  said : 

"  I  acknowledge  that  you  have  always  supported  the  policy  you 
defend  to-day;  and  if  I  were  sure  that  it  were  that  of  France, 
I  would  engage  the  king  to  withdraw  without  touching  your  terri- 
tory or  demanding  an  obole.  And  I  know  so  well  his  generous 
sentiments  that  I  would  guarantee  you  his  acceptance.  But  you 

218 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

represent  the  imperceptible  minority.  You  have  sprung  from  a 
popular  disturbance,  which  may  overthrow  you  to-morrow.  We 
have  therefore  no  guarantee.  We  should  have  no  more  in  any 
government  which  may  succeed  you.  The  evil  is  in  the  fickleness 
and  irreflective  character  of  your  nation;  the  remedy  is  in  the 
material  pledge  which  we  have  the  right  to  take. ' ' 

At  a  second  interview,  which  took  place  in  the  Salle  de 
Chasseurs  at  Haute  Maison,  Favre  pressed  the  subject  of 
an  armistice,  but  without  making  any  impression  on  the 
minister-president.  When  in  the  course  of  his  argument  he 
referred  to  the  Prussian  victories,  and  the  effect  that  they  had 
produced  in  the  eyes  of  the  world, — a  military  glory  which 
might  satisfy  the  most  ambitious, — Bismarck  interrupted  him 
with, — 

"  Do  not  mention  that ;  that  is  a  glory  without  value  to  us.  It 
is  our  interest  alone  that  we  consult,  and  the  need  of  guaranteeing 
it  is  so  evident  that  we  should  be  wrong  to  abandon  ourselves  to  a 
chimerical  hope." 

Favre  believed  that  a  profound  change  had  taken  place  in 
the  French  nation  and  in  the  opinions  of  the  civilized  world, 
— a  strong  opinion  against  going  to  war : 

"The  majority  of  the  nation  will  be  necessarily  drawn  by  that 
irresistible  current  which  conducts  her  towards  a  new  policy  and  to 
higher  destinies.  She  will  understand  that  the  support  of  all  na- 
tions— especially  Germany — is  indispensable  to  her ;  and  she  will 
seek  it,  not  by  sterile  conquests,  but  by  the  benefits  of  work  and 
interchange;  and  it  may  be  affirmed  that  if  this  movement  be 
favored  by  wise  statesmen,  war  will  soon  become  impossible." 

To  this  Bismarck  replied, — 

"The  question  is  to  find  these  wise  statesmen,  and  I  am  con- 
vinced that  they  do  not  exist  in  France.  You  express  noble  ideas, 
and  if  you  were  master  I  should  be  of  your  opinion,  and  would  treat 
with  you  at  once  ;  but  you  are  in  opposition  to  the  real  sentiments 
of  your  country,  which  retains  its  warlike  disposition  ;  and,  to  speak 

219 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

only  of  the  present,  you,  as  a  government,  are  born  of  sedition, 
and  you  may  be  overthrown  to-morrow  by  the  populace  of  Paris."  x 

So  the  conference  ended.  The  interviews  have  slight  his- 
torical importance,  but  Favre's  account  of  them  has  a  rare 
value  for  its  clear  setting  forth  of  Bismarck's  plain,  straight- 
forward method  of  dealing.  How  conspicuous  does  the 
virtue  of  these  two  men  appear  in  it !  How  much  honester 
were  these  two  diplomats  negotiating  for  whole  provinces 
than  the  average  business  man  who  has  wool  to  buy  or  iron 
to  sell !  The  problem  they  were  dealing  with  was  one  of  the 
gravest,  and  the  arguments  on  either  side  evince  great  good 
sense  and  historical  foresight.  Only  time  can  determine 
which  of  the  two  was  most  nearly  right. 

Bismarck  showed  Favre  a  curious  missive  which  had  been 
sent  to  Napoleon  III.  by  his  empress  as  a  sort  of  passport  for 
a  Bonapartist  envoy.  It  was  a  photograph  of  an  English 
sea-port,  and  underneath  was  written,  "This  is  a  view  of 
Hastings,  which  I  have  selected  as  a  residence  for  my  good 
Louis ;"  signed  "  Eugenie."  Bismarck  did  not  think  well  of 
the  emissary^  but  gave  him  permission  to  visit  the  emperor. 
Bismarck,  in  his  report  to  the  king  of  the  interview,  said: 

"  I  was  unable  to  convince  him  that  conditions  which  France 
had  obtained  from  Italy  and  demanded  of  Germany,  without  having 
been  at  war  with  either  country, — conditions  which  France  would 
undoubtedly  have  imposed  upon  us  had  we  been  vanquished,  and 
which  had  been  the  natural  outcome  of  every  modern  war, — could 
involve  no  dishonor  to  a  country  conquered  after  having  gallantly 
defended  itself;  or  that  the  honor  of  France  differed  in  any  essen- 
tial respect  from  that  of  other  countries." 

So  they  parted,  to  meet  again  under  less  favorable  auspices 
for  France. 

Favre  and  the  provisional  government  had  excellent  rea- 
sons for  not  desiring  too  speedy  a  termination  of  the  war. 
Marshal  Bazaine  was  a  thorough  Bonapartist,  and  had  with 
him  in  Metz  the  only  French  army  that  was  now  of  any  value. 

1  Favre's  "  Government  of  the  National  Defence,"  chap.  iv. 
220 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

If  peace  had  been  concluded  at  this  moment,  it  is  morally 
certain  that  he  would  have  marched  upon  Paris  and  replaced 
Napoleon  in  the  Tuileries.  To  give  stability  to  the  new  gov- 
ernment it  was,  therefore,  necessary  that  the  Committee  of 
Safety  should  maintain  an  army  of  its  own  and  continue  the 
war  until  either  Bazaine  surrendered  or  they  became  strong 
enough  to  withstand  the  Bonapartist  faction. 

Neither  did  Favre  and  his  colleagues  count  without  some 
chance  of  success.  To  besiege  a  city  of  two  million  inhabi- 
tants, fortified  in  the  most  skilful  manner  and  capable  of  rais- 
ing an  army  of  one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  men  within 
its  walls,  was  a  problem  altogether  new  in  military  science. 
Three  hundred  thousand  men  would  be  required  to  invest  it, 
and  half  as  many  to  prevent  Bazaine  from  breaking  forth  from 
Metz.  Then  they  depended  on  a  general  arming  of  the  pop- 
ulation, such  as  had  been  so  successful  in  the  first  French 
revolution.  What  they  neglected  to  consider  was  that  the 
soldiers  who  drove  the  Duke  of  Brunswick  back  to  Ger- 
many in  1792  were  fighting  for  a  great  cause;  they  were 
filled  with  the  spirit  of  the  time,  and  the  whole  French  nation 
was  at  a  white  heat.  It  was  now  the  Germans  who  had  a 
cause  to  fight  for,  and  this  was  as  essential  to  their  success  as 
Von  Moltke's  tactics.  The  rank  and  file  of  Louis  Napoleon's 
army  were  not  the  persons  who  made  the  conflict,  and  felt 
little  interest  in  it.  Never  since  the  Seven  Years'  War  had 
French  armies  fought  so  tamely.  The  Parisian  journalists 
and  gay  saunterers  of  the  boulevards  who  had  helped  to  pre- 
cipitate the  conflict  were  the  ones  who  had  least  at  stake  in  it. 
The  small  peasant  proprietors  in  France  knew  little  of  what 
Bismarck  was  doing,  and  cared  less.  They  hated  war,  and 
only  wished  to  enjoy  the  fruits  of  the  earth  without  inter- 
ference. Nevertheless,  the  Committee  of  Safety  was  so  nearly 
right  that  Bismarck  confessed  to  Von  Beust  three  years  later 
that  if  Bazaine  had  held  out  a  week  longer  German  affairs 
would  have  been  in  a  critical  condition.  By  the  1st  of  De- 
cember Germany  was  almost  denuded  of  able-bodied  men, 
and  trade,  except  for  military  supplies,  was  nearly  at  a  stand- 
still. Such  mammoth  wars  cannot  be  of  long  duration. 

221 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

As  Favre's  mission  had  come  to  no  result,  Thiers  was  sent 
on  a  circular  tour  to  foreign  courts  for  the  purpose  of  organ- 
izing a  coalition  against  Germany.  Thiers  was  the  best  per- 
son that  could  have  been  appointed  for  this  purpose,  for, 
in  spite  of  his  national  egotism,  he  was  the  ablest  French 
politician  of  his  time, — a  skilful  and  conciliatory  negotiator. 
However,  he  met  with  no  success.  He  found  in  England,  it 
is  true,  a  favorable  public  sentiment, — songs  about  that  wicked 
Bismarck  were  sung  in  coffee-houses  and  cheap  theatres, — 
but  as  the  British  government  had  no  army  to  speak  of,  there 
was  not  much  it  could  do  to  assist  its  Crimean  ally.  The  Tsar 
Alexander  asked  the  coldly  pertinent  question,  "  What  can 
you  do  for  us  in  return  ?"  Neither  he  nor  Victor  Emmanuel 
could  be  persuaded  that  the  retrocession  of  Elsass  and  Loth- 
ringen  could  in  any  way  disturb  the  European  balance  of 
power;  while  Von  Beust  was  still  less  inclined  to  place  an 
army  of  observation  in  Bohemia  than  he  had  been  two  months 
earlier.  Meanwhile  Von  Moltke  had  drawn  his  lines  about  the 
capital,  and  Paris  was  besieged.  On  October  6  Bismarck  and 
William  I.  arrived  at  Versailles ;  the  king  was  quartered  in  the 
palace  of  Louis  XIV.,  and  Bismarck  at  the  house  of  Veuve 
Jesse.  An  English  M.  P.,  who  was  residing  in  Paris  and  per- 
mitted himself  to  be  shut  in  there,  has  given  an  edifying 
account  of  the  proceedings  he  witnessed.  The  confusion 
would  seem  to  have  been  almost  indescribable,  and  he  com- 
pares General  Trochu  to  a  military  professor  who  understands 
theory,  but  is  not  a  fighter.  Large  crowds  of  French  men 
and  women  rushed  into  the  city  at  the  last  moment,  where 
they  could  be  of  no  use  except  to  eat  up  the  supplies  and 
hasten  the  famine.  It  seems  as  if  the  Committee  of  Safety 
might  have  been  wise  enough  to  send  away  those  families 
who  could  afford  to  live  in  London  or  elsewhere  before  the 
city  was  encircled  by  the  German  forces. 

Bismarck,  anticipating  that  the  Paris  government  would 
make  what  capital  they  could  out  of  the  failure  of  Favre's 
negotiation  to  prejudice  the  German  interests,  addressed  a 
circular  to  the  powers,  in  which  he  summed  up  the  situation 
in  these  terms : 

222 


LIFE  OF   BISMARCK 

"  By  refusing  to  avail  itself  of  the  opportunity  offered  to  it  to 
elect  a  National  Assembly  (even  within  the  portions  of  French  ter- 
ritory occupied  by  us)  the  French  government  proves  its  determi- 
nation to  prolong  the  difficulties,  hindering  it  from  effecting  an 
international  conclusion  of  peace,  and  to  close  its  ears  to  the  voice 
of  the  French  people." 

One  effect  of  this  was  to  excite  the  Legitimists  and  Bona- 
partists  with  renewed  hope  that  their  claims  might  yet  find 
consideration  at  the  German  head-quarters.  The  crown 
prince  in  his  diary  thus  sums  up  the  position  of  affairs  on 
October  9 : 

"  Bismarck  tells  me  that  Chambord  and  Ollivier  have  written  to 
his  Majesty.  The  former  wishes  that  he  should  comply  with  the 
demands  of  his  people,  but  make  no  concessions  of  land  ;  Ollivier 
stands  for  war,  but  warns  against  debt;  and  both  presume  to 
give  advice  to  the  conqueror !  St.  Cloud  in  flames.  Burnside 
comes  again  from  Paris,  commissioned  by  the  government,  which 
offers  proposals  without  any  judgment,  hearkens  to  no  sugges- 
tions, and  carries  on  the  war  without  plan,  holding  counsel  only 
with  itself.  Bazaine  wishes  his  chief  of  staff  to  arrange  trea- 
ties of  a  military-political  kind.  Bismarck  will  listen  to  him,  but 
neither  Roon  nor  Moltke,  who,  disagreeing  with  each  other,  yet 
object  to  the  reception  of  communications.  Friedrich  Charles  is 
opposed  to  this  because  he  fears  the  capitulation  may  be  concluded 
at  Versailles.  The  king  will  direct  the  negotiations  from  Wiirtem- 
berg  so  as  not  to  appear  in  Bavaria's  tow.  Bismarck  keeps  watch 
of  the  imperial  question,  advising  me  that  in  1866  he  may  have 
failed  to  realize  the  strength  of  the  popular  impulse  in  Germany  for 
the  imperial  title.  He  is  now  chiefly  apprehensive  of  too  great  a 
display  in  the  way  of  court  splendor,  in  regard  to  which  I  reassured 
him." 

It  is  clear  from  this  summary  that  there  was  not  always 
harmony  and  agreement  in  the  German  camp.  We  see  the 
crown  prince  already  looking  forward  to  the  imperial  title  and 
substantially  justifying  Von  Sybel's  statement  in  regard  to  the 
kings  and  dukes  in  Germany  in  1866;  while  Bismarck  applies 
a  timely  warning  to  the  weak  side  of  the  victor  of  Worth.  If 
there  were  five  distinct  political  parties  in  France,  there  were 

223 


LIFE  OF   BISMARCK 

also  five  different  commanders-iii-chief  to  the  German  forces. 
Somewhat  later  we  hear  of  a  decided  coolness  between  Von 
Moltke  and  the  crown  prince  in  regard  to  military  operations 
before  Paris.  Fortunately,  everything  came  to  be  decided  at 
last  by  the  old  monarch,  and  he  finally  followed  Bismarck's 
advice. 

General  Burnside  had  offered  to  serve  as  mediator  in  the 
interest  of  the  French  republic,  and  Bismarck,  who  liked 
Americans  on  account  of  their  frankness  and  business-like 
methods,  readily  agreed  to  this.  He  was  accordingly  escorted 
to  Paris  under  a  white  flag,  and  remained  there  two  days,  but 
returned  without  accomplishing  anything.  Burnside  described 
the  condition  of  affairs  there  in  terms  similar  to  the  besieged 
M.  P.,  and  he  did  not  hesitate  to  express  the  opinion  that  it  was 
of  no  use  attempting  to  reason  with  such  people.  The  real 
difficulty  was  that  he  had  undertaken  the  office  of  peace-maker 
too  early  in  the  season ;  but  it  is  evident  that  he  considered 
that  the  German  claims  were  not  unreasonable.  Gambetta 
had  gone  off  in  a  balloon  to  organize  the  army  of  the  Loire, 
from  which  grand  results  were  expected.  A  note  was  re- 
ceived from  Earl  Granville — a  faint  echo  of  Thiers's  visit  to 
London — entreating  King  William  to  bring  the  horrors  of 
war  to  a  close  as  speedily  as  possible,  and  was  bluntly  an- 
swered by  Bismarck  to  the  effect  that  there  was  no  place  for 
sentiment  in  politics. 

If  Jules  Favre  had  consented  to  Bismarck's  proposal  in  re- 
gard to  an  armistice,  the  French  cause  would  have  lost  nothing 
by  it,  for  Toul  surrendered  three  days  later,  and  Strasburg  fol- 
lowed suit  at  the  end  of  a  week,  after  a  bombardment  of  three 
days.  How  Bazaine  was  informed  of  MacMahon's  advance  on 
the  line  of  the  Meuse  remains  a  mystery ;  but  he  made  a  vigor- 
ous attempt  to  escape  from  Metz  at  that  time,  which  was  frus- 
trated by  the  activity  of  Frederick  Charles,  though  with  heavy 
losses  on  both  sides.  Bismarck  complained  at  dinner  that  the 
Red  Prince  was  not  sufficiently  considerate  of  the  lives  of  his 
soldiers.  It  is  doubtful  if  Bazaine  made  any  effort  to  escape 
after  the  dethronement  of  Napoleon ;  and  the  reference  in  the 
crown  prince's  diary  to  an  audience  with  Bazaine's  chief  of 

224 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

staff  clearly  refers  to  some  political  negotiation,  which  was, 
however,  strangled  in  its  birth.  An  army  of  one  hundred  and 
eighty  thousand  men  could  not  hold  out  forever  in  a  besieged 
fortress,  and  Von  Moltke  calculated  exactly  the  length  of  time 
they  would  be  able  to  do  this.  On  the  27th  of  October, 
Bazaine,  Canrobert,  and  Leboeuf  surrendered  with  six  hun- 
dred cannon,  besides  the  guns  on  the  fortress ;  the  heaviest 
capitulation  recorded  in  history.  That  Bazaine  behaved  with 
comparative  indifference  towards  the  French  cause  after  the 
battle  of  Sedan  cannot  be  denied;  but  whether  the  result 
would  have  been  different  if  he  had  made  successive  attempts 
to  escape  from  the  German  blockade  is  doubtful.  In  all 
probability,  by  acting  as  he  did  he  saved  the  lives  of  thou- 
sands of  brave  men.  After  peace  was  concluded,  however, 
he  was  made  a  scapegoat  of  and  condemned  to  death  for 
treasonable  practices  towards  a  republic  which  at  that  time 
certainly  had  no  real  existence.  His  sentence  was  commuted 
by  President  MacMahon  to  exile  for  a  term  of  years. 


WILLIAM  AS   EMPEROR 

That  Bismarck  should  take  advantage  of  these  signal  suc- 
cesses to  strengthen  the  position  of  William  I.  in  Germany 
was  to  have  been  expected.  He  felt  now  that  he  held  the 
South  German  states  in  the  hollow  of  his  hand,  and  could  ac- 
complish whatever  the  king  and  his  ministers  considered 
best ;  but  there  is  nothing  more  remarkable  in  the  life  of  this 
world-statesman  than  his  readiness  to  seize  an  opportunity 
when  it  suddenly  presented  itself  to  him,  and  the  cautious, 
gradual  manner  which  he  adopted  at  other  times  to  gain  his 
ends.  His  prediction,  made  years  since,  that  the  North  Ger- 
man confederation  once  formed,  the  South  German  states 
would  gravitate  to  it  as  inevitably  as  iron  to  the  magnet,  was 
now  to  be  fulfilled ;  but  he  did  not  wish  to  artificially  hasten 
an  event  which  he  foresaw  would  take  place  in  the  due  course 
of  nature.  In  spite  of  the  popular  enthusiasm  which  is  aroused 
by  a  victory  like  Sedan,  he  knew  that  the  least  attempt  to 
exert  a  pressure  on  Wiirtemberg  or  Bavaria  would  not  only 
15  225 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

excite  anti-Prussian  agitation  there,  but  would  create  a  perma- 
nent ill  feeling  in  those  states,  and  an  evil  reproach  towards  the 
king  and  himself  in  other  countries.  The  crown  prince  was 
equally  desirous  of  attaining  this  end ;  and  we  may  suppose 
that  his  interest  in  German  national  unity  was  a  fairly  unselfish 
one ;  but  he  did  not,  like  Bismarck,  see  over  the  whole  ground, 
and  he  feared  that  the  grand  opportunity  might  pass  by  with- 
out achieving  the  due  result.  From  the  last  of  October  until 

O 

December,  1870,  we  find  continual  references  to  this  subject  in 
the  crown  prince's  diary,  which  proves  that  the  matter  was 
under  discussion  at  the  German  head-quarters  for  several 
weeks  before  definite  action  was  taken. 

The  discussion  would  seem  to  have  been  concerning  the 
organization  of  an  upper  house  of  parliament,  and  that  the 
crown  prince,  from  his  English  education  and  proclivities, 
favored  something  like  the  House  of  Lords,  without  realizing 
the  political  weakness  and  comparative  uselessness  of  that 
venerable  body.  It  may  have  been  that  the  King  of  Saxony 
and  others  wished  for  such  a  collective  union  of  princes,  so  as 
to  maintain  their  dignity  nearer  to  an  equality  with  William  I. 
Bismarck,  however,  did  not  want  personages  of  that  sort 
staying  in  Berlin ;  besides  which,  the  presidency  of  such  an 
assembly  would  have  been  a  severe  burden  to  the  aged  king. 
Neither  did  he  believe  in  the  imitation  of  foreign  political 
machinery.  Every  country,  in  his  opinion,  should  have  its 
own  style  of  government. 

On  the  1st  of  November  the  crown  prince  speaks  of  a  con- 
ference between  the  ministers  of  the  smaller  German  states 
for  the  purpose  of  winning  over  Bavaria  to  the  scheme  of  a 
German  empire,  with  responsible  delegates  for  the  states,  or 
else  a  House  of  Lords ;  but  he  says,  "  It  has  come  to  no  re- 
sult, because  Bray,  the  Bavarian  envoy,  asserts  that  all  these 
questions  will  have  to  be  discussed  with  Count  Delbriick  at 
Munich."  Bavaria  was  evidently  the  chief  and  only  remain- 
ing obstacle  to  the  completion  of  this  plan. 

What  the  king's  views  were  on  this  subject  we  have  no 
means  of  ascertaining  further  than  this :  The  crown  prince 
says,  October  27 : 

226 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

"The  king  told  Regenbach  yesterday  that  he  looks  upon  the 
North  German  situation  as  requiring  a  change  and  revision,  and 
has  declared  himself  generally  favorable  in  regard  to  the  question 
of  the  empire  As  Bismarck  cannot  leave  here,  people  are  of  the 
opinion  that  the  German  Reichstag  had  better  be  called  here. 
Then  the  power  of  impressions  would  work ;  and  if,  besides,  the 
congress  of  princes  would  join  in  with  the  same  session,  as  is  now 
much  desired  by  me,  then  the  German  cause  would  be  helped  at  a 
blow." 

Again  the  crown  prince  writes,  November  16: 

"Talked  with  Bismarck  about  the  German  question.  He  wants 
to  come  to  a  decision,  but  expounds  the  difficulties  with  a  shrug  of 
his  shoulders, — What  can  be  done  with  the  South  Germans  ?  Do  I 
wish  that  they  should  be  threatened  ?  I  answered,  '  Yes,  indeed, 
there  is  no  danger  at  all  if  we  are  fair  and  imperious ;  you  will  see 
that  I  am  right  in  maintaining  that  you  are  not  as  yet,  by  any 
means,  sufficiently  aware  of  your  power.'  Bismarck  seriously  dep- 
recates any  threatening,1  and  thinks  if  we  went  to  extreme  measures 
we  might  drive  Bavaria  into  the  arms  of  Austria.  '  We  shall  have  to 
leave  the  imperial  question  to  work  itself  out  of  its  own  free  will.' 
I  replied  that  I  was  well  acquainted  with  that  method  of  procedure, 
but  that,  representing  the  future  as  I  do,  I  could  not  regard  the 
matter  with  indifference;  that  it  would  not  be  necessary  to  use 
brute  force  to  prevent  Bavaria  and  Wiirtemberg  from  uniting  them- 
selves to  Austria." 

There  is  no  reason  why  we  should  blame  the  crown  prince 
for  his  attitude  on  the  South  German  question,  except  so 
far  as  it  appears  inconsistent  with  respect  to  his  professions 
of  liberalism  and  government  according  to  law  and  order 
during  the  Schleswig-Holstein  muddle.  No  great  nation  has 
ever  been  organized  without  the  use  of  force  in  some  direc- 
tion. We  may  have  supposed  that  the  United  States  was  an 
exception  to  this,  until  we  were  undeceived  in  1861.  There 
was  no  serious  disagreement  between  Bismarck  and  the  crown 
prince,  as  the  partisans  of  both  have  sometimes  tried  to  prove ; 

1  One  of  Bismarck's  sayings  was,  "  If  you  want  to  make  a  bargain,  never 
threaten." 

227 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

it  was  only  a  question  of  the  right  time  and  method ;  and 
here  Bismarck  appears  in  decided  advantage  to  his  would-be 
rival.  If  there  was  opposition  anywhere  to  the  founding  of 
a  new  German  empire,  it  came  from  the  Prussian  Particular- 
ists,  who  foresaw  that  the  admission  of  the  South  German 
states  would  diminish  their  influence,  and  perhaps  from  the 
old  king,  who  dreaded  the  infusion  of  Bavarian  Catholics  and 
Wiirtemberg  democrats. 

The  real  difficulty  in  dealing  with  Bavaria  in  this  emer- 
gency originated  not  in  Munich,  but  in  Rome.  Since  the 
occupation  of  the  latter  city  by  Victor  Emmanuel,  Pius  IX. 
and  Antonelli  had  been  in  a  state  of  exasperation  beyond  the 
faculty  of  speech  either  to  express  or  describe;  and  since 
they  could  discover  no  way  to  escape  from  their  own  difficul- 
ties, they  were  determined  to  make  as  much  trouble  for  Bis- 
marck and  the  King  of  Prussia  as  they  possibly  could.  There 
is  no  engine  for  such  work  like  the  priesthood,  and  perhaps  it 
was  fortunate  that  the  young  King  of  Bavaria  had  no  queen 
for  the  Jesuits  to  play  upon ;  but  they  exerted  themselves  to 
arouse  the  Bavarians  to  the  danger  which  threatened  the  true 
faith  from  the  prospect  of  having  their  country  under  the  con- 
trol of  a  Protestant  emperor,  and  they  started  a  lively  anti- 
German  agitation  in  Elsass  and  Lothringen.  This  went  so 
far  that  the  Bavarian  ministry  feared  a  popular  uprising  in 
Munich,  which,  with  their  whole  army  employed  in  France, 
would  have  been  a  dangerous  problem  to  deal  with.  Prussian 
interference  would  have  been  only  too  likely  to  kindle  this 
into  a  flame,  and  it  was  from  his  better  information  of  existing 
conditions  that  Bismarck  could  answer  the  crown  prince  with 
so  much  confidence. 

Two  months  later,  after  the  empire  had  been  established 
and  William  had  been  crowned  emperor  in  Versailles,  it  was 
generally  reported  in  English  newspapers,  and  echoed  in  many 
American  ones,  that  the  Crown  Prince  of  Prussia  was  opposed 
to  the  new  political  order  in  Germany,  and  would  have  much 
preferred  to  have  his  father  remain  simply  King  of  Prussia 
at  the  head  of  the  North  German  confederation.  This  is 
an  excellent  example  of  the  growth  of  the  modern  my  thus. 

228 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

Although  English  gentlemen  have  always  confessed  that  the 
national  organization  of  Germany  was  an  advantage  to  Great 
Britain  and  conducive  to  the  general  peace  of  Europe,  a  large 
allowance  of  national  vanity  was  aroused  by  the  surprising 
victories  of  Gravelotte  and  Sedan  and  the  formidable  growth 
of  this  neighboring  power.  As  the  crown  prince  was  Vic- 
toria's son-in-law,  it  was  considered  essential  for  the  credit  of 
the  English  royal  family  that  he  should  be  represented  as 
having  no  direct  agency  in  such  high-handed  proceedings. 
All  newspaper  editors  are  by  no  means  to  be  considered  un- 
truthful ;  but  when  one  of  the  brotherhood  imagines  such  a 
canard  as  this,  others  naturally  copy  it,  and  the  correspond- 
ents of  leading  newspapers  were  not  slow  to  transport  such 
valuable  information  to  America.  Now  they  are  trying  to 
prove  that  it  was  the  crown  prince  rather  than  Bismarck 
who  laid  the  corner-stone  of  the  new  German  empire,  since 
Germany  is  the  main  support  of  England's  Eastern  policy. 

THE  TSAR   CLAIMS   HIS   REWARD 

On  or  about  October  30,  Prince  GortchakofT  cast  a  diplo- 
matic bomb-shell  among  European  potentates  by  issuing  a 
circular  to  the  effect  that,  since  the  Franco-German  war  had 
materially  changed  the  political  status  of  Europe,  Russia  did 
not  consider  the  clause  in  the  treaty  of  Paris  which  restricted 
her  from  a  free  navigation  of  the  Black  Sea  was  longer  obli- 
gatory on  her  government.  The  true  reason  was  that  the 
French  government  was  no  longer  able  to  enforce  the  treaty 
of  Paris,  and  the  British  government,  left  to  itself,  would  not 
be  likely  to  attempt  it.  This  had  evidently  been  agreed  upon 
at  Ems,  for  Bismarck  is  admitted  to  have  said,  on  hearing  it, 
"  The  fools  have  begun  a  month  too  early ;"  and  the  crown 
prince  reports  that  his  father  was  greatly  disturbed  by  it.  In 
fact,  GortchakofF  had  chosen  the  most  critical  moment  in  the 
affairs  of  the  Germans  to  assert  the  Russian  claim,  and  it  was 
as  much  a  surprise  to  Bismarck  as  it  was  to  the  British 
Cabinet  or  to  the  unutterable  Turk.  It  was,  in  fact,  the  mo- 
ment when  the  Prussian  government  would  be  most  depend- 
ent on  Russia's  friendliness ;  and  if  Gladstone  had  been  a 

229 


LIFE   OF   BISMARCK 

match  in  diplomacy  for  Bismarck,  and  had  acted  in  a  bold 
and  decisive  manner,  thirty  days  later  the  German  forces 
might  possibly  have  been  encamped  again  before  the  Rhine- 
land.  Gladstone,  however,  was  pacific,  indisposed  to  foreign 
intervention,  and  indecisive.  He  commissioned  Lord  Odo 
Russell,  a  sort  of  English  Polonius,  to  wait  on  Bismarck  and 
protest  against  the  action  of  Russia.  Von  Beust  thought  that 
Lord  Russell  was  the  most  unsuitable  envoy  he  could  have 
selected,  and  that  if  an  inflexible,  determined  Englishman  had 
been  sent  in  his  place  something  would  have  been  accom- 
plished. Sir  Odo  Russell  is  said  to  have  been  an  admirer  of 
Bismarck,  and  by  this  time  there  was  no  diplomat  in  Europe 
who  did  not  dread  an  audience  with  the  Prussian  colossus. 
The  interview  was  pleasant  enough,  with  an  effusion  of  amia- 
bility on  both  sides,  but  resulted  in  nothing. 

Bismarck  knew  how  to  suit  himself  to  his  man.  Treaties 
were,  after  all,  only  good  so  long  as  they  could  be  enforced. 
The  Black  Sea  clause  was  a  mean  and  petty  restriction  on 
Russia  and  of  no  real  advantage  to  any  other  power.  It  was 
unreasonable  that  a  nation  should  not  have  the  right  to  pro- 
tect the  shipping  on  its  own  coast.  Such  a  restriction  must 
come  to  an  end  sooner  or  later,  and  it  had  already  endured 
for  fifteen  years.  He  could  not  believe  that  England  would 
go  to  war  on  a  question  which  concerned  her  material  inter- 
ests so  little.  Besides,  the  British  government  was  not  pre- 
pared for  war.  As  for  any  future  aggrandizement  of  Russia, 
that  would  concern  Germany  quite  as  much  as  it  would  Eng- 
land. He  advised  a  European  conference  in  order  to  give  the 
Black  Sea  clause  a  dignified  burial.  There  was  not  much 
that  Lord  Russell  could  say  against  this,  and  the  suggestion 
of  an  Anglo-German  alliance  against  Russia  had  a  hopeful 
sound.1 

Alexander  and  Gortchakoff  may  have  feared  that  the  Ger- 
man successes  would  make  Bismarck  too  independent,  but 
they  clearly  made  a  mistake  by  interfering  with  him  when  his 

1  The  crown  prince  writes,  December  6,  "Odo  Russell  says  that  Bismarck  is 
favorable  to  an  alliance  with  England." 

230 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

hands  were  full.  This  showed  Bismarck  what  he  might  ex- 
pect from  them  in  the  future,  and  it  would  have  been  more 
for  their  interest  in  the  long  run  if  they  had  trusted  him  as 
Francis  Joseph  and  Andrassy  afterwards  trusted  him.  There 
is  no  evidence  that  Bismarck  ever  betrayed  the  confidence  of 
man  or  woman,  though  during  the  siege  of  Paris  the  French 
newspapers  published  the  most  infamous  libels  against  him. 
"  It  is  fortunate,"  he  remarked,  "  that  they  do  not  know  about 
the  little  house  in  my  garden."  He  talked  at  dinner  of  the 
war  between  Poland  and  Prussia  in  the  time  of  the  Great 
Elector,  which  might  have  resulted  in  the  conquest  of  Poland 
but  for  the  interference  of  Holland.  "  Poland,"  he  said, 
"  might  have  played  the  same  part  in  Prussian  affairs  which 
Hungary  had  in  Austrian ;"  and  this  would  certainly  have 
been  far  better  for  the  Poles  than  their  present  situation.  He 
remarked  to  the  crown  prince,  "  I  wish  your  Royal  Highness 
would  study  the  Polish  language,"  to  which  the  latter  replied 
that  he  had  already  had  enough  of  such  studies. 

The  capitulation  of  Metz  was  a  severe  blow  to  the  Paris  Com- 
mittee of  Safety,  and  immediately  afterwards  Thiers,  having 
returned  from  his  foreign  expedition,  requested  a  consultation 
with  Bismarck  in  regard  to  an  armistice.  He  was  accordingly 
conducted  to  the  domicile  of  Madame  Jesse,  and  Bismarck 
immediately  asked  him  if  he  was  provided  with  full  and 
necessary  powers  for  the  negotiation.  When  Thiers  expressed 
surprise  at  such  a  question,  Bismarck  informed  him  that 
news  had  already  been  received  of  a  revolution  within  the 
city  since  he  had  left  it.  Thiers  was  evidently  startled,  and 
Bismarck  judged  from  this  how  unstable  the  state  of  affairs 
was  in  Paris. 

In  a  general  circular  of  November  8  Bismarck  said : x 

"  I  proposed  to  him  to  fix  the  relative  positions  of  both  armies, 
as  they  stood  on  the  day  of  signing  the  armistice,  by  the  line  of 
demarcation ;  to  suspend  hostilities  for  a  month,  and  during  that 
time  to  accomplish  the  elections  and  the  constitution  of  a  National 


1  Our  Chancellor,  p.  72. 
231 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

Assembly.  .  .  .  With  respect  to  the  elections  in  Elsass  I  was  able 
to  assure  him  that  we  would  not  insist  upon  any  stipulation  calling 
in  question  the  restoration  of  the  German  departments  to  France 
before  the  conclusion  of  peace,  nor  would  we  haul  any  inhabitant 
of  those  departments  over  the  coals  for  having  represented  his  com- 
patriots in  a  French  National  Assembly.  I  was  amazed  when  he 
rejected  these  proposals,  and  declared  that  he  could  only  agree  to 
an  armistice  if  it  should  include  a  thorough  provisioning  of  Paris. 
I  replied  that  this  would  involve  a  military  concession,  so  far  ex- 
ceeding the  status  quo  and  every  reasonable  expectation,  that  I 
must  ask  him  what  equivalent,  if  any,  he  was  in  a  position  to  offer 
for  it." 

The  situation  of  France  was  a  peculiar  one.  The  country 
was  without  a  legitimate  government,  and  could  only  obtain 
one  through  an  armistice ;  and  yet  an  armistice  would  afford 
the  French  such  advantages  as  no  enemy  in  the  field  could 
possibly  agree  to.  Thiers  was  entirely  right  in  saying  that 
a  German  possession  of  the  forts  would  be  a  capitulation 
within  an  armistice.  If  the  whole  negotiation  was  a  stratagem 
of  the  French  in  order  to  gain  time,  who  can  blame  them  ? 
The  endurance  of  the  Parisians  was  heroic,  and  they  were  not 
yet  prepared  to  yield  to  the  conqueror.  The  army  of  the 
Loire  was  still  in  position,  and  much  was  expected  of  a  second 
army  which  General  Bourbaki  was  organizing  on  the  frontier 
of  Switzerland,  and  with  which  he  intended  to  invade  Ger- 
many. 

About  the  middle  of  November  Bismarck  and  the  crown 
prince  came  pretty  close  to  a  quarrel.  The  latter  says : 

"  Bismarck  thought  the  expression  of  my  opinions  must  have 
an  injurious  effect  on  the  imperial  question.  In  his  judgment  the 
crown  prince  ought  not  to  utter  such  opinions.  I  take  a  most  de- 
cided stand  against  having  my  mouth  sealed  in  this  manner,  espe- 
cially with  regard  to  questions  like  this  of  the  future.  I  looked 
upon  it  as  a  duty  to  leave  no  one  in  doubt  in  regard  to  my  opinion  ; 
furthermore,  nobody  except  his  Majesty  himself  can  give  me  any 
directions  in  regard  to  what  I  may  talk  about  or  not.  Perhaps 
they  take  the  ground  that  I  am  not  yet  old  enough  to  have  my 
own  opinion.  Bismarck  declared  that  if  I  gave  him  orders,  he 

232 


OF 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

would  treat  me  accordingly.  Against  this  I  protested,  because 
I  had  no  orders  to  give  him.  Whereupon  he  said,  as  far  as  he 
was  concerned,  he  would  gladly  make  room  for  any  other  per- 
son whom  I  considered  better  fitted  to  carry  on  the  matter  than 
himself,  but  until  then  he  must  hold  fast  to  those  principles  which 
accorded  with  the  result  of  his  experience  and  of  his  best  under- 
standing. Then  we  came  to  questions  of  particulars.  I  remarked 
that  perhaps  I  had  become  a  little  excited,  but  one  could  not  expect 
me  to  be  indifferent  at  a  turning-point  in  the  history  of  the  world." 

Here  we  have  a  view  behind  the  scenes,  —  an  insight  into 
those  family  jars  of  the  Hohenzollerns  of  which  much  has 
been  said  and  so  little  is  known.  There  was  evidently  a  con- 
stant internal  struggle  going  on  ;  or,  if  not  constant,  at  least 
intermittent,  like  that  of  Richelieu  with  Louis  XIII.  This 
vigorous  conflict  of  opinion  only  indicates  a  vigorous  intel- 
lectual life.  Bismarck  and  the  crown  prince  had  the  same 
end  in  view,  but  wished  to  reach  it  by  different  ways,  and  each 
thought  that  his  road  was  the  only  safe  one.  Such  contro- 
versies are  common  enough  in  all  human  affairs,  from  the 
direction  of  a  household  to  the  management  of  an  empire. 

The  policy  of  Bavaria  toward  other  German  states  had  al- 
ways been  mean  and  provincial.  A  Bavarian  who  married  a 
wife  from  any  other  German  state  could  not  bring  her  to  his 
home  without  paying  a  heavy  duty  on  his  feminine  importa- 
tion. The  King  of  Wurtemberg  had  complained  to  Bismarck 
two  years  previously  that  the  railway  fare  between  Munich 
and  Stuttgart  was  so  arranged  as  to  impose  a  tax  on  those  of 
his  subjects  who  wished  to  visit  the  Bavarian  capital.  If 
Bavaria  entered  the  new  German  empire  these  petty  sources 
of  local  emolument  would  have  to  be  dispensed  with  ;  and 
the  Bavarians  strongly  objected  to  being  taxed  for  a  German 
navy,  since  as  an  inland  community  they  would  derive  only 
an  indirect  advantage  from  it.  November  29  Dr.  Busch  says, 
4<  In  the  afternoon  I  sent  off  another  article  on  the  conven- 
tion with  Bavaria  ;  a  grudging  dissatisfaction  seems  to  be  the 
prevailing  mood  there."  There  was  also  opposition  on  the 
Prussian  side,  which  irritated  Bismarck,  although  he  declared 
he  was  not  surprised  at  it.  "  They  are  out  of  humor,"  he 

233 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

said,  "  because  certain  officials,  who  will  have  to  conduct 
themselves  in  all  respects  according  to  our  laws,  will  wear 
the  Bavarian  uniform.  .  .  .  They  would  have  us  wait  a  long 
while.  If  we  put  off  we  allow  time  for  our  enemies  to  come 
in  and  sow  tares  among  our  wheat.  They  want  more  uni- 
formity,—  if  they  would  only  think  of  five  years  back  and 
what  they  would  have  been  satisfied  with  then."  Something, 
it  is  true,  had  been  conceded  to  Bavaria,  chiefly  in  matters  of 
form  and  uniform,  in  order  to  bring  the  state  fairly  within  the 
German  fold ;  but  was  not  this  better  than  the  use  of  force  or 
intimidation  ? 

A  brief  review  of  the  Bavarian  negotiations  will  explain 
the  difficulty  of  Bismarck's  position  in  regard  to  them,  as  well 
as  the  cause  of  the  crown  prince's  irritation.  The  last  of 
September  Bismarck  commissioned  the  Prussian  minister 
Delbruck  to  proceed  to  Munich  and  hold  a  trial  conference 
with  King  Louis's  ministry  on  the  imperial  question.  Much 
to  Delbriick's  astonishment,  the  Bavarians  designated  eighty 
particulars  in  which  they  wished  the  constitution  of  the  North 
German  confederation  changed  before  Bavaria  could  enter  it. 
They  wished  an  independent  administration  of  the  army,  their 
own  legislation  in  regard  to  the  judiciary,  complete  indepen- 
dence of  their  railway  system,  an  absolute  veto  on  constitu- 
tional changes,  and  exemption  from  taxes  for  the  support  of 
a  navy.  Such  conditions  had  never  been  heard  of  before, 
and  seemed  to  preclude  the  necessity  of  further  negotia- 
tion. 

However,  Bismarck  was  not  discouraged ;  he  saw  that  he 
had  begun  at  the  wrong  end,  and  took  another  direction.  A 
month  later  he  invited  the  ministers  of  Baden,  Wiirtemberg, 
and  Darmstadt  to  a  conference  at  Versailles,  and  when  the 
Bavarian  ministers  were  informed  of  this  they  expressed  a 
desire  to  be  present  also.  At  the  conference,  however,  they 
found  themselves  in  a  minority,  for  the  other  states  cared 
little  for  most  of  the  Bavarian  exceptions.  It  was  plain  to 
them  that  if  all  other  states  had  the  right  to  a  constitu- 
tional veto  there  would  never  be  any  constitutional  changes. 
Von  Bray,  who  had  succeeded  Von  der  Pfordten  as  premier 

234 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

to  King  Louis,  finally  yielded  this  point,  but  the  conference 
came  to  an  end  without  definite  result. 

Three  weeks  later  there  was  a  conference  at  Versailles  with 
the  Darmstadt,  Baden,  and  Wiirtemberg  ministers,  to  which 
apparently  Von  Bray  was  not  invited.  This  time  the  obsti- 
nacy of  the  Wiirtemberg  assembly  prevented  a  conclusion, 
but  terms  were  agreed  upon  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  Wur- 
temberg  ministers,  who  dissolved  the  assembly  and  ordered  a 
fresh  election.  On  November  15  Baden  and  Darmstadt  sig- 
nified their  assent  to  enter  the  national  federation  on  the  same 
terms  as  the  Saxon  duchies.  Finally  the  Bavarians,  finding 
the  current  too  strong  for  them,  came  to  an  agreement  with 
Bismarck  the  last  of  November,  after  several  days  of  very  hard 
talking.  Bavaria  retained  her  diplomatic  service,  the  manage- 
ment of  her  military  establishment,  postal,  telegraph,  and  rail- 
road lines ;  besides  which  a  most  important  compromise  was 
that  the  united  votes  of  Bavaria,  Saxony,  and  Wiirtemberg 
in  the  Reichstag  should  constitute  a  veto  on  any  proposed 
change  of  the  national  constitution.  There  were  other  minor 
exceptions,  but  the  eighty  objective  points  were  reduced  to 
less  than  a  dozen.  Wiirtemberg  was  admitted  with  similar 
privileges  in  regard  to  the  post,  railroads,  and  telegraph  lines, 
and  a  new  assembly,  in  which  the  demagogues  were  left  out, 
ratified  the  Versailles  convention  at  once.  Could  there  have 
been  a  finer  illustration  of  Richelieu's  grand  maxim,  "  First, 
all  methods  to  conciliate  "  ? 

This  brought  the  crown  prince's  troubles  to  a  close  for  the 
present.  After  an  interview  with  his  royal  father  and  Bis- 
marck, on  December  3  he  wrote : 

"  As  he  left  the  room  Bismarck  and  I  shook  hands.  This  day 
finds  the  emperor  and  the  empire  irrevocably  fixed.  Now  are  the 
sixty-five  years  of  long  interregnum  and  dreadful  emperorless 
time  past.  This  grand  title  is  a  surety  in  itself,  for  which  we  might 
thank  the  Grand  Duke  of  Baden,1  who  has  spared  no  trouble. 
Rliggenbach  is  sent  by  Bismarck  to  Berlin." 

1  The  grand  duke  may  not  have  realized  that  this  would  result  in  Bismarck's 
driving  the  gambling-hells  out  of  Baden. 

235 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

It  was  sixty-five  years  since  the  first  Napoleon  had  com- 
pelled the  Emperor  Francis  to  change  his  title  from  Germany 
to  Austria,  but  the  office  had  been  practically  in  abeyance 
since  the  peace  of  Westphalia  in  1648.  The  first  German 
empire,  which  began  after  the  death  of  Charlemagne,  was 
ruled  by  the  finest  race  of  monarchs  of  whom  history  can 
boast,  ending  with  Frederick  II.,  to  whom  both  pope  and 
Saracen  were  obliged  to  bend  the  knee.  The  present  German 
empire  is  constituted  in  a  wholly  different  manner  from  its 
predecessor,  and  is  substantially  a  new  form  of  government, 
similar  to  that  of  constitutional  Austria,  which  antedated  it 
but  four  years.  Nothing  now  remained  to  complete  its  es- 
tablishment but  the  coronation  of  William  I. 

When  King  Leopold  of  Belgium  wrote  a  letter  of  congratu- 
lation to  the  crown  prince  on  the  fortunate  conclusion  of  the 
imperial  question,  the  latter  magnanimously  showed  it  to 
Bismarck,  who  expressed  himself  in  a  highly  appreciative 
manner  over  its  contents,  and  requested  him  in  his  answer  to 
refer  to  the  advantage  which  a  strong  Germany  would  be  to 
Belgium,  and  the  protection  which  a  strong  Germany  would 
afford  the  Belgians  against  France.  "  Founding  the  empire," 
however,  began  in  1866,  or,  one  might  say,  on  April  I,  1815. 

General  Bourbaki,  having  assembled  an  army  of  more  than 
a  hundred  and  twenty  thousand  men  about  Lyons,  including 
the  remnant  of  De  Paladine's  force,  early  in  January  decided 
to  take  the  offensive,  and  marched  northward,  driving  General 
Werder  before  him  towards  Belfort.  His  plan  seemed  to  be 
to  relieve  the  siege  of  Belfort,  and  then  cut  the  Prussian 
communications  with  Germany ;  perhaps,  also,  to  invade  the 
Rhineland.  General  Werder  took  up  a  strong  position  at  the 
south  of  Belfort  and  applied  to  Von  Moltke  for  reinforce- 
ments. General  Manteuffel  was  despatched  to  his  assistance 
with  two  army  corps,  in  whose  ranks  was  Count  William  von 
Bismarck,  now  promoted  to  a  lieutenancy  for  bravery  on  the 
field  of  battle.  He  had  fought  at  Sedan  and  done  his  duty 
in  the  siege  of  Paris,  and  was  now  entering  on  his  last  cam- 
paign. 

Before  Manteuffel  could  arrive,  Bourbaki  attacked  Werder, 

236 


LIFE  OF   BISMARCK 

January  15,  and  was  repulsed.  General  Werder's  army  con- 
sisted of  only  about  forty  thousand  men,  but  he  held  his 
ground  against  Bourbaki  three  days  in  succession.  The 
losses  of  the  French  were  not  heavy,  and  General  Bourbaki, 
a  noble  type  of  the  old  French  soldier,  was  so  much  dis- 
couraged at  the  conduct  of  his  troops  that  he  attempted 
suicide. 

On  November  30  General  Trochu  had  arranged  for  a  grand 
sortie  on  the  side  of  Paris  towards  Fontainebleau.  General 
Ducrot  attacked  the  German  lines  with  not  less  than  fifty 
thousand  men,  but  after  an  engagement  of  several  hours  was 
obliged  to  retreat  with  heavy  loss.  After  this  there  was  more 
than  a  month  of  inactivity,  when  a  series  of  desperate  sorties 
were  attempted  during  the  middle  of  January,  but  all  without 
effect.  These  were  timed  in  concert  with  Bourbaki's  advance 
on  Belfort,  and  after  his  defeat  there  the  Parisians  settled 
down  to  face  starvation  and  the  inevitable.  When,  on  the 
2 1st,  a  second  socialist  uprising  had  to  be  suppressed,  the 
Committee  of  Safety  realized  that  their  time  had  come.  On 
January  8  Von  Moltke  had  commenced  his  bombardment  of 
the  city, — mainly  for  moral  effect, — but  so  solidly  built  were 
the  blocks  on  Napoleon's  boulevards  that  in  the  better  portion 
of  Paris  it  was  even  less  effectual  than  he  anticipated,  and  the 
fires  which  it  caused  in  the  Latin  Quarter  were  easily  extin- 
guished. The  Tuileries  and  Louvre  were  not  damaged,  and 
would  seem  to  have  been  purposely  avoided.1 

THE   CORONATION   AT  VERSAILLES 

The  new  German  empire  was  announced  to  the  various 
governments  of  Europe,  January  I,  1871,  without  waiting  for 
the  sanction  of  the  Bavarian  legislature,  since  that  of  the 
king  and  his  ministers  had  already  been  obtained.  In  medi- 
aeval Germany  the  emperor  had  always  been  chosen  by  elec- 
toral princes  of  the  larger  states,  with  a  tendency  to  hereditary 

1  The  building  to  which  the  Venus  of  Melos  had  been  removed  for  safety 
was  afterwards  set  on  fire  during  the  Commune,  and  the  statue  was  preserved  as 
if  by  a  miracle. 

237 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

succession  so  long  as  the  imperial  family  produced  first-rate 
men.  After  the  time  of  Charles  V.  the  title  had  become 
hereditary  in  the  house  of  Hapsburg,  but  it  also  became  little 
more  than  a  title.  Bismarck  had  taken  advantage  of  this  fact 
to  make  the  position  hereditary  in  the  Prussian  family,  which 
certainly  was  no  more  than  prudent,  and  in  order  to  clinch 
the  business  at  both  ends  he  wished  to  have  the  confirmation 
come  from  the  representatives  of  the  people  as  well  as  from 
the  princes.  A  vote  to  this  effect,  therefore,  was  obtained 
from  the  North  German  Reichstag,  not  without  a  good  deal 
of  declamatory  opposition  from  the  Prussian  Particularists, 
the  Saxons,  and  the  Ultramontanes. 

The  chief  objection  to  the  new  title  seemed  to  be  that  it 
would  afford  William  I.  an  increase  of  authority,  which  might 
prove  dangerous  to  the  personal  liberty  of  German  citizens, 
although  there  is  practically  no  real  difference  between  the 
authority  of  a  king  and  of  an  emperor.  The  difference  always 
consists  in  the  manner  in  which  their  authority  is  limited. 
Louis  XIV.  was  a  more  absolute  ruler  than  Napoleon  I. 
Emperor,  Imperator ;  Kaiser,  Ccssar ;  and  Prince,  Princeps 
Senatus,  were  all  derived  from  the  titles  of  Augustus,  but  no 
German  emperor  from  Henry  the  Fowler  onward  possessed 
the  unlicensed  power  of  the  Caesars.  In  the  character  of 
their  authority  they  resembled  more  closely  the  Henrys  and 
Edwards.  King  is  of  German  derivation,  and  its  origin  is 
lost  in  the  prehistoric  twilight  of  the  German  forests.  Eng- 
lish monarchy  is  the  best  representative  of  it,  but  Napo- 
leon cheapened  the  title  by  conferring  it  on  the  electoral 
princes  of  Saxony  and  Bavaria.  It  was  now  essential  that 
the  King  of  Prussia,  as  the  chief  executive  of  United  Ger- 
many, should  be  endowed  with  an  exceptional  distinction, 
and  what  could  be  more  appropriate  than  the  name  of  Kaiser? 
His  authority  as  emperor,  however,  never  equalled  that  which 
he  had  exercised  (or  Bismarck  for  him)  during  the  previous 
five  years ;  nor  did  it  much  exceed  the  authority  of  President 
Lincoln  during  the  Civil  War,1 

1  It  was  characteristic  of  King  William's  plain  good  sense  that  he  at  first  ob- 
jected to  the  imperial  title,  which  he  spoke  of  as  a  fancy-dress  affair,  and  it  was 

238 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

The  time  for  the  coronation  was  fixed  for  the  i8th  of  Jan- 
uary, an  anniversary  of  the  day  when  the  first  King  of  Prus- 
sia was  crowned  in  1701.  It  was  his  contribution  in  soldiers 
and  money  to  the  war  against  Louis  XIV.  by  which  he  ob- 
tained that  elevation ;  and  Prince  Eugene,  foreseeing  its  ulti- 
mate effect  on  Austrian  affairs,  declared  that  the  man  who 
suggested  it  ought  to  have  been  hanged.  Now  the  successor 
of  Frederick  was  to  receive  a  still  further  elevation  through 
a  war  with  France,  in  the  very  hall  of  Louis  XIV., — the 
Hall  of  Mirrors,  intended  purposely  to  give  an  infinite  reflec- 
tion to  the  magnificence  of  the  grand  monarch.  Louis  XIV. 
never  dreamed  what  a  use  his  showy  palace  would  come  to. 
Certainly  it  never  saw  afmore  distinguished  gathering  than 
the  present,  considering  the  princes,  generals,  and  foreign 
ambassadors  who  were  assembled  there ;  not  supernumeraries 
in  uniform,  but  men  of  genuine  ability,  who  had  earned  their 
right  to  surround  Emperor  William  by  dignified  public  ser- 
vice. There  were,  besides,  two  men  of  genius  there, — Bis- 
marck and  Moltke, — conspicuous  above  all  others,  whose 
names  will  be  spoken  so  long  as  German  or  English  lasts. 

The  crown  prince's  account  of  the  ceremony  has  rather  a 
critical  tone.  The  Prussian  court  chaplain,  in  his  opening 
prayer,  referred  to  the  German  spoliation  by  Louis  XIV.,  the 
theft  of  Strasburg  and  the  sacking  of  Worms,  and  the  final 
retribution  which  had  attended  these  unhallowed  deeds.  The 
crown  prince  did  not  find  this  in  good  taste,  nor  was  he 
better  pleased  with  Bismarck's  reading  the  proclamation  to 
the  German  people  in  his  "  monotonous,  business-like  man- 
ner." William  I.  read  a  congratulatory  address  to  the  sov- 
ereigns and  representatives;  and  then  the  coronation  took 
place,  and  the  Duke  of  Baden  called  out,  "Long  live  his 
Imperial  Majesty,  the  Emperor  William !" 

only  through  the  united  efforts  of  Bismarck,  the  Crown  Prince  of  Prussia,  and 
the  King  of  Bcavaria  that  he  was  finally  persuaded  to  agree  to  it.  Even  after  this 
he  had  a  stubborn  controversy  with  Bismarck  as  to  whether  his  title  should  be 
Emperor  of  Germany  or,  as  the  latter  preferred,  Emperor  of  the  Germans.  Bis- 
marck supported  his  argument  by  producing  a  thaler  of  Frederick  the  Great  on 
which  was  the  legend  Rex  Borussorum. 

239 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

The  two  Fredericks  were  created  field  marshals  of  the 
empire,  a  title  of  more  value  since  it  occurs  but  rarely  in 
Prussian  history  as  compared  with  the  French  custom.  Na- 
poleon I.  made  it  much  too  common,  conferring  it  on  officers 
of  inferior  merit  like  Grouchy  and  Suchet.  Bismarck  about 
this  time  received  the  honorary  distinction  of  lieutenant- 
general. 

The  London  conference  on  the  Black  Sea  clause  had 
opened  the  day  previous.  Bismarck  seems  to  have  given  the 
subject  little  attention ;  but  we  find  an  entry  in  Dr.  Busch's 
diary,  a  short  time  before,  to  the  effect  that  the  Prussian 
delegate  was  to  support  the  claims  of  Russia  with  all  his 
might.  As  Bismarck's  influence  was  now  at  its  height,  and 
as  Francis  Joseph  and  Victor  Emmanuel  were  very  much 
afraid  of  what  he  might  do  next,  the  British  government 
found  itself  in  a  minority  of  one,  and  allowed  the  question  to 
subside  as  quietly  as  possible. 

CONCLUSION   OF   PEACE 

The  bombardment  of  Paris  lasted  two  weeks  before  the 
white  flag  appeared  announcing  the  capitulation.  Trains  of 
supplies  had  been  prepared  in  Germany  for  the  benefit  of  its 
starving  citizens  before  the  catastrophe  came,  and  Bismarck 
feared  that  the  knowledge  of  this  might  encourage  the  Pari- 
sians to  prolong  their  ordeal,  but  it  was  the  revolt  of  the  Com- 
munists which  finally  broke  the  camel's  back.  On  January 
23  *  Favre  appeared  at  Versailles  with  request  for  an  armistice, 
which,  however,  was  as  unreasonable  as  the  previous  one. 
He  wished  for  permission  to  have  the  regular  troops  march 
out  with  honors  of  war  and  retire  to  the  Loire,  where  Gam- 
betta  was  again  organizing  fresh  levies.  This,  of  course, 
could  not  be  granted,  and  a  long,  fruitless  discussion  ensued, 
lasting  the -best  portion  of  five  days.  Bismarck  said  of  him 
afterwards,  "  Favre  is  a  good  talker,  and  his  sentences  are 
well  balanced,  but  he  is  not  the  man  to  effect  a  favorable  bar- 
gain, not  even  to  sell  a  horse."  In  order  to  find  out  more 

1  The  crown  prince  says  on  the  24th. 
240 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

exactly  as  to  the  condition  of  affairs  in  Paris,  he  said  to 
Favre,  "  We  know  the  situation  in  Paris  better  than  you  do, 
who  have  only  been  there  a  few  days ;  there  are  still  pro- 
visions in  the  city  for  three  weeks  more."  By  the  surprise 
on  Favre's  face  Bismarck  perceived  that  this  was  not  the 
case. 

The  bombardment  continued  all  the  time  while  Favre  and 
Bismarck  were  arguing  at  Versailles.  Finally,  on  the  28th, 
it  was  agreed  that  there  should  be  an  armistice  for  three 
weeks,  during  which  time  elections  should  be  held  for  dele- 
gates to  a  national  convention,  with  authority  to  make  a  per- 
manent peace  and  decide  all  questions  appertaining  thereto. 
The  army  in  Paris  was  to  be  surrendered  to  Emperor  William, 
with  the  exception  of  one  division,  who  were  to  retain  their 
arms  for  the  preservation  of  order,  and  the  German  forces 
were  to  occupy  the  forts.  Besides  this,  the  city  of  Paris  was 
compelled  to  pay  a  war  contribution  of  two  hundred  million 
francs.  The  surrender  and  the  occupation  of  the  forts  took 
place  the  following  day,  while  provision  trains  rushed  into 
Paris  from  all  directions.  The  crown  prince  states  that  Favre 
ate  like  a  wolf. 

Gambetta's  behavior  in  this  crisis  was  indicative  of  the 
peculiar  mental  condition  of  the  average  French  mind,  as  it 
had  been  fostered  by  the  political  writing  of  Thiers  and  the 
imperial  adulation  of  Louis  Napoleon.  Although  he  had 
seen  the  armies  which  he  had  conjured  up,  as  Bismarck  said, 
with  a  stamp  of  his  foot,  dissipated  like  smoke,  and  every 
fortress,  as  well  as  the  capital,  was  now  in  the  possession  of 
the  enemy,  he  still  refused  to  believe  that  the  war  was  over 
and  that  further  resistance  was  useless.  The  French  army 
and  government  had  ceased  to  exist,  and  yet  he  still  had  faith 
that  in  some  miraculous  manner  his  country  might  yet  be 
delivered  from  the  Germans.  He  opposed  the  armistice  with 
all  the  force  of  his  untiring  energy,  and  when  he  failed  to 
produce  an  effect  in  this  direction  he  endeavored  to  turn  the 
elections  to  account  by  supporting  such  candidates  as  might 
persuade  the  convention  to  continue  the  war  at  all  hazards. 
Nothing  could  be  more  unpatriotic  than  such  a  course,  and 
16  241 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

yet  Gambetta  always  believed  that  he  was  the  one  person  in 
France  who  lived  for  his  country  and  for  her  alone.  The  last 
of  January  he  published  a  manifesto  on  his  own  responsi- 
bility, declaring  that  no  persons  who  had  held  office  or  had  in 
any  way  been  connected  with  the  government  of  Napoleon  III. 
would  be  eligible  to  vote  at  the  coming  elections.  Bismarck 
protested  against  this,  or  any  other  measures  which  would 
interfere  with  the  free  expression  of  public  opinion ;  and,  as 
the  national  committee  also  objected  to  it,  Gambetta  resigned. 
It  has  been  supposed  that  his  course  at  this  time  was  dictated 
by  personal  ambition, — a  desire  to  preserve  his  popularity  at 
the  expense  of  his  colleagues,  who  would  have  to  bear  the 
odium  of  the  capitulation, — and  this  is  the  natural  way  to 
look  at  it ;  but  it  is  quite  as  likely  to  have  arisen  from  the  same 
infatuation  which  had  led  his  countrymen  into  this  unequal 
conflict.  Thiers,  Favre,  Gambetta,  and  Rochefort  formed  a 
descending  series  in  French  republicanism,  if  the  last  can 
properly  be  called  a  republican. 

The  elections  were  held  on  February  8,  and  four  days  later 
the  national  convention  met  at  Bordeaux  and  declared  almost 
unanimously  for  peace  and  republicanism, — as  two  years  pre- 
viously the  French  people  had  declared  for  the  continuation 
of  the  empire.  On  the  I7th  Thiers  was  elected  temporary 
president  of  the  republic,  and  on  the  2ist,  with  Favre  and 
Picquard,  he  proceeded  to  Versailles  to  conclude  terms  of 
peace  with  Bismarck. 

It  must  have  been  with  gloomy  forebodings  that  these  three 
gentlemen  made  their  way  to  the  mansion  of  Veuve  Jesse, 
but  Bismarck's  demand  exceeded  even  their  worst  anticipa- 
tions. Strasburg,  Metz,  and  Belfort  must  be  given  up  with 
adjacent  territory,  and  in  addition  France  must  pay  a  war 
indemnity  of  six  thousand  million  francs.  Such  a  demand 
had  to  be  fought  out  so  long  as  words  and  arguments  would 
last,  and  Thiers  and  Favre  were  just  the  men  to  do  this.  On 
the  other  hand,  Bismarck  had  France  completely  in  his  power, 
and,  so  to  speak,  held  the  long  end  of  the  lever.  The  limita- 
tion to  this  was  that  he  was  really  as  desirous  of  concluding 
peace  as  his  opponents,  and  he  also  knew  that  there  is  an 

242 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

element  of  desperation  in  the  French  character  which  always 
has  to  be  considered  in  critical  emergencies.  It  must  have 
been  a  severe  ordeal  for  all  concerned.  It  is  nervous  business 
bargaining  for  a  house,  and  when  it  comes  to  a  question  of 
thousands  of  millions  of  dollars  the  strain  is,  to  say  the  least, 
herculean. 

The  discussion  was  conducted  in  French,  and  the  fine  lan- 
guage was  all  on  the  side  of  Thiers  &  Co.,  but  the  facts  were 
mainly  with  Bismarck.  When  they  urged  that  the  war  was 
not  of  their  making,  he  replied,  "  Yes ;  but  you  continued  it, 
and  could  have  obtained  better  terms  after  Sedan."  When 
Thiers  called  it  a  veritable  spoliation,  he  was  reminded  of  the 
terms  which  Napoleon  exacted  of  Prussia  in  1806  and  re- 
mained inexorable,  although  the  weeping  queen,  mother  of 
William  I.,  fell  on  her  knees  before  him.1  It  was  true  that 
Napoleon  had  never  exacted  such  a  colossal  sum  of  money, 
but  he  had  systematically  fleeced  Prussia  for  six  years,  so  that 
her  wealthiest  merchants  were  reduced  to  poverty.  Bismarck 
had  not  based  his  calculations  on  guess-work,  but  had  a  pre- 
pared table  of  statistics  on  hand  in  order  to  prove  that  the 
revenues  of  France  were  quite  equal  to  the  provision  of  such 
a  sum.  Finally  he  declared,  in  reply  to  Thiers's  eloquent  pro- 
test that  France  might  be  ruined  but  would  never  consent 
to  a  dishonorable  peace,  "  If  you  persist  in  prolonging  the 
war  four  or  five  years,  the  German  government  will  annex 
France." 

A  more  potent  argument,  perhaps,  was  the  threat  to  rein- 
state Napoleon  with  the  two  hundred  thousand  French  sol- 
diers who  were  then  imprisoned  in  Germany.  We  may 
wonder  that  Bismarck  consented  to  continue  this  discussion. 
Lord  Nelson's  method  on  such  occasions  was  to  place  his 
watch  on  the  table,  and  give  the  opposite  party  an  hour  for 
silent  reflection  on  the  subject;  but  Bismarck  was  not  so 
domineering  as  that.  Exacting  he  certainly  was,  but  he  liked 
to  base  all  his  actions  on  logical  grounds,  and  to  satisfy  his 

1  Thiers  could  not  be  ignorant  of  this,  for  he  had  written  a  graphic  account 
of  it.     She  was  avenged  by  her  own  son. 

243 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

opponents  that  whatever  he  did  he  considered  right.  Finally 
he  brought  the  conference  to  a  conclusion  in  a  highly  adroit 
manner.  The  French  commissioners  had  protested  vigor- 
ously against  a  triumphal  entry  into  Paris,  and  so,  when  Bis- 
marck perceived  that  they  had  reached  the  last  ditch  of 
despair,  he  offered  them  the  choice  between  a  triumphal  entry 
and  taking  off  a  milliard  of  francs  with  Belfort  from  the  con- 
ditions of  peace.  The  offer  was  snapped  at  eagerly,  for  the 
triumphal  entry  really  amounted  to  nothing,  and,  after  an 
eloquent  epilogue  on  the  buried  glory  of  France,  the  bargain 
was  clinched  at  five  milliard  francs,  with  Alsace  and  Lor- 
raine. 

Von  Beust  allows  Thiers  the  credit  of  having  saved  Belfort 
and  reducing  the  war  indemnity,  and  something  may  be 
accredited  to  the  tenacity  with  which  he  conducted  the  nego- 
tiation, but  it  is  more  probable  that  Bismarck  put  these  items 
on  before  he  took  them  off,  as  men  usually  ask  more  for  an 
object  of  barter  than  they  are  willing  and  ready  to  accept. 
One  does  not  altogether  like  Bismarck's  small  tricks  and 
stratagems,  but  the  charitable  way  to  consider  them  is  as  a 
part  of  his  profession  as  a  diplomat  rather  than  as  belonging 
to  the  man.  They  do  not  differ  essentially  from  the  decep- 
tions which  doctors  practise  for  the  benefit  of  their  patients. 
Referring  to  this  interview,  Favre  afterwards  said  of  him, 
"  Bismarck  is  a  political  man  of  business,  and  on  such  a  scale 
as  it  is  difficult  to  imagine." 

The  peace  preliminaries  were  signed  at  Versailles  on  Feb- 
ruary 26,  and  the  French  commissioners  at  once  returned  to 
Bordeaux,  where  the  national  convention  ratified  it  by  a  rela- 
tive vote  of  five  to  one.  As  Bismarck  knew  that  the  payment 
of  such  an  immense  sum  would  only  be  secured  under  compul- 
sion, he  made  the  new  government  agree  to  an  occupation  of 
French  territory  by  German  forces  until  it  was  liquidated, — 
an  evacuation  of  territory  to  take  place  according  to  the  par- 
tial payments  which  should  be  made.  This  was  another 
expensive  burden  on  the  French  people,  but  there  was  no 
help  for  it.  On  March  I  a  select  army  corps  was  reviewed  by 
Emperor  William  and  afterwards  marched  through  Paris, 

244 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

with  the  emperor,  Bismarck,  Moltke,  the  crown  prince,  and 
other  high  officers.  It  was  like  a  city  of  the  dead ;  the  blinds 
and  shutters  were  everywhere  closed,  and  not  a  Frenchman 
was  to  be  seen  in  the  streets,  except  here  and  there  a  stray 
vender  of  supplies.  It  gave  the  private  soldiers,  however,  an 
opportunity  to  view  this  wonderful  city,  which  in  its  way  is 
without  a  rival,  and  to  many  of  them  it  would  be  the  only 
chance  they  would  ever  have.  During  the  following  week  as 
many  battalions  as  possible  were  entertained  by  their  officers 
in  a  similar  manner.  The  emperor  signed  the  treaty  of  peace 
at  Versailles  the  following  day,  and  on  the  i/th  was  again 
in  Berlin. 

The"  French  will  never  forgive  Bismarck  for  the  severe 
terms  of  this  treaty,  and  he  has  been  liberally  blamed  for  it 
in  England  and  America.  If  our  civil  war  cost  the  United 
States  government  three  million  dollars  a  day,  it  is  not 
probable  that  the  French  campaign  cost  the  German  govern- 
ments at  a  higher  rate.  If  greater  forces  were  employed  in 
it,  the  cost  of  labor  and  materials  must  have  been  relatively 
smaller.  Half  of  the  five  milliard  francs,  therefore,  must 
have  been  intended  to  cover  the  loss  in  killed  and  wounded, 
and  should  properly  have  gone  to  them  or  their  families.  It 
is  to  be  feared  that  this  was  not  the  case  to  the  extent  to 
which  it  might  have  been.  What  is  abstractly  right  in  par- 
ticular instances  often  has  to  give  way  to  what  is  judicious. 
It  was  Favre's  finest  argument  at  the  conference,  as  previously 
at  Haute  Maison,  that  to  conclude  an  enduring  peace  it  was 
necessary  to  agree  upon  terms  which  the  vanquished  party 
should  consider  reasonable. 

Bismarck  did  not  believe  in  this.  You  may,  perhaps,  ex- 
pect magnanimity  from  an  individual  if  you  know  your  man, 
but  from  a  large  number  of  men  it  is  useless  to  think  of  it. 
In  the  second  Silesian  war,  when  Frederick  the  Great  was 
attacked  by  Austria  and  Saxony  and  defeated  his  enemies  in 
four  decisive  engagements,  he  replied  to  their  commissioners, 
"  I  want  nothing  of  you  but  peace,"  trusting  in  this  way  to 
escape  future  coalitions  against  him.  Yet  he  was  obliged  not 
long  afterwards  to  contend  against  the  whole  continent  of 

245 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

Europe, — the  hardest  piece  of  work  that  man  ever  succeeded 
in.  On  the  other  hand,  the  first  Napoleon's  practice  of  weak- 
ening his  enemies  by  taking  territory  from  them  is  supposed 
to  have  been  the  proximate  cause  of  his  downfall.  It  is  often 
difficult  to  choose  between  the  danger  of  doing  too  much  and 
that  of  letting  slip  a  favorable  opportunity.  The  practice  of 
abstracting  territory  as  one  of  the  penalties  of  warfare  is  not 
confined  to  Europe :  there  are  precedents  for  it  in  both  North 
and  South  America.  It  is  well  known  that  Bismarck's  own 
judgment  favored  the  establishment  of  a  frontier  in  a  nearly 
straight  line  from  Luxemburg  to  Switzerland,  but  Von 
Moltke  insisted  on  Metz  (which  can  only  be  compared  to 
Gibraltar  and  Ehrenbreitstein)  as  equal  in  value  to  three 
army  corps.  Bismarck  had  a  very  strong  pressure  behind 
him, — an  exultant  army  and  an  ambitious  court.  It  was  in 
his  nature  to  conceive  and  carry  out  grand  designs,  yet  if  he 
could  have  been  satisfied  himself  and  satisfied  others  with  the 
cession  of  Elsass  and  an  indemnity  of  three  milliard  francs,  it 
might  have  been  less  expensive  for  Prussia  in  the  long  run. 
The  possession  of  Elsass  and  Lothringen  has  cost  the  German 
government  not  less  than  fifty  million  thalers  in  the  military 
establishment  which  it  entails. 

The  French  at  least  should  feel  indebted  to  Bismarck  for 
relieving  them  of  Louis  Napoleon.  To  whom  else  can  we 
attribute  the  demoralized  condition  of  the  French  army  which 
was  so  conspicuous  at  Vionville  and  Sedan, — the  army  which 
in  1855  had  so  heroically  stormed  Sebastopol,  and  behind  this 
there  must  have  been  the  same  tendency  in  the  French  people, 
from  whom  the  army  was  taken?  Whatever  may  be  the 
virtues  of  the  Bonapartes,  their  line  of  policy  is  not  the  one 
by  which  the  French  nation  can  rise  to  a  higher  civilization 
than  that  of  the  First  Empire.  The  French  people  are  now 
at  liberty  for  the  first  time  in  history  to  work  out  their  destiny 
according  to  their  own  judgment,  and  the  person  whom  they 
have  to  thank  for  this  above  all  others  is  Otto  von  Bismarck. 
A  meddlesome  Metternich  or  Beaconsfield  would  have  re- 
stored the  Bonapartes  or  Bourbons,  and  compelled  France  to 
accept  another  term  of  monarchy. 

246 


CHAPTER   XI 

THE   IRON    CHANCELLOR 

PRUSSIA  is  really  the  most  peaceable  of  the  great  powers  of 
Europe.  This  becomes  evident  when  we  compare  the  dif- 
ferent campaigns  undertaken  by  the  Prussian  government 
during  the  past  century  with  those  of  other  countries.  Count- 
ing from  1798,  the  French  have  had  full  twenty  years  of 
warfare,  and  Great  Britain  about  the  same,  if  we  consider  such 
small  affairs  as  the  Ashantee  war  and  the  Egyptian  campaign 
in  the  way  of  fractions.  Russia  has  had  fourteen  years  of 
war ;  Austria,  twelve ;  the  United  States  of  America,  nine,  in- 
cluding the  numerous  Indian  wars;  and  Prussia,  seven  years 
of  warfare.  Italy  and  Spain  have  been  treated  too  much  like 
footballs  between  other  nations  to  enter  into  this  computation. 
Many  of  these  wars  have  been  inevitable,  and  could  not  have 
been  avoided,  so  far  as  we  can  judge  from  a  candid  estimate 
of  the  facts  concerning  them ;  but  Great  Britain  could  cer- 
tainly have  escaped  from  the  War  of  1812,  and  France  from 
the  War  of  1870.  It  is  difficult  to  determine  whether  the 
English  or  French  are  the  more  pugnacious  people,  but  they 
certainly  lead  all  others  in  that  respect. 

Grim  old  Manteuffel  was  left  in  command  of  the  army  of 
occupation,  to  make  sure  of  the  French  indemnity,  with  about 
one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  men,  and  the  rest  of  the 
German  forces  returned  to  their  own  firesides  as  quietly  and 
methodically  as  they  had  come.  To  the  French  they  were 
like  an  army  of  locusts ;  but  the  manner  in  which  they  went 
back  to  their  daily  avocations,  as  if  nothing  great  or  remark- 
able had  happened  in  the  mean  time,  is  very  pleasing,  not  to 
say  poetic.  Senator  Wilson,  of  Massachusetts,  was  present 
when  some  twenty  thousand  men  were  mustered  out  of  ser- 
vice at  Munich,  and  was  delighted  with  the  sober,  orderly 
manner  in  which  they  dispersed ;  not  crowding  the  sidewalks 

247 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

or  filling  up  the  streets  with  idle  groups,  though  the  beer- 
gardens  were  unusually  well  attended,  and  every  musician 
that  could  be  found  was  in  request  for  them. 

The  war  was  over,  but  whether  peace  was  at  hand  Bis- 
marck did  not  feel  sure.  It  seemed  as  if  the  era  of  prosperity 
had  arrived  for  Prussia;  but  there  is  a  Spanish  proverb, 
"  Beware  of  smooth  water,"  which  men  of  the  wiser  sort 
always  bear  in  mind.  He  knew  the  inflammable  condition  in 
which  he  had  left  the  French  people,  with  an  improvised  and 
untried  government  and  inexperienced  rulers,  who  pretended 
always  to  act  in  conformity  with  the  popular  will.  It  was  one 
of  his  few  maxims  that  the  unexpected  may  happen  in  France 
at  any  time ;  and,  sure  enough,  it  did  in  less  than  two  weeks, 
to  the  astonishment  of  mankind.  Overcome  with  the  exer- 
tions of  the  last  six  months,  Bismarck  had  only  reached  his 
country  residence  when  the  first  news  from  the  Paris  Com- 
mune followed  close  upon  him. 

All  the  world  was  startled,  and  especially  America.  Pow- 
erful revolutionary  elements  and  extensive  secret  organiza- 
tions were  known  to  exist  in  Europe  from  Poland  to  Portugal ; 
but  it  was  generally  supposed  that  their  object  was  the  sub- 
jugation of  tyrants,  that  they  were  chiefly  enemies  of  the 
monarchical  order,  and  if  they  once  attained  republican  gov- 
ernments they  would  be  contented.  In  the  Paris  revolution 
of  March  17,  18/1,  there  was  plain  evidence  that  the  object 
of  these  associations  was  not  republicanism,  but  the  abolition 
of  the  Roman  law,  the  system  of  jurisprudence  which  has 
held  society  together  since  the  dark  ages.  It  was  an  attack 
on  the  very  existence  of  government,  on  the  possession  of 
property  and  all  individual  rights,  on  education  and  superior 
culture.  To  name  it  in  a  single  phrase,  it  was  barbarism  let 
loose.  This  was  the  character  by  which  it  declared  itself, 
and  the  moment/it  selected  was  the  one  above  all  others  in- 
imical to  republicanism  and  liberal  institutions.  It  was  at 
once  predicted  in  political  circles  that  the  result  of  the  Com- 
mune would  be  the  restoration  of  the  Bourbons,  and  it  came 
ver^.ae'ar  to  this  shortly  afterwards.  It  is  not  to  be  doubted 
that  the  Commune  greatly  strengthened  the  cause  of  mon- 

248 


LIFE  OF   BISMARCK 

archy  in  Europe,  and  that  the  antagonism  to  communism  is 
now  the  strongest  support  of  kings  and  emperors. 

The  proceedings  of  the  Paris  revolutionists  were  worthy 
of  such  a  cause.  Thiers  had  contended  in  the  peace  stipu- 
lations at  Versailles  that  a  division  of  the  National  Guard 
should  retain  their  arms,  and  the  far-sighted  Moltke  protested 
against  this.  The  result  was  now  perceived  in  the  fusion  of 
the  National  Guard  with  the  communists.  Two  generals  of 
the  regular  army  whom  they  captured  were  condemned  and 
shot,  after  the  fashion  of  1793.  The  Socialists  plundered  the 
churches,  forced  loans  from  the  banks,  insurance  companies, 
and  millionaires,  burned  down  the  Tuileries,  and  imprisoned 
the  priests,  against  whom  they  seemed  to  have  a  particular 
spite.  The  final  murder  of  Archbishop  Darboy  and  his  com- 
panions requires  no  comment.  It  was  from  this  class  of 
irreconcilables  to  civilization  that  Charles  Cohen  emanated, 
the  would-be  assassin  of  Bismarck  in  the  spring  of  1866,  and 
numerous  other  assassins  and  inhuman  monsters  have  ema- 
nated from  it  since.  The  Internationals  were  not  all  Com- 
munists, however,  but  contained  many  stanch  Republicans 
and  high-minded  men.  There  were  wheels  within  wheels  in 
the  society,  and  its  membership  included  a  wide  range  of 
political  theory  and  belief. 

The  Paris  revolution  must  have  been  in  preparation  for  a 
number  of  years.  According  to  Di'sraeli,  the  secret  societies 
promised  to  Napoleon  III.  the  continuance  of  his  reign  and 
the  succession  of  his  son  if  he  would  only  leave  Rome  to 
Garibaldi,  but  he  did  not  do  this.  An  International  named 
Linton,  an  English  engraver,  came  to  America  in  1868,  to 
obtain  recruits  for  a  conspiracy  against  the  French  emperor. 
He  persuaded  Wendell  Phillips  to  become  an  associate  mem- 
ber of  the  fraternity,  and  even  Charles  Sumner  had  some 
connection  with  the  Internationals  at  an  earlier  time.  It  was 
the  Mazzini  wing  of  the  society  which  Sumner  affiliated  with, 
but  after  the  Commune  in  1871  he  disclaimed  all  further  con- 
nection with  them. 

The  government  at  Versailles  appealed  to  Bismarck^  for 
assistance,  and,  though  he  preserved  his  attitude  of  non-inter- 

249 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

ference,  he  hastened  the  liberation  of  a  large  body  of  French 
soldiers  captured  at  Sedan,  considering  it  only  right  that  their 
country  should  have  the  benefit  of  their  services.  These, 
being  troops  of  the  regular  line  and  chiefly  Bonapartists,  could 
be  depended  on  not  to  fraternize  with  the  insurgents ;  and 
Marshal  MacMahon,  having  repulsed  two  attacks  of  the  Com- 
munists before  the  arrival  of  this  re-enforcement,  stormed  the 
forts  about  Paris  and  finally  entered  the  city  on  May  21. 
The  Communists  were  driven  from  one  barricade  to  another, 
and  a  large  body  of  them,  who  had  taken  refuge  in  the  church 
of  the  Madeleine,  were  all  bayoneted  by  the  infuriated  soldiers 
of  Napoleon.  Fifty  thousand  more  were  taken  prisoners,  and 
the  streets  of  Paris  ran  with  blood. 

Bismarck,  although  there  was  nothing  he  hated  like  social- 
ism, saw  that  in  this  outbreak  there  was  more  justification 
than  even  a  republican  might  suppose.  In  a  semi-official  state- 
ment, published  the  last  of  April,  he  said  : 

"  It  is  communism  of  the  grossest  description  which  has  tempted 
from  fifteen  to  twenty  thousand  released  criminals  and  other  scum 
and  dregs  of  modern  society  to  lend  their  aid  to  these  champions 
of  cataclysm.  In  this  revolution,  however,  bad  as  it  is,  may  be 
detected  a  movement  founded  upon  reason  and  supported  by  or- 
derly and  intelligent  social  elements, — viz.,  the  effort  to  obtain  a 
sensible  municipal  organization,  and  to  emancipate  the  commons 
from  vexatious  and  unnecessary  state  tutelage,  an  effort  finding  its 
explanation  in  French  history,  and  its  exact  converse  in  Hauss- 
mann's  tyrannical  proceedings,  so  injurious  to  the  Paris  munici- 
pality. Were  the  Parisians  endowed  with  a  municipal  constitution 
like  that  possessed  by  the  Prussian  cities  ever  since  the  days  of 
Hardenberg,  many  practical  thinkers  in  Paris  who  now  hold  aloof 
from  the  Versailles  government  would  be  satisfied,  and  no  longer 
support  the  revolution  by  passive  resistance." 

Haussmann  the  Alsatian  was  Louis  Napoleon's  prefect  of 
the  Seine,  and  it  is  to  be  feared  that  in  his  remodelling  of  the 
Paris  boulevards  he  often  proceeded  in  a  tyrannical  and  unfair 
manner  with  respect  to  the  property  of  persons  who  stood  in 
the  way  of  his  improvements. 

250 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 


THE   FIRST   GERMAN   REICHSTAG 

It  was  a  momentous  occasion,  the  first  opening  of  parlia- 
ment for  united  Germany  on  March  21,  1871.  The  address 
from  the  throne  was  brief,  dignified,  and  modest.  The  em- 
peror said : 

"On  seeing  you  for  the  first  time  after  the  glorious  but  hard 
struggle  which  Germany  has  successfully  accomplished  for  her  in- 
dependence, the  German  Diet  assembled  round  me,  my  first  impulse 
is  to  offer  my  humble  thanks  unto  God  for  all  important  successes 
with  which  His  grace  has  crowned  the  faithful  unanimity  of  the 
German  allies,  the  heroic  courage  and  the  excellent  discipline  of 
our  troops,  and  the  self-denying  devotion  of  the  German  nation. 

"  We  have  accomplished  that  which  since  the  time  of  our  fathers 
has  been  the  universal  aim  for  Germany, — the  union  and  its  organic 
formation,  the  safeguarding  of  our  frontiers,  the  independence  of 
the  development  of  our  national  laws. 

"Although  hidden,  the  consciousness  of  its  unity  was  ever  alive 
in  the  German  nation ;  it  burst  its  shell  in  the  moment  of  enthu- 
siasm in  which  the  entire  nation  arose  to  the  defence  of  their  threat- 
ened Fatherland,  and  cut  its  name  in  indelible  characters  on  the 
battle-fields  of  France  as  a  nation  resolved  to  be  and  remain  one 
people. 

**  The  spirit  that  lives  in  the  German  people,  and  that  penetrates 
its  culture  and  civilization,  as  well  as  the  constitution  of  the  empire 
and  the  structure  of  its  army,  preserve  Germany  in  the  midst  of 
successes  from  any  temptation  to  misuse  the  power  gained  by  her 
unity.  The  respect  which  Germany  claims  for  her  own  indepen- 
dence she  is  fully  prepared  to  accord  to  the  independence  of  all 
other  states  and  nations,  the  weak  as  well  as  the  strong.  The  new 
Germany  that  has  come  forth  from  the  fiery  ordeal  of  the  present 
war  will  be  a  reliable  surety  for  the  peace  of  Europe,  being  sufficiently 
powerful  and  self-conscious  to  reserve  for  herself  the  ordering  of  her 
own  affairs  as  an  exclusive  but  at  the  same  time  fully  sufficient  and 
satisfactory  heritage.'11  z  .  .  . 

The  announcement  that  Bismarck  was  created  a  prince2  and 

1  Bismarck's  Speeches,  v.  J. 

2  Readers  of  Bismarck's  Memoirs  will  remember  that  he  wished  to  decline 
this  title,  and  went  to  the  Schloss  in  Berlin  for  that  purpose,  but  at  the  top  of  the 

251 


LIFE  OF   BISMARCK 

chancellor  of  the  new  empire  was  received  with  more  enthu- 
siasm than  the  title  of  count  and  field-marshal  general  which 
was  bestowed  on  Von  Moltke,  for  it  was  felt  that  the  latter  had 
not  been  rewarded  equal  to  his  deserts.  No  shade  of  envy  or 
disappointment,  however,  could  be  detected  on  the  face  of  the 
old  veteran,  who  was  as  cool-headed  in  the  hour  of  success  as 
on  the  field  of  battle.  He  had  done  his  work,  and  he  must 
have  been  conscious  that  he  had  earned  an  enviable  place  in 
the  world's  history,  and  not  ip  that  of  Germany  alone.  From 
this  time  forth  he  avoided  ovations  and  all  other  demonstra- 
tions in  his  honor, — an  unostentatious  hero.  As  for  the  sin- 
cerity of  the  emperor's  pacific  intentions,  twenty-eight  years 
of  continued  peace  and  prosperity  in  Europe  ought  to  have 
sufficiently  proved  it.  Sensational  news  and  magazine  writers 
maintained  a  perpetual  clamor  in  regard  to  the  danger  of  the 
German  military  power  and  the  malign  intentions  of  Bismarck, 
until  he  and  Marshal  Moltke  both  became  too  old  to  take  the 
field, — and  it  is  wonderful  how  much  of  this  was  believed ; 
but  the  world  finally  concluded  that  William  I.  and  his  min- 
isters knew  their  own  interests  too  well  to  run  the  risk,  by 
grasping  too  much,  of  losing  any  portion  of  what  they  had 
already  gained. 

The  government  had  a  large  majority  in  this  Reichstag  and 
could  have  accomplished  almost  anything  that  Bismarck 
considered  expedient,  but  the  chancellor  now  showed  his 
strength  in  his  moderation.  He  had  no  intention  of  tinkering 
the  political  machine  until  he  discovered  how  well  it  would 
run,  and  where  the  weak  spots  in  it  actually  were.  A  fund 
of  two  hundred  and  forty  million  thalers,  or  nearly  one-fifth 
of  the  war  indemnity,  was  set  apart  for  the  benefit  of  wounded 
and  disabled  soldiers,  as  well  as  for  the  widows  of  those 
who  had  fallen  in  the  campaign ;  four  million  thalers  were 
distributed  among  the  more  deserving  veterans,  and  four 
millions  were  divided  among  the  most  distinguished  generals. 
Prince  Frederick  Charles,  Manteuffel,  and  Von  Roon  received 


royal  staircase  he  was  met  by  the  whole  imperial  family ;  William  I.  embraced 
him,  and  he  felt  that  it  would  be  positively  ungracious  to  oppose  his  wishes. 

252 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

three  hundred  thousand  thalers  apiece,  and  it  may  be  fairly 
said  that  they  deserved  it.  Bismarck  himself  was  rewarded 
by  his  sovereign  with  estates  in  Holstein  valued  at  nearly  a 
million  thalers. 

This  Reichstag  seemed  almost  like  a  symposium  of  sages, 
but  its  perfect  harmony  was  somewhat  ruffled  by  an  aston- 
ishing resolution,  offered  by  the  Catholic  members,  that  it  was 
the  duty  of  Emperor  William  to  interfere  in  behalf  of  the 
pope  and  drive  Victor  Emmanuel  out  of  Rome.  This  motion 
was  brought  up  on  March  30,  and  was  closely  followed  by  a 
demand  of  the  Polish  members  of  Posen  for  Polish  indepen- 
dence. Bismarck  perceived  that  the  two  movements  were 
closely  connected,  and  conjectured  rightly  that  they  both 
originated  from  the  Vatican.  It  was  the  first  premonitary 
cloud,  small  as  a  man's  hand,  of  the  approaching  storm. 
Bismarck  replied  to  the  Polish  resolution : 

"  You,  gentlemen,  are  really  no  people :  you  represent  no  people ; 
you  have  no  people  backing  you, — you  are  backed  by  nothing  but 
your  fictions  and  illusions,  one  of  which  is  that  you  were  elected 
by  the  Polish  people  into  the  Reichstag  in  order  to  represent  the 
interests  of  the  Catholic  Church,  and  if  you  do  this  whenever  the 
interests  of  the  Catholic  Church  are  at  stake  you  meet  the  expec- 
tations of  your  electors.  But  a  mandate  to  represent  the  Polish 
people  or  the  Polish  nationality  has  been  given  you  by  no  man,  and 
least  of  all  by  the  people  of  Posen  and  Western  Prussia.  I  do  not 
share  your  fiction  that  the  Polish  rule  was  good  and  not  bad.  I 
wish  to  be  impartial  and  just,  but  I  can  assure  you  it  was  truly  bad, 
and  therefore  it  will  never  return." 

What  the  Poles  demanded  was  nothing  less  than  separation 
from  the  German  empire,  and  Bismarck,  in  his  position,  could 
not  have  spoken  otherwise  than  as  he  did.  Not  only  was  the 
thing  absurd  in  itself,  for  the  Prussian  Poles  are  too  small  a 
community  to  form  an  independent  political  organization,  but 
the  inevitable  consequence  would  be  that  Posen  would  be- 
come the  centre  of  a  revolutionary  movement  which  would 
extend  to  Russian  Poland  and  produce  a  coalition  of  Russia 
with  France.  But  for  the  instigation  of  the  priests  it  is  not 

253 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

very  probable  that  the  Poles  would  have  thought  of  this  chi- 
merical project,  but  Bismarck  hit  the  nail  exactly  when  he 
referred  to  the  Polish  members  as  representing  the  interests 
of  the  Catholic  Church.  It  is  true  that  the  old  Polish  gov- 
ernment was  one  of  the  worst, — fully  as  vicious  as  the  French 
government  of  the  eighteenth  century, — but  there  is  no  rea- 
son why  a  reunited  Poland  should  not  obtain  a  government 
as  just  and  liberal  as  that  of  France  at  the  present  time.  A 
reunited  Poland,  however,  would  mean  the  disruption  of  the 
Russian  Empire,  for  which  at  present  there  is  no  vestige  of 
hope. 

In  reply  to  the  request  of  Dr.  Windhorst  and  other  Cleri- 
cals for  material  aid  and  comfort  to  the  pope,  it  was  con- 
sidered sufficient  to  substitute  a  resolution  to  the  effect  that 
the  present  German  Empire  was  not  identical  with  that  of 
Frederick  Barbarossa,  and  that  the  day  of  interference  in 
internal  affairs  of  other  countries  had  passed  by,  "  never  to 
return,  it  was  to  be  hoped,  under  any  form  or  pretext."  The 
vote  by  which  this  resolution  was  carried — 243  to  63 — not 
only  indicated  the  strength  of  the  Clerical  party  in  the  Reichs- 
tag, but  the  comparative  numbers  of  Protestants  and  Catho- 
lics in  the  empire.  Dr.  Windhorst  then  moved  the  insertion 
in  the  imperial  constitution  of  the  three  liberal  principles 
of  the  Prussian  constitution, — complete  independence  of  the 
church,  freedom  of  the  press,  and  the  right  to  hold  public 
meetings ;  but,  as  this  was  evidently  intended  to  place  the 
Catholic  Church  beyond  the  sphere  of  government  super- 
vision, it  was  also  defeated.  Bismarck  evidently  intended  to 
have  a  Protestant  empire. 

Unlimited  success  always  has  its  effect.  Emperor  William 
and  his  chancellor  did  not  lose  their  balance  politically,  as 
many  predicted  they  would,  but  the  victories  of  Sedan  and 
Gravelotte  produced  an  aggressive  Teutonism  which  lasted 
five  or  six  years,  and  resulted  in  some  peculiar  manifestations. 
The  Berlin  hatters  consulted  together  to'  introduce  a  German 
national  hat.  intended  to  supersede  the  French  chape aut  which 
has  become  the  dress-hat  of  all  civilized  countries,  but 
their  attempt  ended  in  a  miserable  failure.  It  was  also  cur- 

254 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

rently  reported  that  Bismarck  attempted  to  make  German  the 
language  of  diplomatic  correspondence,  and  with  as  little 
success.  A  communication  in  German  to  the  British  ministry 
was  returned  to  him.  France,  although  conquered,  still  re- 
mained France,  and  Paris  still  continued  the  centre  of  good 
taste  and  fashion,  because  the  world  felt  confidence  in  French 
judgment  so  far  as  dress  and  behavior  are  concerned.  To 
the  feminine  world,  at  least,  Paris  had  become  an  oracle — a  re- 
ligion of  the  toilet — which  it  would  require  centuries  to  over- 
throw. The  French  language  also  had  superseded  Latin  as 
the  universal  tongue,  not  from  the  supremacy  of  Louis  XIV., 
but  because  it  was  the  most  convenient  language  for  commu- 
nication between  the  different  European  nations.  Everybody 
knew  more  or  less  French,  because  France  was  in  a  central 
position  between  Spain,  England,  Germany,  and  Italy.  French 
became  the  language  of  diplomacy  by  the  principle  of  nat- 
ural selection,  and  it  was  as  impossible  to  change  this  as  to 
move  Mont  Blanc.  Berlin,  however,  had  become  the  politi- 
cal centre  of  Europe,  and  it  remained  to  be  seen  what  would 
be  the  consequences  thereof. 

THE  FRANKFORT  CONVENTION 

Alsace  and  Lorraine  were  not  annexed  to  Prussia  directly, 
but  placed  under  military  government  for  the  time  being 
as  imperial  fiefs.  It  might  have  been  supposed  that  Alsace 
would  have  been  united  with  Baden,  but  the  people  of  the 
Palatinate  were  as  much  opposed  to  this  as  the  Alsatians 
were  to  being  separated  from  France.  It  would  have  joined 
two  states  together  of  nearly  equal  size,  but  of  different  re- 
ligion and  antagonistic  in  all  political  respects.  Representa- 
tive government  under  such  conditions  would  be  practically 
impossible ;  and  if  Lorraine  had  been  added  the  people  of 
Baden  would  have  found  themselves  continually  outvoted  in 
their  state  assembly  by  their  two  unfriendly  neighbors.  The 
formation  of  the  annexed  provinces  into  fiefs  was  looked  on 
as  a  concession  by  Prussia  to  the  German  Union.  Bismarck 
did  not  consider  it  prudent  that  they  should  possess  local 
autonomy,  but  they  were,  of  course,  represented  in  the  Reichs- 

255 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

tag,  and  their  delegates  lost  no  time  in  protesting  against 
their  separation  from  France.  This  action  was  anticipated, 
and  failed  to  excite  a  ruffle  on  the  surface  of  legislative  af- 
fairs. But  they  soon  began  to  agitate  in  a  more  serious 
manner. 

France  could  hardly  be  said  to  have  had  a  regular  govern- 
ment until  Thiers  was  chosen  president  of  the  republic  on  the 
last  day  of  August,  1871,  and  it  is  not  to  be  wondered  at  that 
the  Versailles  organization  managed  affairs  in  a  rather  irregu- 
lar and  uncertain  manner.  It  is  not  surprising  that  the  need- 
ful supplies  for  supporting  the  German  army  of  occupation 
were  not  forthcoming  in  suitable  quantity ;  but  the  French 
commissioners,  who  were  occupied  at  Brussels  with  the  Ger- 
man representatives  in  reducing  the  preliminaries  of  Versailles 
to  a  sound  legal  condition,  showed  a  disposition  to  evasion 
and  postponement  which  did  not  augur  well  for  a  speedy  con- 
clusion, and  the  people  of  the  annexed  provinces  had  begun 
to  complain  of  an  unfair  discrimination  against  them  in  their 
dealings  on  the  other  side  of  the  border.  This  was  all  nat- 
ural enough,  but  required  serious  attention,  and  Bismarck 
accordingly  seized  the  opportune  moment  before  the  Com- 
mune was  crushed  to  summon  Favre,  the  French  foreign 
minister,  to  an  interview  at  Frankfort,  and  there,  in  the  ancient 
seat  of  the  Frankish  nation  and  the  former  capital  of  medi- 
aeval Germany,  the  final  settlement  between  the  two  countries 
was  effected. 

A  few  days  later  Bismarck  made  a  report  of  this  meeting 
to  the  Reichstag,  in  which,  after  specifying  the  details  of  the 
conference,  he  said : 

"When  I  went  to  Frankfort  I  did  not  hope  to  settle  matters 
finally,  but  to  obtain  an  abridgment  of  the  terms  fixed  for  pay- 
ment of  the  war  indemnity  and  an  improvement  in  the  nature  of 
the  guarantees  for  that  payment.  But,  in  the  prospect  of  a  defini- 
tive settlement  which  became  manifest  at  Frankfort,  I  recognized  an 
enormous  advantage  to  both  countries  concerned  therein,  being 
convinced  that  such  an  arrangement  will  not  only  materially  lighten 
the  military  burdens  Germany  has  hitherto  had  to  bear,  but  will 

256 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

contribute  in  no  inconsiderable  measure  to  the  consolidation  of 
affairs  in  France.  .  .  .  This  settlement  will  probably  not  please 
everybody,  but  I  think  it  realizes  all  that  we  could  demand  from 
France  in  reason,  and  conformably  to  the  traditions  connected  with 
transactions  of  this  class.  We  have  secured  our  frontiers  by  terri- 
torial annexation  ;  we  have,  so  far  as  is  humanly  possible,  insured 
payment  of  our  war  indemnity.  I  feel  confident  that  the  present 
French  government  intends  to  carry  out  the  treaty  honestly."  x 

His  tribute  to  the  character  of  the  French  government  was 
well  deserved.  The  affairs  of  France  were  never  so  wisely 
administered  as  by  Favre  and  Thiers,  and  their  overthrow  was 
little  to  the  credit  of  that  restless  and  changeable  people. 

The  Reichstag  had  adjourned  on  the  I4th  of  June,  and  on 
the  1 5th  there  was  a  triumphal  procession  in  Berlin  such  as 
reminds  us  of  the  days  of  Pompey  and  Caesar,  though  there 
were  no  captives  present  to  humiliate  the  vanquished  foe.  It 
was  a  triumph  of  rejoicing  unmixed  with  vengeance. 

A  chosen  corps  of  forty- five  thousand  men,  selected  from 
the  different  armies  of  Germany,  were  mustered  in  the  Tem- 
pelhof  field,  where  the  emperor  appeared  at  eleven  A.M., 
accompanied  by  his  ministers,  generals,  and  princes  of  the 
royal  family,  to  take  command  of  the  procession.  He  was 
followed  by  a  brilliant  cavalcade,  in  which  the  different  royal 
and  princely  houses  of  Germany  were  represented,  and  after 
this  came  the  carriages  of  the  Empress  Augusta,  the  crown 
princess,  and  other  queens  and  princesses.  The  emperor  led 
the  procession  at  the  head  of  the  guard  to  the  Brandenburg 
gate,  where  he  encountered  sixty  beautiful  young  ladies, 
dressed  in  blue  and  white,  representing  the  large  and  small 
political  divisions  of  Germany,  who  presented  him  with  a 
laurel  wreath  of  gold  in  the  name  of  the  United  Fatherland. 

Thence  the  procession  was  conducted  by  the  emperor 
through  the  Unter  den  Linden,  which  was  spanned  by  five 
triumphal  arches,  adorned  with  trophies  of  the  war,  while  the 
sidewalks  were  lined  with  captured  pieces  of  ordnance.  The 
emperor  rode  a  dark  brown  horse  of  great  beauty,  and  sat  as 

1  Bismarck's  Speeches,  v.  193. 
'7  257 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

erect  and  looked  as  vigorous  as  any  man  in  the  procession ; 
but  Bismarck,  in  his  white  cuirassier's  uniform,  was  the  ob- 
jective point  of  every  eye,  and  no  man  knew  better  how  to 
carry  himself  in  a  dignified  manner.  The  stately  courtesy  of 
the  empress,  who  bowed  repeatedly  to  the  enthusiastic  crowd, 
was  contrasted  with  the  more  gracious  manner  of  the  crown 
princess,  who  had  been  brought  up  in  a  less  military  and 
more  democratic  country.  In  front  of  the  French  hotel  the 
procession  halted  and  a  deputation  of  officers  brought  for- 
ward the  eagles  and  standards  taken  from  the  French  and 
presented  them  to  the  emperor  with  appropriate  ceremonies. 
When  they  reached  the  end  of  the  avenue  the  emperor  and 
his  suite  took  up  a  position  by  the  statue  of  Bliicher,  while 
the  procession  marched  past  for  the  space  of  two  hours.  He 
then  crossed  the  Schloss-briicke  leading  to  the  palace  and 
unveiled  the  statue  of  his  father,  Frederick  William  II.,  in 
whose  reign  Prussia  had  been  conquered  by  the  French  and 
afterwards  recovered  her  independence.  The  ceremony  in- 
cluded music  by  the  royal  band,  an  address  by  the  emperor, 
and  speeches  by  Bismarck,  Von  Moltke,  and  others, — alto- 
gether a  tasteful  and  impressive  ceremony. 

The  unprecedented  success  of  the  French  campaign  and 
the  sudden  rise  of  Prussia  to  the  first  position  in  European 
affairs  was  viewed  with  no  slight  jealousy  by  England  and 
Russia,  but  created  great  rejoicing  in  Italy  and  Hungary. 
There  was  no  longer  danger  of  French  regiments  being  seen 
at  Rome ;  no  more  fear  that  Hungarian  independence  would 
become  the  dream  of  a  day,  as  in  1848.  Francis  Joseph,  who 
was  really  the  football  of  the  age  he  lived  in,  found  himself 
as  dependent  on  the  Hungarians  as  he  formerly  supposed 
Germany  dependent  on  him,  and  he  was  willing  to  accept  this 
fact  for  the  sake  of  peace  and  harmony  after  so  many  troubles 
and  disasters.  Bismarck,  writing  from  Hungary  in  1852, 
mentioned  meeting  the  Austrian  emperor,  and  of  being 
pleased  with  him.  It  has  been  said  that  he  also  liked  Bis- 
marck, and  it  is  certain  that  from  this  time  forward  he  fol- 
lowed Bismarck's  advice  with  an  implicit  confidence  that 
proved  much  to  his  advantage. 

258 


LIFE  OF   BISMARCK 

The  Tsar  of  Russia  passed  through  Berlin  in  the  summer 
of  1871  on  his  way  to  Ems,  and  held  a  satisfactory  consulta- 
tion with  William  I.  Francis  Joseph  must  also  be  conferred 
with  to  secure  the  peace  of  Europe  on  an  enduring  basis,  but 
for  him  to  come  to  Berlin  might  have  had  the  appearance  of 
too  exacting  a  requirement ;  so  William  I.  graciously  offered 
to  meet  his  imperial  brother  at  Salzburg  in  Upper  Austria. 
Bismarck  and  Von  Beust  accompanied  their  respective  sov- 
ereigns, and  held,  no  doubt,  a  highly  edifying  conference; 
but  little  of  their  conversation  has  ever  been  revealed  to  the 
public.  The  Paris  Commune,  however,  was  a  phenomenon 
which  must  have  occupied  their  attention,  and  Bismarck  is 
supposed  to  have  made  the  most  of  this  argument  to  bring 
the  three  imperial  powers  into  a  closer  and  more  sympathetic 
relation.  The  evident  danger  to  all  governments  from  those 
secret  societies,  whose  object  strikes  at  the  root  of  civilization 
itself,  was  the  most  serious  problem  of  the  future.  All  mon- 
archical governments  especially  should  cultivate  peaceful  re- 
lations to  avoid  public  censure  and  disarm  the  imputations  of 
these  invisible  enemies  to  law  and  order.  There  was,  in  fact, 
at  this  time  the  shadow  of  a  second  Holy  Alliance  passing 
over  Europe  ;  but  it  proved  to  be  nothing  more  than  a  shadow, 
and  Bismarck  was  too  far-sighted  to  attempt  the  revival  of 
a  political  organization  with  which  the  name  of  Metternich 
would  always  be  connected.  One  consequence  of  the  Salz- 
burg meeting  was  the  retirement  of  Von  Beust  in  the  follow- 
ing autumn,  and  the  appointment  of  Count  Potocki  as  Aus- 
trian premier  in  his  place.  His  previous  antagonism  to 
Bismarck  rendered  it  impossible  for  Von  Beust,  in  spite  of  his 
invaluable  services  to  the  state,  to  take  the  lead  in  a  policy  of 
reconciliation  towards  Prussia.  He  may  have  requested  this 
himself,  and  Francis  Joseph  sent  him  to  the  court  of  St. 
James,  where  he  found  ready  listeners  to  his  animadversions 
against  the  German  chancellor.  That  his  removal  was  sug- 
gested by  Bismarck  is  not  at  all  probable.  Such  a  decided 
change  of  policy  required  a  change  of  ministers  to  make  it 
effectual,  and  Potocki  was  soon  succeeded  by  Count  Andrassy, 
the  first  Hungarian  premier  to  rule  the  Empire  of  the  Danube, 

259 


LIFE   OF   BISMARCK 

who  was  the  right  man  to  carry  out  the  Salzburg  programme. 
He  was  in  all  respects  Von  Beust's  equal,  even  if  Louis  Napo- 
leon had  not  spoken  of  him  as  a  "  caged  eagle,"  and  he  ap- 
pears to  have  been  the  one  statesman  of  his  time  whom  Bis- 
marck thoroughly  respected. 

FRENCH   AFFAIRS 

Thiers  was  finally  elected  President  of  the  French  Republic 
on  the  last  day  of  August,  and  his  first  serious  effort  was  an 
attempt  to  arrange  with  Bismarck  for  the  evacuation  of 
French  territory  by  anticipating  the  payment  of  the  war  in- 
demnity. Bismarck  was  ready  to  meet  him  half-way  on  such 
a  question,  and  expressed  a  desire  to  do  anything  he  could  to 
facilitate  the  establishment  of  order  and  tranquillity  under  the 
new  government.  Germany  could  not  accept  French  securities 
in  return  for  the  indemnity  to  any  large  amount,  because  in 
that  case  it  would  depend  on  the  good-will  of  the  French 
people  whether  the  securities  were  finally  redeemed;  but  if 
the  bankers  would  exchange  French  rentes  for  other  securities 
there  would  certainly  be  no  objection.  The  Rothschilds  and 
other  bankers  assured  Thiers  that  this  could  be  done,  and  the 
French  government  accordingly  advertised  for  a  loan  of  two 
and  a  half  milliards  (five  hundred  million  dollars),  and  over 
seven  milliards  were  subscribed,  or  more  than  enough  to  ex- 
tinguish the  whole  indemnity.  This  was  not  accomplished, 
however,  until  1873 ;  but  by  this  policy  Thiers  relieved  France 
of  the  burden  of  supporting  fifty  thousand  German  troops. 
There  were  other  reasons  why  the  Germans  should  evacuate 
France  as  soon  as  possible. 

There  is  no  better  evidence  that  the  campaign  of  1870  was 
a  popular  war  on  the  French  side  than  the  spiteful  feeling  that 
has  endured  so  long  towards  their  gallant  opponents.  There 
was  no  such  bitterness  in  Germany  towards  Napoleon  I.,  and 
it  is  difficult  to  find  an  unfavorable  criticism  of  him  among 
German  writers.  The  French  went  to  war  for  glory,  and  got 
the  worst  of  it,  and  might  have  learned  wisdom  from  the 
lesson.  Instead  of  doing  so,  however,  they  immediately  com- 
menced preparations  for  a  war  of  revenge.  This  belligerent 

260 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

spirit  manifested  itself  in  the  autumn  of  1871  by  the  murder 
of  a  German  soldier  at  Melun  and  another  at  Paris.  The 
cases  were  so  clear  that  Bismarck  trusted  the  trial  of  the  as- 
sassins to  French  jurisdiction,  which  resulted  in  their  acquittal 
amid  a  chorus  of  approbation  from  the  more  ordinary  class 
of  French  newspapers.  Under  some  conditions  such  a  fla- 
gitious proceeding  might  have  resulted  in  a  renewal  of  hos- 
tilities ;  but  Bismarck  contented  himself  with  notifying  Presi- 
dent Thiers  that  in  the  future,  if  the  perpetration  of  such 
crimes  was  not  duly  punished,  French  hostages  would  be 
exacted  and  further  reprisals  inflicted.  If  the  classes  to  which 
judges  and  barristers  -belonged  were  not  above  such  bitter- 
ness of  feeling,  the  German  government  would  be  obliged  to 
take  rigorous  measures  for  the  protection  of  their  citizens  in 
the  occupied  departments.1  Thiers  accordingly  issued  a  proc- 
lamation to  the  French  people  on  December  7,  in  which  he 
said,  "  To  those  who  may  believe  that  killing  a  foreigner  is 
not  murder,  I  may  observe  that  they  are  abominably  in  error." 
The  Empress  Augusta  ingenuously  wrote  to  Guizot  to  advise 
her  how  the  French  animosity  towards  the  Germans  might  be 
ameliorated.  No  doubt  it  might  have  been  ameliorated  by 
a  heavy  reduction  of  the  war  indemnity  and  the  retroces- 
sion of  Metz ;  but  this  plan  does  not  seem  to  have  occurred 
to  the  newly  created  empress.  The  letter  occasioned  a  good 
deal  of  comment ;  so  that  Count  Henry  von  Arnim,  the  Ger- 
man envoy  at  Paris,  sent  a  despatch  to  Bismarck  concerning 
it,  and  also  in  regard  to  the  troubles  of  German  residents  in 
Paris,  who  were  suffering  a  kind  of  small  persecution  on  ac- 
count of  their  nationality. 

Bismarck  replied  that,  with  all  respect  to  the  empress,  he  did 
not  consider  any  attempt  to  appease  the  wrath  of  the  French 
people  would  be  likely  to  succeed,  and,  as  for  the  German 
residents  on  French  soil,  they  were  at  liberty  to  return  to 
their  own  country,  and  must  take  their  chances  if  they  re- 
mained. 


1  Our  Chancellor,  ii.  So.     I  cannot  learn  that  these  villains  were  finally  pun- 
ished at  all. 

261 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

This  certainly  was  not  a  narrow  or  supersensitive  view  of 
the  situation,  and  later  reports  indicated  that  the  complain- 
ants were  chiefly  German  Jews,  who  had  gone  to  Paris  on 
speculation  and  to  escape  military  service ;  so  that  they  were 
suffering  not  for  their  patriotism,  but  from  their  pronunciation. 

THE   KULTURKAMPF   BEGINS 

The  spiritual  strength  of  Protestantism  consists  in  its  lib- 
erty of  conscience,  which  allows  every  man  to  think  for  him- 
self, and,  though  this  has  its  small  evils,  it  is  far  better  than 
the  religious  despotism  of  the  Church  of  Rome ;  but  in  this 
also  lies  the  political  weakness  of  Protestantism.  It  is  strange 
how  little  sympathy  was  felt  by  English  and  American  Prot- 
estants for  the  German  struggle  against  papal  infallibility 
between  1871  and  1882.  It  was  a  long-continued,  harassing 
conflict,  and  caused  Bismarck  more  trouble  than  Francis  Jo- 
seph or  Louis  Napoleon  had.  It  has  been  called  in  Germany 
the  Kulturkampf,  or  religious  battle. 

The  dogma  of  infallibility  was  intended  to  place  the  au- 
thority of  the  pope  above  all  civil  authority,  and  was  directly 
aimed  against  the  Italian  government.  That  it  would  pro- 
duce a  conflict  with  the  civil  authorities  must  have  been  fore- 
seen, but  what  advantage  the  Church  of  Rome  was  to  gain 
by  this  the  most  impartial  judges  could  not  determine.  The 
obstinacy  of  priests  is  proverbial,  and  little  as  their  spiritual 
weapons  avail  them  against  the  scepticism  of  the  nineteenth 
century,  their  defensive  armor  is  as  invulnerable  now  as  it  was 
in  the  twelfth  century.  Like  the  Greek  Capaneus,  they  can  be 
buried  for  a  time,  but  cannot  be  destroyed. 

In  Italy  the  dogma  proved  of  very  slight  effect.  The  people 
were  so  heartily  on  the  side  of  national  unity  that  it  could 
hardly  find  an  entering  wedge  anywhere.  Of  all  civilized 
cities  there  were  none  in  which  the  pope  was  less  respected 
than  his  own  capital.  The  king  of  Italy  had  already  been 
excommunicated  with  but  trifling  inconvenience  to  himself  or 
the  government,  and  the  pope  might  continue  this  down  to 
his  most  petty  officials  without  its  attracting  serious  attention. 
The  distinction  between  civil  and  religious  marriages  con- 

262 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

tinued,  without  producing  any  worse  consequences  than  a  few 
youthful  and  perhaps  unprincipled  divorces. 

In  Switzerland,  however,  the  dogma  created  a  fierce  tumult 
between  the  Protestant  and  Catholic  cantons,  and  in  South 
America  a  number  of  violent  revolutions  were  occasioned  by 
it  with  various  results.  In  Ecuador  the  Clerical  party  was 
triumphant,  while  in  Brazil  the  reaction  against  the  Church 
was  so  energetic  and  the  clergy  so  tenacious  of  its  rights  that 
the  Supreme  Court  finally  imprisoned  the  archbishop — buried 
like  Capaneus — for  four  years.  In  the  old,  unconstitutional 
Prussia  of  Frederick  and  his  descendants  the  pope  could  not 
have  accomplished  much,  but  in  constitutional  Germany  the 
Catholics,  by  uniting  with  the  Poles,  Saxons,  and  other  mal- 
contents, could  cause  the  government  a  good  deal  of  annoy- 
ance, and  this  Pius  IX.  was  determined  they  should  do. 
There  was  practically  little  to  be  gained  by  it,  but  revenge 
is  sweet,  even  to  a  pontiff.  It  was  to  be  a  campaign  of  ob- 
stacles. 

There  is  only  one  step  from  papal  infallibility  to  the  wor- 
ship of  man  as  a  god, — from  the  High  Pontiff  to  the  Grand 
Lama.  Bismarck  informed  the  crown  prince,  during  all  the 
pressing  business  of  the  French  campaign,  that  he  intended 
to  make  a  stand  against  infallibility.1  What  he  would  have 
done  if  the  conflict  had  not  been  forced  on  him  is  not  very 
evident,  but  he  perhaps  foresaw  that  it  would  be  forced  on 
him.  "  Sovereignty,"  he  said,  "is  a  unit,  and  there  could  not 
be  two  sovereignties  in  Germany."  It  was  not  long  before 
this  question  was  brought  to  a  crucial  test.  The  first  three 
months  of  peace  had  not  closed  when  the  Catholic  Bishop 
Krementz  of  Ermland  excommunicated  one  of  the  subordi- 
nates of  his  diocese  for  refusing  to  subscribe  to  the  new 
dogma.  This  in  a  Catholic  community  was  a  serious  matter 
to  the  subordinate  priest,  and  an  infringement  of  the  principle 
of  religious  liberty  which  had  continued  in  Prussia  for  nearly 
a  hundred  and  fifty  years.  Emperor  William  was  very  much 
disgusted  at  it,  and  still  more  indignant  when  the  Archbishop 

1  The  crown  prince's  diary,  November,  1870. 
263 


LIFE  OF   BISMARCK 

of  Cologne  suspended  a  number  of  professors  at  Bonn  for  the 
same  reason.  This  was  not  only  persecution,  but  in  direct 
contravention  to  Prussian  law,  and  the  more  inexcusable  since 
it  was  only  through  the  liberality  of  the  Prussian  government 
that  the  university  at  Bonn  was  permitted  to  exist.  Not  only 
the  German  government  but  public  opinion,  even  among  a 
large  portion  of  Catholics,  was  mightily  stirred  up  at  such  a 
tyrannical  procedure. 

While  the  Ecumenical  Council  was  in  session  the  Prussian 
envoy  at  the  Vatican  had  warned  Bismarck  of  the  course 
events  were  taking,  and  suggested  the  appointment  of  a  lay 
representative  to  confer  with  Pius  IX.  and  endeavor  to  re- 
strain him  before  the  Rubicon  was  passed ;  but  Bismarck 
knew  Pius  IX.  too  well  to  make  the  attempt.  "  We  should 
only  obtain  a  rebuff,"  he  said,  "  and  weaken  our  cause  before 
we  were  fairly  in  the  field."  Now  he  acted  with  his  custom- 
ary promptness,  and  on  July  8  issued  a  decree  abolishing  the 
Catholic  department  of  public  worship  in  the  ministry.  This 
was  a  summary  proceeding  and  was  freely  criticised ;  but  this 
branch  of  the  government  jurisdiction  was  filled  mainly  with 
Ultramontanes,  and  Bismarck  foresaw  that  it  would  continue 
to  be  an  obstacle  between  the  public  and  any  laws  which  the 
Reichstag  might  enact  on  this  question.  It  also  served  as  a 
case  of  lex  talionis ;  for  if  the  professors  at  Bonn  were  to  be 
deposed  the  Catholics  serving  under  the  government  would 
also  lose  their  places.  The  almost  infinite  wealth  of  the 
Roman  Church,  however,  prevented  this  from  having  much 
effect. 

As  the  priests  in  Bavaria  and  other  Catholic  communities 
preached  sermons  exciting  their  parishioners  against  the  gov- 
ernment and  urging  them  to  vote  for  Clerical  candidates,  the 
Reichstag  passed  a  law  in  December  that  this  should  be  con- 
sidered insurrectionary  talk,  and  its  authors  be  held  respon- 
sible according  to  the  penal  code.  The  Bavarian  government 
supported  this  bill,  and,  in  fact,  the  condition  of  affairs  in 
Bavaria  was  a  smaller  duplication  of  that  in  Prussia.  The 
Bishop  of  Strasburg  was  one  of  the  first  to  suffer  under  this 
law.  His  attacks  on  the  government  were  so  violent  and 

264 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

uncompromising  that  he  was  banished  from  the  empire.  The 
conflict,  however,  was  like  fighting  a  swarm  of  mosquitoes, 
for  where  one  irreconcilable  papist  was  disposed  of  two  or 
three  others  appeared  in  his  place.  The  mock-heroic  is  such 
an  easy  part  to  play  that  there  will  always  be  found  plenty  to 
attempt  it  when  the  opportunity  presents  itself.  The  self- 
imposed  imprisonment  of  Pius  IX.  served  as  an  example  for 
his  dark-robed  followers  to  imitate. 

Bismarck's  next  card  was  a  trump,  and  a  high  one.  Ever 
since  the  foundation  of  the  Prussian  monarchy,  and  of  many 
other  German  states,  all  schools,  public  and  private,  had  been 
under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  church.  The  universities  were 
independent,  but  in  primary  and  secondary  instruction  the 
courses  of  study  and  the  text-books  in  use  were  under  the 
supervision  of  the  clergy.  This,  of  course,  gave  them  great 
influence  over  the  minds  of  the  young,  and  a  change  in  this 
direction  would  affect  the  future  of  all  Germany.  By  a  sweep- 
ing measure  in  January,  1872,  this  jurisdiction  was  transferred 
from  the  church  to  the  state, — making  the  board  of  school  in- 
spectors a  government  appointment  in  both  Protestant  and 
Catholic  communities.  At  the  same  time  the  religious  in- 
structors connected  with  the  schools  were  not  to  be  interfered 
with,  so  long  as  they  avoided  the  obnoxious  dogma  and  made 
no  attempt  to  prejudice  their  youthful  hearers  against  the 
German  government.  When  the  bill  for  this  purpose  was  in- 
troduced in  the  German  Reichstag  it  produced  the  most  pro- 
found sensation  that  had  been  known  since  the  capitulation 
of  Paris.  Dr.  Windhorst  instantly  recognized  its  importance, 
and  exerted  himself  in  opposition  to  it  with  an  energy  and 
determination  equal  to  Bismarck's  own,  and  in  power  of  in- 
vective he  went  far  beyond  him.  Never  had  Windhorst 
displayed  such  resources;  never  had  the  keen  blade  of  his 
scimitar  flashed  so  brilliantly.  The  act  was  revolutionary, — 
it  would  penetrate  to  every  German  home ;  would  overturn  all 
traditions  of  German  education ;  would  strike  at  the  root  of 
moral  instruction.  What  would  Germany  be  like  in  the  next 
century  with  such  violent  changes  and  innovations  ? 

There  were  others  who  considered  the  measure  revolu- 

265 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

tionary,  but  a  revolution  too  long  delayed  and  now  most 
needful  and  salutary.  Bismarck  was  on  hand  to  defend  his 
bill,  which  he  did  in  his  usual  clear-cut,  business-like  manner. 
The  fine  speeches  were  all  on  the  side  of  clerical  indepen- 
dence and  the  rights  of  minorities,  but  the  votes  were  on  the 
side  of  Bismarck. 

Having  proved  to  Pius  IX.  and  Antonelli  what  he  had 
power  to  accomplish,  Bismarck  now  adopted  a  more  pacific 
policy,  and  evinced  his  desire  to  ameliorate  the  situation  by 
the  appointment  of  Cardinal  Hohenlohe  as  special  ambassador 
to  the  Vatican,  where  Germany  had  only  been  represented 
before  by  a  simple  legate  or  charge  d'affaires.  The  Hohen- 
lohe family  of  Germany  is,  like  the  OrlofT  family  in  Russia, 
bred  to  the  diplomatic  service  for  generations.  Until  the 
present  epoch  they  have  never  risen  to  high  distinction,  but 
they  have  grown  time-honored,  both  in  the  service  of  Prussia 
and  of  Bavaria.  If  there  was  a  person  in  Germany  who 
could  have  been  selected  with  any  expectation  of  success  as 
a  mediator  between  Emperor  William  and  Pius  IX.,  it  was 
Cardinal  Hohenlohe.  His  loyalty  to  the  state  was  unques- 
tionable, and  as  the  first  Catholic  appointment  of  the  kind 
from  a  Protestant  government  he  ought  to  have  been  accep- 
table to  the  pope.  Pius  IX.,  however,  was  soured  beyond 
the  help  of  antiseptics,  and  he  was  determined  to  continue  the 
selfish  warfare,  although  there  was  nothing  he  could  gain  by 
it  except  the  mean  satisfaction  of  causing  petty  annoyances. 

On  April  25,  1872,  Von  Derinthal,  the  German  charge 
d'affaires  at  Rome,  reported  the  appointment  of  Cardinal 
Hohenlohe  to  Antonelli,  and  announced  the  expectation  of 
his  early  arrival.  As  no  reply  was  received  to  this  commu- 
nication, Von  Derinthal  was  directed  to  make  inquiries  of  the 
Jesuit  cardinal  as  to  the  cause  of  his  silence.  Antonelli  re- 
plied that,  though  the  pope  was  not  insensible  to  the  good 
intentions  of  the  emperor,  he  was  nevertheless,  under  existing 
circumstances,  obliged  to  decline  the  acceptance  of  so  impor- 
tant a  mission.  Great  indignation  was  expressed  at  this  in 
Berlin  and  other  German  capitals,  and  a  motion  was  imme- 
diately made  in  the  Reichstag  to  strike  out  from  the  schedule 

266 


LIFE   OF   BISMARCK 

the  appropriation  for  the  charge  d'affaires  at  the  Vatican.  On 
May  14  Bismarck  made  a  speech  in  the  Reichstag  in  opposi- 
tion to  this  motion,  which  has  become  historical.  He  said, 
inter  alia  : 

"I  hardly  believe  that  with  the  existing  ruling  sentiments  of  the 
Catholic  Church  an  envoy  of  the  German  empire  could,  by  most 
skilful  diplomacy  or  by  persuasion,  exert  any  influence;  that  he 
would  be  capable  of  modifying  the  attitude  taken  by  his  Holiness 
the  Pope  towards  us  in  temporal  matters.  According  to  recently 
expressed  and  publicly  promulgated  dogmas  of  the  Catholic  Church, 
I  do  not  think  it  possible  for  a  temporal  power  to  attain  to  a  con- 
cordat[  without  this  temporal  power  being  effaced  to  a  degree  and  in 
a  way  which  the  German  Empire,  at  least,  cannot  accept.  Fear 
not ;  to  Canossa  we  shall  not  go,  neither  bodily  nor  mentally. 

"I  had  hoped  that  by  the  choice  of  an  envoy  who  had  full  con- 
fidence from  both  sides  on  account  of  his  love  of  truth  and  his 
trustworthiness,  and  on  account  of  his  conciliatory  disposition, — I 
had  hoped  that  the  choice  of  such  an  envoy  as  his  Majesty  the  Em- 
peror had  made,  in  the  person  of  a  noted  prince  of  the  church, 
would  be  welcome  in  Rome,  that  it  would  be  conceived  as  a  pledge 
of  our  peaceful,  friendly  sentiments,  that  it  might  be  used  as  a 
means  of  coming  to  an  understanding.  .  .  .  My  regret  at  this  re- 
fusal is  exceedingly  great ;  but  I  am  not  justified  in  giving  this 
regret  the  form  of  an  irritation,  for  the  government  owes  our  Catholic 
fellow-citizens  an  untiring  search  for  those  paths  in  which  the 
boundary-line  between  clerical  and  temporal  power,  so  absolutely 
necessary  to  us  in  the  interest  of  peace,  might  be  found  in  a  manner 
least  inclined  to  cause  ill-feeling.  Therefore,  I  shall  not  be  dis- 
couraged by  this  occurrence,  but  continue  in  trying  to  persuade  his 
Majesty  the  Emperor  to  find  a  representative  of  the  empire  for  Rome 
who  enjoys  the  confidence  of  both  powers,  if  not  in  an  equal 
measure,  at  least  to  a  degree  sufficient  for  his  calling.  That  this 
task  has  been  rendered  exceedingly  difficult  by  recent  events  can 
hardly  be  denied." 

Even  the  Clericals  could  not  withhold  their  admiration  for 
Bismarck's  calm,  dispassionate  wisdom,  and  the  more  enthu- 
siastic Liberals  were  obliged  to  admit  the  superiority  of  his 
judgment.  He  again  repeated  his  determination  never  to 

267 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

admit  any  claim  of  the  Church  of  Rome  that  a  law  passed 
by  the  Reichstag  should  not  be  binding  on  every  German 
citizen.  The  motion  for  striking  out  was  then  rejected  by 
a  heavy  majority.  The  expression,  "  We  are  not  going  to 
Canossa,"  became  as  proverbial  as  the  earlier  expression,  "  By 
no  means  sufficient" ;  and  though  much  of  the  anti-papal 
legislation  was  afterwards  retracted,  it  cannot  fairly  be  said 
that  Bismarck  ever  went  to  Canossa  any  more  than  Canossa 
came  to  him.1 

Afterwards  the  Jesuits  still  remained  to  be  dealt  with. 
Antonelli  was  the  chief  adviser  of  Pius  IX.,  and  diplomatic 
opinion  made  him  responsible  for  a  large  share  of  the  pope's 
deviltry;  but  there  were  other  substantial  reasons.  Within 
the  last  fifteen  years  the  number  of  convents  in  Germany  had 
increased  from  sixty-nine  to  eight  hundred  and  twenty-six, 
and  the  number  of  persons  immured  in  them  from  nine  hun- 
dred and  seventy-six  to  something  like  ten  thousand.  This 
withdrawal  of  so  many  efficient  helpers  from  the  community, 
and  a  large  proportion  of  young  women  among  them,  was 
looked  upon  as  a  national  evil,,and  generally  attributed  to  the 
influence  of  the  Jesuits.  Huge  petitions  from  all  parts  of  Ger- 
many were  presented  to  the  Reichstag,  praying  for  the  expa- 
triation of  the  order  of  Jesus ;  and  it  is  noteworthy  that  on 
these,  besides  other  distinguished  names,  was  that  of  Prince 
Hohenlohe  of  Bavaria,  the  brother  of  Cardinal  Hohenlohe 
who  had  lately  been  refused  as  ambassador  to  the  Vatican. 

The  question  was  debated  on  May  15,  and  a  resolution 
drawn  up  jointly  by  a  body  of  conservative  and  liberal  mem- 
bers was  adopted  petitioning  the  chancellor  for  the  expulsion 
of  the  Jesuits.  The  petition  desired  Prince  Bismarck,  firstly, 
to  take  measures  that  peace  and  concord  among  the  various 
churches  of  the  empire  should  be  preserved ;  and,  secondly, 
that  a  bill  be  introduced  for  the  purpose  of  regulating  all  re- 
ligious orders,  congregations,  and  the  like,  to  decide  whether 
they  should  be  admitted,  and  on  what  terms,  special  consid- 

1  Canossa,  a  town  in  Lombardy.where  the  Emperor  Henry  IV.  abased  himself 
before  Gregory  VII., — the  greater  Gregory,  and  most  powerful  of  all  the  popes. 

268 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

eration  being  taken  in  this  matter  to  the  behavior  of  the  order 
of  the  Jesuits.  In  accordance  with  this  resolution  the  Federal 
Council,  on  June  11,  adopted  a  bill  authorizing  the  police 
authorities  to  forbid  members  of  the  society  of  Jesuits  from 
residing  in  any  part  of  the  German  empire,  even  if  they  pos- 
sessed rights  as  native  Germans.  At  the  first  reading  of  the 
bill  the  federal  commissioner,  Friedberg,  declared  that  the 
law  was  only  provisional,  and  necessitated  by  the  dangerous 
opposition  of  the  order  of  Jesus  to  the  state.  At  a  meeting 
of  the  leaders  of  the  various  parties  in  the  Reichstag,  with 
the  exception  of  the  Clericals,  a  substitute  for  the  govern- 
ment bill  was  agreed  upon,  to  the  effect  that  members  of  the 
order  of  Jesuits,  if  foreigners,  should  be  expelled  from  the 
empire;  but  if  native  Germans  they  might  remain  on  certain 
conditions,  and  by  changing  their  residence  to  places  desig- 
nated by  the  government.  This  substitute  was  finally  adopted 
by  a  hundred  and  thirty-one  against  ninety-three  votes. 

A  few  days  later,  when  a  German  Catholic  delegation  at 
Rome  waited  on  Pius  IX.  to  assure  him  of  their  unfailing  alle- 
giance, the  pope  complained  of  the  persecution  of  the  Catholic 
Church  in  Germany  in  bitter  and  aggressive  language,  finally 
concluding  with  the  words  which  were  generally  reported,  "  Be 
trustful  and  united,  for  some  stone  will  surely  fall  to  shatter 
the  heel  of  this  Colossus."  x  This  was  imprudent,  to  say  the 
best  of  it,  for  it  easily  might  be  interpreted  as  an  invitation  to 
rid  the  world  of  his  opponent  by  unlawful  means,  and  so  it 
seems  to  have  been  interpreted.  It  also  showed  plainly  that 
the  Catholic  party  were  getting  the  worst  of  this  war  of  legal 
measures  which  they  had  inaugurated.  The  Bishop  of  Erm- 
land  was  one  of  the  first  to  feel  the  weight  of  the  anti-Catholic 
laws.  He  persisted  in  excommunicating  all  those  who  did 
not  subscribe  to  the  doctrine  of  infallibility,  and  in  conse- 
quence his  salary  was  stopped  by  the  government.  He  en- 
tered a  suit  for  arrears,  but  lost  his  case  and  was  obliged  to 
depend  for  his  living  on  the  slender  munificence  of  the 
Vatican. 


1  Mullet's  Political  History,  p.  500. 
269 


CHAPTER  XII 

1873  TO  1876 — INTRIGUES  OF  VON  ARNIM 

THIERS  remained  president  of  the  French  Republic  from 
August,  1871,  until  May  24,  1873,  and  he  did  much  to  raise 
his  country  from  the  gulf  of  despair  into  which  it  had  been 
plunged  by  the  suicidal  folly  of  Gramont  and  Napoleon  III. 
His  appointments  were  judicious  and  gave  satisfaction  ;  he 
elevated  the  character  of  the  foreign  service ;  he  was  a  skilful 
financier,  and  helped  to  lighten  the  severe  burden  of  the  war 
indemnity.  In  a  little  more  than  two  years  the  last  regiment 
of  the  army  of  occupation  was  recalled  from  French  terri- 
tory, a  great  relief  to  both  parties  concerned.  Thiers  advo- 
cated the  adoption  of  a  protective  tariff,  which  stimulated 
industry,  effaced  the  ravages  of  war,  and  gave  a  kind  of  pros- 
perity and  prestige  to  the  new  republic.  Unhappily,  he  felt 
too  confident  of  his  position,  and  had  no  suspicion  how  short- 
lived his  ascendancy  would  prove  to  be.  Von  Beust  came 
to  see  him  from  London  for  a  consultation  on  the  peace  of 
Europe,  and  remarked  to  him  on  the  strength  of  the  oppo- 
sition in  the  French  Chamber  of  Deputies.  "  Yes,"  replied 
Thiers,  "  they  sometimes  make  disturbances,  but  I  have  only 
to  do  so,"  holding  up  his  finger.  It  occurred  to  Von  Beust 
that  Thiers  might  have  made  the  same  remark  to  a  less 
friendly  and  prudent  person  than  himself. 

This  self-complacency  may  have  helped  to  bring  about  his 
downfall,  but  there  was  also  a  deeper  reason.  France  had 
not  yet  become  republican  at  heart.  As  the  brilliant  mono- 
graphist,  Arsene  Houssaye,  wrote  at  the  time,  the  French  Re- 
public derived  its  support  from  a  combination  of  Legitimists, 
Orleanists,  and  Bonapartists.  The  monarchical  reaction  had 
set  in  again,  and  the  elections  for  1873  were  strongly  in 
Napoleon's  favor.  Strange  as  it  may  seem,  Thiers  was  re- 
peatedly outvoted  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  and  finally 

270 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

sent  in  his  resignation,  in  a  confident  belief  that  it  would  not 
be  accepted.  On  the  contrary,  it  was  accepted,  and  Marshal 
MacMahon,  still  faithful  in  spirit  to  the  old  emperor,  was 
chosen  in  his  place.  It  is  thought  that  if  Thiers  had  dis- 
solved the  Chambers  and  appealed  tp  the  public  for  support, 
a  new  election  might  have  sustained  him  in  his  place ;  and 
MacMahon  afterwards  made  precisely  the  same  mistake  in  his 
struggle  against  Gambetta. 

Napoleon  III.  did  not  remain  idle  at  Chiselhurst,  nor  had 
he  given  up  hope  of  returning  to  his  uncle's  throne.  His 
situation  was  convenient  for  loyal  Bonapartists,  who  came  and 
went  continually  from  France.  Finally,  in  the  autumn  of 
1872,  a  definite  plan  was  arranged  for  a  second  coup  d'etat,  no 
doubt  with  the  connivance  of  President  MacMahon.  In  order 
to  accomplish  this  it  would  be  necessary  for  the  emperor  to 
appear  on  horseback,  and  unfortunately  his  physical  condition 
was  such  that  a  dangerous  surgical  operation  was  necessary 
before  he  could  attempt  it.  The  operation  was  undertaken  on 
January  9,  and  Napoleon  expired  under  the  influence  of  the 
chloroform.1 

This  left  the  Bonapartists  without  a  leader  until  the  prince 
imperial  should  be  more  advanced  towards  manhood,  and  it 
strengthened  the  two  Bourbon  factions  in  a  corresponding  de- 
gree. The  Count  of  Chambord  was  the  Legitimists'  heir  to  the 
throne,  and  the  Count  of  Paris  was  the  nearest  living  relative 
of  Louis  Philippe.  Neither  of  them  was  a  man  of  exceptional 
ability  nor  especially  popular;  but  the  tide  was  running  in 
their  favor,  and  if  one  or  the  other  could  be  persuaded  to 
resign  his  claim  it  was  likely  that  France  would  again  become 
a  monarchy.  The  idea  of  this  was  acceptable  to  Emperor 
William  and  the  other  hereditary  monarchs  of  Europe,  in- 
cluding Queen  Victoria ;  but  Bismarck  did  not  favor  it,  and  it 
is  supposed  that  he  had  frequent  discussions  on  the  subject 
with  his  sovereign,  who  finally  yielded  his  opinion  to  Bis- 

1  Von  Beust  even  fixes  the  date,  March  20,  on  which  Napoleon  III.  intended 
to  imitate  his  uncle's  return  from  Elba.  He  says,  "  Great  hopes  were  then 
entertained  of  a  Napoleonic  restoration,  as  I  saw  during  my  occasional  visits  to 
Chiselhurst."  Memoirs,  ii.  195. 

271 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

marck's  superior  wisdom.  The  German  ambassador  at  Paris, 
however,  Count  Henry  von  Arnim,  was  an  enthusiastic  mon- 
archist, and,  having  been  sounded  by  the  Bonapartists  shortly 
before  Napoleon's  death,  notified  Bismarck  of  the  fact,  adding 
a  decisive  opinion  of  his  own  approval  of  the  movement.1 
This  in  itself  was  exceeding  the  customary  bounds  of  an  en- 
voy's authority,  for  it  was  not  Von  Arnim's  place  to  judge  of 
what  measures  the  home  government  should  adopt.  Bis- 
marck, however,  replied  to  him  in  a  temperate  manner,  and 
endeavored  to  persuade  him  that  the  interests  of  Germany 
were  not  likely  to  be  improved  by  any  change  from  the 
prudent  and  pacific  policy  of  Thiers.  His  argument  did  not 
seem  to  produce  any  effect  on  Von  Arnim,  who  continued  to 
discuss  the  matter  and  reiterate  his  first  position.  At  the 
same  time  Bismarck  became  satisfied  that  Von  Arnim  was 
carrying  on  a  correspondence  on  this  subject  with  some  one 
at  the  Prussian  court  independently  of  the  foreign  office. 

Bismarck  found  more  difficulty  in  obtaining  suitable  am- 
bassadors for  the  foreign  service  than  Von  Moltke  did  in  his 
selection  of  subordinate  generals  for  the  army.  Dr.  Busch's 
report  of  his  chief's  commentaries  on  some  of  them  is  more 
amusing  than  complimentary.  Baron  Goltz,  who  figured  at 
Paris  during  the  campaign  of  1866,  was  always  flirting,  so 
Bismarck  said,  first,  with  the  Queen  of  Portugal,  and  after- 
ward with  Eugenie  herself;  and,  though  this  was  creditable 
to  his  powers  of  attraction,  it  was  not  exactly  what  Bismarck 
wanted  of  him.  Von  Arnim,  while  legate  at  the  Vatican, 
had  troubled  his  superior  with  such  freedom  of  advice  as  was 
hardly  in  place  from  a  subordinate  officer.  His  despatches 
from  Paris  were  composed  in  a  similar  tone  of  self-confidence, 
which  may  have  caused  Bismarck  to  suspect  that  in  opposing 
Von  Arnim  he  had  also  to  deal  with  a  power  behind  him. 
Who  it  was  that  encouraged  the  count  in  this  business  to 
show  such  a  bold  front  has  never  yet  come  to  light,  but 


1  Even  recently  it  was  stated  in  an  American  magazine  that  from  the  beginning 
of  Von  Arnim's  career  he  "  developed  strong  radical  opinions,  and  was  bitterl) 
opposed  to  the  growing  influence  and  conservative  policy  of  Bismarck." 

272 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

suspicion  naturally  points  towards  the  crown  prince.  It  is 
possible,  however,  that  Von  Arnim  was  aware  of  a  difference 
in  opinion  between  the  emperor  and  Bismarck  in  regard  to 
republicanism  in  France,  and  hoped,  by  taking  the  emperor's 
side,  to  widen  the  breach,  bring  himself  prominently  into 
favor,  and  supplant  Bismarck  when  his  master  had  become 
dissatisfied  with  him.  Among  the  long  list  of  opponents 
whom  Bismarck  may  be  said  to  have  tumbled  from  their 
horses  in  this  grand  political  tournament,  there  was  no  other 
so  vainly  ambitious,  so  unscrupulous  of  his  means,  and  who 
so  well  deserved  his  fate  as  Henry  von  Arnim.1 

This,  however,  is  anticipating  events.  From  the  time  of 
MacMahon's  accession  to  the  presidency,  Von  Arnim  paid  no 
more  attention  to  Bismarck's  directions  than  a  spoiled  child 
does  to  those  of  his  parents.  It  was  not  long,  therefore, 
before  Bismarck  informed  him  that  it  was  his  business  to  take 
orders,  and  not  criticise  the  home  government.  This  resulted 
in  a  letter  from  Von  Arnim  to  the  emperor,  complaining  that 
Bismarck  placed  him,  metaphorically,  in  a  strait-jacket,  and 
did  not  allow  him  such  freedom  of  judgment  or  action  as  an 
envoy  or  plenipotentiary  was  always  supposed  to  possess. 
That  this  letter  did  not  result  in  his  immediate  recall  is  ample 
evidence  that  Von  Arnim  was  not  acting  alone,  but  was  the 
confederate,  if  not  the  instrument,  of  more  powerful  parties  at 
court.  The  difficulty  of  Bismarck's  position  in  this  emer- 
gency cannot  be  overestimated.  If  there  had  been  a  flaw 
anywhere  in  the  magnanimous  nature  of  the  old  emperor  for 
jealousy  to  enter  in,  Bismarck  would  have  gone  under  like 
Von  Stein  before  him,  and  as  Chatham  did  after  the  Seven 
Years'  War.  He  was  compelled  to  endure,  in  the  most  criti- 
cal and  important  position  of  the  foreign  service,  a  subordinate 
who  deliberately  opposed  his  policy  and  who  evidently  in- 
tended to  become  his  rival.  The  Bismarck  who  had  revo- 
lutionized Austria  and  crushed  Louis  Napoleon  was  to  be 
balked  by  this  "  young  gilded  serpent,"  as  Richelieu  called 

1  There  is  an  excellent  account  of  this  intrigue  in  Holtzendorff  's  Rechtsgut- 
achten. 

18  273 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

the  giddy  favorite  of  Louis  XIII.  To  the  emperor,  who  sent 
for  him,  Bismarck  opened  his  mind  concerning  Von  Arnim 
with  customary  frankness.  He  may  have  found  William  I. 
more  than  half  inclined  to  side  with  Von  Arnim's  opinion. 
At  all  events,  it  was  agreed  that  Von  Arnim  should  not  be 
removed  for  the  present,  but  that  Bismarck  should  await  the 
development  of  events. 

The  transition  from  the  prudent  and  peaceable  adminis- 
tration of  Thiers  to  the  energetic  but  less  experienced  Mac- 
Marion  was  not  favorable  to  the  interests  of  Germany,  and  it 
was  doubly  irritating  to  Bismarck  that  his  representative  in 
Paris  not  only  would  not  be  persuaded  of  this,  but  had  actu- 
ally assisted  in  bringing  it  to  pass.  The  tendency  to  sudden 
changes  in  French  politics  was  of  itself  a  source  of  insecurity 
to  Germany  and  a  danger  to  the  peace  of  Europe ;  and  with 
a  disorderly  Chamber  of  Deputies,  a  fanatical  clergy  behind 
that,  and  a  Bonapartist  general  at  top,  the  prospect  of  a  con- 
tinued peace  did  not  look  favorable.  As  the  monarchical 
movement  strengthened  during  the  summer,  Von  Arnim  be- 
came bolder  and  more  combative.  He  believed  the  tide  was 
running  in  his  favor,  and  there  can  be  little  doubt  that  he 
received  equal  encouragement  from  Berlin.  The  evacuation 
treaty,  which  had  been  commenced  by  Thiers  and  left  unfin- 
ished at  his  resignation,  was  so  delayed  and  neglected  by  Von 
Arnim  that  Bismarck  was  obliged  to  attend  to  the  case  him- 
self with  the  help  of  the  French  ambassador  at  Berlin ;  and 
now  it  appeared  that  the  whole  of  Thiers's  communication  on 
the  subject  had  not  been  reported  by  Von  Arnim  to  Bismarck 
the  preceding  winter,  as  it  should  have  been.  Any  other 
foreign  envoy  would  have  been  immediately  superseded. 

The  emperor  sent  for  Von  Arnim  to  return  to  Berlin  and 
explain  himself,  and,  according  to  the  latter's  account  of  the 
interview,  William  I.  was  not,  on  the  whole,  displeased  with 
his  statement,  while  he  admitted  that  Bismarck  had  serious 
faults  which  made  him  difficult  to  deal  with.  The  truth  of 
this  statement  is  questionable,  but  it  is  certain  that  the  em- 
peror was  conciliatory,  and  advised  Von  Arnim  to  call  on 
Bismarck  in  a  friendly  spirit.  Whatever  spirit  he  may  have 

274 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

been  in  at  the  time  was  quickly  knocked  out  of  him  by  the 
savage  attack  that  Bismarck  made.  The  wrath  of  many 
months,  bottled  up  like  champagne,  burst  forth  in  a  torrent  of 
vindictive  eloquence  which  swept  everything  before  it.1  After 
the  first  surprise,  Von  Arnim,  who  was  a  man  of  real  ability, 
defended  himself  stoutly, — stemmed  the  torrent,  as  it  were, — 
and  finally  persuaded  Bismarck  that  they  should  lay  their 
case  together  before  the  emperor.  We  can  almost  admire 
Von  Arnim  for  the  determined  manner  with  which  he  sus- 
tained his  position,  unstable  as  it  was,  against  the  strongest 
will  and  before  the  most  powerful  monarch  in  Europe.  Bis- 
marck impeached  Von  Arnim's  veracity,  and  the  latter  re- 
turned the  compliment  in  round  terms.  If  the  emperor's 
confidence  in  Bismarck  remained  unshaken,  he  nevertheless 
concluded  to  give  Von  Arnim  the  benefit  of  a  case  not  proven. 
Perhaps  he  also  wished  to  have  it  said  that  he  did  not  al- 
ways follow  Bismarck's  judgment.  The  Iron  Chancellor  was 
obliged  to  accept  a  reconciliation,  and  Von  Arnim  returned  to 
Paris  with  the  admonition  to  be  more  prudent  in  the  future. 
What  a  position  for  the  autocrat  of  Europe  to  be  placed  in ! 
Truly,  Bismarck  was  a  much-enduring  man. 

Von  Arnim  now  hurried  onward  to  his  fate  like  a  ship  that 
is  driven  on  the  rocks  by  a  storm.  The  monarchical  move- 
ment in  France  ripened  by  the  magnanimous  withdrawal  of 
the  Count  of  Paris  in  favor  of  the  Legitimist  candidate,  to 
whom  the  National  Assembly  finally  offered  the  crown,  only 
to  discover  that  they  had  set  up  a  fool  for  all  men  to  gaze  at.2 
The  Count  of  Chambord  would  accept  the  proffered  honor  only 
on  condition  that  the  French  would  serve  under  the  white  flag 
of  his  ancestors,  and  that  he  was  not  to  be  circumscribed  by 
constitutional  forms.  It  was  this  foolish  letter  of  Chambord's 
which  upset  Von  Arnim's  plans,  and  perhaps  saved  Bismarck 
for  Germany.  It  left  the  monarchical  movement  stranded  on 
a  bar,  and  produced  a  revulsion  of  feeling  among  the  French 
people,  who  now  realized  from  what  an  empty  figure-head  they 


1  Arnim's  "  Pro  Nihilo." 

8  This  is  what  Minister  Bancroft  called  him  at  the  time. 
275 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

had  escaped.  Louis  XV.  did  not  deal  a  more  severe  blow 
at  royalty.  The  Prussian  court  saw  clearly  now  that  Bis- 
marck was  justified  in  the  course  he  had  pursued  towards 
the  French  republic ;  but  Von  Arnim  did  not  see  it,  and  con- 
tinued as  stiff-necked  as  ever.  All  this  time  the  Kultur- 
kampf  was  raging,  and  a  number  of  French  ecclesiastics  on 
the  borders  of  Elsass  and  Lothringen  were  preaching  incen- 
diary harangues  against  the  Protestant  Germans  and  their 
heathen  emperor.  It  was  the  business  of  the  German  ambas- 
sador to  notify  the  chancellor  of  this,  but  he  failed  to  do  so, 
and  the  information  came  to  Bismarck  from  other  sources. 
When  Von  Arnim  was  directed  to  confer  with  President  Mac- 
Mahon  on  the  subject  he  is  reported  to  have  replied  that  he 
did  not  consider  it  of  sufficient  importance.  How  far  it  is 
best  to  interfere  in  such  matters  is  always  a  question  of  judg- 
ment, but  Bismarck  believed  that  incendiary  harangues  and 
sensational  newspaper  articles  caused  a  great  deal  of  mischief. 
In  this  case  it  was  part  of  the  same  struggle  that  he  was  fight- 
ing in  Germany,  and  the  relation  of  the  two  countries  was  too 
critical  at  this  time  to  leave  much  of  a  margin  for  theoretical 
politics. 

Bismarck  accordingly  applied  to  the  French  envoy  at  Berlin, 
M.  de  Gontaud-Biron,  who  appears  to  have  been  a  sensible 
person  and  well  adapted  to  his  difficult  position,  to  convey  a 
remonstrance  to  President  MacMahon  in  regard  to  the  inimi- 
cal behavior  of  the  French  ecclesiastics,  but  MacMahon, 
requiring  the  support  of  the  Ultramontanes,  and  being  aware 
that  the  German  ambassador  was  opposed  to  Bismarck's 
action,  declined  to  interfere.  This,  however,  was  the  first  step 
towards  Von  Arnim's  downfall,  for  the  German  emperor's 
sympathies  were  heartily  enlisted  in  the  conflict  with  Pius 
IX.,  and  he  had  no  intention  of  yielding  an  inch  on  that  ques- 
tion. Bismarck  accordingly  returned  to  the  attack,  and,  find- 
ing that  he  had  French  law  on  his  side,  pressed  the  case  so 
energetically  that  in  January,  1874,  he  issued  a  circular  note 
to  the  great  powers,  dwelling  on  the  serious  danger  that  evi- 
dently existed  of  a  renewal  of  the  conflict  between  France 
and  Germany,  and  intimating  broadly  that  in  such  case  the 

276 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

authorities  at  Berlin  would  not  wait  until  the  enemy  was 
better  prepared  for  it  than  at  present.  Diplomats  had  learned 
by  this  time  to  know  that  Bismarck  meant  what  he  said  and 
never  threatened  in  vain.  To  his  enemies  he  had  come  to 
appear  like  a  veritable  bogie,  or  limb  of  Lucifer.  President 
MacMahon  recognized  the  crisis  and  bowed  his  head  to  it. 
The  incendiary  bishops  were  threatened  with  suspension  in 
case  they  continued  their  warlike  counsels,  and  the  Ultra- 
montane movement  was  thus  held  in  check  for  the  time  being. 

The  exasperation  of  the  French  people,  however,  soon  ex- 
pressed itself  in  a  new  direction.  Previous  to  1871  it  had  been 
customary  to  commission  envoys  from  the  French  court  to 
all  the  more  important  German  states,  and  these  positions 
served  as  comfortable  sinecures  to  the  impecunious  depend- 
ents of  Napoleon,  but  after  the  establishment  of  German  unity 
these  missions  naturally  came  to  an  end  for  the  smaller  states 
with  the  exception  of  Bavaria.  It  was  now  proposed  (winter 
of  1874)  in  the  French  Chamber  of  Deputies  that  diplomatic 
relations  should  be  renewed  with  Saxony  and  the  South  Ger- 
man states.  This  would  have  served  as  a  fine  entering  wedge 
for  French  intrigue,  and  was,  in  fact,  a  blow  aimed  directly  at 
German  national  unity.  It  was  Von  Arnim's  business  to  have 
protested  against  it  at  once ;  but,  instead  of  doing  so,  he  wrote 
to  Bismarck  for  instructions  as  to  how  he  should  proceed. 
Such  a  case  indicates  little  more  than  a  sulky  disposition,  but, 
as  it  happened,  it  capped  the  climax.  The  truth  was  that,  now 
the  monarchical  problem  was  out  of  sight,  Von  Arnim  had 
lost  much  of  his  former  importance.  The  emperor  now 
agreed  with  Bismarck,  and  on  March  12  Von  Arnim  was 
superseded  by  Prince  Hohenlohe  and  directed  to  report  at 
Constantinople.1 

"  Whom  the  gods  would  destroy  they  first  make  mad." 
Henry  Von  Arnim's  subsequent  behavior  can  only  be  ac- 
counted for  by  a  blind  rage  which  overpowered  all  judgment. 

1  Bismarck  had  provided  Von  Arnim  with  seven  thousand  thalers  from  the 
"  reptile  fund"  to  subsidize  French  newspapers  in  the  German  interest,  but  he 
was  satisfied  that  Von  Arnim  had  used  this  money  to  subsidize  German  news- 
papers against  himself. 

277 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

He  carried  off  from  the  embassy  at  Paris  a  large  number  of 
state  documents,  which  might  either  have  compromised  his 
previous  transactions  there,  or  such  as  he  thought  might  aid 
him  in  fighting  out  his  quarrel  with  the  chancellor.  He  also 
supplied  a  news  correspondent  of  the  Vienna  Press,  an  old 
Catholic-Metternich  organ,  with  material  for  an  attack  on 
Bismarck's  Roman  Church  policy,  in  which  it  was  compared 
to  a  disadvantage  with  the  advice  proposed  by  Von  Arnim 
while  Prussian  legate  at  Rome.  This  was  published  in  time 
to  prevent  Von  Arnim's  departure  for  the  Turkish  capital, 
and  created  a  lively  sensation  throughout  Germany  and  Aus- 
tria. Bismarck  at  once  divined  its  authorship,  and  though 
Von  Arnim  denied  any  connection  with  it  he  was  at  once 
retired  from  the  diplomatic  service.  It  was  an  act  of  treach- 
erous insubordination  which  even  the  kindly  old  emperor 
could  not  overlook. 

Worse  consequences  were  soon  to  follow.  Hohenlohe,  who 
has  since  become  chancellor  himself,  was  more  of  a  Prussian 
than  a  prince ;  he  had  no  intention  of  doing  his  work  as  ambas- 
sador by  halves,  and  he  soon  reported  from  Paris  in  regard  to 
the  missing  documents.  This  was  a  case  of  theft,  quite  as  much 
as  if  Von  Arnim  had  stolen  government  bonds ;  but  he  does 
not  seem  to  have  realized  the  fact.  Perhaps  he  supposed  that 
his  social  position  and  powerful  friends  at  court  would  shield 
him  from  the  customary  penalties  of  Prussian  law.  When 
the  missing  documents  were  demanded  he  returned  a  portion, 
but  evidently  not  the  whole  number.  Bismarck  had  a  search- 
warrant  issued ;  Von  Arnim's  house  at  Stettin  was  ransacked, 
and,  as  other  government  papers  were  found  in  his  effects,  he 
was  arrested  and  brought  to  jail  in  Berlin. 

At  this  a  general  outcry  was  raised  throughout  France  and 
England.  Before  the  proper  explanation  could  be  offered  it 
was  looked  upon  as  Bismarck's  high-handed  tyranny,  and 
Disraeli  congratulated  a  small  audience,  the  following  evening 
in  London,  that  they  did  not  live  in  a  country  where  domi- 
ciliary visits  were  possible.  His  speech  was,  of  course,  re- 
ported to  the  press,  and  Bismarck  telegraphed  to  London  the 
next  day  to  know  if  the  English  premier's  remarks  were 

278 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

intended  to  have  a  personal  application,  to  which  Disraeli 
replied  meekly  enough  that  he  had  no  thought  of  such  a 
thing, — to  the  great  amusement  of  the  opposition.  The  Anglo- 
American  public  was  still  more  astonished  to  learn  that  Von 
Arnim's  offence  was  for  intriguing  in  favor  <?/"  monarchy.1 

His  imprisonment  only  lasted  a  few  days,  for  the  condition 
of  his  health  was  so  delicate  that  it  was  feared  the  confine- 
ment would  prove  fatal  to  him.  His  trial,  which  took  place 
in  December,  was  looked  forward  to  with  great  expectation 
by  Bismarck's  enemies,  for  it  was  supposed  that  all  the  du- 
bious tricks  and  underhand  methods  by  which  the  chancellor 
gained  his  ends  would  now  be  revealed.  They  were,  how- 
ever, doomed  to  grievous  disappointment.  Von  Arnim  did 
bring  some  unpleasant  charges  against  him,  but  they  were 
unsubstantiated,  and  even  if  true  would  not  seriously  com- 
promise him.  On  the  other  hand,  the  letter  to  the  Vienna 
Press  was  traced  directly  to  Von  Arnim's  apartments  in  Paris. 
His  unpatriotic  policy  and  selfish  ambition  were  paraded 
before  the  court  in  perhaps  too  sensational  colors ;  while  Bis- 
marck's character  went  up  ten  degrees  in  the  public  estima- 
tion ;  for  it  clearly  appeared  that  he  had  endured  much  and 
patiently,  and  was  really  a  disinterested  statesman  whose 
country's  welfare  was  the  magnetic  needle  which  guided  his 
course  through  storm  and  darkness.  William  Miiller  says, 
"  The  most  weighty  despatches  were  read  and  published,  and 
the  world  had  another  opportunity  to  admire  the  consistency 
and  far-sightedness  of  the  chancellor's  national  policy."  One 
fact  was  elicited,  however,  which  must  have  caused  him  some 
uneasiness,  and  that  was  the  plans  he  had  already  laid  in 
regard  to  the  election  of  a  successor  to  Pius  IX.  The  trial 
concluded  on  the  I9th  of  December,  and  Von  Arnim  was 
sentenced  to  three  months'  imprisonment,  which  seems  rather 
a  light  penalty  when  it  is  considered  that  two  centuries  earlier 
he  would  certainly  have  been  decapitated. 

Bismarck  considered  the  punishment  too  light,  and  appealed 
from  the  decision  of  the  Superior  Court  to  the  High  Chamber 

*  This  at  least  was  the  commencement  of  it. 
279 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

of  Justice.  Von  Arnim  also  appealed,  but  prudently  took 
himself  out  of  the  way  before  the  decision  of  the  second  tri- 
bunal, on  October  20,  1875,  which  increased  his  sentence  from 
three  to  nine  months ;  after  which  a  charge  of  high  treason 
was  brought  against  him,  and,  as  he  refused  to  appear  before 
the  court,  he  was  sentenced  to  five  years'  imprisonment.  He 
lived  for  some  time  in  Switzerland,  where  he  published  tracts 
and  books  in  self-defence,  and  afterwards  went  to  Vienna. 
He  died  at  Nice,  strangely  enough  on  April  19,  1881,  a  man 
of  ruined  reputation  and  an  illustration  of  Wolsey's  warning 
to  Cromwell,  "  Let  all  the  ends  thou  aimst  at  be  thy  coun- 
try's, thy  God's,  and  truth's."  Of  all  the  incidents  of  Bis- 
marck's life  his  conflict  with  Von  Arnim  has  the  most  strongly 
dramatic  character,  and  if  we  could  only  know  what  went  on 
behind  the  scenes, — Bismarck's  struggle  with  the  emperor, 
and  the  influence  that  was  brought  to  bear  on  the  other  side, 
— it  would  be  far  more  interesting  than  it  is  now,  seen  from 
the  external  side.  Some  Schiller  of  the  future,  perhaps,  will 
place  it  on  the  German  stage.  It  was  the  last,  if  not  the  first, 
"  intrigue"  against  Bismarck  during  the  reign  of  William  I., 
and  it  is  not  surprising  that  no  others  followed  it. 

THE   MAY    LAWS 

Meanwhile  the  Kulturkampf  was  dragging  on  its  weari- 
some existence,  with  a  good  deal  of  animosity  and  hard  feeling 
on  both  sides,  but  with  little  real  injury  to  any  one  concerned 
in  it.  Political  intrigue  is  the  natural  element  of  the  Vatican, 
and  a  priest  enjoys  his  obstinacy  as  an  athlete  does  his  exer- 
cise. Neither  is  it  likely  that  Bismarck  and  Dr.  Falk  suffered 
more  severely ;  and  the  conflict  aroused  an  interest  in  religious 
subjects  in  Germany  such  as  had  not  been  felt  since  the  Thirty 
Years'  War.  The  breach  between  the  Emperor  William  and 
Pius  IX.  widened  continually.  In  December  of  1872  the 
pope  referred  to  Bismarck  and  the  emperor,  before  a  meeting 
of  cardinals,  in  such  opprobrious  language  that  the  German 
legate  at  the  Vatican,  who  duly  reported  the  circumstance, 
was  at  once  recalled.  Such  action  between  two  civil  govern- 
ments would  have  been  tantamount  to  a  declaration  of  war, 

280 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

but  Bismarck  was  the  only  person  in  real  danger,  and  whether 
he  realized  this  or  not,  he  kept  straight  on  his  course,  like  the 
knight  in  Diirer's  picture,  though  death  and  the  devil  stalked 
behind  him. 

Early  in  the  new  year  Dr.  Falk  had  introduced  a  bill  in  the 
Reichstag  containing  a  number  of  laws  for  the  better  regulation 
of  Catholic  institutions  in  Germany.  They  occasioned  a  long 
and  spirited  discussion,  and  were  finally  enacted  in  the  month 
of  May,  from  which  they  derived  their  well-known  title.  As 
the  original  document  is  lengthy  and  legal  in  form,  we  will 
content  ourselves  here  with  an  abstract  statement  of  them. 

The  first  of  the  May  Laws  placed  a  limitation  on  the  penalties 
imposed  by  Catholic  ecclesiastics  on  the  members  of  their  diocese 
or  parish.  It  permitted  them  to  regulate  the  conditions  of  mem- 
bership in  the  church,  and  also  to  dismiss  members  who  had  in- 
fringed on  the  laws  of  religious  government ;  but  it  withheld  all 
right  of  jurisdiction  over  the  property,  freedom,  or  reputation  of  a 
German  citizen,  or  of  taking  any  action  whatever  affecting  his  civil 
rights.  This  was  especially  designed  to  prevent  intimidation  or 
undue  influence  in  regard  to  voting  at  elections. 

The  second  measure  was  intended  to  control  the  training  and 
education  of  the  clergy,  and  provided  that  neither  priest  nor  bishop 
should  be  installed  unless  he  were  a  graduate  of  a  German  gymna- 
sium, and  had  studied  three  years  at  a  German  university.  After 
this  he  might  study  at  the  College  of  the  Propaganda  in  Rome  if  he 
chose ;  but  he  must  first  become  a  German  by  education  and  by 
habit  of  thought.  The  second  law  also  provided  a  board  of  inspec- 
tors for  all  religious  seminaries  and  monastic  institutions,  and  placed 
them  under  the  direct  guardianship  of  the  civil  government.  It  re- 
quired the  Catholic  bishops  to  give  previous  notification  to  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  appointment  of  priests  to  particular  parishes,  or  of 
their  transference  from  one  parish  to  another,  and  it  forbade  ap- 
pointments or  changes  without  the  approval  of  the  state  inspectors. 

The  third  law  was  intended  for  the  protection  of  Catholic  dis- 
senters, so  that  the  same  freedom  of  opinion  might  be  encouraged 
within  the  fold  of  the  Church  of  Rome  as  now  exists  in  all  Protes- 
tant communities.  A  dissenter  was  only  required  to  express  his 
difference  of  belief  before  a  local  court  of  law  to  obtain  protection 
in  his  new  position. 

281 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

The  fourth  measure  was  intended  to  provide  against  all  secret 
and  arbitrary  forms  of  punishment,  especially  corporeal  chastise- 
ment, and  placed  all  monastic  institutions  under  the  supervision  of 
inspectors  for  this  purpose. 

Surely  there  was  nothing  very  terrible  in  this.  It  seems 
like  a  fair  and  judicious  measure,  not  of  a  coercive  charac- 
ter, but  intended  to  guarantee  the  same  freedom  of  thought, 
right  of  individual  opinion,  and  unrestricted  action  in  the 
clerical  profession  which  prevails  in  other  professions.  A 
similar  code  had  long  existed  in  Wiirtemberg  and  some  other 
German  states.  Compared  with  the  religious  code  of  Sweden, 
or  that  of  England  in  the  eighteenth  century,  it  was  liberality 
itself.  According  to  the  traditional  custom  of  the  Church 
of  Rome,  Catholic  boys,  especially  of  indigent  parents,  are 
marked  for  the  priesthood  while  still  at  the  gymnasia,  and 
hurried  or  coaxed  into  the  College  of  the  Propaganda  at 
Rome  before  they  are  old  enough  to  realize  the  difference  it 
is  going  to  make  to  them.  Their  studies  are,  of  course,  all 
directed  to  a  single  end ;  they  have  no  debating  societies,  hear 
no  arguments  on  opposite  sides  of  a  question,  know  nothing 
of  the  free  discussion  which  takes  place  in  Protestant  univer- 
sities, and  thus  their  whole  intellectual  life  becomes  a  piece 
of  cast-iron  dogmatism.  No  progress  is  possible  in  a  religion 
constituted  in  this  manner,  and  if  it  once  began  the  whole 
fabric  would  fall  to  pieces.  Catholic  priests  are  often  sympa- 
thetic, warm-hearted,  and  practically  helpful  men,  but  the 
higher  mental  qualities  are  stultified  in  them.  Bismarck  and 
Dr.  Falk  struck  at  the  root  of  the  matter,  and  if  their  plan 
could  be  carried  out  in  all  Catholic  communities  the  su- 
premacy of  the  pope  over  the  minds  of  his  followers  would 
soon  come  to  an  end.  They  wished  to  have  all  citizens  of  the 
empire  become  Germans  before  they  became  anything  else. 
No  wonder  the  May  Laws  raised  a  storm  in  which,  as  JEschy- 
lus  says,  "  The  heavens  were  embroiled  with  the  deep." 

These  laws  were  debated  in  the  Reichstag  until  the  2/th  of 
February,  when  the  final  vote  was  taken  on  them.  Just  before 
this  was  done  Bismarck  addressed  the  assembly  in  favor  of 

the  bill. 

282 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

The  returns  of  the  last  elections  had  not  been  so  favorable 
to  the  government  as  previously,  and  though  the  Clericals  were 
still  in  a  weak  minority,  they,  as  well  as  the  Social  Democrats, 
had  gained  a  number  of  seats.  As  this  fact  was  made  the 
most  of  in  debate  by  Dr.  Windhorst  and  Lasker,  Bismarck 
recalled  to  their  minds  that  he  had  predicted  as  much,  the 
year  before,  and  considered  it  likely  that  they  might  gain  still 
more  ground.  The  reason  for  it  was  to  be  looked  for  in  the 
distrust  and  difference  of  opinion  between  the  Conservatives 
and  the  National  Liberals.  "  There  can  be  no  decisive  politi- 
cal action  without  confidence,  and  confidence  is  a  delicate 
plant ;  if  it  is  once  destroyed  it  will  not  soon  sprout  again. 
The  supporters  of  the  government,  though  united  in  their 
opposition  to  the  usurpation  of  the  pope,  are  divided  among 
themselves,  and  hence  become  a  prey  to  decomposition."  He 
then  said : 

"The  gentleman  who  spoke  last  has  further  followed  the  same 
tactics  taken  up  by  the  opponents  of  this  bill  in  the  other  house, 
that  is,  to  give  these  bills  a  confessional — I  would  say,  a  clerical 
character.  The  question  which  we  are  treating  becomes,  in  my 
opinion,  falsified,  and  the  light  in  which  we  look  at  the  same  is 
false,  if  we  treat  the  same  from  the  confessional  or  clerical  point  of 
view.  It  is  essentially  political ;  it  is  not,  as  our  Catholic  fellow- 
citizens  are  made  to  believe,  the  contest  of  a  Protestant  dynasty 
against  the  Catholic  Church, — it  is  not  a  contest  between  faith  and 
infidelity.  It  is  the  ancient  contest  of  power,  which  is  as  old  as  the 
human  race ;  the  contest  of  power  between  kingship  and  priesthood ; 
a  contest  of  power  that  is  much  more  ancient  than  the  appearance 
of  our  Saviour  in  this  world ;  the  contest  of  power  in  which  Aga- 
memnon engaged  at  Aulis  against  his  seers,  which  there  cost  him 
his  daughter  and  prevented  the  Greek  ships  from  sailing ;  the  con- 
test of  power  that  impregnated  the  German  history  of  the  Mid- 
dle Ages  up  to  the  decomposition  of  the  German  Empire,  known 
as  the  conflict  of  the  popes  with  the  emperors,  which  found  its 
climax  in  that  the  last  representative  of  the  illustrious  Swabian  im- 
perial lineage  died  on  the  scaffold  under  the  axe  of  a  French  con- 
queror, and  that  this  same  French  conqueror  was  in  league  with 
the  pope  then  reigning.  We  have  been  very  close  to  an  analogous 
solution  of  this  same  situation,  only  applied  to  the  customs  of  our 

283 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

own  time.  If  the  French  war  of  conquest,  the  outbreak  of  which 
coincided  with  the  publication  of  the  Vatican  decrees,  had  been 
crowned  by  success,  I  do  not  know  what  one  might  have  been  able 
to  report  of  the  gesta  Dei  per  Francos  even  within  domains  of  the 
church. 

******** 

"Also  in  the  conflicts  of  the  popish  power  it  has  not  always  been 
the  case  that  just  Catholic  powers  were  the  exclusive  allies  of  the 
pope  ;  neither  have  the  priests  always  stood  by  his  side.  Cardinals 
have  been  the  state-ministers  of  great  powers  at  a  time  when  these 
powers  followed  a  strongly  anti-papistical  policy,  even  to  pro- 
nounced violence. 

"The  question  is,  here,  the  defending  of  the  state.  The  ques- 
tion is,  the  limitation  of  priestly  by  monarchical  government,  and 
this  limitation  must  be  such  that  the  state  can  assert  itself  at  the 
same  time.  For  '  in  the  kingdom  of  this  earth'  it  is  the  state  which 
rules  and  which  has  the  precedence."  2 

Bismarck's  interpretation  of  Iphigenia  at  Aulis  is  not  to  be 
found  in  Greek  mythologies,  but  it  is  plausible  and  probable. 
There  was  no  doubt  a  conflict  between  the  temporal  and  the 
priestly  power  at  that  time,  caused,  perhaps,  by  some  slight 
or  displeasure  which  the  augurs  had  incurred  from  Agamem- 
non. Unfortunate  is  the  nation  in  which  priestcraft  or  any 
traditional  religious  formalism  gains  the  ascendancy ;  all  the 
higher  forms  of  intellectual  life  are  crushed  out  of  the  people, 
and  progress  in  civilization  is  no  longer  possible.  India  is 
an  example  of  such  a  country,  and  formerly,  also,  Egypt. 
Two  thousand  years  before  Christ  only  the  Jews  could  com- 
pare with  the  Hindoos  in  their  lofty  religious  thought  and 
grand  conception  of  a  supreme  being ;  but  the  whole  political 
power  of  India  was  permitted  to  merge  in  the  priesthood, 
an  inflexible  system  of  caste  was  established,  life  became  a 
traditional,  unprogressive  routine,  and  the  Brahmans,  with 
their  fine  intellectual  heads  and  close  kinship  to  European 
nations,  are  no  wiser  to-day  than  in  the  time  of  Moses.  So 
it  would  have  been  in  modern  Europe  but  for  the  reformation 
of  Luther  and  Calvin,  and  so  it  was  largely  in  Spain,  Italy, 

1  Bismarck's  Speeches,  Reclam  ed.,  v.  251. 
284 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

and  Portugal  from  that  time  until  the  revolution  of  1789.  It 
was  an  after-skirmish  of  this  old  battle  that  Bismarck  was 
fighting. 

The  chief  measures  of  the  May  Laws  were  passed  at  this 
date  by  a  strong  majority,  but  were  amended  at  various  times 
afterwards,  and  the  question  of  civil  and  religious  marriages 
was  brought  up  the  following  month.  It  was  considered 
necessary  to  introduce  this  separately,  because  Bismarck  had 
formerly  placed  himself  on  record  against  it  in  the  debates  on 
the  North  German  constitution  of  1868.  It  is  even  stated 
that  he  now  placed  himself  in  opposition  to  it,  and  was  over- 
ruled by  Dr.  Falk  and  his  associates  in  the  ministry.  How- 
ever that  may  have  been,  either  he  was  prostrated  by  the  severe 
strain  of  business  or,  as  his  opponents  declared,  was  schul- 
krank,  because  he  did  not  wish  to  have  his  sudden  change  of 
base  continually  hurled  at  him  in  argument.  The  latter  is 
likely  enough,  although  there  is  sufficient  difference  between 
the  action  of  such  a  law  in  Protestant  and  Catholic  commu- 
nities— since  it  is  impossible  to  place  the  highest  Protestant 
prelate  in  the  position  of  the  pope — to  justify  such  an  altera- 
tion of  opinion.  The  people  who  prefer  a  contradiction  in 
form  to  an  agreement  in  fact  are  always  sufficiently  numerous 
to  have  made  it  unpleasant  for  Bismarck  to  face  this  discus- 
sion, and  the  government  would  also  have  suffered  a  certain 
loss  of  prestige  in  the  eyes  of  the  vulgar,  so  that  it  was  quite 
as  well  that  he  should  not  be  present  during  the  debate.  The 
Italian  application  of  the  law  has  already  been  referred  to.  It 
was  found  necessary  there  in  order  to  prevent  acts  of  illegally 
appointed  priests  from  having  a  public  validity,  and  there  was 
no  reason  why  the  same  application  should  not  be  made  in 
Germany. 

The  bill  was  passed  without  Bismarck's  assistance,  and  with 
the  other  measures  previously  agreed  upon  was  approved  by 
the  emperor  on  the  1st  of  May.  It  was  first  necessary,  how- 
ever, to  change  the  Prussian  constitution  in  regard  to  civil 
marriages ;  and  here  the  chief  difficulty  was  encountered  in 
the  Prussian  House  of  Peers,  always  more  conservative  than 
the  Landtag  or  the  Reichstag,  whose  members  were  only  too 

285 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

ready  to  make  changes  that  would  suit  the  requirements  of 
the  moment,  without  much  consideration  for  the  future.  The 
vote  was  taken  on  April  24,  and  Bismarck  in  his  explanatory 
speech  aptly  compared  his  change  of  policy  to  the  action  of  a 
man  who  has  been  compelled  by  circumstances  to  lay  aside  a 
peaceful  demeanor  and  adopt  a  belligerent  one. 

The  Church  of  Rome  has  always  been  the  enemy  of 
national  consolidation,  and  its  intrigues  for  this  purpose  were 
older  than  the  order  of  the  Jesuits.  Francis  Newman  takes 
notice  that  it  was  not  long  after  the  formation  of  European 
countries  into  solid  nationalities  with  effective  central  govern- 
ments that  Protestantism  appeared.  The  priests  and  the 
socialists  were  now  Bismarck's  two  enemies,  and  the  manner 
in  which  he  finally  played  off  one  against  the  other  was  an 
ingenious  piece  of  statecraft  which  cannot  be  too  much  ad- 
mired. The  constitutional  amendment  on  civil  marriages  was 
passed,  but  not  without  a  general  expression  of  regret  that 
such  a  measure  should  have  become  necessary. 


THE   ASSASSIN    KULLMAN 

The  stone  which  Pius  IX.  had  predicted  and  desired  to  fall 
on  the  heel  of  Bismarck  took  the  form  of  a  pistol-bullet,  at 
Kissingen,  in  July  of  this  year.  The  self-appointed  avenger 
of  Catholic  wrongs  was  a  cooper  of  Magdeburg  named  Ed- 
ward Kullman,  a  man  possessed  of  an  idea  until  it  had  become 
a  personal  devil.  He  was  only  twenty-one  years  old,  a  youth 
of  good  conduct  and  reputation,  but  at  that  impressionable 
age  much  given  to  the  society  of  priests  and  religious  exer- 
cises. The  prince  was  riding  in  a  half-open  carriage  on 
July  13  through  the  crowded  streets  of  the  watering-place, 
when  a  man  in  priestly  habiliments  placed  himself  as  if  by 
accident  in  front  of  the  horses,  so  that  the  driver  reined  them 
in.  Simultaneously  Kullman  advanced,  and  fired  a  shot  at 
Bismarck's  head.  At  the  same  instant  Bismarck  was  raising 
his  hand  to  make  a  salute,  and  the  bullet  just  nicked  his 
wrist  without  doing  further  injury.  Kullman  probably  aimed 
at  his  head  from  the  popular  impression  that  Bismarck  always 

286 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

wore  a  shirt  of  mail  under  his  military  coat,1  and  this  rep- 
utat'on  no  doubt  preserved  Bismarck's  life ;  for,  though  he 
may  have  taken  such  a  precaution  at  one  time,  it  is  not  likely 
that  he  always  continued  it. 

Kullman  was  instantly  seized,  but  in  the  public  anxiety  for 
the  chancellor,  his  confederate,  whether  a  priest  or  not,  ap- 
pears to  have  escaped.2  After  Bismarck  had  returned  to  his 
hotel  he  sent  for  Kullman  and  cross-examined  him.  The 
latter  made  no  secret  of  the  object  of  his  crime,  and  an  inves- 
tigation at  Magdeburg  soon  implicated  a  priest  named  Stohr- 
mann,  who  suddenly  died  before  the  plot  could  be  traced  any 
further.  In  the  sixteenth  century  this  would  have  been  ac- 
counted for  by  a  mandate  from  the  Vatican,  but  in  our  own 
time  it  is  more  likely  to  have  been  a  case  of  suicide.  Al- 
though this  chapter  of  the  Kulturkampf  is  the  darkest  epi- 
sode in  the  biography  of  Pius  IX.,  there  is  no  sufficient  reason 
for  believing  that  he  would  deliberately  plan  an  assassination. 
Kullman  was  tried  at  Wiirzburg  and  condemned  to  fourteen 
years'  imprisonment, — a  sentence  which  seems  hardly  severe 
enough.  As  a  matter  of  security  he  ought  to  have  been  im- 
prisoned during  the  rest  of  Bismarck's  life.  In  Prussia  death 
is  the  penalty  for  an  attempt  to  assassinate  members  of  the 
royal  family,  and  so  it  should  be  everywhere  for  the  highest 
officers  of  state,  such  as  presidents,  cabinet  ministers,  and 
field-marshals.  It  is  no  ordinary  crime,  but  high  treason  of 
the  blackest  description. 

A  cold  shudder  ran  through  Germany  at  Kullman's  at- 
tempt, and  there  was  scarcely  a  Protestant  church  where 
prayers  and  thanks  for  the  chancellor's  safety  were  not  offered 
the  following  Sabbath.  The  act  was,  of  course,  injurious  to 
the  pope's  cause,  and  even  converted  a  large  number  of  Ultra- 
montanes  into  honest,  patriotic  Germans.  The  Clerical  party 
endeavored  to  counteract  this  feeling  by  stigmatizing  Kull- 
man as  a  half-deranged  crank,  who  was  not  altogether  respon- 


1  There  was  also  a  belief  that  he  wore  a  coat  of  plaited  linen  of  many  thick- 
nesses which  no  bullet  could  penetrate. 

8  At  least  I  have  not  been  able  to  find  an  account  of  his  arrest  or  trial. 

287 


LIFE   OF   BISMARCK 

sible  for  his  act ;  but  the  Magdeburgers,  who  have  good  reason 
for  their  strong  Protestantism,  testified  contrary  to  this,  and 
his  connection  with  a  large  Catholic  society  and  the  influence 
of  the  priest  Stohrmann  were  soon  proved  beyond  question. 
The  weapon  that  he  used  was  traced  to  the  man  from  whom 
he  bought  it,  and  was  found  to  have  been  purchased  during 
the  Clerical  agitation  of  the  previous  year.  The  sudden  death 
of  Stohrmann  added  to  the  public  sensation,  and  attached  to 
the  event  the  character  of  a  dark  and  hidden  mystery. 

Bismarck  cannot  be  blamed  after  this  for  withdrawing  the 
German  legate  from  the  Vatican,  and  ordering  a  strict  enforce- 
ment of  the  laws  against  revolutionary  sermons  and  libellous 
publications.  Incendiary  language  and  personal  calumny  are 
the  powder  and  ball  of  the  assassin's  revolver.  Among  others 
who  were  indicted  under  his  special  orders  was  a  Silesian 
priest  named  Majunke,  formerly  editor  of  the  Volkszeitel,  a 
furious  Catholic  publication,  who  was  also  a  member  of  the 
Reichstag.  Surprising  as  it  may  seem,  Majunke  succeeded 
in  escaping  arrest,  and,  trusting  to  the  protection  of  those 
"  sacred  precincts,"  appeared  in  his  seat  when  the  Reichstag 
was  convened  in  the  following  December.  It  was  now  that 
the  Social  Democrats,  and  especially  Lasker,  who  was  really 
a  German  Rochefort,  showed  their  true  colors  by  supporting 
the  Clericals  in  their  hour  of  disgrace.  A  committee  ap- 
pointed to  consider  Majunke's  case  reported  that  the  indict- 
ment against  him  was  well  grounded,  and  that  the  judgment 
of  the  court  of  a  year's  imprisonment  ought  to  be  enforced ; 
but  Lasker  succeeded  in  carrying  a  motion  by  a  small  ma- 
jority which  substantially  declared  that  members  of  the  Reichs- 
tag were  superior  to  the  civil  laws,  and  could  only  be  judged 
and  punished  by  their  own  associates.  This  was  practically 
the  same  as  the  pope's  doctrine  of  infallibility,  and  it  is  an 
indication  of  a  tendency  of  our  time  which  goes  to  maintain 
that  legislative  bodies  exist  by  divine  right,  and  that  their 
decisions  are  equally  inviolable. 

How  disheartening  this  must  have  been  to  Bismarck !  He 
was  in  constant  danger  of  assassination,  and  yet  this  body  of 
men,  who  were  supposed  to  represent  the  sentiment  and  feel- 

288 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

ing  of  united  Germany, — the  Germany  which*  he  had  created, 
— refused  him  the  only  relief  from  this  grievous  oppression 
which  he  knew  how  to  obtain.  A  man  who  had  been  con- 
demned under  laws  created  by  the  Reichstag  could,  never- 
theless, escape  punishment,  and  continue  to  beard  him  in  the 
legislative  halls  so  long  as  his  superstitious  constituents  chose 
to  send  him  there.  Never  before  had  his  language  to  the 
popular  assembly  been  so  scathing,  so  scornful.  It  was  like 
Scipio's  reply  to  the  senate  when  he  was  accused  of  pecula- 
tion. His  words  were  like  burning  coals,  and  those  who  saw 
the  expression  of  his  face  never  forgot  it. 

He  left  the  chamber  abruptly  and  waited  on  the  emperor 
with  the  information  that  he  had  been  outvoted  and  was 
willing  to  resign.  William  L,  however,  refused  to  consider 
this  as  a  possibility,  and,  though  almost  as  indignant  as  Bis- 
marck, advised  him  to  take  no  further  notice  of  the  difficulty. 
Bismarck's  absence  from  the  chamber  at  the  next  meeting 
attracted  attention,  and  a  rumor  of  his  retirement  was  circu- 
lated, causing  no  slight  uneasiness,  among  both  the  Conser- 
vatives and  the  National  Liberals.  It  was  now  the  latter  who 
came  forward  in  his  support  with  a  resolution  of  special  con- 
fidence in  the  "  wisdom,  uprightness,  and  patriotism  of  the 
chancellor,"  which  Deputy  Benningsen  supported  with  such 
a  vigorous  speech  that  even  Dr.  Windhorst  was  effectually 
silenced  by  it.  Legislative  bodies  are  even  more  unwilling 
than  individuals  to  confess  that  they  have  made  a  mistake, 
but  the  resolution  was  passed  by  a  union  of  all  parties  except- 
ing the  Clericals,  Poles,  and  Socialists. 

The  German  Catholic  bishops  held  a  convention  at  Fulda 
and  agreed  upon  a  series  of  resolutions,  which  were  forwarded 
to  the  ministry,  protesting  against  the  May  Laws  as  unjust, 
inhuman,  sacrilegious,  and  contrary  to  canon  law.  Dr.  Falk 
replied  to  this  with  a  request  that  they  should  submit  regular 
reports  of  the  condition  of  their  parishes  and  all  their  pro- 
ceedings to  his  bureau.  The  bishops  were  enjoined  against 
the  installation  of  priests  without  previous  notification  to  the 
government.  There  were  some  who  might  have  obeyed  this 
order  but  for  fear  of  being  dispossessed  themselves  by  the 
19  289 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

Vatican  council*  The  unfortunate  bishops  were  really  under 
a  cross-fire.  They  declared  that  they  were  not  able  to 
comply  with  Dr.  Falk's  demands,  and  would  be  obliged  to 
resist  them  to  the  extremity  of  persecution.  Dr.  Falk's  per- 
secution, however,  went  no  further  than  to  declare  the  acts  of 
such  installed  priests  illegal,  and  to  suspend  the  payment  of 
salaries  due  them  from  the  government.  Hundreds  of  par- 
ishes soon  became  vacant  of  their  officiating  clergy,  but  the 
parishioners  did  not  appear  to  suffer  much  from  this,  and  the 
government  reaped  the  benefit  of  the  suspended  salaries. 
When  Joseph  II.  abolished  capital  punishment  in  Austria  the 
number  of  murders  increased  so  alarmingly  that  he  found 
himself  obliged  to  restore  the  death-penalty ;  but  we  do  not 
hear  of  an  increase  of  crime  or  vice  in  the  Catholic  portions 
of  Prussia  during  what  has  been  termed  Bismarck's  Diocle- 
tian period.  What  might  have  resulted  if  this  order  of  affairs 
had  continued  for  a  whole  generation,  it  would  hardly  be  safe 
to  predict. 

The  severest  case  under  the  operation  of  the  May  Laws 
was  that  of  Archbishop  Ledochowski  of  Posen,  who  was  at 
once  a  prelate  and  a  Polish  count.  In  order  to  make  amends 
for  the  deficit  in  the  exchequer  in  his  diocese,  he  made  an 
importunate  and  successful  endeavor  to  raise  contributions  in 
all  the  parishes  under  his  dominion.  As  this  was  an  onerous 
burden  on  the  Poles,  for  the  funds  were  mostly  derived  from 
the  superstitious  peasants,  Dr.  Falk  requested  him  to  discon- 
tinue it,  and,  as  he  still  persisted,  Dr.  Falk  suspended  him. 
As  Ledochowski  lived  in  a  community  that  was  determined 
to  protect  him,  he  defied  the  German  government,  and  actu- 
ally succeeded  in  protracting  his  case  by  a  series  of  ingenious 
legal  make-shifts  for  nearly  seven  months  before  he  was  finally 
brought  into  court  under  a  criminal  indictment  and  sentenced 
to  four  years'  imprisonment.  Among  the  accusations  against 
him  he  was  charged  with  having  attempted  to  exclude  the 
study  of  the  German  language  from  the  schools  in  his  dio- 
cese, and  the  police  discovered  that  he  was  in  active  corre- 
spondence with  certain  Russian  Poles  who  were  under  sus- 
picion of  hatching  a  new  revolution.  Pius  IX.  sent  him  a 

290 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

cardinal's  hat  for  consolation  in  his  confinement  and  to  show 
his  contempt  for  German  jurisprudence.  The  Archbishop  of 
Cologne  and  the  bishops  of  Treves  and  Paderborn  were  all 
imprisoned  for  short  terms  for  contumacious  behavior, — no 
severe  trial  for  a  common  priest,  but  hard  lines  for  a  luxurious 
bishop.  A  bishop  who  had  been  excommunicated  by  the 
pope  for  refusing  to  support  the  infallibility  dogma  was  re- 
stored to  his  diocese  by  Dr.  Falk. 

The  anti-infallibility  Catholics  under  the  lead  of  Dr.  D61- 
linger  formed  themselves  into  a  separate  party  called  the  Old 
Catholics,  with  the  professed  intention  of  reforming  their 
church  and  restoring  it  to  the  purity  and  simplicity  of  the 
early  Christians.  Although  not  a  large  fraction  of  their  own 
sect,  they  gave  the  German  government  a  strong  moral  sup- 
port, and  the  adherents  of  the  pope  quite  as  much  trouble,  at 
the  elections. 

What  was  Pius  IX.  going  to  do  about  this?  In  the  pre- 
ceding August  (1873)  he  had  written  a  most  imprudent  letter 
to  Emperor  William,  in  which  he  took  for  granted  that  there 
was  a  difference  of  opinion  between  him  and  his  ministers  on 
the  Catholic  question,  and  trusted  that  he  would  be  suffi- 
ciently resolute  to  adhere  to  his  convictions,  and  to  dispense 
with  the  services  of  those  who  wished  to  lead  him  into  con- 
troversial pitfalls  and  unfriendly  relations  with  the  See  of 
Rome.  What  advantage  the  pope  and  Antonelli  expected  to 
gain  from  this  manoeuvre,  especially  after  their  declination  to 
receive  Cardinal  Hohenlohe  at  the  Vatican,  it  is  difficult  to 
comprehend,  and  its  ultimate  effect  was  merely  to  cause  Pius 
IX.  to  appear  ridiculous.  The  emperor  replied  in  September 
that  he  and  his  ministry  were  altogether  in  harmony  in  regard 
to  the  policy  that  was  being  pursued  on  the  dogma  of  infalli- 
bility, and  designated  the  Roman  Catholic  clergy  as  the  origi- 
nators of  the  quarrel,  since  they  had  distinctly  refused  to 
render  obedience  to  the  laws  and  constitution  of  the  German 
empire ;  nor  could  he  consider  the  pope  in  any  respect  as  a 
mediator  between  him  and  the  Christian^  religion.  The  corre- 
spondence was  made  public,  greatly  to  the  pope's  annoyance; 
and  the  absurdity  of  presuming  that  the  stout  old  emperor 

291 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

had  been  acting  under  the  pressure  of  unfair  influence  was 
manifest  to  everybody. 

After  Kullman's  attempt  to  assassinate  Bismarck  the  Vati- 
can council  prudently  went  under  cover,  and  the  chief  interest 
of  the  time  centred  in  the  prosecution  of  the  Archbishop  of 
Posen,  when  it  was  discovered  Pius  IX.  had  named  Ledo- 
chowski  to  be  primate  of  Poland, — a  revolutionary  movement, 
in  view  of  the  fact  that  no  such  state  as  Poland  existed.  The 
revolutionary  intentions  of  the  Vatican  were  so  carelessly 
concealed  that  a  document  in  evidence  of  them  from  the 
pope's  nuncio  at  Munich  came  into  Bismarck's  possession, 
and  was  exposed  by  him  in  the  Reichstag  during  the  debate 
on  Paul  Majunke. 

The  agitation  in  Belgium  reached  such  a  pitch  that  Bis- 
marck found  himself  obliged  to  interfere,  and  notified  the 
Belgian  government  that  a  stop  must  be  placed  to  such  in- 
flammatory proceedings,  which  might  even  endanger  the 
peace  of  Europe.  At  first  the  King  of  Belgium,  relying  on 
the  protection  of  Great  Britain,  was  inclined  to  disregard  this 
admonition ;  but  a  notification  from  Disraeli,  who  was  even 
more  opposed  to  Catholicism  than  Gladstone,  caused  an  alter- 
ation in  his  cabinet  councils,  and  the  requisite  orders  were 
issued ;  and  though  not  enforced  with  proper  strictness,  they 
served  indifferently  to  reform  the  evil. 

After  the  commencement  of  the  new  year  the  pope  took 
courage  again,  and  on  February  5,  1875,  published  an  encyclic 
letter  to  his  bishops,  declaring  the  May  Laws  invalid  with  re- 
gard to  his  adherents ;  forbade  all  faithful  followers,  both  clergy 
and  laity,  from  rendering  them  obedience ;  and  ordered  a  bull 
of  excommunication  against  Dr.  Dollinger,  Bishop  Reinkens, 
and  the  whole  sect  of  the  Old  Catholic  clergy.  In  the  twelfth 
century  this  edict  might  have  produced  a  terrible  effect,  but 
it  could  do  little  harm  in  the  nineteenth,  especially  under 
a  Protestant  government.  However,  it  was  considered  in- 
judicious that  so  much  seed  of  incipient  rebellion  should  be 
sown  broadcast  without  receiving  some  check  and  supervision 
from  the  government ;  and  as  the  Ultramontane  organ  Ger- 
mania  published  at  this  time  an  atrocious  editorial,  in  which 

292 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

assassins  were  made  to  appear  conspicuously  to  the  advantage 
of  what  were  called  the  oppressors  of  the  faithful,  Bismarck 
and  Dr.  Falk  contrived  together  three  new  enactments,  as  a 
supplement  to  the  May  Laws,  of  a  still  more  sweeping  char- 
acter. 

The  first  of  these  was  an  extension  of  the  law  against  gov- 
ernment salaries  being  paid  to  priests  who  had  been  installed 
contrary  to  the  civil  regulations.  It  provided  for  a  stoppage 
of  salary  to  all  ecclesiastics  who  were  unwilling  to  subscribe 
implicit  obedience  to  the  May  Laws  and  take  an  oath  to  sup- 
port the  government. 

The  second  law  was  intended  for  the  expurgation  of  mon- 
asteries and  cloisters ;  and  it  provided  that  all  such  establish- 
ments should  be  closed  and  their  inmates  expelled  unless  they 
were  willing  to  take  the  oath  of  allegiance  to  the  German 
government.  The  Sisters  of  Mercy,  however,  were  exempted 
from  this  regulation,  as  serviceable  and  harmless  members  of 
society. 

The  third  law  was  intended  to  reconstruct  such  Catholic 
parishes  as  had  become  disintegrated,  and  to  afford  them  an 
opportunity  of  managing  their  own  affairs, — very  much  after 
the  American  fashion ;  though  it  was  provided  that  this  should 
take  place  under  the  supervision  of  government  inspectors. 
Bills  were  also  passed  securing  to  the  Old  Catholics  continued 
use  and  occupation  of  their  churches  and  church  property. 

Supplementary  laws  were  found  necessary  to  prevent  priests 
who  had  been  turned  out  of  their  parishes  by  the  government 
from  returning  and  performing  the  functions  of  their  office  in 
an  illegal  manner,  and  also  for  the  administration  of  property 
belonging  to  the  Church  in  dioceses  left  vacant  by  the  ex- 
patriation of  bishops.  In  the  former  case  moderate  terms  of 
imprisonment  were  adjudicated,  and  in  the  latter  commis- 
sioners were  appointed  to  care  for  the  property  and  account 
for  its  income  in  a  scrupulous  manner  until  bishops  should  be 
appointed  who  could  receive  the  sanction  of  the  ministry. 
Various  additions  were  made  to  the  May  Laws  from  time  to 
time,  but  these  are  the  substance  of  them.  The  fierceness  of 
the  debate  in  the  Reichstag  on  this  occasion  may  readily  be 

293 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

imagined.  Mud-throwing  was  common,  and  everything  that 
could  be  raked  up  against  Bismarck,  just  and  unjust,  true  and 
improbable,  from  his  college  days  to  the  malicious  inventions 
of  the  Paris  journalists,  was  made  full  use  of.  The  socialistic 
Lasker  made  himself  particularly  conspicuous  in  this  dirty 
work.  At  the  same  time  Bismarck  received  abundant  as- 
surances of  encouragement  and  support  from  all  parts  of 
Germany,  including  Bavaria  and  Rhenish  Prussia.  A  warfare 
of  pamphlets  was  carried  on  continually,  and  cartoons  published 
representing  infallibility  as  an  ugly  serpent,  into  which  a  St. 
George  in  the  likeness  of  Bismarck  was  thrusting  his  spear. 
That  there  were  honest  convictions  on  the  other  side,  much 
endurance,  and  a  praiseworthy  dignity  to  be  recognized  in 
the  behavior  of  the  priests,  is  not  to  be  denied.  It  was  at 
least  a  bloodless  warfare,  and  even  the  sufferings  of  Arch- 
bishop Ledochowski  and  others,  who  were  imprisoned  for  the 
glory  of  Pius  IX.,  cannot  properly  be  estimated  at  a  high 
rate. 

These  enactments  were  passed  and  approved  by  the  em- 
peror in  the  spring  of  1875,  and  made  a  grand  clearing  out 
of  Catholicism  from  the  greater  portion  of  Germany.  Bis- 
marck, like  the  morning  sun,  had  swept  the  dark  shadows 
across  the  horizon.  Whether  he  had  slain  the  python  of  infal- 
libility still  remained  to  be  proved,  for  such  monsters  have  a 
rare  faculty  of  coming  to  life  after  remaining  for  long  periods  in 
a  torpid  condition,  and  it  is  even  said  of  common  snakes  that 
their  tails  never  die  till  after  sunset.  He  knew  that  his  own 
life  was  constantly  in  danger,  but  he  went  straight  on,  like  an 
ocean  steamer  through  storm  and  fog.  To  a  certain  extent 
the  whole  community  was  in  a  state  of  siege,  and  this  he 
knew  could  not  endure  forever.  The  event  from  which  he 
chiefly  apprehended  relief  was  the  death  of  Pius  IX.,  which 
now  could  not  be  delayed  many  years.  Without  the  least 
pretence  of  concealment  he  agitated  the  question  of  the  next 
pontifical  election,  and  advised  the  Christian  courts  of  Europe 
to  take  such  measures  in  regard  to  it  that  a  repetition  of  the 
present  evil  might  not  occur. 

The  King  of  Bavaria  and  his  ministry  supported  Bismarck 

294 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

in  the  Kulturkampf  to  a  degree  which  plainly  shows  that  the 
question  was  not  one  of  Protestantism  versus  Catholicism  so 
much  as  it  was  of  church  against  state.  The  elections  in 
1874  for  the  Bavarian  legislature  resulted  in  a  loss  to  the 
Ultramontanes,  though  they  still  preserved  a  slight  majority 
in  the  House.  They  nevertheless  adopted  an  address  to  the 
throne,  in  which  they  requested  the  dismissal  of  the  patri- 
otic ministry  and  the  formation  of  a  cabinet  to  support  the 
policy  of  Pius  IX. ;  but  the  king  was  not  to  be  moved,  and 
gave  the  committee  from  the  House  to  understand  that  their 
majority  was  too  small  to  dictate  the  policy  of  Bavaria.  At 
the  same  time  he  signified  to  the  ministry  that  he  was  entirely 
satisfied  with  their  position  with  regard  to  the  Kulturkampf, 
and  assured  them  of  his  entire  confidence  in  their  manage- 
ment of  affairs.  This  was  in  November,  and  one  month 
earlier  Emperor  William  had  made  a  visit  to  Victor  Em- 
manuel in  Rome  itself,  where  he  was  received  with  an  enthu- 
siasm which  in  the  pope's  opinion  was  near  akin  to  madness. 

THE   SPANISH   REPUBLIC 

After  the  withdrawal  of  the  Hohenzollern  candidacy  the 
crown  of  Spain  was  offered  by  the  Cortes  to  Amadeo,  the 
second  son  of  Victor  Emmanuel,  and  this  plan  of  uniting  the 
interests  of  Spain  and  Italy  by  a  royal  family  bond  would 
seem  to  have  been  a  judicious  one.  Amadeo,  however,  found 
the  Spanish  throne  a  most  uncomfortable  position.  The  whole 
country  was  divided  into  factions,  whose  leaders  were  contin- 
ually conspiring  together  to  make  difficulties  for  him,  and 
the  behavior  of  the  Spanish  nobility,  always  noted  for  their 
arrogance,  called  soberbia,  was  unfriendly  and  disagreeable. 
After  enduring  these  tribulations  for  nearly  two  years,  Ama- 
deo concluded  that  a  princely  life  in  Italy  was  preferable  to  a 
royal  life  in  Spain,  and  tendered  his  resignation.  This  left 
the  monarchical  party  in  the  vocative.  They  had  tried  every 
experiment  that  had  offered  itself.  Castelar,  the  finest  orator 
in  Europe,1  now  led  the  Republicans  to  victory,  which  was 

*  According  to  Sumner's  estimate. 
295 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

not  difficult  in  the  demoralized  state  of  the  opposition.  The 
political  condition  of  Spain,  however,  or  the  temperament  of 
the  people,  is  not  suited  to  republicanism,  and  Castelar  had  no 
sooner  become  president  than  he  found  it  necessary  to  usurp 
the  authority  of  a  dictator.  How  reluctant  he  was  to  do  this 
those  who  knew  him  can  testify.  He  was  a  high-minded 
patriot,  and  by  no  means  a  sentimentalist;  but  in  the  confused 
turmoil  of  Spanish  affairs  the  wisest  judgment  might  have 
been  at  fault.  He  looked  to  republicanism  as  one  chance 
among  others ;  but  republicanism  strengthened  the  hands  of 
the  Carlists,  who  were  the  Ultramontanes  of  Spain.  The 
guerilla  warfare  which  the  Carlists  had  been  carrying  on  in 
the  northern  provinces  now  assumed  a  formidable  aspect,  and 
on  December  9  they  gained  a  decisive  victory  over  General 
Loma  and  captured  a  large  number  of  prisoners. 

Among  the  captives  there  was  a  German  officer  named 
Schmidt,  who  was  serving  as  war  correspondent  for  the  Ger- 
man press.  In  violation  of  all  rules  of  warfare  and  humanity 
this  man  was  shot  by  the  Carlist  general,  with  many  others, 
to  the  great  indignation  of  the  German  people,  who  were  in 
no  mood,  after  their  late  victories,  to  feel  resigned  to  such  an 
outrage.  As  the  Carlists  were  rebels  and  beyond  the  direct 
reach  of  diplomacy,  Bismarck  found  other  ways  by  which  he 
could  make  his  power  felt.  Castelar  was  succeeded  by  Mar- 
shal Serrano  as  president  of  the  immature  republic,  which  was 
not  yet  recognized  by  foreign  courts.  To  give  stability  to 
the  government  at  Madrid  and  weaken  the  position  of  the 
Carlists,  Bismarck  proposed  to  the  powers  that  the  Spanish 
republic  should  be  accepted  as  a  de  facto  government.  All 
agreed  to  this,  with  the  exception  of  France  and  Russia.  The 
Tsar  was  sufficiently  disgusted  with  the  French  republic,  and 
MacMahon's  relation  with  the  Ultramontanes  was  such  that 
he  was  equally  afraid  of  displeasing  them  and  of  irritating 
Bismarck ;  so  that  the  curious  spectacle  presented  itself  of  a 
monarchy  endorsing  a  republic,  and  of  a  republic  supporting 
monarchical  claims.  Not  only  did  the  French  administration 
give  moral  encouragement  to  the  Carlists,  but  large  quantities 
of  arms  and  other  war  material  were  being  furnished  to  Don 

296 


LIFE  OF   BISMARCK 

Carlos  by  his  French  sympathizers.  As  soon,  however,  as 
Serrano's  government  had  been  recognized  by  Great  Britain, 
Germany,  and  Italy,  this  traffic  became  contrary  to  inter- 
national law,  and  Bismarck  notified  the  French  president  that 
it  must  come  to  an  end.  MacMahon,  who  was  always  a 
well-meaning  man,  and  as  desirous  as  Thiers  of  the  public 
good,  had  no  objection  to  this  so  long  as  he  could  give  a 
satisfactory  excuse  for  it.  At  the  same  time  two  German 
ships  of  war  were  despatched  to  the  Bay  of  Biscay,  in  order 
to  cut  off  the  supplies  of  the  Carlists  in  that  direction,  and  it 
was  not  long  before  France  also  recognized  the  government 
at  Madrid. 

Unfortunately  the  republic  could  not  support  itself  in  Spain 
even  with  foreign  assistance.  Almost  on  the  last  day  of 
December  General  Campos  proclaimed  Alfonso,  the  son  of 
Queen  Isabella,  at  the  time  a  pupil  of  seventeen  years  in  a 
French  school,  to  be  king  of  Spain.  His  example  was  imme- 
diately followed  by  the  other  generals  serving  under  Serrano, 
who  accordingly  resigned  the  presidency  with  a  good  grace. 
Two  weeks  later  the  unfortunate  boy  was  crowned  in  Madrid 
as  Alfonso  XII.  Don  Carlos,  after  struggling  obstinately 
against  fate  during  the  spring  and  summer  of  1875,  finally 
crossed  the  French  frontier  with  a  remnant  of  two  thousand 
men.  Although  the  murder  of  Captain  Schmidt  was  never 
avenged,  Don  Carlos's  chances  were  materially  injured  by  it, 
and  something  at  least  had  been  gained  towards  enforcing 
respect  for  German  citizenship  in  foreign  countries.  Ger- 
many, for  the  last  hundred  years  or  more,  had  really  been  the 
first  nation  in  Europe, — the  nation  which  produced  the  great- 
est men  and  the  finest  art, — and  yet  it  had  been  habitual  for 
English,  French,  and  even  Italians  to  speak  of  Germans  in  a 
tone  of  condescension,  if  not  of  contempt. 

THE   RIOT   AT   SALONICA 

Bismarck's  next  interference  in  behalf  of  the  rights  of  Ger- 
man citizens  placed  him  side  by  side  with  President  Mac- 
Mahon. On  May  6,  1876,  the  French  and  German  consuls 
at  Salonica  were  murdered  by  a  fanatical  mob  of  Mohamme- 

297 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

dans  for  interfering  to  prevent  a  young  Christian  woman  from 
embracing  the  faith  of  Islam.  It  is  always  difficult  to  reach 
the  true  condition  of  such  affairs,  so  conflicting  are  the  ac- 
counts in  regard  to  them,  and  whether  undue  pressure  was 
exerted  on  the  mind  of  this  young  girl  it  is  now  impossible  to 
determine.  The  Turks  live  in  a  state  of  sluggish  animosity 
towards  their  Christian  neighbors,  which  is  generally  harm- 
less enough,  but  which  may  at  the  slightest  irritation  madden 
them  to  the  most  desperate  deeds.  They  have  learned  to 
tolerate  the  Christian  faith  as  a  political  necessity,  but  they 
resent  the  least  interference  with  their  own  creed  with  a  fury 
that  passes  all  bounds.  If  the  missionaries  make  converts  of 
Mohammedans  by  the  Christian  method,  the  Turks  retaliate 
by  making  converts  according  to  their  own  method, — that  is, 
at  the  sword's  point.  The  Turkish  mind  is  so  constituted 
that  this  seems  to  them  perfectly  fair  and  reasonable.  It  may 
have  been  injudicious  for  the  French  and  German  consuls  to 
interfere  with  the  ceremonies  in  the  mosque,  but  their  murder 
was  no  less  an  outrage  of  international  right. 

Bismarck  and  MacMahon  acted  in  concert.  A  Franco- 
German  fleet  was  despatched  to  Salonica,  and  the  Sultan 
received  a  peremptory  demand  for  satisfaction.  The  cus- 
tomary method  of  treating  such  claims  of  justice  at  the 
Ottoman  court  has  been  to  make  unlimited  professions  with 
small  performance  of  the  same.  Real  or  imaginary  obstacles 
are  brought  into  play,  all  of  which  the  foreign  ambassador 
has  to  discover  some  method  of  removing,  until  the  time  has 
passed  by  when  anything  like  justice  can  be  obtained,  and 
only  some  pitiful  compromise  is  possible.  By  what  persua- 
sion Bismarck  succeeded  in  having  his  demands  enforced  in  a 
prompt  and  effective  manner  has  never  transpired,  but  it  is 
certain  that  Abdul  Aziz  acted  in  this  instance  with  excep- 
tional alacrity.  A  Turco-European  commission  was  ap- 
pointed and  proceeded  at  once  to  Salonica,  where  a  number 
of  the  leading  rioters  were  seized,  convicted,  and  hanged, 
while  many  others  were  condemned  to  milder  punishments, 
which  the  German  ambassador  was  directed  to  see  were  prop- 
erly enforced.  Even  indemnities  in  money  for  the  families 

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LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

of  the  murdered  consuls  were  obtained,  though  with  some- 
what more  difficulty. 

A   WAR   SCARE 

During  the  spring  and  summer  of  1875  suspicious  rumors 
were  in  the  air  of  another  war  between  France  and  Germany, 
and  the  frog-and-insect  chorus  on  the  political  Brocken  set  up 
a  constantly  repeated  refrain  of  "  that  demoniacal  Bismarck," 
who  was  again  going  to  water  the  valleys  of  Europe  with 
blood.  The  origin  of  this  appears  to  have  come  from  the 
constantly  increasing  military  preparations  of  the  French  gov- 
ernment. The  Prussian  military  system  had  been  introduced 
into  France,  and  this  enabled  the  nation  to  maintain  a  force 
twice  as  great  as  that  with  which  Napoleon  III.  went  to  war 
in  1870.  Such  an  army,  well  drilled,  and  with  competent 
general  officers,  would  not  have  been  an  unfair  match  for  the 
German  military  machine,  and  the  fact  naturally  attracted 
attention  in  Berlin,  and  the  question  was  asked  in  the  impe- 
perial t cabinet,  "Whither  is  this  armament  tending?"  The 
influence  of  Gambetta  was  constantly  increasing  in  France, — 
a  rash,  impetuous  man,  full  of  what  is  called  the  spirit  of  the 
age,  and  who  had  proved  in  1870  to  be  not  less  remarkable 
for  his  organizing  ability  than  for  his  unwillingness  to  recog- 
nize accomplished  facts.1  There  could  be  no  more  appro- 
priate or  more  dangerous  leader  for  a  popular  war  of  revenge 
against  Germany.  French  newspapers,  periodicals,  and  books 
were  never  more  belligerent  than  at  this  time,  and  the  same 
spirit  expressed  itself  in  the  fine  arts,  so  that  during  the  next 
ten  years  a  large  number  of  French  paintings  were  produced 
representing  battle-scenes  in  which  the  Germans  were  always 
defeated, — and  these,  too,  the  work  of  excellent  artists.  Mean- 
while President  MacMahon,  who  had  no  intention  himself  of 
going  to  war  a  second  time  for  French  glory,  was  organizing 
a  fine  army  for  Gambetta's  purpose, — if  only  it  should  fall 
into  his  hands.  MacMahon  recognized  the  superiority  of 

1  Manteuffel  expressed  his  opinion  in  1872  .that  Thiers  would  be  succeeded 
by  Gambetta,  Gambetta  by  the  Commune,  and  the  Commune  by  a  military 
despotism. 

299 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

Von  Moltke,  and  had  no  desire  to  try  conclusions  with  him 
again. 

At  the  same  time  an  intrigue  was  on  foot  to  unite  the 
Ultramontanes  of  France,  Austria,  and  Italy  in  an  alliance 
against  Germany.  The  plan  was  impracticable  in  itself,  un- 
less a  revolution  could  be  effected  in  Austria  first  of  all.  If 
that  could  be  accomplished  it  was  expected  that  MacMahon 
and  Francis  Joseph  would  shake  hands,  and  that  Victor 
Emmanuel,  finding  himself  between  two  fires,  and  that  the 
chances  were  turning  against  Bismarck,  would  feel  obliged  to 
fall  into  line.  The  current  in  Austria,  however,  was  now  run- 
ning in  the  opposite  direction.  Public  opinion  in  Vienna, 
which  had  always  counted  for  something,  and  now  counted 
for  much  more,  was  fairly  expressed  by  the  citizen  who  knelt 
on  the  sidewalk  to  embrace  Von  Beust's  knees  for  having 
delivered  Austria  from  the  concordat  ;  yet  liberalism  had  gone 
a  pretty  fair  length  in  Austria  since  the  battle  of  Sadowa,  and 
there  were  many  to  predict  that  a  conservative  reaction  was 
at  hand,  as  it  always  comes  in  time.  That  it  did  not  come 
sooner  in  Austria  was  mainly  owing  to  the  wisdom  and  con- 
ciliatory policy  of  Bismarck  in  1871.  The  Hungarians  are 
Protestant  to  the  backbone,  and  now,  with  the  Prussian  mili- 
tary system  to  support  their  rights,  they  had  no  intention  of 
bowing  before  Catholic  mandates  from  Vienna.  The  triumph 
of  Pius  IX.  in  Austria  must  have  resulted  in  civil  war. 

This  movement  could  not  escape  the  notice  of  the  lynx- 
eyed  chancellor  and  he  took  his  measures  accordingly,  but 
of  the  consultations  that  were  held  over  it  only  a  few  signifi- 
cant words  from  Bismarck  have  survived.  The  Berlin  Post,  a 
semi-official  organ,  was  first  to  sound  the  note  of  alarm,  in  an 
editorial  which  was  ascribed  to  the  government,  though  this 
was  afterwards  denied.  It  was  mainly  an  echo  of  Bismarck's 
threat  to  the  French  government  the  year  before.  It  called 
attention  to  the  belligerent  tone  of  French  publications  and 
the  unprecedented  increase  of  the  French  army.  "  If  there  is 
going  to  be  a  war  of  revenge,"  said  the  Post,  "  the  sooner  it 
comes  the  better  for  Germany." 

This  statement  created  quite  a  sensation  in  the  political 

300 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

centres  of  Europe,  which  was  not  much  allayed  by  Bismarck's 
explanation  in  the  Reichstag  a  few  days  later.  The  present 
attitude  of  the  French,  he  admitted,  was  a  threatening  one, 
and  would  have  to  be  seriously  considered.  He  did  not  regret 
the  editorial  in  the  Post,  and  wished  other  nations  to  take 
notice  of  the  situation.  How  long  were  these  attacks  on 
Germany  to  continue  ?  The  French  also  would  do  well  to 
consider  what  might  be  the  effect  of  a  second  defeat  by  the 
German  forces.  President  MacMahon,  who  really  wished  for 
peace  as  much  as  Emperor  William  did,  and  was  more  afraid  of 
his  own  people  than  he  was  of  the  Germans,  appealed  to  Lon- 
don and  St.  Petersburg  for  intervention  in  behalf  of  France,  and 
the  Parisian  journals  suddenly  changed  their  tone  to  a  cry  for 
help  against  the  insatiable  monster  Bismarck.  Even  Gam- 
betta  went  under  cover,  and  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  became 
as  quiet  as  an  audience  at  a  theatre.  There  was  more  occa- 
sion for  this  than  perhaps  many  of  them  imagined. 

In  the  spring  of  1893,  after  Bismarck  had  left  public  life, 
he  made  a  brief  statement  which  shows  that  at  this  time  there 
was  a  strong  war  party  at  Berlin,  including  Von  Moltke,  Man- 
teuffel,  Prince  Frederick  Charles,  and  perhaps  other  high 
officials,  which  Bismarck  was  obliged  to  resist  and  repress  at 
the  same  time  that  he  made  use  of  the  war  scare  to  intimi- 
date the  French.  It  must  be  admitted  that  this  was  a  diffi- 
cult position  even  for  a  great  statesman  to  be  placed  in,  and 
the  result  of  it  was  that  he  received  the  credit  of  belliger- 
ent intentions  which  properly  belonged  to  others.  "  I  was 
obliged,"  he  said  in  1893,  "to  protest  to  the  emperor  against 
the  interference  of  the  German  staff  in  the  affairs  of  the  for- 
eign office."  Von  Moltke  always  talked  in  favor  of  war, — as 
Bismarck  said,  it  was  his  business, — and  it  is  presumable  that 
he  thought  if  there  was  to  be  a  war  of  revenge  it  had  better 
come  while  he  was  still  equal  to  the  command  of  the  German 
army,  and  it  could  be  fought  by  veterans,  instead  of  under  new 
generals  and  with  untried  soldiers.  It  is  not  to  be  won- 
dered at  that  he  should  have  felt  so,  but  the  far-reaching  con- 
sequences of  such  a  collision  were  better  understood  by  Bis- 
marck than  by  himself.  In  fact,  Bismarck  had  now  arranged 

301 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

the  map  of  Europe  exactly  as  he  wished  to  have  it,  and  not 
on  any  account  would  he  hazard  the  chance  of  having  it 
readjusted  again. 

It  was  this  consideration  also  that  caused  anxiety  at  St. 
Petersburg  and  London.  The  efficiency  of  the  German  mili- 
tary machine  was  perhaps  overestimated  at  this  time.  It  was 
considered  almost  irresistible,  and  the  prospect  of  a  second 
conquest  of  France,  with  consequent  loss  of  more  French 
territory,  was  not  one  which  either  Alexander  or  Victoria 
liked  to  contemplate.  If  Germany  became  too  strong  to  be 
interfered  with,  the  annexation  of  Holland  was  not  improb- 
able, and  such  a  combination  of  land  and  naval  power  would 
threaten  the  independence  of  Great  Britain  itself.  The  Tsar 
likewise  was  beginning  to  think  that  the  agreement  with  his 
Prussian  uncle  at  Ems  in  1 870  was  resulting  too  favorably  for 
German  interests.  MacMahon's  special  envoys  to  Disraeli 
and  GortchakofF  were  well  received,  and  the  two  premiers 
promised  to  give  the  French  government  active  support  so 
long  as  it  persevered  in  a  pacific  policy.  The  French  presi- 
dent was  only  too  ready  to  do  this,  while  Bismarck,  for  rea- 
sons already  stated,  was  obliged  to  preserve  an  aggressive 
attitude;  and  so  it  happened  that  Disraeli  and  Alexander 
obtained  the  credit  of  preserving  the  peace  of  Europe  and 
protecting  France  from  the  ambitious  designs  of  the  German 
chancellor ; '  although  it  is  more  than  probable  that  the  source 
of  this  political  tension  originated  in  the  Vatican  and  was 
directed  against  Prussia. 

1  Bismarck  said  in  the  Reichstag  in  1888:  "My  Russian  colleague,  Prince 
Gortchakoff,  first  evinced  in  1875  an  inclination  more  friendly  to  France  than 
towards  us,  and  employed  artificial  means  to  gain  popularity  there, — trying  to 
make  the  world  believe  that  we  had  some  vague  notion  of  attacking  France, 
and  that  it  was  his  especial  merit  to  have  preserved  France  from  this  danger." — 
Speemann's  "Bismarck's  Speeches,"  xvi.  160. 


302 


CHAPTER    XIII 

THE    RUSSO-TURKISH    WAR   AND   THE   CONGRESS   OF    BERLIN 

THE  most  serious  trouble  with  Turkish  finances  is  that 
there  is  no  limitation  to  the  drafts  for  the  sultan's  personal 
expenses.  Abdul  Aziz  was  always  extravagant,  and  had  no 
consideration  for  bad  harvests.  In  1874  there  was  a  very 
short  crop  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  and  at  the  same  time 
the  sultan  gave  orders  to  the  tax  collectors  that  they  must 
fill  up  his  empty  treasury  at  the  risk  of  their  lives.  The 
consequences  of  this  might  have  been  foreseen  by  any  one 
except  a  sultan.  The  collectors'  demands  were  excessive, 
and  finding  a  deficit  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  they  carried 
off  everything  that  they  could  find.  Many  families  fled  with 
what  they  could  take  with  them  in  their  wagons  to  the  neigh- 
boring Austrian  provinces.  Those  who  resisted  were  beaten 
or  imprisoned.  A  deputation  of  the  wealthier  citizens  waited 
on  the  Turkish  pasha,  or  governor  of  the  provinces,  who  gave 
the  customary  pledges  of  reform,  which  he  had  no  intention  of 
fulfilling.  A  report,  circulated,  perhaps,  by  Russian  agents, 
that  the  Austrian  government  had  proposed  to  purchase 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  set  the  provinces  ablaze.  It  is  often 
said  that  a  man  will  give  all  he  has  for  his  life ;  and  this,  per- 
haps, is  true  with  regard  to  individuals,  but  not  where  masses 
of  men  and  their  families  are  concerned.  Assured  of  the  as- 
sistance of  the  Montenegrins,  who  in  their  Balkan  Switzerland 
have  defied  the  Turks  for  centuries,  the  people  of  these  narrow 
provinces  entered  on  a  desperate  conflict  with  the  whole 
Turkish  empire.  They  succeeded  in  raising  an  army  of  from 
twelve  to  fifteen  thousand  men,  and  drove  back  the  first 
Turkish  contingent  that  was  sent  to  subdue  them.  When, 
however,  Raouf  Pasha  advanced  against  them  with  a  greatly 
superior  force,  they  retired  to  the  mountainous  districts  and 

3°3 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

maintained  a  guerilla  warfare  during  the  winter  and  spring  of 
1875. 

Here  was  a  serious  problem  for  England,  Austria,  and 
Russia,  but  especially  for  Austria.  Whatever  good-will  An- 
drassy  might  feel  towards  the  persecuted  subjects  of  Abdul 
Aziz,  he  was  obliged  to  recognize  the  fact  that  the  interests 
of  the  Austrian  empire  were  nearly  identical  with  those  of 
the  Turkish  government.  Austria  might  have  long  since 
swept  Turkey  into  the  Bosphorus,  but  for  the  impossibility  of 
organizing  a  government  at  Constantinople  that  would  prove 
an  effective  barrier  either  to  the  return  of  the  sultan  or  to 
Russian  ambition.  The  old  Greek  empire  fell  to  pieces  from 
the  lack  of  true  national  feeling ;  and  to  attempt  to  revive  it 
would  be  like  the  Jews'  returning  to  Jerusalem.  The  Slavonic 
races  have  not  yet  shown  the  least  capacity  for  self-govern- 
ment, and  are,  besides,  antipathetic  towards  the  Hungarians, 
who,  having  obtained  local  autonomy,  objected  in  a  deter- 
mined manner  to  their  further  introduction  in  the  empire. 
Even  Von  Beust,  the  most  liberal  of  Austrian  premiers,  has 
stated  that  in  his  opinion  if  Abdul  Aziz  had  crushed  out  the 
insurrection  in  Herzegovina  at  once,  it  would  have  been  better 
for  all  parties  concerned. 

In  Russia  the  sympathy  for  their  suffering  coreligionists  was 
lively  and  ardent.  The  government  newspapers  of  St.  Peters- 
burg treated  the  question  in  a  diplomatic  manner,  but  evidently 
in  a  firm  belief  that  the  time  had  come  to  put  an  end  to  the 
atrocities  in  the  Balkan  states,  while  less  official  publications 
fairly  clamored  for  the  intercession  of  the  Tsar.  Fervent 
prayers  were  delivered  in  the  churches  that  the  God  of 
battles  might  give  aid  and  victory  to  the  insurgents,  and  sub- 
scriptions were  raised  from  Finland  to  the  Crimea  in  aid  of 
their  destitute  families.1  In  Great  Britain  there  was  an  appre- 
hension fully  equal  to  that  in  Austria.  Nobody  wanted  an- 
other Crimean  War,  and  it  was  doubtful  if  the  queen  and 
Disraeli  would  be  supported  by  the  general  public  in  bringing 

1  Chiefly,  however,  from  the  poorer  classes,  so  that  the  aggregate  was  not  so 
very  much. 

3°4 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

about  another  Inkerman  or  Balaklava.  In  this,  at  least, 
Disraeli  was  confident :  that  the  British  fleet  could  prevent  the 
Russians  from  taking  possession  of  Constantinople.  Beyond 
that  there  was  diplomacy,  in  which  he  believed  himself  to  be 
more  of  an  expert  than  afterwards  appeared.  At  the  same 
time  his  old  rival  Gladstone  was  waiting  in  readiness  to  take 
advantage  of  any  mistakes  he  might  make.  His  position  was 
not  a  comfortable  one,  and  the  path  before  him  was  beset 
with  difficulties. 

European  politics  now  revolved  about  Germany.  The 
prestige  of  the  Prussian  military  machine  did  not  surpass 
Bismarck's  reputation  for  sound  judgment  and  political  fore- 
sight. Nothing  of  importance  was  likely  to  be  undertaken 
without  his  first  being  consulted.  It  was  not  presumed  that 
he  could  mould  Gortchakoff  and  Andrassy  to  his  will,  but  if 
he  said  to  them,  "  Only  thus  far  it  is  prudent  to  go,"  it  was 
not  considered  likely  that  they  would  exceed  his  limit.  The 
London  Times  no  doubt  asserted  too  much  when  it  declared 
that  Bismarck  by  one  word  could  prevent  the  Russian  army 
from  crossing  the  Danube,  but  there  was  no  question  that  he 
could  recall  it  from  the  Balkan  provinces  whenever  he  thought 
best  to  do  so.  He  watched  passing  events  with  the  eye  of  an 
expert  who  knows  from  old  practice  when  the  time  has  come 
to  take  a  hand  in  them.  It  is  doubtful  if  he  shared  Von 
Beust's  opinion,  but,  as  he  often  confessed,  his  chief  interest 
in  foreign  affairs  was,  what  advantage  or  disadvantage  might 
result  to  Germany.  He  did  not  wish  to  have  the  Tsar  take 
possession  of  Constantinople,  but  neither  did  he  propose  to 
interfere  with  the  Russian  government  in  behalf  of  Great 
Britain.  As  already  suggested,  there  may  have  been  a  previ- 
ous understanding  in  regard  to  this  very  occasion.  At  all 
events,  he  is  known  to  have  expressed  himself  in  a  friendly 
way  towards  Russia  at  the  time,  and  to  have  considered  the 
cause  of  the  Slavonic  states  a  just  one.  If  he  foresaw  or  cal- 
culated the  ultimate  effect  of  the  insurrection  in  the  Balkans, 
he  must  have  been  far-sighted  indeed. 

It  was  Andrassy's  place  to  take  the  initiative,  as  representing 
the  power  which  was  most  directly  compromised  by  the  Balkan 
20  305 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

disturbances,  and  the  one  which  could  least  be  suspected  of 
self-interest.  For  Bismarck  to  have  done  this  would  have 
had  the  appearance  of  unreasonable  interference,  and  Gort- 
chakoff  might  be  supposed  to  act  from  interested  motives. 
The  guerilla  warfare  had  continued  through  the  spring  and 
summer  without  decisive  results ;  and  when,  late  in  August, 
the  ambassadors  of  the  three  powers  went  to  Abdul  Aziz  with 
a  joint  note  of  intervention,  the  sultan  promised  everything 
and  performed  nothing.  The  schedule  he  agreed  to,  if  car- 
ried out,  might  have  resulted  in  an  idyllic  mixture  of  despot- 
ism and  democracy ;  but  he  issued  one  firman  after  another, 
and  neither  Turk  nor  Christian  paid  any  heed  to  them.  Ac- 
cordingly, on  the  last  of  January,  1876,  Andrassy  sent  a  defi- 
nite demand  to  the  sultan,  specifying  five  essential  points  of 
reform,- — complete  religious  freedom,  the  introduction  of  a 
European  tax  system,  the  application  of  the  revenue  of  Bosnia 
and  Herzegovina  for  a  term  of  years  to  restoring  prosperity 
in  the  provinces,  the  establishment  of  a  commission  to  super- 
vise the  condition  of  the  country  farmers,  and  of  a  mixed 
commission  to  supervise  the  execution  of  reforms.  This  was 
accepted  by  the  Turkish  government,  and  a  proclamation 
issued  promising  the  rebels  a  safe  return  to  their  homes  if 
they  would  lay  down  their  arms ;  but  the  insurgents  refused 
to  do  this  unless  the  great  powers  would  guarantee  their  per- 
sonal safety  and  also  the  administration  of  the  reforms.  Pro- 
crastination and  the  memory  of  broken  pledges  were  the  two 
best  allies  of  the  sultan ;  but  he  was  soon  found  to  have  an- 
other ally,  and  one  that  caused  all  parties  concerned  a  great 
deal  of  trouble. 

The  behavior  of  the  English  Tory  government  at  this 
crisis  was  not  only  injudicious,  but  a  disgrace  to  the  name  of 
civilization.  Repeated  editorials  in  the  London  Times  argued 
that  the  only  security  for  British  interests  was  a  prompt  sup- 
pression of  the  revolt  in  such  a  manner  that  it  would  not  be 
likely  to  occur  again ;  or,  in  the  language  of  Machiavelli,  to 
deal  the  insurgents  such  heavy  blows  that  they  could  not 
well  be  repaid.  It  would  seem  as  if  the  Turks  required  little 
encouragement  in  this  direction;  but  it  was  well  known  in 

306 


LIFE  OF   BISMARCK 

Berlin  that  Disraeli  encouraged  the  sultan  in  his  treacherous 
course,  and  even  persuaded  Andrassy  in  the  spring  of  1876 
to  set  a  patrol  on  his  frontiers  to  prevent  the  defeated  insur- 
gents from  crossing,  and  to  close  Austrian  charitable  estab- 
lishments against  the  refugees;  so  that  he  succeeded  for  a 
time  in  disturbing  the  cordial  relations  between  the  three  em- 
perors. Disraeli,  with  characteristic  cynicism,  admitted  that 
the  Bosnians  and  Herzegovinians  were  greatly  to  be  pitied, 
but  said  that  the  peace  of  Europe  could  only  be  preserved 
by  crushing  them  to  the  earth.  He  did  not  believe  that  the 
Turkish  nature  was  accessible  to  reform,  and  the  mildest  de- 
gree of  independence  for  the  Balkan  states  would  only  prove 
a  stepping-stone  to  Russian  aggression.  This  policy  proved 
a  failure  from  the  start,  and  resulted  in  the  death  of  Abdul 
Aziz  as  well  as  the  overthrow  of  the  Tory  party. 

It  was  the  counterpart  of  Louis  Napoleon's  policy  in  1870, 
a  desperate  venture  which  could  only  succeed  by  quickness 
and  good  fortune.  Unhappily  for  Disraeli  and  Lord  Derby, 
the  rebellion  was  not  to  be  crushed  in  a  week  or  a  month. 
Mukhtar  Pasha  marched  into  Herzegovina  with  a  consider- 
able army  in  March,  1876,  and  offered  the  rebels  two  weeks 
in  which  to  make  their  submission.  His  promises  were  gen- 
erous, but  nobody  trusted  them ;  and  before  the  fortnight  had 
expired  a  subsidiary  revolution  broke  out  in  Turkish  Croatia, 
and  a  force  of  fourteen  thousand  men  sent  to  suppress  it  was 
defeated.  As  the  armistice  came  to  an  end  without  result, 
Mukhtar  Pasha  marched  through  the  Dugar  Pass,  where  he 
was  beset  on  all  sides,  and  compelled  to  retreat  again  with 
heavy  losses.  No  doubt  there  were  Montenegrins  present  in 
these  engagements,  but  the  prince  of  Montenegro  had  thus 
far  preserved  an  attitude  of  fair  neutrality,  although  thousands 
of  Bosnians  and  Herzegovinians  had  taken  refuge  in  his 
country  and  were  being  supported  by  the  inhabitants.  Mukh- 
tar Pasha,  in  order  to  excuse  his  defeat,  represented  that  he 
was  attacked  by  a  large  force  of  Montenegrins,  and  the  con- 
sequence was  that  the  sultan  prepared  an  invasion  of  that 
country  also.  The  Turks  established  a  fortified  camp  on  the 
borders  of  Servia,  and  in  less  than  four  months  after  Disraeli's 

307 


LIFE  OF   BISMARCK 

cynical  statement  in  the  House  of  Commons  the  insurrection 
had  spread  over  a  territory  seven  hundred  miles  in  extent. 
The  most  terrible  consequences  followed  in  Bulgaria,  where 
the  Turkish  government  had  since  1855  practised  a  regular 
system  of  extirpation  of  the  native  population  and  the  colo- 
nization of  the  country  with  bands  of  Tartars,  who  lived  by  a 
discreet  system  of  plundering.  A  revolt  broke  out  there  on 
May  Day ;  and  as  the  available  forces  of  the  sultan  were  em- 
ployed in  other  directions,  the  Turkish  governor  ordered  a 
general  arming  of  the  Mohammedan  population,  who,  being 
under  no  military  control,  fell  upon  the  Christians,  robbing 
and  murdering  indiscriminately,  without  regard  to  age  or  sex. 
The  atrocities  committed  at  Batak,  described  by  a  correspon- 
dent of  the  London  Daily  News,  sent  a  thrill  of  horror  through 
Great  Britain,  and  came  close  to  upsetting  the  Tory  ministry. 
The  number  of  sufferers  in  the  Bulgarian  massacre  has  been 
estimated  as  high  as  a  hundred  thousand,  and,  though  that 
may  be  an  exaggeration,  it  was  without  question  one  of  the 
most  awful  atrocities  in  history.  We  hear  so  much  of  "  our 
enlightened  era"  that  it  is  difficult  to  realize  that  such  horrors 
continue  to  take  place  and  are  permitted  in  Christian  Europe. 
In  the  time  of  Frederick  Barbarossa  an  army  of  knights 
would  soon  have  been  gathered  on  the  Danube  that  would 
have  retaliated  for  every  Christian  life  which  had  been 
taken. 

The  Bulgarian  massacre  was  the  finishing  stroke  to  Abdul 
Aziz.  The  ablest  of  his  advisers  perceived  that  he  had  made 
a  mistake,  and  the  withdrawal  of  Disraeli's  support,  which 
was  necessitated  by  public  opinion  in  England,  proved  fatal 
to  him.  It  was  also  believed  that  in  spite  of  the  financial 
dearth — many  of  the  highest  officers  being  in  long  arrears 
for  their  salaries — the  sultan  had  immense  sums  of  money 
stored  away  in  his  palace.  There  was  a  sudden  revolution 
among  the  viziers,  and  Abdul  Aziz  was  deposed.  Several 
millions  in  gold  coin  were  recovered  to  the  treasury,  and  a 
few  days  later  he  mysteriously  died  in  the  kiosk  of  Top-Capu, 
where  he  had  been  confined.  It  was  given  out  that  he  had 
committed  suicide,  but  it  is  quite  credible  that  he  was  dis- 

308 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

posed  of  after  the  oriental  fashion.    In  his  death  he  was  com- 
parable to  Nero ;  nor  was  his  life  much  better. 

When  the  standard  of  rebellion  was  raised  in  Bulgaria 
Bismarck  saw  that  the  time  had  come  for  a  definite  policy. 
He  proposed  a  conference  at  Berlin  to  Gortchakoff  and  An- 
drassy,  and  the  proposition  was  accepted.  By  uniting  with 
Great  Britain  and  Austria  at  this  time,  Bismarck  might  have 
postponed  the  independence  of  the  Balkan  states  for  fifty 
years  or  more.  Whatever  his  motives  may  have  been,  He 
certainly  acted  in  the  cause  of  humanity,  and  played  the  part 
of  a  true  statesman.  Andrassy  meanwhile  had  discovered  of 
what  light  stuff  Disraeli  was  made,  and  returned  to  Bis- 
marck's lead  with  increased  confidence.  Only  two  days  before 
the  massacre  at  Batak  the  three. ministers  held  a  meeting  and 
drew  up  a  statement  based  on  Andrassy's  previous  note.  This 
was  agreed  upon  and  approved  by  the  three  emperors.  A 
truce  of  two  months  was  to  be  proclaimed  in  order  to  confer 
with  the  insurgents  on  disputed  points,  the  execution  of  the 
reforms  was  to  be  superintended  by  the  consuls  of  the  great 
powers,  and  an  international  fleet  was  to  take  possession  of 
the  Bosphorus  as  moral  support  to  the  consuls.  If  this  failed 
to  produce  the  desired  result,  armed  intervention  should 
ensue.  The  plan  was  approved  by  the  French  and  Italian 
governments,  but  rejected  by  Disraeli,  though  he  was  already 
aware  of  the  Bulgarian  outrages,  and  in  his  nonchalant  man- 
ner had  denied  all  knowledge  of  them  when  questioned  in  the 
House  of  Commons.  The  Tory  newspapers  congratulated 
their  readers  that  Bismarck  was  not,  after  all,  the  autocrat  of 
Europe.  Andrassy,  however,  informed  the  Austro-Hunga- 
rian  Parliament  on  May  1 8  that  the  conference  had  resulted 
in  a  complete  unanimity  of  the  three  emperors  in  regard  to 
the  Turkish  question,  and  in  a  resolve  on  their  part  to  renew 
their  present  agreement  from  time  to  time.1  Disraeli's  com- 
munication of  this  circular  to  the  Turkish  government,  with 
the  expression  of  an  unfavorable  opinion  on  it,  was  a  piece  of 
trickery  not  unlike  Louis  Napoleon's.2  His  Eastern  policy 

1  Our  Chancellor,  ii.  122.  s  Muller's  Political  History,  p.  512. 

3°9 


LIFE   OF   BISMARCK 

might  be  compared  to  a  man  who  was  trying  to  prop  up  a 
falling  house  with  a  barber's  pole. 

When  this  became  known  in  St.  Petersburg  the  peace-lov- 
ing Tsar  was  furious.  Bismarck,  in  his  place,  might  have  said, 
as  he  did  of  the  Augustenburger,  "  Thank  goodness  for  it ;" 
but  Alexander  was  not  so  far-sighted.  "  To  have  everything 
spoiled  by  that  fortune-hunting  Jew  !"  For  every  one  could  see 
that  by  treating  the  circular  of  the  great  powers  with  such 
levity  Disraeli  encouraged  the  Turks  to  make  the  utmost 
resistance,  and  it  is  only  fair  to  hold  him  responsible  in  some 
measure  for  the  events  which  followed.  On  June  27  Prince 
Milan  of  Servia  declared  war  on  the  sultan,  and  on  July  2 
Prince  Nikita  of  Montenegro  followed  his  example.  Their 
combined  forces  amounted  to  over  one  hundred  thousand 
men,  but  the  Servian  army  was  mainly  composed  of  volun- 
teers not  sufficiently  well  trained  for  operations  in  the  open 
field.  The  most  active  sympathy  was  manifested  in  Russia 
for  the  cause  of  the  two  princes.  It  is  not  permitted  to 
hold  public  meetings  in  the  dominions  of  the  Tsar,  but 
the  war  was  supported  in  the  churches  as  a  holy  cause  ; 
collections  were  taken  up,  hospital  stores  were  provided 
by  cities  and  towns,  and  even  ladies  of  quality  volunteered 
their  services  with  army  surgeons  to  do  duty  in  the  hos- 
pitals. 

While  the  Montenegrins  were  successful  and  held  their 
ground  in  a  number  of  small  encounters,  the  Servian  general 
trusted  too  much  to  the  enthusiasm  of  his  soldiers.  The 
Turkish  army  outnumbered  the  united  forces  of  the  insur- 
gents, and  was  continually  increased  by  the  addition  of 
troops  drawn  from  Asia  and  Egypt,  and  with  recruits  who 
were  attracted  by  the  report  of  fabulous  treasures  discovered 
in  the  palace  of  Abdul  Aziz.  On  July  14  the  Servians  were 
repulsed  and  obliged  to  retreat,  and  on  August  5  they  were 
defeated  in  a  pitched  battle  at  Knyazebec,  but  continued  to 
contest  the  invasion  of  their  country  step  by  step  in  an  obsti- 
nate and  courageous  manner.  Failing  to  receive  the  expected 
succor  from  Russia,  and  finding  himself  hard  pressed,  by  the 
middle  of  September  Prince  Milan  begged  of  the  Turkish 

310 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

commander  an  armistice,  which  was  readily  granted  him.  As 
soon  as  negotiations  for  peace  commenced,  however,  disagree- 
ments arose  again  between  the  Turkish  government  and  the 
Russian  ambassador,  who  insisted  on  compensation  to  those 
sufferers  in  the  Bulgarian  massacres  who  still  lived  to  receive 
it,  and  punishment  for  those  who  were  chiefly  accountable  for 
them.  As  usual,  the  sultan  attempted  to  shirk  the  responsi- 
bility of  direct  interference  by  the  execution  of  a  few  bashi- 
bazouks.  Disraeli  was  also  obliged  to  support  the  Russian 
demands  in  this  instance  as  a  sop  to  English  public  opinion, 
and  the  British  envoy  warned  Sultan  Murad  that  in  the  event 
of  a  war  with  Russia  he  would  be  obliged  to  contend  alone ; 
but  the  new  sultan  possessed  neither  force  nor  intellect,  and 
could  do  nothing  to  stem  the  current  of  events. 

The  Tsar  Alexander  appears  more  prominently  than  Gort- 
chakoff  in  dealing  with  the  Balkan  question,  and  always 
appears  to  advantage.  Early  in  November  he  was  interviewed 
by  Lord  Augustus  Loftus,  and  expressed  himself  on  the  sub- 
ject with  a  plainness  and  sincerity  to  which  subsequent  events 
have  testified.  The  Porte,  he  declared,  by  a  series  of  ma- 
noeuvres had  frustrated  all  Europe's  efforts  to  terminate  the 
war  and  secure  general  peace,  and  that  if  the  other  powers 
chose  to  put  up  with  such  behavior,  he  could  not  reconcile 
it  with  Russian  honor,  dignity,  and  interests  to  do  so  any 
longer.  It  is  plain  that  he  pledged  his  word  to  Lord  Loftus 
that  he  had  no  design  upon  Constantinople,  and  that  if  he 
found  it  necessary  to  occupy  Bulgaria  he  would  only  do  so 
until  suitable  guarantees  of  local  autonomy  had  been  given. 
He  declared  that  he  had  made  the  same  proposal  to  all  the 
powers ;  that  he  had  suggested  the  occupation  of  Bosnia  by 
Austria,  and  that  Great  Britain  should  make  a  naval  demon- 
stration before  Constantinople.  Alexander  then  specified  his 
demands  of  the  sultan  to  be  an  armistice  for  Servia  and  Mon- 
tenegro, a  conference  to  decide  what  reforms  were  practi- 
cable and  requisite  for  the  Christian  provinces,  and  adequate 
guarantees  from  the  sultan  that  the  reforms  should  be  carried 
out  in  earnest.  That  the  Tsar  and  Bismarck  were  acting  in 
concert  in  this  crisis  is  evident  from  a  statement  made  by  the 

3" 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

latter  at  a  dinner-party  in  Berlin,  only  three  weeks  later,  in 
which  he  said  : 

"Germany's  duty,  before  all,  is  to  maintain  peace  within  her 
own  borders.  If  war  should  take  place  between  Russia  and  Turkey 
they  will  both  become  tired  of  it  in  course  of  time,  and  then  the 
mediation  of  Germany  will  be  more  likely  to  prove  effectual.  It 
would  be  inexpedient  to  give  Russia  advice  just  at  present.  Such 
a  step  would  put  the  Russian  nation  out  of  temper,  which  would  be 
more  prejudicial  to  us  than  a  passing  difference  with  any  govern- 
ment. It  is  unlikely  that  England  will  go  to  war  with  Russia." 

Alexander's  proposition  was  fair  enough  to  have  satisfied 
any  one  except  the  sceptical  Disraeli.  He  may  have  been 
right  in  not  trusting  the  Russians  any  more  than  he  could 
help,  but  it  was  fortunate  for  Austria  that  he  was  not  in  An- 
drassy's  position.  The  irritation  caused  by  these  events  in 
England  was  taken  note  of  by  the  German  people  in  their  quiet 
way,  and  contrasted  with  the  public  feeling  there  in  1870. 
Queen  Victoria  was  very  much  distressed,  and  exerted  her- 
self in  a  laudable  manner  in  the  interest  of  peace,  though,  with 
such  a  will-o'-the  wisp  as  Disraeli  to  guide  her,  her  efforts 
were  no  more  than  a  vain  beating  of  the  air.  She  sent  her 
secretary,  Colonel  Wellesley,  to  the  Tsar  on  a  secret  mission 
which  has  never  been  properly  explained.  She  also  wrote  a 
number  of  letters  to  Bismarck  imploring  him  to  make  use  of 
his  great  authority  for  the  benefit  of  England.  British  influ- 
ence was  also  brought  to  bear  on  the  crown  prince,  and  Bis- 
marck had  the  same  struggle  to  contend  with  in  the  palace 
which  had  happened  so  often  before,1 — this  time  not  a  difficult 
one,  however,  for  the  personal  regard  of  William  for  Alex- 
ander had  increased  rather  than  diminished  since  the  Franco- 
German  war.  The  Turk  had  one  other  ally  in  Europe  and 
only  one, — Pius  IX.  The  Voice  of  Truth,  a  semi-official  pub- 
lication of  the  Vatican,  printed  an  editorial  to  prove  that  the 
Mohammedan  rule  was  to  be  preferred  before  the  ascendancy 
of  the  Greek  cross.  The  head  of  the  Catholic  Church  would 

1  Our  Chancellor,  ii.  127. 
312 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

seem  to  have  been  stony-hearted  so  far  as  the  suffering  of 
human  beings  was  concerned. 

On  December  5  the  Socialist  leader,  Eugene  Richter,  inter- 
rogated Bismarck  in  regard  to  the  presumed  support  that 
Russia  was  receiving  from  the  German  government,  and  re- 
ceived the  following  reply : 

"If,  at  an  ill  timed  moment,  you  put  a  spoke  in  the  wheel  of 
a  power  which  happens  to  be  in  difficulties,  it  is  quite  possible  that 
you  may  upset  the  coach,  but  the  driver  will  have  noticed  who  it 
was  that  inserted  the  spoke.  The  previous  speaker,  like  many  other 
people,  labors  under  the  error  that  Russia  is  just  now  soliciting  great 
favors  and  services  at  our  hands.  This  is  by  no  means  the  case. 
He  has  hinted  that  Russia  is  bent  upon  conquest  and  territorial 
annexations.  We  have  the  Emperor  Alexander's  solemn  assurance 
that  he  will  refrain  from  the  one  and  the  other.  Russia  asks  us  for 
nothing  that  we  can  bargain  about ;  she  only  seeks  our  co-operation 
in  a  peaceable  conference,  with  an  object  which  is  ours  as  well  as 
hers, — namely,  the  safeguarding  of  the  Forte's  Christian  subjects 
against  the  treatment  which  is  incompatible  with  existing  European 
legal  conditions,  and  upon  the  abolition  of  which  Europe  is  entirely 
at  one,  although  she  has  not  yet  hit  upon  the  right  way  of  giving 
effect  to  her  unanimity.  It  would  appear  that,  should  the  con- 
ference prove  fruitless,  Russia  will  very  shortly  proceed  on  her  own 
account  to  obtain  by  force  that  which  the  Porte  refuses  to  concede 
peaceably.  Even  in  that  case  Russia  asks  nothing  from  us  but  neu- 
trality, which  it  is  in  our  interest  to  observe. ' ' 

The  conferences  between  the  Turkish  government  and  the 
envoys  of  the  great  powers  continued  at  Constantinople  from 
the  middle  of  December  until  the  middle  of  January,  1877, 
without  coming  to  any  favorable  issue,  and  perhaps  it  was  not 
intended  that  they  should.  It  does  not  appear  that  the  Turks 
were  encouraged  at  this  time  by  English  support,  but  the  war 
party  had  gained  the  ascendancy  and  the  old  Moslem  element 
had  become  thoroughly  stirred  up.  On  January  20  the  Tsar 
issued  a  circular  note  to  the  effect  that  the  continual  refusal 
of  the  Turkish  government  to  consider  the  claims  and  wishes 
of  Europe  could  no  longer  be  disregarded.  The  Christian 
nations  of  Europe  were  dishonored  by  it,  and  the  only  remedy 

3*3 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

now  possible  consisted  in  an  appeal  to  arms.  At  this  Victoria 
is  credited  with  having  written  a  spirited  letter  to  Emperor 
William,  in  which  she  designated  him  and  his  chancellor 
as  chiefly  responsible  for  the  approaching  war. 

We  wonder  if  Emperor  William  replied  that  he  had  also 
appealed  to  her  government  to  prevent  a  war  which  was  a 
much  more  serious  matter  to  Germany  than  the  Balkan  ques- 
tion was  to  England,  and  had  received  in  reply  the  advice  to 
humiliate  himself  to  Louis  Napoleon.  Let  us  suppose  that 
William  I.  and  Bismarck  had  permitted  Victoria  and  the 
crown  prince  to  determine  their  policy  in  this  crisis ;  what 
would  have  happened  ?  Two  consequences  were  possible, — 
either  the  Russo-Turkish  war  would  have  been  prevented, 
and  the  population  of  the  Balkan  states  have  been  relegated 
to  a  worse  than  African  slavery,  or  Russia  would  have  formed 
an  immediate  alliance  with  France,  and  carried  out  her  pro- 
gramme as  before,  on  condition  of  a  combined  attack  against 
Germany  in  the  near  future.  In  either  case  Germany  would 
have  become  the  chief  sufferer,  and  would  have  fallen  from 
the  first  position  in  Europe  to  the  tributary  one  of  1854. 
Emperor  William  would  have  been  obliged  either  to  make 
war,  in  case  of  the  Tsar's  refusal  to  accept  an  authoritative 
mediation,  or  to  expose  his  own  weakness  before  the  whole 
of  Europe.  The  result  proved  that  there  was  no  such  great 
danger  to  British  interests  as  Disraeli  imagined,  and  that  Bis- 
marck understood  perfectly  the  elements  he  was  dealing  with, 
and  how  to  bring  the  Turkish  problem  to  a  fortunate  issue. 
It  was  not  until  April  24  that  the  Russian  forces  passed  the 
Danube  and  invaded  Bulgaria.  The  slow  progress  which  was 
made  after  this,  however,  did  not  compare  favorably  with  Von 
Moltke's  rapid  and  decisive  advance  in  1870.  The  army  of 
the  Danube  was  commanded  by  princes  of  the  royal  blood  ; 
but  they  were  not  princes  like  the  two  Fredericks,  and  after 
they  had  met  with  a  bloody  repulse  south  of  the  Balkans,  the 
Tsar  began  fairly  to  realize  this.  General  Todleben,  the 
venerable  defender  of  Sebastopol,  was  given  the  chief  com- 
mand early  in  December,  and  took  advantage  of  an  imprudent 
advance  of  the  Turkish  right  wing  to  isolate  it  in  the  Bal- 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

kans,  where  its  commander,  Osman  Pasha,  was  soon  com- 
pelled to  surrender  with  forty  thousand  men.  On  January 
20  he  captured  Adrianople  and  opened  the  road  to  the  Otto- 
man capital,  and  the  following  day  the  London  Daily  News 
published  a  statement  to  the  effect  that  Turkey  as  a  military 
power  no  longer  existed. 

This  sudden  collapse  of  the  Ottoman  empire  produced 
great  consternation  at  Westminster.  A  large  fleet  of  iron- 
clads was  already  posted  at  the  Dardanelles ;  British  regi- 
ments were  ordered  from  India  to  the  Levant,  and  Disraeli 
despatched  an  ultimatum  to  GortchakofT  threatening  war  in 
case  the  Russian  forces  occupied  Constantinople.  There  is 
no  evidence  that  Alexander  intended  to  do  this  in  contra- 
vention to  the  pledge  given  to  Lord  Loftus  at  Livonia.  The 
Russian  army  paused  at  Adrianople;  Andrassy  conferred 
with  Bismarck,  and  proposed  a  European  congress  to  meet 
at  Berlin.  Bismarck  now  appeared  as  the  mediator  between 
these  great  antagonists.  It  was  he  who  persuaded  GortchakofT 
and  Disraeli  to  submit  their  opposing  claims  to  European 
arbitration.  The  Turk  was  powerless,  and  could  be  disposed 
of  as  the  great  powers  considered  best. 

To  bring  Disraeli  and  Gortchakoff  together  was  not  a 
simple  task,  for  they  represented  the  most  aggressive  element 
in  their  respective  nationalities.  The  Turkish  government 
had  concluded  a  provisional  treaty  with  Russia  on  March  3 
at  San  Stephano,  and  this  gave  the  Russians  such  advantages 
as  both  Disraeli  and  Andrassy  declared  were  incompatible 
with  the  peace  of  Europe.  The  war  indemnity  of  fourteen 
hundred  thousand  roubles  was  not  so  important,  since  it  was 
quite  unlikely  to  be  paid ;  but  the  extension  of  Bulgaria  from 
Roumania  to  the  boundaries  of  ancient  Thessaly,  to  be  occu- 
pied by  an  army  of  fifty  thousand  men,  would  place  Con- 
stantinople in  continual  danger  from  any  sudden  uprisal  of 
the  Greeks  and  Macedonians.  Disraeli  was  decidedly  of  this 
opinion,  and  the  Hungarian  traveller  Vambery  wrote  lettters 
and  articles  on  the  subject  for  English  periodicals.  Indig- 
nation meetings  were  held  at  Buda-Pesth,  and  there  was  a 
corresponding  agitation  for  Russia  in  the  Slavic  provinces  of 

3'5 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

Austria.  Andrassy  steered  his  course  between  these  danger- 
ous rocks  like  a  skilful  pilot,  and  succeeded  in  preserving 
Austrian  neutrality  without  threats  or  bombast.  It  was  at 
this  time  that  Bismarck  said  of  Andrassy  in  the  Reichstag : 

"  Our  relations  to  Austria  are  characterized  by  frankness  and 
mutual  confidence,  which  is  a  remarkable  fact,  considering  what 
took  place  in  former  times,  when  other  political  parties  in  Austria 
were  more  powerful  than  they  are  now.  This  is  not  only  the  case 
between  the  two  monarchs  and  the  two  governments ;  no,  I  am 
proud  to  say  that  my  personal  relations  to  Count  Andrassy  are  of 
so  friendly  a  character  as  to  permit  him  to  put  any  question  openly 
to  me  in  the  interest  of  Austria,  and  to  feel  as  certain  that  I  will 
answer  it  truthfully,  as  I  do  that  he  tells  me  nothing  but  the  truth 
with  respect  to  Austria's  intentions." 

The  Clericals,  of  course,  sympathized  with  Turkey,  and  Dr. 
Windhorst  had  questioned  Bismarck  sharply  with  regard  to 
his  sacrifice  of  German  interests  by  a  continued  informal  alli- 
ance with  Russia ;  in  this  instance  German  interests  and  Aus- 
trian interests  were  identical.  To  which  Bismarck  replied  as 
above,  and  also  assured  the  doctor  that  there  was  a  perfect 
understanding  between  Count  Andrassy  and  himself,  which 
did  not  require  Windhorst's  oversight  or  mediation.  The  easy 
good  humor  of  Bismarck's  speeches  at  this  time  indicates 
that  he  was  well  satisfied  with  what  was  taking  place,  and 
felt  himself  master  of  the  situation. 

The  posture  of  affairs  in  April  appeared  more  warlike  than 
before,  and  Bismarck  exerted  himself  energetically  to  per- 
suade Alexander  to  mitigate  the  conditions  of  peace,  and  the 
English  cabinet  to  be  more  willing  to  accept  accomplished 
facts.  In  this  good  service  he  was  greatly  assisted  by  Count 
Schouvaloff,  who  belonged  to  the  moderate  Slavonic  party 
in  Russia,  and  who  acted  as  a  mediator  between  Bismarck, 
Alexander,  and  Lord  Salisbury,  whose  advent  in  the  English 
ministry  at  this  juncture  was  fortunate  for  all  concerned.  The 
last  of  May  Schouvaloff  and  Salisbury  signed  an  agreement 
to  the  effect  that  the  clauses  in  the  treaty  of  San  Stephano 
which  had  become  a  bone  of  contention  should  be  left  to  the 

316 


LIFE  OF   BISMARCK 

Berlin  congress,  for  which  Bismarck  immediately  issued  invi- 
tations to  all  the  powers. 

As  usual,  Bismarck  was  requested  to  explain  his  policy  in 
the  Reichstag,  which  he  did  in  the  following  felicitous 
manner : 

"  I  do  not  picture  to  myself  a  peace  mediator  playing  the  part  of 
an  arbitrator,  and  repeating,  'It  must  be  thus,  or  thus,'  when  the 
whole  power  of  Germany  stands  behind  to  enforce  my  statement ; 
but  a  more  modest  one,  something  like  that  of  an  honest  broker 
who  really  wants  to  transact  business.  We  are  in  the  position  to 
save  any  power  entertaining  secret  wishes  from  the  embarrassment  of 
encountering  refusal,  or  even  a  disagreeable  rejoinder,  from  its  op- 
ponent in  the  congress.  If  we  are  equally  friendly  with  both  par- 
ties, we  can  first  sound  one  and  tell  the  other,  '  Don't  do  this  or 
that,  but  try  to  manage  it  thus!'  I  have  had  many  years'  experi- 
ence in  these  matters,  and  have  often  observed  that  in  discussions 
between  two  people  the  thread  is  frequently  dropped,  and  each 
party  feels  bashfully  disinclined  to  pick  it  up.  If  a  third  party  be 
present  he  can  do  so  without  hesitation,  and  even  bring  the  other 
two  together  again  if  they  have  parted  ill-humoredly.  That  is  the 
part  I  want  to  play." 

The  modest,  intelligent  simplicity  of  such  a  statement  dis- 
arms criticism,  for  it  seems  too  much  even  to  praise  it ;  and 
Bismarck  was  known  henceforth  as  the  "honest  broker" 
among  the  diplomats  of  Europe.  If  he  began  his  course  as  a 
statesman  with  a  sword  in  his  hand,  he  now  carried  an  olive- 
branch  and  wielded  it  no  less  effectively. 

The  congress  met  on  June  13  in  Bismarck's  own  dwelling, 
the  Radziwill  Palace,  in  Berlin,  and  continued  its  sessions 
exactly  one  month.  Bismarck  presided  and  played  the  part 
of  honest  broker  in  and  out  of  its  sessions.  Gortchakoff  may 
not  have  expected  such  an  obstinate  resistance  as  he  encoun- 
tered to-  the  Russian  demands.  The  natural  tendency  of  all 
men  to  unite  against  an  individual  who  proves  himself  too 
strong  for  them  also  applies  to  nations,  and  it  is  only  neces- 
sary to  look  at  the  map  of  Europe  to  recognize  its  applica- 
tion in  the  present  instance.  There  was  an  excellent  oppor- 

317 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

tunity  for  French  intrigue  at  the  Congress  of  Berlin,  which 
Waddington,  the  French  envoy,  was  perhaps  too  high- 
minded  to  take  advantage  of.  If  he  did  not  oppose  the 
claims  of  Russia,  he  certainly  neglected  to  support  them  in 
an  outspoken  manner.  The  tendency  to  an  alliance  between 
Austria,  Germany,  and  Great  Britain  was  evident  from  the 
first ;  but  in  spite  of  that  Disraeli  was  found  the  most  difficult 
plenipotentiary  to  deal  with.1  In  his  case  the  proverbial  diffi- 
culty was  exemplified  of  making  a  bargain  with  a  Jew,  and  it 
was  essential,  besides,  that  he  should  return  to  England  with 
flying  colors  for  the  sake  of  the  Tory  party,  which  had  been 
weakening  ever  since  the  massacre  at  Batak ;  but  the  current 
of  affairs  was  now  in  his  favor.  Bessarabia  was  restored  to 
Russia,  and  the  other  Christian  states  became  autonomous, 
with  the  exception  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  which  were 
placed  in  the  care  of  the  Austrian  government  for  a  term  of 
years, — an  indefinite  term,  apparently.  Servia  and  Bul- 
garia were  both  enlarged  in  the  interest  of  Christianity,  and 
Batoum  was  made  a  free  port.  The  only  direct  advantage 
which  Russia  had  obtained  from  the  war,  at  a  sacrifice  of 
seventy  thousand  men,  was  Kars  and  adjacent  territory,  Bess- 
arabia, and  an  uncertain  indemnity,  which  could  not  be  com- 
pared with  the  compensation  that  Prussia  derived  from  the 
campaign  of  1870.  GortchakofT  was  very  much  disgusted  at 
this;  but  the  Tsar  kept  the  promise  he  had  made  to  Lord 
Loftus,  and  did  not  go  beyond  the  scheme  he  laid  down  at 
Livonia. 

At  the  close  of  the  conference  Punch  published  a  humorous 
cartoon  of  Bismarck  and  Disraeli,  viewing  each  other  across 
a  table,  and  underneath  this  Bizzy  was  represented  saying, 
"  Do  you  know,  I  doubt  if  our  friend  the  Turk  will  more  than 
half  like  this  arrangement ;"  to  which  Dizzy  replies,  "  Ah,  yes, 
that  is  possible,  but  we  must  educate  him  lip  to  it" — referring 
to  the  sentimental  talk  in  the  House  of  Commons  in  regard 
to  educating  the  Turks  to  a  sense  of  moral  responsibility.  It 


1  Bismarck  even  states  that  he  went  to  Disraeli's  bedside  at  midnight  in  order 
to  obtain  his  assent  to  agreements  concluded  between  the  other  envoys. 

318 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

would  be  quite  as  practicable  to  train  up  cougars  for  sheep- 
dogs. 

This,  after  all,  was  the  truth  of  the  matter.  The  English 
cabinet  had  been  insisting  for  two  years  past  that  the  dis- 
memberment of  Turkey  would  be  a  political  monstrosity,  the 
thought  of  which  was  not  to  be  tolerated,  and  Disraeli  had 
declared  at  a  London  dinner  that  "  in  such  a  righteous  cause 
the  cost  of  one,  two,  or  three  campaigns,  in  men  and  money," 
was  not  to  be  considered.1  Yet  this  was  what  the  Berlin 
Congress  had  accomplished,  and  what  Disraeli  subscribed  his 
name  to.  He  returned  to  England  with  a  flourish  of  trum- 
pets, and  Victoria  made  him  Lord  Beaconsfield  for  work  that 
had  really  been  performed  by  Bismarck  and  Andrassy ;  after 
which  he  plunged  into  the  most  chimerical  political  adven- 
tures, and  led  his  party  to  defeat  at  the  next  general  election. 
The  purchase  of  the  Suez  Canal  was  sensible  and  practical, 
but  Beaconsfield's  scheme  of  a  railroad  through  Mesopo- 
tamia, and  his  treaty  with  the  Ameer  of  Herat  almost  bor- 
dered on  political  lunacy.  Bismarck  shook  his  head  at  the 
Afghanistan  adventure,  and  remarked  that  treaties  with  half- 
civilized  nations  were  worse  than  useless, — one  must  either 
conquer  them  or  let  them  alone. 

Gortchakoff  returned  to  St.  Petersburg  with  a  feeling  of 
dissatisfaction  that  never  left  him.  He  had  perhaps  pictured 
to  himself  reviving  the  former  ascendancy  of  Russia  during 
the  Holy  Alliance,  and  did  not  realize  the  difference  between 
the  times  of  Alexander  I.  and  of  Alexander  II.  Bismarck  may 
have  preserved  Russia  from  a  war  with  England  and  Austria, 
but  Gortchakoff  did  not  realize  this.  The  cordial  feeling 
which  continued  between  the  two  emperors  did  not  extend  to 
their  ministers.  Bismarck  expressed  himself  afterwards  as 
holding  Gortchakoff  in  slight  esteem,  either  as  a  man  or  a 
statesman.  The  Journal  de  St.-Petersbourg,  the  Golos,  and 
other  Russian  newspapers  soon  began  to  attack  the  policy  of 


1  Wilhelm  Miiller  says  that  Disraeli's  policy  was  "  oriental"  in  more  senses 
than  one.  History,  p.  510.  It  was  in  fact  oriental  in  its  geography,  its  ferocity, 
and  its  extravagance. 

319 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

the  German  empire,  and  hinted  broadly  at  the  possibility  of 
a  French  alliance.  Austria  and  Count  Andrassy  came  in  for 
their  share  of  this  splenetic  humor.  The  Tsar  had  supported 
Germany  during  the  war  in  1870,  and  the  opposition  to  Gort- 
chakoff  at  the  Berlin  congress  was  treated,  of  course,  as  base 
ingratitude.  It  is  true  enough  that  Russia  was  not  permitted 
the  full  swing  in  1878  that  Germany  may  be  said  to  have  en- 
joyed in  1871,  and  the  accruing  advantages  of  the  war  with 
Turkey  were  not  equal  to  those  which  Prussia  obtained  in  the 
war  with  France;  but  the  question  may  be  asked  whether 
Bismarck  could  have  effected  more  favorable  results  for  Russia 
if  he  had  attempted  to  do  so.  The  solution  of  the  Turkish 
problem  was,  if  anything,  more  difficult  than  the  creation  of 
German  nationality, — so  diverse  and  antagonistic  were  the 
elements  of  which  it  was  composed, — and  if  it  was  not  settled 
by  the  Berlin  congress  in  a  wholly  ideal  manner,  it  was  cer- 
tainly settled  in  a  more  satisfactory  manner  than  any  one 
could  have  expected  two  years  before,  and  the  peace  and  con- 
tentment of  the  Christian  provinces  since  that  time  is  good 
testimony  in  its  favor.  As  Gladstone  replied  to  his  old  antag- 
onist, "A  cordon  of  independent  states  is  a  much  stronger 
barrier  to  Russian  aggression  than  the  hollow  shell  of  the  old 
Turkish  Empire."  For  Bulgaria  and  Servia  to  come  under 
the  yoke  of  the  Russian  despotism  would  be  only  a  less  mis- 
fortune than  their  reconquest  by  the  Turks,  and  their  inhabi- 
tants were  well  aware  of  this.  Humanity,  as  Bismarck  stated 
in  the  Reichstag,  had  been  well  served,  and  Turkey  was  the 
only  power  that  could  reasonably  complain. 

Looked  at  from  all  sides  the  settlement  of  the  Turkish 
problem  was  one  of  the  most  ingenious  pieces  of  statecraft. 
The  Russian  press  was  particularly  exasperated  at  the  trans- 
fer of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  to  Austria,1  for  by  this  means 
Bismarck  achieved  a  three-fold  advantage.  The  presence  of 
an  Austrian  army  corps  in  this  entering- wedge  of  the  Bal- 


1  According  to  Bismarck,  this  was  the  result  of  a  previous  agreement  between 
Alexander  and  Francis  Joseph  before  the  commencement  of  hostilities.  Me- 
moirs, ii.  235. 

320 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

kans  would  serve  to  discourage  local  insurrections  and  rash 
political  movements ;  a  short  route  was  secured  from  Hun- 
gary to  Constantinople  by  which  an  Austrian  force  could 
reach  the  Bosphorus  before  the  Russians  might  be  able  to 
pass  the  Balkans  ;  and  the  loss  of  Austrian  territory  by  the  war 
of  1866  was  in  a  great  measure  repaired.1  At  the  same  time 
the  possession  of  Bessarabia  and  the  independence  of  Bul- 
garia had  given  Russia  an  advantage  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Danube  which  could  not  but  have  a  permanent  effect  on  the 
policy  of  Austria,  and  this  effect  proved  in  the  sequel  to  be 
greatly  to  the  advantage  of  Germany.  Bismarck's  master- 
stroke, however,  was  his  suggestion  to  M.  Waddington  that 
the  French  government  should  take  possession  of  Tunis  as 
their  share  in  the  general  distribution  of  prizes.  This  was 
done  shortly  afterwards,  but  it  produced  an  amount  of  irrita- 
tion in  Italy  which  French  politicians  had  not  counted  upon. 
The  Parisian  journalists  discovered  too  late  that  Bismarck's 
object  was  to  produce  an  antagonism  in  Rome  against  France, 
and  that  the  possession  of  Tunis  was  paid  for  in  an  Austro- 
German-Italian  alliance.  Bismarck  had  remodelled  Europe 
after  his  own  fashion,  and  had  buttressed  Germany  about  like 
a  strong  castle.  Austria,  however,  gained  the  most  decided 
advantage,  for,  next  to  Turkey,  it  was  the  power  most  se- 
riously imperilled  by  the  Russian  victories ;  and  it  was  some- 
thing more  than  an  amiable  formality  which  led  Count  An- 
drassy  to  propose  a  vote  of  thanks  to  Bismarck,  previous  to 
the  adjournment  of  the  congress,  for  the  wisdom  and  untiring 
energy  with  which  he  had  directed  its  proceedings  and  influ- 
enced its  members  in  the  work  of  pacification ;  to  which  Bis- 
marck replied  in  a  gracious  and  complimentary  spirit. 

1  Andrassy  had  a  hard  struggle  to  reduce  these  provinces  to  an  orderly  condi- 
tion after  two  years  of  continuous  revolution,  but  the  equitable  manner  in  which 
he  treated  all  parties,  Christians  and  infidel  alike,  has  been  greatly  com- 
mended. 


21  321 


CHAPTER    XIV 

SOCIALISM   AND   THE   TARIFF 

DURING  the  last  month  of  1877  it  was  well  known  that 
Pius  IX.  could  not  live  much  longer.  He  had  been  one  of 
the  youngest  popes  ever  elected  to  the  papal  see,  and  he  had 
occupied  the  chair  of  St.  Peter,  which  he  acquired  in  a  literal 
sense,  longer  than  any  other,  but  his  reign  had  happened  in 
unfavorable  times,  to  which  his  naturally  amiable  and  kindly 
disposition  was  not  suited.  That  he  was  still  possessed  of  a 
forgiving  spirit  towards  his  enemies  appeared  at  the  sudden 
death  of  Victor  Emmanuel  on  January  9,  1878.  "Victor," 
he  said,  "  was  not  bad  at  heart,  but  he  was  surrounded  by  evil 
counsellors.  But  he  will  have  a  good  bath, — yes,  yes,  he 
will  have  a  good  bath,  and  then  he  will  come  out  all  right." 
A  vivid  description  of  the  good  bath  referred  to  will  be  found 
in  Dante's  "  Purgatorio,"  x  and  in  Victor  Emmanuel's  case  it 
would  come  to  several  centuries  of  purification  by  fire.  In 
less  than  a  month  Pius  followed  after  the  King  of  Italy,  and 
Cardinal  Pecci  was  chosen  pope  by  a  vote  of  forty-five  to 
eighteen,  adopting  the  title  of  Leo  XIII. 

This  election  was  a  quiet  revolution  in  the  Catholic  Church, 
for  Pecci  had  always  acted  in  a  half-concealed  antagonism  to 
Pius  IX.  He  had  been  Bishop  of  Perugia,  and  a  favorite 
with  the  predecessor  of  Pius,  and  it  was  expected  that  he 
would  adopt  a  more  conciliatory  policy  than  had  prevailed  of 
late  in  the  Vatican  councils.  Whether  Bismarck  had  exer- 
cised any  influence  in  his  election,  or  whose  Bismarck's  can- 
didate may  have  been,  has  not  been  revealed,  but  Francis 
Joseph,  the  King  of  Belgium,  and  even  the  French  govern- 
ment took  a  lively  interest  in  the  selection  of  a  pope,  and 
probably  all  had  something  to  say  on  the  subject.  Those 

1  Purgatorio,  canto  xxvi. 
322 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

who  expected  to  see  Leo  XIII.  reconciled  immediately  to  the 
German  emperor  and  the  May  Laws  repealed  by  the  Reichs- 
tag without  delay  were  soon  undeceived.  Great  bodies  move 
slowly,  and  though  the  new  pope  made  friendly  advances  to 
William  and  Alexander,  they  were  such  as  signified  little 
beyond  a  desire  to  live  as  peaceably  as  the  present  situation 
of  affairs  would  permit 

Leo  issued  an  encyclic  letter  on  April  21  in  which  he  re- 
newed and  confirmed  all  protests  of  his  predecessor  against 
the  deprivation  of  his  temporal  dominion  and  against  every 
infringement  of  the  rights  properly  belonging  to  the  Church 
of  Rome.  This  was  a  dignified  assertion  of  a  position  the 
church  had  assumed,  and  which  the  pontiff  could  not  wholly 
escape  from.  He  wrote  to  the  Emperor  of  Germany  at  the 
same  time,  expressing  the  utmost  good-will,  and  suggesting 
for  the  promotion  of  peace  and  harmony  an  alteration,  though 
not  the  repeal,  of  the  May  Laws.  William  I.  never  answered 
this  letter,  for  the  buckshot  of  Nobeling  had  laid  him  at  the 
door  of  death;  but  Leo,  upon  hearing  of  this  catastrophe, 
joined  the  other  potentates  of  Europe  in  a  despatch  express- 
ing the  keenest  solicitude  and  sympathy  for  his  condition. 
The  crown  prince  was  now  acting  as  regent,  and  between  him 
and  Bismarck  there  was  for  once  no  difference  of  opinion.  He 
answered  the  pope's  letter  of  condolence,  and  at  the  same  time 
replied  to  his  previous  communication  in  regard  to  the  May 
Laws.  His  statement  was  clear,  simple,  and  emphatic.  With 
all  good-will  to  the  Church  of  Rome  and  its  highest  repre- 
sentative, the  regent  could  see  no  alternative  other  than  the 
supremacy  of  the  empire  and  the  strict  enforcement  of  its 
laws.  However,  a  change  of  policy  soon  became  evident. 
The  form  remained  the  same,  but  the  animating  spirit  was 
different.  There  was  no  longer  a  German  envoy  at  the  Vati- 
can, but  diplomatic  relations  still  continued  between  the  pope 
and  the  Bavarian  government.  When  Bismarck  went  to  Kis- 
singen  in  July  it  was  noticed  that  he  had  a  number  of  inter- 
views with  the  papal  nuncio  from  Munich.  No  external  re- 
sults followed  upon  these  consultations,  but  to  the  shrewder 
sort  it  was  apparent  that  both  parties  were  heartily  tired  of 

323 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

the  contest,  and  would  be  glad  of  an  opportunity  to  escape 
from  the  continuation  of  it.  Although  the  May  Laws  re- 
mained nominally  in  force,  there  was  continually  less  occasion 
for  the  application  of  them,  and  it  is  supposed  that  in  many 
instances  the  opposition  to  them  passed  unheeded  where  this 
did  not  attract  public  attention.  Subsequent  events  would 
seem  to  indicate  that  there  was  some  kind  of  an  under- 
standing between  Bismarck  and  the  pope's  nuncio  at  Kis- 
singen. 

It  was  now  that  the  slumbering  volcano  of  socialism,  or,  as 
it  is  called  in  Germany,  social  democracy,  suddenly  became 
active  beneath  the  German  soil,  manifesting  itself  in  a  most 
surprising  manner.  On  the  nth  of  May,  1878,  while  the 
emperor  was  driving  in  an  open  carriage  in  the  Unter  den 
Linden,  a  tinker  from  Leipsic  named  Hodel  fired  two  shots  at 
him  from  the  sidewalk,  neither  of  which  took  effect  Hodel 
was  immediately  arrested,  and  ultimately  executed. 

Hodel  was  not  a  typical  Socialist,  but  rather  a  vagabond, 
like  Guiteau,  who,  having  been  exposed  for  fraudulent  prac- 
tices, wished  to  distinguish  himself  by  some  desperate  act 
which  he  supposed  would  win  the  applause  of  suffering  hu- 
manity. He  had,  however,  belonged  to  two  Socialist  organi- 
zations, and  professed  that  his  object  was  to  rid  the  earth  of  a 
tyrant.  Why  he  should  have  considered  William  I.  in  the 
light  of  a  tyrant,  while  Germany  was  enjoying  a  period  of 
peace  and  prosperity,  and  its  government  had  no  aggressive 
policy  except  towards  the  Roman  Catholics,  it  is  difficult  to 
comprehend ;  but  at  this  same  time  there  were  Germans  in 
America  who  talked  against  Emperor  William  with  a  blind 
bitterness  like  negrophobia.  A  German  newspaper  published 
in  New  York  never  ceased  its  vituperation  of  him,  and  did 
not  hesitate  to  declare  that  the  Reign  of  Terror  was  prefer- 
able to  a  peaceable  condition  of  society  under  the  existing 
laws.  Carl  Schurz,  the  representative  German  of  America, 
was  described  as  a  traitor  to  two  hemispheres.  Only  two 
months  later  a  riot  of  foreign  workmen  broke  out  on  the 
Pennsylvania  Railroad,  which  could  only  be  suppressed  by  a 

324 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

regiment  of  United  States  regulars.  It  was  a  wide-spread 
conspiracy,  not  directed  against  monarchical  government  or 
any  particular  kind  of  government,  but  against  the  right  of 
individuals  to  hold  and  inherit  property. 

Bismarck  had  not  expected  that  Germany  would  escape 
from  this  French  mania,  but  he  was  surprised  at  the  sudden 
form  in  which  it  appeared.  He  had  looked  for  a  general 
uprising  of  the  laboring  classes  in  Berlin  and  other  portions 
of  Germany,  and  this  would  probably  have  happened  if  they 
had  been  organized  into  militia  by  themselves,  as  they  had 
been  at  Paris.  If  William  was  less  than  an  emperor  to  his 
chancellor,  he  was  more  than  a  friend,  and  Hodel's  criminal 
attempt  was  like  a  blow  which  stung  Bismarck  to  action. 
Something  must  be  done ;  but  what  ?  How  was  this  invisible 
hydra  to  be  reached  and  dealt  with?  His  health  was  never 
so  miserable  as  at  this  period  of  his  life ;  for  he  was  now  sixty- 
three,  and  feeling  the  influence  of  old  age  upon  him.  Von 
Beust  had  proposed  to  him  at  Salzburg  to  organize  an  anti- 
international  society,  independent  of  governments,  which 
would  serve  to  inculcate  such  doctrines  as  might  counteract 
the  influence  of  those  chimerical  and  impracticable  theories 
from  which  the  Socialists  distilled  their  peculiar  mental  poison. 
Some  attempt  had  been  made  at  this  in  Berlin,  and  what  had 
been  the  consequence  ?  Irony  of  ironies  :  Hodel  was  an  asso- 
ciate of  this  very  society  at  the  time  he  made  his  attempt ! 

"  Bismarck,"  says  Von  Beust,  4<  agreed  that  the  govern- 
ments on  their  side  would  have  to  introduce  more  stringent 
laws  against  such  revolutionary  societies,  against  commu- 
nistic undertakings  with  a  criminal  intent,  such  as  arson,  and 
against  speeches  in  defence  or  glorification  of  communism. 
Prince  Bismarck  recommended  that  a  committee  should  be 
formed  to  investigate  this  question,  and  to  this  I  agreed,  under 
the  proviso  that  one  of  the  subjects  referred  to  it  for  consid- 
eration should  be  the  condition  of  the  working  classes,  with  a 
view  to  its  being  ameliorated  in  a  constitutional  manner." r 
This  memorandum  formed  the  basis  of  Bismarck's  subsequent 

1  Memoirs,  ii.  273. 
325 


LIFE   OF   BISMARCK 

policy  towards  the  Socialists:  first,  government  repression, 
especially  for  incendiary  speeches  and  publications,  and,  sec- 
ondly, an  attempt  to  ameliorate  the  condition  of  the  laboring 
classes.  He  had  never  been  a  believer  in  absolute  freedom 
of  speech,  and  thought  the  Prussians  had  too  much  liberty  in 
that  respect.  He  now  saw  plainly  that  assassins  like  Cohen  and 
Hodel  were  little  more  responsible  for  their  own  acts  than  the 
weapons  they  used.  Socialist  publications  and  photographs 
of  Socialist  agitators  were  found  upon  HodeFs  person.  It 
was  the  rhetoricians  who  stirred  up  unbalanced  and  misan- 
thropic individuals  to  these  desperate  attempts.1  For  the 
government  to  permit  such  revolutionary  talk  and  licentious 
language  was  a  libel  on  all  freedom.  There  must  be  a  limit 
in  such  matters  as  in  all  other  mundane  affairs ;  and  the  first 
point  to  be  considered  was  the  emperor's  safety.  Bismarck 
drafted  the  sketch  of  a  law,  making  it  a  penal  offence  to  use 
inflammatory  language  in  regard  to  the  emperor  in  any  public 
manner;  and  also  a  law  to  restrict  the  right  of  holding  public 
meetings  to  such  as  were  convened  by  the  better  class  of  citi- 
zens. Not  feeling  equal  to  an  exertion  which  included  so 
much  personal  feeling,  Bismarck  sent  the  sketch  of  his  laws 
to  the  Bundesrath,  where  all  constitutional  changes  had  to  be 
entered,  and  delegated  Von  Moltke,  whose  personal  feeling  in 
the  case  was  equally  strong,  to  undertake  its  passage  in  the 
Reichstag;  but  there,  to  his  surprise  and  to  that  of  many 
others,  all  parties,  except  the  Conservatives,  united  against 
the  law.  The  National  Liberals  deserted  Bismarck  in  a  body, 
an  act  of  treachery,  as  he  considered  it,  which  warned  him  in 
regard  to  the  future.  Von  Moltke's  simple,  unpretending 
argument,  delivered  with  all  the  earnestness  of  a  soldier  on 
the  battle-field,  failed  to  produce  any  effect  on  the  serried 
ranks  of  the  opposition.  Absolute  freedom  of  speech  and 
the  right  of  all  classes  to  hold  public  meetings  had  been  won 
in  the  street-fights  of  1848,  and  was  not  to  be  relinquished. 


1  So  Guiteau  admitted  on  his  trial, — that  during  the  month  while  he  was  lying 
in  wait  for  President  Garfield  he  fed  upon  the  editorials  of  certain  newspapers 
which  were  violently  opposed  to  the  policy  of  the  administration. 

326 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

The  assertion  of  the  Clericals,  that  the  tendency  to  anarchy 
was  the  natural  outgrowth  of  the  suspension  of  religious  exer- 
cises in  so  many  German  parishes,  was  silenced  by  the  retort 
that  even  if  such  an  argument  could  apply  to  Hodel,  whose 
parents  were  Protestants,  it  certainly  could  not  apply  to  Kull- 
man ;  but  the  chamber  was  fairly  drowned  with  the  floods  of 
Lasker's  eloquence  in  regard  to  "  the  rights  of  man"  and  "  the 
meaning  of  the  nineteenth  century." 

Lasker  was  very  close  to  a  Socialist  himself,  and  the  Con- 
servatives thought  that  he  would  not  have  regretted  it  if 
Model's  shots  had  taken  effect.  The  bill  was  defeated  by  an 
exceptionally  large  majority.  One  would  think  that  the 
Reichstag  might  have  taken  some  action  for  the  better  se- 
curity of  their  chief  magistrate.  If  Bismarck's  measures 
were  considered  too  stringent,  it  would  seem  as  if  the 
National  Liberals  might  have  introduced  a  substitute  of  some 
kind. 

This  result  so  disheartened  Bismarck  that  he  contemplated 
resigning,  and  declared  openly  that  he  would  no  longer  serve 
so  ungrateful  a  public.  It  of  course  encouraged  the  Socialists, 
and  may  have  contributed  to  the  subsequent  attempt  at  assas- 
sination on  the  2d  of  June.  Dr.  Charles  Nobeling,  a  philolo- 
gist and  a  disagreeable  egotist,  believed  that  he  could  improve 
on  Hodel's  method,  which  it  was  easy  to  see  had  small  chance 
of  success  unless  the  assassin  were  a  practised  marksman. 
Nobeling  was  a  fine  shot  with  a  fowling-piece,  and  could  hit 
swallows  on  the  wing.  He  was  well  educated,  but  had  lived 
rather  a  vagrant  life,  and  was  known  in  all  his  haunts  for  the 
aggressiveness  of  his  socialism.  He  had  lately  visited  among 
the  Internationals  at  London,  and  it  was  believed  that  they 
had  encouraged  him  to  make  this  desperate  attempt.  The 
emperor  took  no  special  pains  to  protect  himself  after  Hodel's 
miscarriage,  and  could  be  seen  driving  on  the  Unter  den 
Linden  at  regular  hours.  Nobeling  obtained  a  room  on  the 
first  story  of  a  dwelling-house,  and,  waiting  until  William  I. 
drove  by,  fired  two  charges  of  buckshot  at  him  in  rapid 
succession.  In  the  excitement  of  the  moment,  however,  he 
neglected  to  allow  for  the  declination,  and  this  saved  the  em- 

327 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

peror's  life.  The  buckshot  riddled  the  helmet, — Miiller  says 
it  looked  like  a  sieve, — and  inflicted  a  good  many  scalp 
wounds,  but  did  not  penetrate  the  skull.  William  was  driven 
back  to  his  palace  almost  insensible,  but  was  able  to  say,  as 
they  laid  him  on  his  bed,  "  I  cannot  understand  why  people 
are  always  shooting  at  me."  z  The  crowd  on  the  Unter  den 
Linden,  where  army  officers  are  always  promenading,  rushed 
into  the  house  where  Nobeling  was  concealed,  and,  seizing 
upon  a  man  whom  they  supposed  to  be  the  offender,  came 
near  tearing  him  to  pieces  before  his  innocence  could  be 
proved.  Others  who  saw  the  window  from  which  the  shot 
was  fired  broke  into  Nobeling's  room  and  attempted  to  arrest 
him ;  but  the  criminal  made  a  desperate  struggle,  and  after 
inflicting  severe  injuries  on  those  nearest  him,  gave  himself 
a  wound  with  a  dagger  which  eventually  ended  his  life. 

The  news  went  all  over  Berlin  in  a  twinkling,  and  the 
greatest  excitement  prevailed.  An  immense  crowd  collected 
about  the  royal  palace,  and  stood  there  silently  and  respect- 
fully waiting  for  information  of  the  emperor's  condition. 
When  at  length  the  surgeons  reported  that  his  wounds, 
though  serious,  were  not  necessarily  fatal,  there  was  a  gen- 
eral feeling  of  relief.  Every  one  spoke  of  the  strength  of  the 
emperor's  constitution,  the  regularity  of  his  exercise,  and  his 
hardy,  vigorous,  and  virtuous  life.  These  were  certainly  in 
his  favor ;  but  the  doctors  found  the  next  day  that  the  feeling 
of  discouragement  that  had  taken  possession  of  him  was  more 
dangerous  than  the  gunshot  wounds.  He  had  done  every- 
thing he  had  known  how  to  do  for  his  people,  and  this  was 
his  return  for  it.  The  two  attempts  to  assassinate  Bismarck 
had  a  definite  object,  but  what  advantage  could  any  one  expect 
from  removing  him  from  the  world  ? 

Bismarck  was  still  at  Varzin  and  the  crown  prince  in 
London,  where  the  hisses  of  the  Internationals  served  as  a 
premonition  of  Nobeling's  crime.  Both  came  at  once,  and 
their  strengthening  presence  revived  William's  courage,  so 
that  in  a  few  days  the  Prussian  people  were  rejoiced  to  learn 

1  Political  History  of  Recent  Times,  p.  638. 
328 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

that  he  was  convalescent.  The  greatest  indignation  was  ex- 
pressed all  over  Germany  at  the  outrage,  and  Bismarck,  like 
a  man  heated  through  with  indignation,  dissolved  the  Reichs- 
tag and  ordered  a  new  election.  Even  such  an  event  could 
not  obliterate  old  party  lines,  but  there  was  a  large  increase 
in  the  number  of  Conservatives ;  and  the  Social  Democrats, 
who  hastened  to  disclaim  all  connection  with  Nobeling,  were 
reduced  to  nine  members,  six  of  whom  were  from  Frenchi- 
fied Saxony.  The  Conservatives  were  still  in  a  minority,  but 
the  National  Liberals  had  changed  their  minds,  and  many  of 
them  had  been  replaced  by  men  of  a  more  loyal  spirit.  They 
would  not  agree  to  all  that  Bismarck  desired,  but  they  were 
willing  to  adopt  a  compromise  measure,  which  it  was  hoped 
would  provide  for  the  better  security  of  the  emperor  and  his 
chancellor.  The  chief  articles  in  the  anti-socialist  law  were, 
firstly,  empowering  the  government  to  dissolve  all  societies 
which  were  considered  dangerous,  confiscate  all  revolutionary 
publications,  and  enable  the  police  to  interfere  with  the  pro- 
ceedings of  public  meetings  whenever  these  showed  a  danger- 
ous tendency ;  secondly,  to  expel  from  their  residences  or 
banish  all  persons  whose  proceedings  'were  of  an  obnoxious 
character;  and  thirdly,  to  make  all  opprobrious  language  in 
regard  to  the  emperor,  or  even  severe  criticism,  a  criminal 
offence.  The  Reichstag  met  on  the  Qth  of  September,  so  that 
the  deputies  had  sufficient  time  to  act  on  these  measures  with 
calm  nerves  and  cool  heads.  They  were  severe  and  despotic 
remedies,  but  it  was  a  case  for  seventy.  Socialism  was  a 
political  monstrosity,  which  in  Bismarck's  opinion  would  have 
to  be  treated  as  Hercules  dealt  with  the  hydra.  Yet  it  was 
not  without  a  ratio  essendi  in  the  inequality  of  fortune,  the 
hardships  of  poverty,  and  the  terrible  power  which  wealth 
gives  its  possessor.  These  would  have  to  be  considered,  as 
well  as  the  danger  which  menaced  civilization  from  its  im- 
practicable theories.  On  September  17  Bismarck  reviewed 
the  subject  in  a  temperate  and  masterly  manner,  admitting,  in 
the  course  of  his  address,  that  there  had  been  a  time  when  he 
felt  a  certain  sympathy  with  socialism,  but  he  could  not  feel 
that  any  longer.  He  said,  in  explanation  of  this  : 

329 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

"  The  change  took  place  in  me  long  ago,  at  that  moment  when 
either  Representative  Bebel  or  Liebknecht — certainly  one  of  the  two 
— represented  in  a  pathetic  appeal  the  French  Commune  as  a  model 
of  political  institutions,  and  openly  professed  himself  a  disciple  of 
the  creed  of  these  murderers  and  incendiaries.  From  that  time  on- 
ward I  have  felt  the  heavy  weight  which  the  conviction  of  the  pres- 
ence of  this  danger  carries  with  it.  I  had  meanwhile  been  absent, 
owing  to  sickness  or  war  ;  but  that  appeal  to  the  Commune  was  a  ray 
of  light  that  was  thrown  on  the  matter,  and  from  that  moment  onward 
I  have  known  the  social-democratic  element  to  be  an  enemy  against 
whom  the  state  and  society  had  to  stand  on  guard  in  self-defence. 
The  attempts  which  I  have  made  in  this  line  at  different  stages  of 
the  legislature  are  known,  and  the  members  of  the  Reichstag  will 
not  fail  to  remember  them.  You  know,  also,  that  I  have  not  suc- 
ceeded in  carrying  out  the  same ;  on  the  contrary,  a  great  many 
reproaches  have  been  directed  against  me  on  that  account ;  but 
from  that  moment  I  have  never  been  remiss  in  my  opposition  to 
social  democracy.  Nor  do  I  believe  my  endeavors  to  have  been  in 
vain,  although  they  may  sometimes  appear  so.  We  Germans  have 
no  need  of  resorting  to  such  extreme  measures  as  were  used  in 
France  in  1871,  though  France  has  ceased  to  be  the  chief  seat 
of  Socialism,  and  now  takes  a  stand  which  our  government,  no 
less  than  society,  need  not  be  altogether  dissatisfied  with.  What 
has  wrought  the  change  in  France,  convincing  people  they  have 
been  wholly  in  the  wrong  ?  By  no  other  method  than  this, — by 
resorting  to  forcible  means,  such  as  I  would  not  recommend  you 
to  imitate.  .  .  .  Surely,  gentlemen,  if  we  are  compelled  to  live 
under  the  tyranny  of  a  set  of  murderers,  life  ceases  to  be  worth 
living,  and  I  trust  that  the  Reichstag — that  we — will  stand  by  the 
government,  by  the  emperor,  who  asks  for  protection  for  his  own 
person,  for  his  Prussian  subjects,  and  his  German  countrymen.  It 
is  quite  possible  that  for  this  occasion,  perhaps,  some  of  us  may 
become  the  victims  of  murderous  assaults ;  but  let  any  one  to 
whom  this  happens  bear  in  mind  that  he  dies  on  the  field  of  honor 
for  the  good— for  the  great  good— of  the  Fatherland." 

The  anti-socialist  measures,  somewhat  modified  by  the 
amendments  of  the  Liberals,  were  enacted  for  a  term  of  four 
years  and  a  half,  but  they  were  enacted  again  in  1883,  and 
afterwards  in  1887;  so  that  public  opinion  in  Germany  evi- 
dently considered  them  necessary  and  justifiable.  The  doc- 

330 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

trinaires  cried  out  against  them  as  "  empirical  makeshifts." 
"  Persecution  is  the  seed  of  the  church,"  they  said,  and  pre- 
dicted that  now  Bismarck  would  be  strangled  in  his  own 
coil;  but  they  were  not  aware  that  Protestantism  had  for- 
merly been  eradicated  from  Belgium  and  Bohemia  by  unfavor- 
able legislation.  It  is  not  easy  to  decide,  even  now,  exactly  the 
effect  of  the  anti  socialist  laws.  They  did  not  eradicate  So- 
cialism, for  it  continued  to  increase  for  the  following  twelve 
years,  and  since  then  it  would  seem  to  have  decreased.  It 
appears,  however,  to  have  placed  the  Socialists  on  their  good 
behavior,  and  given  the  movement  a  slightly  different  direc- 
tion. There  were  no  more  attempts  at  the  life  of  the  emperor 
or  of  other  high  officials,  which  is  probably  what  Bismarck 
cared  for  most.  Prosecutions  under  the  laws  were  not  nu- 
merous, and  caused  little  sensation.  They  did  not  arouse  the 
excitement  and  animosity  of  the  Kulturkampf  laws.  A  num- 
ber of  the  most  inveterate  of  the  offenders  anticipated  their 
sentences  by  emigrating  to  America,  where  they  filled  the  air 
with  outcries  against  the  tyranny  of  Emperor  William,  and 
finally  wound  up  their  career — at  least,  some  of  them — on  an 
Illinois  scaffold  ten  years  later.  Lasker  came  across  the 
ocean  about  the  same  time,  and  added  the  force  of  his  argu- 
ment to  the  odium  of  these  reprobates.  If  the  German  gov- 
ernment was  in  any  respect  more  despotic  at  that  time,  or  is 
so  now,  than  it  was  in  1871,  it  is  the  Socialists  and  not  Bis- 
marck who  are  accountable  for  this.  Bismarck  called  the 
thing  by  its  right  name  when  he  declared  that  it  would  be 
intolerable  to  live  under  the  tyranny  of  such  men  as  the  So- 
cialists. Nobeling  died  in  prison,  but  Hodel  was  hung ;  and 
it  is  noteworthy  that  this  was  the  first  criminal  execution  at 
Berlin  for  seven  years.  What  other  metropolis  can  show  the 
like  of  that  ?  x 

The  best  justification  of  the  anti-socialist  laws  at  this  dis- 
tance is  the  fact  that  they  have  been  three  times  re-enacted 
by  the  Reichstag,  at  intervals  previously  agreed  upon,  when 
there  was  no  public  excitement  such  as  consecrated  their 

1  General  Grant  approved  of  Model's  execution. 
331 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

origin,  and  at  times  when  Bismarck's  influence  over  the  popu- 
lar chamber  was  less  than  it  had  been  formerly.  The  law  to 
provide  for  persons  talking  and  writing  against  the  emperor 
was  intended  to  have  the  effect  of  what  Berlin  doctors  call 
moralisches  chloroform, — that  is,  the  mild  administration  of 
chloroform  so  as  to  keep  the  patient  quiet  for  a  few  minutes 
without  quite  taking  away  his  senses.  It  was  not  intended  to 
prevent  candid,  dispassionate  criticism  of  the  government,  but 
to  mitigate  personal  attacks  and  hot-tempered  denunciations 
against  the  chief  magistrate  and  those  most  nearly  connected 
with  him  ;  such  as  are  only  too  common  in  all  countries  where 
freedom  of  speech  prevails.  No  person  has  ever  been  prose- 
cuted under  the  law  for  talking  in  a  reasonable  and  civil  man- 
ner, and  very  few  for  any  description  of  talking.  Bismarck 
may  have  shown  himself  rather  too  sensitive  in  prosecuting 
Mommsen,  the  historian,  for  accusing  him  of  having  "  dispos- 
sessed the  Prussian  crown,"  a  rather  serious  charge  when 
taken  in  its  literal  meaning,  but  the  prosecution  was  discon- 
tinued, and  was  perhaps  never  intended  for  more  than  a 
threat.  The  editor  who  insinuated  that  the  letters  of  assassi- 
nation with  which  Bismarck  was  threatened  were  written  at  his 
own  dictation  certainly  deserved  his  punishment ;  for  meanness 
and  calumny  could  go  no  further,  considering  the  attempts 
of  Kullman  and  Nobeling.  Apart  from  the  assassination  of 
emperors  and  presidents,  indiscriminate  falsification  is  an  evil 
which  future  statesmen  will  have  to  deal  with  in  a  most  ener- 
getic manner,  if  civilization  is  not  to  be  utterly  corrupted  and 
destroyed  by  it.  When  all  races  of  men  become  so  morally 
perverted  that  they  must  be  fed  continually  on  partisan  lies, 
like  spoiled  children  on  candy,  and  the  truth  is  hateful  in 
their  ears ;  then  their  course  lies  downward,  and  the  muse  of 
histoiy  turns  away  from  them  with  averted  face,  for  their 
history  will  no  longer  be  worth  recording. 

It  will  be  remembered  in  this  connection  that  when  Bis- 
marck began  to  manage  the  Kniephof  estate  he  issued  an 
order  that  his  tenants  should  attend  to  the  necessary  work  on 
their  own  grounds  before  they  did  their  work  for  him.  If  all 
land-owners  and  capitalists  were  to  act  on  a  similar  principle 

332 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

it  would  perhaps  be  the  best  remedy  for  Socialism  that  could 
be  devised.  Bismarck  was  the  same  in  1878  that  he  had  been 
in  1844,  and  he  believed  that  no  methods  of  repression  would 
be  of  avail  without  some  attempt  to  ameliorate  the  condition 
of  the  laboring  classes. 

He  had  already  made  some  tentative  proposals  in  the  direc- 
tion of  an  insurance  fund  for  aged  and  disabled  working-men 
or  their  families.  The  royal  family  had  made  large  bequests  for 
this  purpose,  but  even  an  emperor  could  not  fill  such  a  gulf 
as  this  subject  opened  up.  Bismarck's  favorite  device  of 
making  a  monopoly  of  tobacco,  and  devoting  the  proceeds 
wholly  for  the  benefit  of  persons  who  worked  for  five  hundred 
thalers  a  year  or  less,  did  not  succeed  in  passing  the  Reichs- 
tag. The  Liberals  and  Progressists,  who  represented  the 
mercantile  and  salaried  classes,  always  opposed  measures  of 
this  description,  on  the  ground  that  they  would  interfere  with 
the  laws  of  supply  and  demand.  Unfortunately,  humanity 
sometimes  has  to  interfere  to  prevent  the  demands  of  capital 
from  crushing  out  the  lives  of  men  and  women  by  overwork. 
Where  and  to  what  extent  governments  should  interfere  with 
the  affairs  of  the  business  community  is  always  a  matter  of 
judgment,  and  no  rule  can  be  scientifically  devised  for  it.  It 
is  an  intricate  question,  and  one  on  which  there  will  always 
be  a  difference  of  opinion ;  but  it  has  often  been  found  neces- 
sary to  limit  the  number  of  hours  for  employees  in  certain 
branches  of  industry,  and  this,  at  least,  is  sufficient  to  estab- 
lish the  principle  of  legislative  interference. 

FREE   TRADE   AND    PROTECTION 

The  French  indemnity,  the  Kulturkampf,  the  Oriental  ques- 
tion, and  the  Socialists  had  so  occupied  Bismarck  since  1871 
that  he  found  little  leisure  to  attend  to  the  industrial  and 
commercial  interests  of  the  empire,  and  these  had  continued  in 
the  same  routine  condition  as  during  the  North  German  con- 
federation without  much  effort  for  change  being  made  by  any 
political  party  or  particular  faction.  He  had,  however,  mean- 
while, taken  notice  of  some  facts  which  seemed  to  him  to 
have  a  peculiar  significance,  and  now  that  he  had  bottled  up 

333 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

the  Socialists,  as  well  as  such  gaseous  creatures  might  be, 
with  untiring  diligence  he  devoted  himself  to  the  material  in- 
terests of  his  country.  On  Christmas  evening,  1878,  it  was 
reported  to  the  Associated  Press  that  Bismarck  had  enter- 
tained his  friends  at  the  Radziwill  Palace  with  a  lengthy  dis- 
sertation on  political  economy.  He  had  noticed  the  sur- 
prising prosperity  of  France  after  the  German  evacuation, 
and  he  rightly  ascribed  it  to  President  Thiers's  protective 
tariff.  He  referred  also  to  the  United  States  of  America, 
which  was  then  entering  on  an  era  of  astonishing  material 
growth ;  referred  to  the  comparatively  depressed  condition  of 
English  trade,  and  concluded  from  these  instances  that  the 
countries  which  had  remained  open  were  growing  poor,  and 
those  which  were  closed  up  by  a  wall  of  custom-houses  were 
becoming  rich.  He  also  produced  a  logical  formula  which 
he  had  worked  out  on  this  new  subject,  and  showed  a  most 
surprising  amount  of  knowledge  of  facts  and  details,  all  of 
which  had  been  the  result  of  a  few  months'  study.  His  first 
principle  of  political  economy  was  that  every  nation  should 
do  its  own  work,  so  far  as  possible.  The  report  that  Bis- 
marck had  become  a  protectionist  startled  large  classes  of 
people  in  Germany,  and  the  business  world  generally. 

What  political  economists  commonly  leave  out  of  their  cal- 
culations is  the  moral  element.  For  instance,  in  the  case  of 
an  irredeemable  currency  they  estimate  that  a  depreciation 
will  take  place  in  proportion  to  the  excess  that  is  issued ;  but 
experience  has  proven  that  this  is  not  the  case,  for  the  value 
of  the  currency  will  always  depend  chiefly  on  the  credit  of 
the  government  and  the  expectation  of  its  final  redemption. 
At  the  time  of  General  Lee's  surrender  gold  was  at  a  premium 
in  the  United  States  of  over  one  hundred  per  cent.,  and  in  two 
days  it  fell  more  than  fifty  per  cent,  although  the  volume  of 
paper  money  in  the  country  had  not  changed  in  an  appre- 
ciable degree.  So  Ricardo's  theory  of  rents  was  found  not 
to  work  on  our  western  prairies,  for  immigration  skipped 
over  certain  districts  because  the  resident  population  was  not 
found  congenial  by  the  new-comers.  On  this  account  many 
of  the  finest  lands  still  remain  unoccupied.  So  it  might  be 

334 


LIFE   OF   BISMARCK 

said  generally  of  free  trade  that  it  leaves  out  the  moral  ele- 
ment. The  greed  of  corporations  is  proverbial,  and  the  law 
is  obliged  to  step  in  to  prevent  capital  from  exercising  too 
despotic  a  power.  Free  trade  would  work  very  well  if  all  the 
civilized  world  was  ruled  by  a  single  government.  Then  the 
wool-growers  would  gravitate  to  those  countries  where  wool 
could  be  raised  to  the  best  advantage,  and  manufactories 
would  spring  up  where  climate  and  water-power  were  com- 
bined to  the  best  advantage.  This  is  the  case  to  a  certain 
extent  at  present,  but  the  principle  of  nationality  steps  in  to 
interfere  with  its  evolution.  Every  nation  is  obliged  to  act  as 
a  unit,  and  to  consider  its  interests  irrespective  of  all  others. 
There  is  a  constant  struggle  for  existence  among  nations,  as 
there  is  among  species  of  animals.  Wool  may  be  grown 
better  and  cheaper  in  South  Africa  than  it  is  in  Germany,  but 
the  money  expended  in  raising  it  there  is  a  direct  benefit  to 
South  Africa,  and  if  it  is  sold  to  Germany  that  takes  so  much 
from  the  "  Fatherland"  for  the  advantage  of  a  foreign  country. 
The  statement  that  every  nation  should  do  its  own  work  is  a 
significant  one.  Every  nation  on  the  continent  is  obliged  to 
maintain  its  population  as  near  a  maximum  as  possible  for 
military  purposes,  and  the  question  for  its  government  is  al- 
ways, how  are  its  laboring  classes  to  be  kept  from  starving  ? 
If  they  earn  good  wages  the  community  is  prosperous,  but 
if  the  reverse,  trade  languishes.  The  funds  of  a  millionaire, 
unless  invested  mainly  in  industrial  enterprises,  are  a  burden 
to  the  community  in  which  he  resides.  If  he  spends  more 
than  a  fixed  amount  it  is  likely  to  be  in  foreign  countries ;  but 
if  the  farmers  have  good  crops  and  get  good  prices  for  them 
they  immediately  make  purchases,  and  all  the  wheels  of  trade 
are  set  in  motion.  The  manner  in  which  wealth  is  divided  in 
a  state  or  nation  is  more  important  than  the  sum  total  thereof. 
After  fifty  years  of  free  trade  the  English  farmer  is  poorer 
than  he  was  before. 

The  conflict  between  free  trade  and  protection,  or  between 
a  low  tariff  and  a  high  one,  is  at  the  root  a  conflict  between 
buyers  and  sellers.  Those  who  have  goods  to  sell  wish  to 
obtain  as  high  a  price  as  possible,  while  those  who  consume 

335 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

the  goods  and  live  on  a  fixed  income,  or,  like  professional 
men,  are  not  producers  in  any  way,  are  equally  desirous  for 
low  prices.  Now,  any  one  can  see  that  placing  a  duty  on 
any  imported  article  which  is  also  produced  in  a  country  will 
raise  the  price  of  it  by  limiting  the  supply ;  and  it  is  equally 
natural  to  suppose  that  by  removing  the  duty  the  price  may 
be  expected  to  decline  again. 

As  the  class  of  consumers  who  are  not  in  business  for 
themselves  greatly  exceeds  those  who  are,  we  should  expect 
that  in  any  industrial  community  the  free-traders  would  have 
a  large  majority;  but  this  is  not  the  case.  The  large  army  of 
store-clerks  live,  it  is  true,  on  a  fixed  salary,  but  the  continu- 
ation of  that  salary  depends  on  the  general  prosperity  of  the 
community.  If  hard  times  arrive  they  become  anxious  lest 
their  salaries  may  be  reduced,  or  even  of  losing  their  posi- 
tions. Thus  their  employer's  interests  become  their  own,  and 
unless  they  are  in  the  service  of  importers  they  are  pretty 
certain  to  vote  the  protective  ticket.  Lawyers,  doctors,  and 
professional  non-producers  are  likely  to  be  influenced  in  the 
same  way,  though  not  to  the  same  extent ;  for  when  money 
is  scarce  there  is  always  less  litigation,  and  physicians  find  it 
more  difficult  to  collect  their  charges.  Even  the  farmer  will 
be  affected  in  this  manner,  because  when  business  is  good 
people  are  always  more  willing  to  pay  fair  prices  for  eggs, 
butter,  and  summer  vegetables.  The  general  influence,  there- 
fore, in  an  industrial  community  will  be  in  favor  of  protection 
so  long  as  protection  stimulates  industry,  and  this  would 
probably  be  the  case  in  England,  also,  if  England  were  not 
governed  so  completely  by  its  commercial  interest.  If,  how- 
ever, the  protection  of  home  industries  is  carried  to  an  ex- 
treme, those  industries  tend  to  become  more  profitable  in  pro- 
portion to  others  than  they  should  be,  and  the  tariff  becomes 
a  tax,  for  the  benefit  of  those  engaged  in  them,  upon  all  the 
rest  of  the  community. 

If  the  pudding  is  to  be  judged  by  the  eating,  free  trade 
cannot  be  considered  a  success.  It  is  rather  too  sweeping  a 
generalization.  It  originated  as  a  political  war-cry  to  relieve 
Great  Britain  of  the  oppressive  duties  on  breadstuffs,  which 

336 


LIFE   OF   BISMARCK 

were  intended  for  the  benefit  of  the  landed  gentry;  and  so 
long  as  a  number  of  other  nations  adopted  it,  as  England  pos- 
sessed the  carrying  trade  of  the  world,1  it  was  greatly  to  the 
advantage  of  British  interests ;  but  it  is  doubtful  if  it  is  so 
now.  France  and  Germany  have  returned  to  a  protective 
system,  and  show  no  present  indication  of  a  desire  for  change. 
The  English  provinces,  Canada  and  Australia,  demanded  pro- 
tection as  soon  as  they  obtained  power  to  legislate  on  their 
own  affairs,  and  it  was  one  of  the  principal  demands  of  the 
Irish  home-rule  movement.  This  tendency  of  nations  is  a 
much  stronger  argument  than  the  penny  pamphlets  of  the 
Cobden  Club.  It  is  a  mistake  to  suppose  free  trade  is  a 
political  principle.  Neither  is  there  good  reason  for  be- 
lieving that  universal  free  trade  would  have  the  effect  of  pre- 
venting wars  between  the  nations  of  the  earth.  Nations  lose 
their  temper  like  individuals,  and  when  they  once  get  to  the 
fighting  point  considerations  of  material  interest  are  thrown 
to  the  winds. 

Bismarck  had  already  attempted  in  1876  to  make  tobacco 
a  government  monopoly,  but  he  could  not  persuade  the 
Reichstag  to  agree  with  him ;  and  they  were  probably  right 
enough  in  this,  for,  although  such  an  authority  would  have 
been  judiciously  wielded  during  Bismarck's  term  of  office,  it 
might  easily  have  been  abused  by  his  successors.  Tobacco, 
though  originally  a  luxury,  has  long  since  acquired  the  char- 
acter of  a  necessity  to  the  working-man,  and  the  comfort  of 
his  pipe  at  the  close  of  the  day  is  as  essential  to  him  as  the 
roof  over  his  head.  Bismarck,  however,  believed  that  his 
countrymen  smoked  too  much,  and  also  drank  too  much 
lager,  so  that  not  long  after  this  he  issued  an  address  to  them 
on  the  subject,  in  the  hope  that  it  might  induce  them  to  become 
more  temperate. 

He  gave  the  German  people  three  months  to  think  over 
and  discuss  the  tariff  question  before  it  was  brought  up  in  the 
Reichstag,  and  this  afforded  occupation  for  many  a  news- 

1  A  legacy  from  the  wars  of  Napoleon. 
22  337 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

writer  and  magazine  contributor.  The  academic  class  attacked 
him  at  once,  and  not  only  denied  any  advantage  in  the  proposed 
change,  but  questioned  the  sincerity  of  Bismarck's  motives. 
His  object  evidently  was  to  conciliate  the  Conservatives  and 
the  landed  interest.  The  cry  went  abroad  that  Bismarck  had 
deserted  the  National  Liberals  and  was  coquetting  with  the 
Clerical  party.  All  the  strongholds  of  Catholicism — Bavaria, 
Posen,  and  the  Rhineland — were  agricultural  districts,  which 
would  be  benefited  by  Bismarck's  proposed  duty  on  corn ; 
and  it  was  also  noticed  that  almost  simultaneously  with  the 
proposal  of  his  new  tariff  in  the  Reichstag,  Dr.  Falk  resigned 
from  the  Ministry  of  Public  Worship.  This  indicated  a  de- 
cided change  in  Bismarck's  Catholic  policy ;  and  he  retorted 
to  the  National  Liberals  that  if  they  were  unwilling  to  follow 
him  he  must  seek  new  allies  where  he  could  find  them. 
There  was  no  need  of  supposing  him  insincere  in  this ;  and  if 
he  had  wished  to  conciliate  the  Conservatives  and  Clericals, 
he  might  have  found  a  more  direct  means  of  doing  so  than  by 
changing  the  tariff.  Political  economy  is  eminently  a  prac- 
tical science,  and  men  who  have  spent  their  whole  lives  in 
lecturing  or  hearing  recitations  are  not  the  best  qualified  to 
express  an  opinion  on  it. 

Low  prices  are  for  the  interest  of  the  professional  class,  so 
far  as  they  depend  upon  a  fixed  salary ;  and  it  is  easy  enough 
to  figure  out  results  on  paper  which  in  their  practical  appli- 
cation fail  to  come  to  the  same  conclusion,  on  account  of 
some  factor  which  has  been  left  out  of  consideration.1 

There  had  never  been  actual  free  trade  in  Germany,  nor 
had  there  been  since  1815  any  very  high  protection.  Since 
1848  the  tendency  of  Prussia  had  been  in  the  direction  of 
lower  duties,  while  raw  materials  were  mostly  admitted  free 
of  duty,  and  the  duties  on  manufactured  articles  varied  ac- 
cording to  circumstances,  without  any  definite  system.  No 
attempt  had  been  made  by  any  minister  of  finance  to  sys- 


1  One  factor  almost  invariably  omitted  is  the  excessive  productiveness  of 
machinery.  Manufacturers  combining  together  can  maintain  a  certain  price  in 
their  own  country  and  throw  a  large  surplus  at  a  lower  rate  on  to  foreign  markets. 

333 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

tematize  the  tariff,  nor  had  the  government  made  any  oppo- 
sition to  the  will  of  the  majority  as  expressed  in  the  Landtag. 
This  continued  through  the  period  of  the  North  German 
confederation  until  the  war  with  France,  after  which  the  in- 
flux of  gold  produced  a  rise  of  prices  and  prosperity  for  those 
who  were  in  active  business,  though  not  advantageous  for 
people  living  on  a  fixed  income.  This  came  to  an  end  soon 
after  the  French  payments  ceased,  and,  as  the  French  tariff 
had  now  closed  one  avenue  to  English  exportation,  Germany 
became  the  particular  centre  to  which  foreign  imports  gravi- 
tated, and  the  consequence  was  a  general  depression  of  Ger- 
man industry.  At  the  same  time  the  nation  was  burdened 
with  a  number  of  irregular  taxes,  of  which  the  matriculary 
assessments  were  the  most  unpopular;  and  these  had  been 
adopted,  according  to  the  confession  of  the  Minister  of  Finance, 
as  temporary  expedients. 

Bismarck  believed  that  both  of  these  evils  could  be  reme- 
died at  a  single  blow ;  and  it  is  significant  that  he  should  have 
taken  the  initiative  in  this  matter,  and  should  have  carried 
through  the  reform  almost  on  his  own  shoulders.  His  plan 
was  to  place  a  moderate  protective  duty  on  all  materials  of 
commerce,  except  such  as  could  not  be  raised  or  produced  in 
Germany.  He  did  not  believe  in  free  raw  material  any  more 
than  in  free  broadcloth,  though  the  duties  on  manufactured 
articles  would  have  to  be  higher  in  proportion  in  order  to 
protect  the  manufacturer  at  all.  He  showed  good  judgment 
both  in  advertising  the  question  a  sufficient  time  in  advance, 
and  in  not  bringing  it  before  the  country  previous  to  a  general 
election,  so  that  the  deputies  who  acted  on  it  might  come  to 
the  subject  as  unprejudiced  as  possible.  It  was  not  until  the 
middle  of  April  that  he  introduced  his  measure,  when  a  storm 
of  facts  and  figures  broke  upon  him,  enough  to  weary  the 
stoutest  brain  and  puzzle  the  clearest  intellect.  There  is  no 
other  subject  in  which  such  contradictory  results  can  be  ob- 
tained from  the  most  reliable  statistics,  and  the  opposition  had 
come  prepared  for  the  purpose  in  a  truly  German  and  thorough- 
going manner.  Changes  of  tariff  have  the  effect  for  the  im- 
mediate time  of  transferring  money  from  the  pockets  of  one 

339 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

class  of  persons  to  those  of  another,  and  there  were  few  dep- 
uties present  who  did  not  feel  this  more  or  less  ;  so  that  it  was 
not  only  a  national  question,  but  a  strongly  personal  one. 
The  debates  were  protracted  and  acrimonious.  The  proposed 
measure  was  treated  as  if  it  were  a  return  to  the  dark  ages. 
The  prosperity  of  England  was  called  to  mind,  together  with 
the  fact  that  wages  were  higher  there  than  in  protected 
France.  The  Liberals  feared  that  it  would  make  the  govern- 
ment too  independent  of  the  popular  will.  However,  a  large 
body  of  the  Liberals,  led  by  Benningsen,  were  inclined  to 
favor  the  measure  to  a  certain  extent,  though  Lasker  and  the 
extremists  were  bitterly  opposed  to  it. 

Bismarck  believed  that  the  more  thorough  the  discussion  of 
the  subject  the  better  the  public  would  be  satisfied  with  the 
final  decision.  He  interfered  little  in  the  debate,  and  it  was 
not  until  May  2  that  he  brought  forward  his  own  argument 
in  a  moderate,  conciliatory  speech,  which  quite  surprised  those 
who  had  expected  that  he  would  attempt  to  carry  through 
his  bill  by  main  force  and  hard  talking.  After  referring  to 
the  matriculary  assessments  as  a  form  of  taxation  not  much 
better  than  financial  anarchy,  which  made  the  government 
a  kind  of  dunning  creditor  such  as  must  necessarily  cause 
great  irritation,  he  presented  the  main  points  of  his  state- 
ment in  the  following  summary  : 

"  There  is  still  another  objection  that  I  must  raise  against  our 
present  legislation,  and  this  is  one  of  the  most  important,  which  is 
likely  to  occupy  us  more  in  our  discussions  than  the  purely  financial 
part  of  the  matter  will  do, — namely,  that  the  present  arrangement 
of  our  indirect  taxation  does  not  provide  for  our  home  industry  that 
amount  of  protection  which  can  be  provided  for  it  without  in  any 
way  injuring  our  general  interests. 

11 1  do  not  care  to  enter  here  into  any  general  discussion  on  free 
trade.  Up  to  this  time  we  all  have  been  protectionists,  even  the 
greatest  free-traders  that  we  have  amongst  us,  for  no  one  has  till  now 
expressed  a  desire  to  go  below  the  tariff  which  is  in  force  to-day ; 
and  this  tariff  is  essentially  a  moderately  protective  one,  and  the 
bill  which  we  are  submitting  is  also  moderately  protective.  What 
we  ask  is  a  moderate  protection  of  home  labor.  We  are  remote 

•  340 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

from  a  system  of  prohibition  such  as  exists  in  the  majority  of  neigh- 
boring states.  .  .  . 

"Surely  we  cannot  expect  Germany  to  be  ever  the 'dupe  of 
honest  conviction.  Through  the  wide-open  doors  of  our  importa- 
tion we  have  thus  far  served  as  a  reservoir  for  the  over-production 
of  all  foreign  countries.  Articles  that  have  come  from  abroad  ap- 
pear to  us  to  have  a  somewhat  higher  value  than  those  of  domestic 
origin  ;  and  the  flooding  of  Germany  with  the  over-production  of 
other  countries  must  have,  as  it  seems  to  me,  a  most  depressing 
influence  on  our  prices  and  on  the  development  of  our  industry. 
Let  us,  therefore,  close  our  doors  and  erect  higher  barriers,  such  as 
we  here  propose  to  you ;  and  let  us  take  such  necessary  steps  that 
the  German  market  at  least — the  market  where  German  good- 
nature is  now  being  taken  advantage  of— shall  be  preserved  for 
German  industry. 

"  The  question  of  a  large  export  trade  is  always  somewhat  pre- 
carious. No  new  countries  can  be  discovered  ;  the  globe  has  been 
circumnavigated,  and  we  cannot  find  any  more  important  nations 
to  purchase  our  goods  from  us.  A  commercial  treaty  is  a  sign  of 
friendship  between  nations ;  but  the  question  for  the  economist  is, 
what  is  included  in  it?  One  might  always  ask  in  such  cases, 
'Which  party  is  going  to  be  cheated?'  As  a  rule,  one  will  always 
be  a  victim,  although  the  treaty  may  last  for  years  before  this  is 
discovered.  I  do  not  refer  here  to  our  own  treaties,  but  would 
remind  you  of  those  concluded  between  France  and  England,  in 
which  both  parties  now  claim  to  have  been  deceived.  What  I 
wish  to  remind  you  of  is  the  fact  that  our  taxing  machinery  is  not 
within  the  power  of  the  government  to  the  same  extent  as  in  neigh- 
boring countries.  The  levying  and  administrating  of  taxes  is  with 
us  entirely  publici  juris,  the  right  of  the  people,  and  no  permis- 
sible deviation  from  the  definition  of  the  law  can  at  any  time  take 
place  with  us ;  while  with  our  neighbors — France  not  excepted, 
although  France  resembles  us  closely  enough — the  power  of  the 
officials  is  such  that  there  the  administration  of  the  law  can  be  con- 
siderably interfered  with."  x 

It  was  said  of  this  argument  by  the  doctrinaires  that  Bis- 
marck had  judged  the  subject  too  much  from  the  stand-point 
of  his  foreign  policy ;  that  he  had  introduced  foreign  politics 

1  Bismarck's  Speeches,  Speemann's  ed.,  xvii.  81. 
341 


LIFE   OF   BISMARCK 

into  political  economy ;  and  that  this  was  to  have  been  ex- 
pected from  the  nature  of  his  genius  and  the  mental  methods 
he  had  been  accustomed  to.  On  the  contrary,  it  was  the 
breadth  of  his  experience  and  his  large  way  of  looking  at  all 
subjects  which  enabled  him  to  see  the  industrial  conditions 
of  his  country  in  their  true  relations.  The  claim  of  specialists 
that  they  alone  are  capable  of  judging  of  matters  within  their 
own  departments  is  one  of  the  plagues  of  the  century.  That 
a  man  can  only  understand  a  subject  by  spending  his  whole 
life  in  the  study  of  it  is  a  delusion.  It  would  be  much  more 
correct  to  say,  as  has  been  often  said  in  regard  to  languages, 
that  he  who  knows  but  one  subject  knows  none.  If  an  art 
critic  is  to  judge  of  an  historical  painting,  he  must  not  only 
be  acquainted  with  the  technicalities  of  the  school  to  which  it 
belongs,  but  he  must  have  a  fine  sense  of  color,  an  eye  for 
form,  a  knowledge  of  history  and  philosophy,  and,  above  all, 
an  insight  into  human  nature  like  that  of  the  dramatic  poet ; 
and  this  last  can  only  be  obtained  by  a  wide  experience  in 
human  affairs.  A  statesman  who  has  to  legislate  on  the  tariff 
must  be  well  read  in  history  as  well  as  political  economy. 
He  must  understand  international  politics,  and  in  what  way 
his  proposed  measures  are  likely  to  be  affected  by  them,  or 
vice  versa.  He  must  also  understand  human  nature,  or  how 
men  are  likely  to  act  under  given  conditions.  Free-trade 
doctrinaires  might  continue  to  argue  the  ultimate  advantages 
of  every  nation's  doing  the  work  which  it  could  do  best ;  but 
the  return  of  France  to  a  protective  policy  had  wholly  sub- 
verted the  basis  on  which  such  calculations  were  made.  They 
reasoned  in  regard  to  Germany  as  if  it  were  an  isolated  nation 
which  could  not  be  affected  by  the  laws  and  tariffs  of  other 
countries.  Bismarck  reasoned  as  if  Germany  were  a  member 
of  a  large  family  whose  individuals  were  bound  by  ties  of  re- 
lationship and  habits  of  co-operation,  so  that  the  proceedings 
of  any  one  of  them  would  be  certain  to  affect,  to  some  extent, 
the  conduct  of  the  others.  Abstract  principles  always  have 
to  be  modified  in  their  practical  application. 

Bismarck's   tariff  was   a   very  moderate    one,   few  of  the 
duties  exceeding  thirty  per  cent,  ad  valorem,  and  the  average 

342 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

being  little  over  twenty  per  cent.  The  discussion  of  the  sub- 
ject lasted  until  the  end  of  July,  when  the  new  tariff  was 
passed  by  nearly  a  two-thirds  majority.  Bismarck's  fore- 
sight in  introducing  this  measure  to  the  Reichstag  before  it 
could  be  acted  upon  by  a  popular  vote  was  justified  by  the 
elections  in  1880,  in  which  the  government  met  with  a  signal 
defeat.  The  various  parties  and  their  numbers  represented  in 
the  election  of  that  year  are  worth  considering  as  an  example 
of  the  confused  condition  of  German  politics.  The  Con- 
servatives carried  seventy-six  seats ;  the  Clericals,  one  hun- 
dred and  seven ;  National  Liberals,  forty-three ;  Secessionists, 
forty-seven;  Progressists,  sixty-eight;  Socialists,  twelve;  Poles, 
eighteen ;  Alsatians,  fifteen.  From  such  an  heterogeneous 
body  of  legislators  almost  anything  might  be  expected.  The 
Secessionists  pretended  to  be  a  new  party,  but  they  were 
really  Socialists  in  disguise,  with  Lasker  among  them,  and 
the  Progressists  were  not  much  better. 

Bismarck  paid  no  attention  to  this  unfavorable  composition 
of  the  Reichstag.  The  new  tariff  had  been  enacted,  and  the 
majority  of  the  opposition  was  not  strong  enough  even  to 
carry  through  a  revision  of  it.  He  again  recurred  to  his  to- 
bacco monopoly,  to  a  state  insurance  fund  for  laborers,  and 
for  elections  every  four  years  instead  of  every  two  years. 
These  measures  were  introduced  in  a  message  from  the  em- 
peror. Bismarck  was  complained  of  for  attempting  to  screen 
himself  behind  the  imperial  personality,  and  William  I.  replied 
to  this  in  a  second  rescript,  in  which  he  asserted  his  own 
responsibility  for  the  policy  of  the  government.  Public  opin- 
ion, however,  did  not  like  the  measures  any  better  for  this  ; 
they  were  considered  reactionary  and  intended  to  strengthen 
the  imperial  authority,  and  make  it  more  independent  of  the 
popular  will.  Bismarck  informed  the  deputies  that  if  they  did 
not  like  his  programme  the  measures  could  go  over  to  an- 
other Reichstag,  and  the  whole  session  was  consumed  in 
fruitless  discussion  and  parliamentary  wrangling.  Mean- 
while, the  new  tariff  was  accomplishing  what  its  support- 
ers anticipated  for  it.  New  manufactories  were  being  con- 
structed, industry  stimulated,  and  the  laboring  classes  obtained 

343 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

slightly  better  remuneration  for  their  work.  On  the  other 
hand,  annual  salaries  were  not  raised  to  correspond  with  this 
change,  so  that  even  the  large  body  of  government  officials 
were  very  much  dissatisfied  with  it.  The  dissatisfaction  in 
Great  Britain  was  more  open  and  pronounced.  The  unpleas- 
ant feeling  towards  Germany  occasioned  by  the  Danish  war 
and  the  battle  of  Sedan  had  been  passing  away  under  the 
influence  of  the  Kulturkampf  and  the  Congress  of  Berlin,  and 
now  here  was  a  protective  tariff,  and  the  doors  of  the  only 
large  nation  in  Europe  which  had  remained  open  to  Eng- 
lish manufacturers  were  closed.  The  ill  effects  of  this  were 
soon  perceptible  in  Manchester  and  Birmingham.  The  tide 
turned  again,  and  Bismarck  became  more  of  a  bogie  than 
ever.  A  newspaper  warfare  against  him  commenced  which 
did  not  subside  so  long  as  he  remained  in  power,  and  even 
such  a  high-toned  weekly  as  the  Spectator  kept  up  a  running 
scream  against  him  which  was  re-echoed  in  America.1 

THE  AUSTRO-GERMAN   ALLIANCE 

Bismarck  again  astonished  the  world  in  1879  by  a  diplo- 
matic triumph  of  the  first  magnitude,  and  this  was  nothing 
less  than  turning  the  Austrian  empire  round  upon  its  base. 
Political  combinations  had  become  with  him  a  matter  of  tact 
rather  than  thought,  as  Napoleon  confessed  his  movements 
were  on  the  battle-field,  and  he  may  have  felt  this  approach- 
ing change  during  the  Berlin  Congress.  The  difficulty  was  to 
make  others  feel  it  and  see  it  as  he  did.  Is  it  possible  that  he 
foresaw  this  culmination  of  his  life's  work  in  his  lenient  treat- 
ment of  Austria  after  the  battle  of  Sadowa  ? 

It  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  the  Russian  complaints  against 
Bismarck  were  altogether  groundless.  He  had  kept  his  agree- 
ment with  the  Tsar  so  far  as  he  could  consistently  with  German 
interests,  but  not  to  the  extent  which  Alexander  expected. 
Even  if  a  definite  programme  is  sketched  out  beforehand,  re- 
sults are  sure  to  differ  from  expectations,  and  circumstances 
alter  cases.  The  irritation  which  commenced  at  the  Berlin 


1  Echoed  by  Protestant  protectionist  newspapers  like  the  New  York  Tribune 
and  the  Boston  Advertiser. 


344 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

Congress  was  considerably  aggravated  by  subsequent  events  at 
Constantinople.  It  soon  came  to  be  reported  that  a  large  num- 
ber of  Prussian  officers  had  entered  the  Turkish  service,  that 
Prussian  tactics  were  being  adopted  in  the  sultan's  army,  and 
that  German  councils  and  influence  had  superseded  English 
councils  and  influence.  This  was  natural  enough,  for  the  Sub- 
lime Porte,  after  his  defeat  in  the  Balkans,  desired  to  reorganize 
his  army  after  the  best  pattern  of  the  time,  and  there  was  no 
law  which  could  prevent  German  officers  from  resigning  their 
commissions  and  leaving  their  country  if  they  chose  to  do  so. 
The  pay  of  a  German  line  officer  was  little  more  than  enough 
to  keep  him  in  clothes  and  tobacco,  whereas  in  the  service  of 
the  Porte  he  would  be  able  to  lay  up  a  competency.  In  Russia 
this  would  not  have  been  permitted,  for  the  Tsar's  government 
claims  an  absolute  control  over  the  life  and  property  of  its 
citizens,  so  that  it  is  impossible  to  leave  the  country  without 
special  permission  to  do  so.  Beyond  this,  the  Turkish  envoy 
to  the  Congress  at  Berlin  had  returned  with  a  strong  impres- 
sion of  Bismarck's  sagacity  and  political  influence ;  and  Bis- 
marck, on  his  side,  had  expressed  a  very  friendly  feeling 
towards  the  Turkish  government.  Now  that  the  Balkan 
question  had  been  settled  in  just  the  right  way,  he  was  as 
anxious  as  the  sultan  himself  that  it  should  not  be  unsettled 
again ;  and  to  further  this  purpose  Bismarck  was  not  unwilling 
to  give  the  sultan  a  little  moral  encouragement,  so  that  the 
evil  tendency  to  excess  which  always  follows  upon  a  pros- 
perous issue  should  not  lead  the  Christian  states  of  Turkey 
into  extravagant  political  movements. 

It  was  even  more  for  the  interest  of  Austria  that  peace 
should  be  kept  between  the  Balkans  and  the  Danube;  but  it 
was  not  for  the  interest  of  Russia, — at  least,  not  in  the  opinion 
of  the  Panslavists,  who  now  were  in  the  ascendancy.  Pan- 
slavism  is  as  dangerous  for  the  Slavs  outside  of  Russia  as  it  is 
for  Austria;  but  it  is  one  of  the  tendencies  of  the  time  towards 
the  union  of  all  people  of  kindred  race  and  tongue.  Thus  the 
rapprochement  of  Austria  and  Germany  was  a  consequence,  of 
the  Russo-Turkish  war,  but  it  might  never  have  exceeded  a 
mutual  understanding  between  the  two  powers  if  it  had  not 

345 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

been  for  the  imprudence  of  Alexander  and  GortchakofT.  In 
1888  Bismarck  made  an  explanation  in  the  Reichstag  of  the 
causes  which  led  to  the  changed  relations  between  Russia  and 
Germany,  in  the  course  of  which  he  said : 

"I  had  the  feeling  at  the  time  of  the  Berlin  Congress  of  having 
rendered  such  services  to  Russia  as  have  seldom  been  rendered  by 
a  minister  to  a  foreign  power.  Judge,  therefore,  of  my  surprise 
and  disappointment  at  perceiving  how  a  kind  of  newspaper  war 
gradually  began  in  St.  Petersburg,  in  which  German  policy  was 
attacked,  and  suspicion  was  cast  on  me  personally  in  regard  to  my 
intentions.  These  attacks  increased  during  the  following  year  till 
1879  they  grew  into  a  strong  demand  for  a  pressure  that  we  were 
to  exercise  on  Austria,  in  matters  which  did  not  admit  of  our  inter- 
fering with  Austrian  rights.  I  could  not  lend  my  hand  to  that,  for 
if  we  allowed  Austria  to  be  estranged,  we  would  necessarily  become 
dependent  on  Russia  if  we  did  not  wish  to  become  quite  isolated 
in  Europe.  Would  such  dependence  have  been  bearable?"  x 

In  a  letter  of  September  10,  1879,  Bismarck  explained  the 
Russian  complication  to  his  faithful  friend  and  admirer,  the 
King  of  Bavaria,  and  from  this  we  cull  the  following  extract : 

"Russian  policy  has  remained  unquiet,  unpacific;  Panslavistic 
chauvinism  has  gained  increasing  influence  over  the  mind  of  the 
Tsar  Alexander,  and  the  serious  (as,  alas !  it  seems)  disgrace  of 
Count  Schouvaloff  has  accompanied  the  Tsar's  censure  of  the 
count's  work, — the  Berlin  Congress.  The  leading  minister,  in  so 
far  as  such  a  minister  there  is  at  present  in  Russia,  is  the  war  min- 
ister Milutin.  At  his  demand,  the  peace,  in  which  Russia  is  threat- 
ened by  no  one,  has  yet  been  followed  by  the  mighty  preparations 
which,  notwithstanding  the  financial  sacrifice  involved  in  the  war, 
have  raised  the  peace-footing  of  the  Russian  army  by  560,000  men, 
and  the  footing  of  the  army  of  the  west,  which  is  kept  ready  for 
active  service,  by  about  400,000  men.  These  preparations  can 
only  be  intended  as  a  menace  to  Austria  or  Germany,  and  the  mili- 
tary establishments  in  the  Kingdom  of  Poland  correspond  to  such 
a  design.  The  war  minister  has  also,  in  the  presence  of  the  tech- 

1  Bismarck's  Speeches,  Speemann's  ed.,  xvi.  161. 
346 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

nical  commissions,  unreservedly  declared  that  Russia  must  prepare 
for  a  war  '  with  Europe. ' 

"  In  this  situation  of  affairs  Russia,  in  the  course  of  the  last  few- 
weeks,  has  presented  to  us  demands  which  amount  to  nothing  less 
than  that  we  should  make  a  definite  choice  between  Russia  and 
Austria,  at  the  same  time  instructing  the  German  members  of  the 
Eastern  committees  to  vote  with  Russia  on  doubtful  questions. ' ' x 

The  Tsar's  request  to  the  Berlin  Cabinet  that  Germany 
should  vote  in  international  concerns  according  to  Russia's 
dictation,  coupled  with  the  presence  of  400,000  Russian 
troops  on  the  German  frontier,  was  sufficiently  ominous ;  and 
it  is  evident  that  Gortchakoff  believed  that  he  had  placed  Bis- 
marck between  two  fires, — France  and  Russia, — a  dilemma 
from  which  there  was  no  escape,  except  in  submission  to  the 
St.  Petersburg  autocrat. 

When  Gortchakoff  sent  threatening  letters  to  Bismarck  he 
counted  on  the  wrong  man  for  a  game  of  bluff.  Alexander 
had  already  tried  that  in  regard  to  the  deposition  of  the  King 
of  Hanover,  and  we  have  seen  what  he  accomplished  by  it. 
The  new  tariff  was  on  Bismarck's  hands  at  this  time,  and  was 
not  disposed  of  until  the  midsummer.  He  might  have  perti- 
nently asked  the  Tsar,  "  What  more  do  you  want  ?"  but  he  left 
that  to  Emperor  William,  who  arranged  a  meeting  with  Alex- 
ander on  the  Prussian  frontier  early  in  September,  and  at  the 
same  time  he  went  himself  to  Vienna  to  consult  with  An- 
drassy,  a  statesman  whom  he  never  counted  on  in  vain.  It  is 
said  that  the  proposition  of  an  alliance  came  from  Andrassy. 
Bismarck's  face  glowed.  Gortchakoff  was  checkmated;  for 
Austria  and  Germany  together  could  withstand  all  the  rest  of 
Europe.  The  treaty  agreed  upon  was  very  simple,  and  was 
immediately  approved  by  Francis  Joseph.  If  either  empire 
should  be  attacked  by  Russia  the  other  would  assist  it  with 
two  hundred  thousand  troops.  In  regard  to  Turkish  affairs  it 
was  agreed  that  the  political  situation  as  determined  by  the 
Congress  of  Berlin  should  be  strictly  maintained. 

x  Memoirs,  ii.  261. 
347 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

Meanwhile  the  German  emperor  had  returned  from  an  alto- 
gether friendly  conference  with  his  nephew  Alexander  at 
Alexandrovo,  and  Bismarck  found  him  in  Berlin  quite  satisfied 
that  the  tone  of  the  Russian  papers  did  not  reflect  the  atti- 
tude of  the  government,  and  was  not  in  itself  a  matter  of 
serious  importance.  He  objected  to  the  Austrian  alliance  as 
a  new  and  revolutionary  movement  in  Prussian  diplomacy. 
The  tradition  of  the  Hohenzollerns  had  been  antagonistic  to 
Austria,  and  this  had  always  been  encouraged  by  the  Russian 
court.  The  emperor  was  now  over  eighty,  and  such  a  mental 
transposition  as  this  treaty  required  is  hard  and  difficult  at 
such  an  age.  Bismarck  found  that  turning  the  Austrian 
empire  round  on  its  base  was  easy  compared  with  turning 
the  Hohenzollerns.  He  argued  that  the  policy  of  Frederick 
the  Great,  while  Prussia  was  an  isolated  kingdom,  could  no 
longer  apply  to  an  united  Germany,  and  that  the  local  inde- 
pendence of  the  Hungarians  had  changed  quite  as  radically 
the  policy  of  Austria.  More  than  ever  now  would  the  Hun- 
garians continue  to  be  the  allies  of  Prussia,  since  they  were 
almost  surrounded  by  a  cordon  of  Slavonic  states.  The  Aus- 
trians  were  Germans,  and  felt  the  same  sympathetic  interest  in 
the  welfare  of  Germany  which  all  Germans  must.  Finally  he 
wrote  to  Von  Moltke,  who  was  at  Freiburg  in  the  Black 
Forest,  urging  him  to  meet  the  emperor  on  his  journey  to 
Baden,  and  lay  before  him  a  scheme  of  the  advantages  of  an 
alliance  with  Austria  from  a  military  point  of  view.  This 
commission  Von  Moltke  was  not  slow  to  undertake,  but  Wil- 
liam I.  still  held  out  obstinately,  trusting  always  in  the  good 
intentions  of  Alexander.  The  crown  prince,  with  his  English 
proclivities,  was,  of  course,  anti-Russian,  and  the  whole  min- 
istry sided  with  Bismarck,  but  it  was  of  no  avail.  The  em- 
peror's ideas  seemed  to  have  become  crystallized.  Finally 
the  chancellor  played  his  last  trump-card, — resignation. 
"  Your  Majesty,  I  cannot  remain  in  office  and  see  an  oppor- 
tunity which  promises  so  much  for  the  peace  of  Germany  and 
of  all  Europe  sacrificed  in  this  manner."  William  gave  way 
before  this  threat ;  the  necessary  preliminaries  were  soon  ar- 
ranged, and  the  treaty  signed  by  both  emperors  by  the  middle 

348 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

of  November.     Gortchakoff  was  a  neophyte  compared  to  his 
German  rival. 

The  text  of  the  treaty  was  not  made  public  until  five  years 
later,  when  the  aggressive  attitude  of  Russia  in  the  far  East 
made  a  little  moral  pressure  serviceable  in  the  interest  of 
political  harmony;  but  the  fact  that  an  Austro-German  alli- 
ance existed  was  soon  proclaimed  in  Bismarck's  favorite  jour- 
nal, the  North  German  Gazette.  Alexander  at  once  tele- 
graphed to  William  his  protest  against  it,  but  the  protest  came 
too  late.  Its  salutary  influence  was  quickly  perceived  in  the 
abatement  of  Russian  newspaper  attacks  on  Bismarck's  policy, 
and  the  withdrawal  of  Russian  regiments  from  the  German 
frontier.  The  Tsarovitch  was  recruiting  at  Cannes  in  France, 
and  was  requested  by  his  father  to  pay  conciliatory  visits  at 
Berlin  and  Vienna, — it  is  said,  much  against  his  own  will.1 
Bismarck  had  upset  the  balance  of  power  only  to  form  a  new 
one,  which  has  continued  to  the  present  time,  and  offers  an 
appearance  of  greater  solidity  than  has  ever  been  known 
before.  It  was  not  long  before  Italy  also  expressed  a  desire 
to  enter  this  partnership,  and  the  combined  forces  of  these 
three  powers,  amounting  to  nearly  a  million  and  a  half  of 
men,  can  easily  bid  defiance  to  any  combination,  civilized  or 
barbarous,  that  could  be  made  up  against  them.  A  more 
serious  check  to  Russian  aggrandizement  could  not  be  imag- 
ined, and  there  was  equal  rejoicing  in  London  and  Constan- 
tinople at  the  news  of  it.  The  invasion  of  Tunis  by  the 
French  also  increased  Bismarck's  influence  with  the  sultan, 
and  he  was  thus  enabled  to  become  the  protector  of  Greece 
and  Montenegro,  besides  suggesting  some  simple  reforms  in 
the  Turkish  administration  which  have  proved  much  to  the 
advantage  of  the  Ottoman  empire.  A  coalition  between 
Russia  and  France  was  no  longer  possible,  and  Panslavism,  if 
not  killed  outright,  had  received  such  a. stunning  blow  that  it 
did  not  raise  its  composite  head — at  least,  in  a  conspicuous 
manner — for  some  years  to  come.  "  Beware  of  the  Cossack," 
said  Napoleon  at  St.  Helena. 

'  W.  Miiller,  p.  651. 
349 


CHAPTER    XV 

KEEPER   OF   THE   PEACE 

THE  Austro-German  alliance  was  the  last  of  Bismarck's 
great  diplomatic  victories,  and  the  last  he  could  very  well 
have  achieved.  There  was  nothing  more  in  that  line  for  him 
to  do.  France  and  Russia  were  both  kept  in  check  by  it ; 
the  Austrians  and  Hungarians  were  contented;  the  Servians 
and  Bulgarians  rejoiced  in  their  liberation  from  the  Turk  ; 
Italy,  like  Germany,  was  engrossed  in  its  internal  develop- 
ment, repairing  the  waste  of  centuries ;  and  Spain  was  trying 
to  discover  the  kind  of  liberalism  that  was  best  suited  to  its 
people.  The  Poles,  of  course,  were  dissatisfied,  but,  divided 
as  they  were  among  three  nationalities,  there  would  seem  to 
be  no  hope  for  them  even  in  the  near  future.  Bismarck  talked 
a  great  deal  on  this  subject,  and  evidently  thought  a  great 
deal,  but  could  see  no  alternative  except  a  continuation  of  the 
present  order.  During  the  siege  of  Paris  he  spoke  of  the 
wars  of  the  Great  Elector  in  Poland,  which  were  brought  to 
an  unfavorable  conclusion  by  the  interference  of  Holland. 
If  Poland  could  have  been  incorporated  in  Germany,  as 
Hungary  was  in  Austria,  it  would  have  been  greatly  to  the 
advantage  of  all  concerned;  but  this  was  a  dream  of  the 
moment  which  he  was  aware  could  not  be  realized.  However, 
there  had  already  been  a  movement  in  this  direction  among 
the  Poles,  and  Bismarck's  name  had  been  imprudently  con- 
nected with  it  As  Bismarck  once  said  in  the  Reichstag  in 
regard  to  Prussian  Poland  : 

"The  Polish  peasant,  from  being  a  despised  and  mercilessly 
plundered  vassal  of  some  noble,  has  become  a  free  man  and  an 
owner  of  the  soil  he  cultivates.  The  usurious  Jews  are  his  only 
plunderers  now.  German  manufactories  and  machines  have  pro- 
moted an  improved  method  of  agriculture.  The  prosperity  of  the 
province  has  been  greatly  increased  by  railways  and  government 

350 


LIFE  OF   BISMARCK 

roads.  Polish  children  enjoy  the  advantage  of  schools  for  ele- 
mentary instruction,  organized  on  German  principles ;  and  gym- 
nasia teach  the  higher  branches  of  learning,  not  by  the  hollow, 
mechanical  methods  of  the  Jesuit  Fathers,  but  in  that  solid  Ger- 
man manner  which  enables  people  to  think  for  themselves.  Army 
service  completes  whatever  is  left  unachieved  by  the  popular  schools. 
In  the  army  the  young  Polish  peasant  learns  to  understand  and 
speak  German.  He  learns  much  by  association  in  his  company, 
and  through  intercourse  with  the  inhabitants  of  his  German  garri- 
soned town  he  acquires  ideas  which  enrich  and  emancipate  his 
narrow  and  fettered  intelligence.  His  notions  of  right  and  wrong 
become  clearer ;  he  is  obliged  to  adopt  orderly  habits  of  living, 
which  he  usually  retains  after  his  term  of  service  has  expired."1 

This  is  perfectly  true,  and  a  fair  picture  of  German  working- 
class  culture ;  but  to  the  average  Polish  mind  only  two  modes 
of  life  would  seem  to  be  cognizable, — a  luxurious  leisure,  or 
serfdom.  In  the  Polish  republic  there  were  practically  only 
two  classes,  and  it  was  the  absence  of  an  industrial  middle 
class,  and  its  elective  monarchy,  which  caused  the  nation  to 
become  so  weak.  They  were  not  satisfied  with  being  a  com- 
ponent part  of  Prussia,  but  wished  to  form  a  separate  state 
within  the  German  empire,  like  Saxony  or  Wiirtemberg,  with 
local  autonomy  or  home  rule.  They  could  not  be  blamed  for 
this ;  but  the  decisive  objection  to  it  was  that  such  a  state  as 
this  would  be  certain  to  form  a  nucleus  for  revolutionary 
agitation  in  Russian  Poland,  and  might  be  the  antecedent 
cause  of  a  life-and-death  struggle  between  Russia  and  Ger- 
many. They  continued  to  agitate  this  plan,  and  their  depu- 
ties in  the  Reichstag  boldly  admitted  their  expectation  of 
restoring  the  Polish  state  in  one  way  or  another,  until  in  1886 
Bismarck  conceived  the  idea  of  buying  up  the  large  Polish 
estates  in  Posen  and  colonizing  them  with  German  farmers. 

This  was  a  severe  remedy,  but  a  magnificent  idea,  for  it 
would  replace  a  class  of  unproductive  arfd  unpatriotic  citizens 
with  industrious,  patriotic  husbandmen.  The  Reichstag  did 
not  consider  it  too  severe  a  measure,  and  the  chancellor  re- 

1  Our  Chancellor,  ii.  150. 
351 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

ceived  letters  from  all  parts  of  Germany  and  from  all  classes 
of  Germans  commending  his  plan,  which  included  a  system 
of  annual  payments  for  the  land  on  the  Von  Stein  principle. 
One  object  which  Bismarck  had  in  this  colonization  was  to 
organize  a  thickly  settled  loyal  population  on  the  eastern 
frontier  of  Germany  as  a  bulwark  against  Russian  invasion ; 
but  at  the  same  time  the  plan  gave  satisfaction  to  the  Russian 
government  as  tending  to  obviate  complications  with  the 
Prussian  Poles.  Whether  it  was  right  or  not  is  what  every 
man  must  decide  with  his  own  conscience. 

PERSECUTION   OF   THE   JEWS 

An  anti-Semitic  agitation  originated  in  Berlin  in  1877, — 
where  or  how  has  not  been  made  apparent, — and  extended 
over  a  large  portion  of  Prussia  and  some  other  German  states, 
lasting  a  number  of  years  and  gradually  dying  out  after  the 
fashion  of  the  Kulturkampf.  Jews  are  much  more  numerous 
in  Germany  than  in  any  other  country  of  Europe,  and  the  ex- 
planation would  seem  to  be  that  they  have  been  treated  here- 
tofore in  a  more  friendly  manner  there  than  elsewhere.  It 
was  not  until  1849,  however,  that  they  were  permitted  to  hold 
public  offices  in  Prussia.  Bismarck  had  taken  part  in  this 
emancipation,  but  had  opposed  their  appointments  to  the 
highest  positions  in  the  state;  and  he  found  afterwards  that 
in  all  his  legislative  measures  the  Jews,  of  whom  Lasker  was 
the  most  prominent  leader,  were  a  compact  body  against 
him.  This  fact  may  have  aroused  the  national  Prussian 
spirit,  which  was  so  aggressive  after  the  campaign  of  1870 
for  twelve  years  or  more.  Petitions  were  circulated  to  pre- 
vent the  appointment  of  Jews  for  both  civil  and  military  offices. 
The  University  of  Berlin  declared  against  the  appointment 
of  Jewish  professors.  Hotel  proprietors  refused  to  receive 
Hebrew  guests,  and  even  saloon-keepers  closed  their  doors 
to  the  unpopular  race.  In  Pomerania  there  was  serious  riot- 
ing, and  many  Israelites  were  driven  from  smaller  places  to 
the  large  cities,  whence  the  numbers  of  their  brethren  could 
afford  them  protection.  The  agitation  extended  itself  into 
Russian  Poland,  whence  the  Jews  were  forcibly  expelled,  their 

352 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

property  seized,  personal  injuries  inflicted,  and  even  murders 
committed,  without  the  perpetrators  being  brought  to  justice. 
Exiled  Russian  Jews  were  not  permitted  to  find  a  home  in 
Prussia,  and  many  of  them  were  obliged  to  cross  the  ocean 
in  search  of  a  refuge. 

Such  an  order  of  affairs  is  by  no  means  pleasant  to  reflect 
on,  but  of  course  there  must  have  been  a  reason  for  it  some- 
where, though  we  may  not  believe  the  reason  to  be  adequate. 
The  English  historian  Freeman  advanced  the  theory  at  this 
time  that  a  nation  has  always  a  right  to  get  rid  of  any  class 
of  people  who  proved  themselves  a  nuisance,  whether  it  were 
the  Jews  in  Russia  or  the  Chinese  in  America.  This  seems 
rather  brutal,  and  we  hesitate  to  endorse  it ;  yet  the  trouble 
with  the  Jews  is  one  which  cannot  be  reached  by  legislation. 
The  majority  of  them  live  like  parasites  on  the  community. 
It  is  true  that  they  take  care  of  their  own  poor,  but  other- 
wise are  not  public-spirited  or  helpful.  They  are  not  Chris- 
tians, and  do  not  believe  in  the  golden  rule.  Those  who  be- 
come Christians  seem  to  change  in  this  respect  more  or  less. 
It  cannot  be  doubted  that  they  are  sharper  at  bargains  than 
any  other  races,  but  at  the  same  time  they  do  not  make  good 
financiers  for  states  or  empires.  Nearly  half  of  the  floating 
wealth  of  Europe  is  in  the  hands  of  Hebrew  bankers,  who 
spend  little  and  give  away  less.  The  Semitic  persecution  had 
the  same  characteristics  as  the  Jews  themselves.  It  certainly 
was  not  Christian,  nor  was  it  remediable  in  any  degree  by 
legislation. 

There  were  attacks  upon  Bismarck  in  the  Radical  papers, 
and  his  friends  felt  it  necessary  to  defend  him  against  them. 
He  was  interviewed  by  a  Jew  at  Varzin,  and  gave  an  opinion, 
which  was  perhaps  somewhat  touched  up  in  transition  to  the 
press  so  that  it  appeared  like  a  stronger  statement  than  he 
intended.  He  is  reported  to  have  said : 

"Nothing  can  be  more  incorrect  than  the  notion  that  I  ap- 
prove of  the  anti-Semitic  agitation.  On  the  contrary,  I  most  posi- 
tively disapprove  of  this  attack  upon  the  Jews,  whether  prompted 
by  dislike  to  their  religion  or  antipathy  to  their  race.  It  would  be 
just  as  unfair  to  fall  upon  Germans  of  Polish  or  French  extraction 
23  353 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

on  the  pretext  that  they  were  not  real  Germans.  That  the  Jews 
preferentially  devote  themselves  to  business  pursuits  is  a  matter  of 
taste ;  moreover,  it  may  be  the  national  consequence  of  their  former 
exclusion  from  other  callings ;  but  it  is  certainly  no  justification  for 
raising  an  outcry  against  their  wealth,  or  reproaching  them  with 
being  better  off  than  Christians, — a  proceeding  which  I  consider 
reprehensible,  because  it  provokes  envy  and  hatred  among  the 
masses.  I  will  never  consent  to  any  curtailment  of  the  constitu- 
tional rights  accorded  to  the  Jews. ' ' 

This  sounds  like  Bismarck,  and,  printed  at  just  the  right 
time  after  the  agitation  had  reached  its  height,  no  doubt 
helped  to  allay  this  strange  public  ebullition.  He  confessed, 
however,  that  he  should  not  like  to  be  governed  by  a  Jew, 
and  wondered  that  notable  Germans  should  make  matches 
for  their  daughters  with  wealthy  Israelites.  As  for  Germans 
marrying  Jewesses,  he  did  not  think  so  badly  of  that,  "  for 
then,"  he  said,  "  their  money  circulates  and  does  good." 

THE   DEATH   OF   ALEXANDER 

On  March  13,  1881,  Alexander  II.  was  assassinated  by  the 
Nihilists,  and  a  shudder  went  across  the  continent  of  Europe. 
He  had  liberated  the  serfs,  he  had  emancipated  the  Christian 
provinces  of  Turkey,  he  had  lived  a  just  and  pious  life,  and 
had  done  much  to  mitigate  the  severity  of  the  military  des- 
potism to  which  he  was  born  and  brought  up ;  it  has  even 
been  affirmed  that  he  had  planned  to  bestow  a  constitutional 
government  on  Russia  just  before  his  death;  but  even  more 
conspicuous  virtues  would  not  have  saved  him  from  becoming 
the  victim  of  political  bigotry. 

There  is  practically  little  difference  between  a  Nihilist,  a 
Socialist,  a  Communist,  a  Fenian,  and  an  Anarchist.  They 
are  differentiated  only  by  the  manners  and  character  of  the 
people  from  whom  they  originated.  There  is  perhaps  more 
hard  ingrained  atheism  in  the  Nihilist  than  in  any  of  the 
others.  Atheism  has  been  popular  in  the  fashionable  society 
of  St.  Petersburg  and  Moscow  for  the  past  fifty  years.  It 
appears  on  the  surface  like  frivolous  talk,  but  has  a  deep  and 
dangerous  undercurrent  which  may  lead  either  to  ruin  or  to 

354 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

crime.  The  realistic  literature  of  the  country  is  one  illustra- 
tion of  it, — an  art  which  goes  continually  round  in  a  circle 
without  coming  to  any  definite  result.  But  Russian  literature 
is  only  a  reflection  of  French  literature,  and,  though  it  repre- 
sents Russian  life  in  externals,  is  not  in  itself  an  exponent  of 
Russian  character.  The  Russian  language,  as  Professor  W. 
D.  Whitney  says,  is  the  vehicle  of  civilization  to  northern 
and  central  Asia.  This  also  is  the  historical  justification  of 
the  Russian  government.  In  Europe  it  is  a  danger  to  higher 
forms  of  civilization,  and  perhaps  a  curse  to  the  more  enlight- 
ened portion  of  its  subjects.  It  has  proved  a  blessing  to  the 
Cossacks,  the  Finlanders,  and  the  nomad  tribes  of  northern 
Asia.  Any  one  who  has  read  Vambery's  travels  in  central 
Asia  must  realize  the  advantage  that  has  resulted  from  the 
Russian  conquest  of  Tartary, — an  advantage  equal  to  the 
British  conquest  of  India.  The  Russian  government  has 
stopped  the  Tartars  from  gouging  one  another's  eyes  out,  and 
compelled  them  to  give  up  their  nomad  way  of  life. 

The  death  of  a  man  like  Alexander  II.  never  happens  in 
vain.  It  aroused  an  active  sentiment  of  indignation  against 
the  more  radical  and  desperate  class  of  Socialists,  impressed 
the  more  moderate  class  with  a  sense  of  their  responsibility  to 
the  moral  law,  and  it  helped  to  disaffect  many  others  from 
the  political  doctrines  which  they  had  rashly  embraced.  There 
were,  of  course,  a  few  who  pretended  to  consider  the  event  as 
the  natural  outcome  of  Russian  institutions,  but  they  might 
as  well  have  inferred  that  Nobeling's  attempt  on  the  emperor 
was  the  result  of  constitutional  government.  Bismarck  took 
advantage  of  its  effect  on  the  public  mind  to  introduce  his 
favorite  scheme  for  the  establishment  of  a  government  insur- 
ance fund  for  the  benefit  of  working-men  who  might  become 
disabled  through  accident,  ill-health,  or  old  age, — one  of  his 
grandest  measures,  and  sufficient  in  itself  to  give  any  man 
distinction.  Certainly  it  was  a  gigantic  undertaking,  for  the 
requisite  funds  would  have  to  be  counted,  not  by  millions  but 
by  hundreds  of  millions.  The  whole  community  would  have 
to  be  taxed  for  its  support,  but  he  considered  it  only  right 
that  the  nation  should  be  taxed  liberally  for  the  benefit  of  its 

355 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

humble  poor,  who  really  form  the  foundation  on  which  the 
whole  fabric  of  society  rests. 

The  outline  of  his  plan  was  simply  this :  it  provided  for  the 
creation  of  a  government  department  similar  to  the  postal 
department,  which  would  have  agencies  in  all  cities  and  towns, 
where  money  could  be  loaned  and  donated  to  those  actually 
in  need,  under  the  direction  of  a  local  committee  of  citizens. 
Each  committee  was  to  consist  often  or  twelve  members,  with 
a  member  of  the  city  council  for  a  presiding  officer,  and  always 
including  the  city  physician  of  the  district  in  which  the  agency 
would  be  located.  In  this  way  it  was  believed  that  the  whole 
public  would  take  an  interest  in  the  working  of  the  system, 
which  from  its  nature  would  be  more  thorough  and  efficient 
than  volunteer  charities,  without  at  the  same  time  dispensing 
with  the  interest  and  help  of  private  individuals.  If  the  system 
was  to  be  a  machine,  it  was  Bismarck's  endeavor  to  make  it  a 
living,  human  machine.  He  said  in  regard  to  it : 

"  I  am  by  no  means  yet  convinced  that  the  notion  of  subsidizing 
eleemosynary  associations  by  the  state  is  an  objectionable  one.  It 
seems  to  me  that  a  possibility  of  improving  the  working-man's  lot 
might  be  found  in  the  establishment  of  productive  associations 
such  as  exist  and  flourish  in  England.  I  have  talked  over  the 
subject  with  the  king,  wrjo  has  the  interests  of  the  working  classes 
at  heart,  and  his  Majesty  paid  a  sum  of  money  out  of  his  own 
pocket  in  aid  of  an  experiment  in  that  direction  connected  with  a 
deputation  of  operatives  from  Silesia,  who  had  lost  their  employ- 
ment through  differing  from  their  employer  in  politics.  ...  To 
attempt  anything  of  the  sort  upon  a  large  scale  might  entail  an 
expenditure  of  hundreds  of  millions ;  but  the  notion  does  not  seem 
to  me  intrinsically  an  absurd  or  silly  one.  We  make  experiments 
in  agriculture  and  manufactures ;  might  it  not  be  as  well  to  do  so 
with  respect  to  human  occupations  and  a  solution  of  the  social 
question?"  J 

Again  he  said : 

"People  talk  about  state  Socialism  and  think  they  have  settled 
the  matter, — as  if  such  things  were  to  be  disposed  of  with  a  phrase  ! 

1  Our  Chancellor,  ii.  196. 
356 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

Socialism  or  not,  it  is  necessary,  the  outcome  of  an  urgent  require- 
ment. They  say,  too,  the  bill  would  entail  enormous  expenditure, 
an  hundred  million  of  marks,  at  least — perhaps  twice  as  much.  As 
for  me,  three  hundred  millions  would  not  alarm  me.  We  must  find 
some  means  of  relieving  the  unindebted  poor,  on  the  part  of  the 
state  and  not  in  the  form  of  alms.  Contentment  amongst  the 
impecunious  and  disinherited  classes  would  not  be  dearly  pur- 
chased by  an  enormous  sum.  They  must  be  made  to  understand 
that  the  state  is  of  some  use, — that  it  does  not  only  take,  but  gives  * 
to  boot.  And  if  the  state, . which  does  not  look  for  interest  or 
dividends,  takes  the  matter  in  hand,  the  thing  is  easy  enough."  x 

The  laborers'  relief  bill  failed  to  pass  the  Reichstag,  owing 
to  the  combination  of  the  very  parties  who,  if  they  had  been 
consistent,  would  have  given  it  unqualified  support, — that  is, 
the  Liberals,  Progressists,  and  Social  Democrats.  It  is  a 
peculiarity  of  the  doctrinaires  to  care  more  for  their  theories 
than  they  do  for  the  good  which  those  theories  are  expected 
to  accomplish.  If  the  world  is  to  be  saved  it  must  be  saved 
according  to  their  method,  and  not  according  to  any  other ; 
otherwise  they  would  prefer  to  have  it  blown  up  altogether.2 
No  doctrinaire  could  ever  have  succeeded  in  practical  affairs 
as  Bismarck  did.  He  patiently  waited  his  time,  and  this 
rejected  measure  has  since  become  the  corner-stone  of  the 
present  German  system  of  charitable  organizations,  which 
may  challenge  all  other  countries  to  show  its  equal.  A  late 
writer  in  the  New  York  Outlook  says : 

"  Beyond  all  question,  the  care  of  the  poor  and  distressed  in  the 
cities  of  Germany  is  superbly  managed.  Of  course,  there  is  in 
every  city  a  general  department  of  poor  relief  with  its  specialists 
and  general  advisers,  but  there  is  also  a  system  of  local  committees 
which  assist  in  the  work.  No  man  in  Germany  would  think  of 
declining  to  serve  on  the  committee.  But  it  is  the  German  ideal 
at  least  to  abolish  poverty.  Germans  think  the  present  policy  of 

1  Bismarck's  Speeches,  Speemann's  ed.,  vol.  xvi. 

2  This  is  especially  true  of  the  Progressists  and  German  free-traders.     Las- 
salle,  the  most  practical  of  German  socialistic  writers,  is  credited  with  having 
said :  "  If  we  were  to  shoot  at  Bismarck,  common  justice  would  compel  us  to 
admit  that  he  is  a  man  ;  whereas  the  Progressists  are  old  women." 

357 


LIFE   OF   BISMARCK 

the  government  will  ultimately  lead  to  it.  For  this  reason  they 
have  inaugurated  a  system  of  municipal  insurance  against  sickness, 
loss  of  employment,  and  old  age.  The  German  cities  also  do  all 
they  can  to  encourage  small  wage-earners  and  protect  those  in  tem- 
porary distress.  To  this  end  they  have  established  a  system  of 
municipal  savings  banks  and  municipal  pawn-shops.  The  Berlin 
savings-bank  system  has  more  than  four  hundred  thousand  such 
depositors.  In  Aachen  (Aix-la-Chapelle)  it  is  said  that  almost 
every  man,  woman,  and  child  has  such  a  bank-book.  These  banks 
pay  about  three  per  cent,  interest  on  their  deposits,  and  it  is  paid 
with  the  greatest  regularity,  as  the  funds  are  usually  invested  in 
government  securities  of  some  sort.  Experience  has  shown  that 
the  pawn-shops  have  also  been  of  great  practical  benefit  to  the 
poor. ' ' 

This  system  of  laborers'  insurance  has  been  imitated,  or 
duplicated,  by  the  Pennsylvania,  the  Burlington  and  Quincy^ 
and  perhaps  one  or  two  other  American  railroads,  with  ex- 
cellent success.  It  had  been  suggested  before,  but  Bismarck 
was  the  first  to  make  the  practical  application,  and  should  re- 
ceive credit  for  it.  The  supplement  of  a  government  pawn- 
brokerage  business  was  an  admirable  device,  as  it  cut  the 
ground  from  under  the  feet  of  the  Jews,  thus  helping  also  to 
allay  the  Semitic  agitation.  In  addition  to  this,  the  tramps 
and  vagrants  in  Germany  have  been  collected  into  villages, 
and  have  had  cottages  built  for  them,  where  they  work  under 
military  supervision.  The  report  of  the  United  States  consul- 
general  at  Berlin  for  the  year  ending  1886  represented  a 
greatly  improved  and  flourishing  condition  of  economical 
affairs  in  Germany,  and  gave  a  flat  contradiction  to  the  state- 
ments on  the  same  subject  in  American  newspapers  at  that 
time.  Simultaneously  the  London  Times  complained  that 
English  commerce  in  Africa,  Asia,  and  the  Pacific  was  suf- 
fering from  German  enterprise  and  competition.  Bismarck 
had  made  personal  exertions  to  secure  for  his  countrymen 
an  immense  army  contract  from  the  Japanese  government, 
amounting  to  several  millions.  "  The  Germans  were  im- 
proving their  foreign  trade,"  said  the  Times,  "  by  their 
promptness,  thoroughness,  and  exact  calculation  of  means  to 

358 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

ends, — those  virtues  by  which  English  commerce  has  grown 
to  greatness,  but  which  are  not  so  common  in  the  realm  as 
formerly.  German  clerks  and  book-keepers  are  securing  the 
best  places,  because  they  know  languages  and  are  more  cor- 
rect. German  servants  are  superseding  English  servants,  be- 
cause they  are  more  respectful  and  trustworthy." 

Bismarck  also  made  some  interesting  remarks  on  the  prob- 
able effect  of  a  national  socialistic  experiment.  He  once  said 
to  Dr.  Busch : 

"  It  is  extremely  difficult  to  discuss  the  Social-Democratic  Realm 
of  the  Future,  while  we  are  groping  about  in  darkness,  like  the 
ordinary  audience  at  a  Social- Democratic  meeting,  who  know 
nothing  at  all  about  the  matter,  but  are  assured  that  '  better  times 
are  coming,'  and  that  *  there  will  be  more  to  earn  and  less  to 
work.'  Where  the  'more'  money  is  to  come  from  nobody  knows; 
I  mean,  when  every  well-to-do  person  shall  have  been  robbed  of 
his  property  in  order  that  it  shall  be  divided  amongst  his  despoil- 
ers.  Then,  in  all  probability,  the  laborious  and  thrifty  will  again 
wax  wealthy,  whilst  the  lazy  and  extravagant  will  fall  into  poverty; 
or  if  everybody  is  to  be  supplied  with  the  needful  by  an  adminis- 
tration, people  will  come  to  lead  the  life  of  prisoners,  shut  up  in 
gaols,  none  of  whom  follow-  occupations  of  their  own  choice,  but 
work  under  the  compulsion  of  the  warders.  In  gaol,  too,  there  is 
at  least  an  official  in  charge,  who  is  a  trustworthy  and  respectable 
person ;  but  who  will  play  the  warder  in  the  Universal  Socialistic 
House  of  Correction?  Probably  the  speechifiers,  who  gain  over 
the  masses  by  their  eloquence." 

Doubtless  the  present  organization  of  society  might  be 
improved  upon,  and  it  looks  as  if  Bismarck  had  taken  the 
first  step  towards  this.  An  association  of  picked  men,  like 
those  who  made  the  Brook  Farm  experiment  at  West  Rox- 
bury,  might  hold  together,  under  the  protection  of  the  gov- 
ernment which  they  pretended  to  despise,  for  a  single  genera- 
tion, and  retain  the  culture  which  they  had  previously  ac- 
quired ;  but  their  descendants  would  inevitably  become  farm- 
ers, and  subject  to  the  limitations  of  farmer  life,  and  so  on 
forever. 

359 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 


RUSSIA  AND   ENGLAND 

Even  in  Germany  little  is  yet  known  concerning  the  life 
and  character  of  Alexander  III.,  but  he  appears  to  have  been 
a  man  of  rather  frail  physique  and  moderate  mental  endow- 
ments, and  yet  at  the  same  time  possessed  of  excellent  judg- 
ment, and,  what  is  quite  as  important,  a  good  heart ;  so  that, 
with  these  two  qualifications  of  true  manliness,  he  struggled 
through  his  difficult  position  until  his  comparatively  early 
death  in  1893  in  a  highly  creditable  manner.  As  Tsarovitch 
he  was  much  under  the  influence  of  the  Panslavists,  and  the 
assassination  of  his  father  aroused  grave  apprehensions  at 
Berlin  and  Vienna  on  this  account.  Whether  the  responsi- 
bility of  power  produced  a  sudden  revulsion  in  his  opinions 
can  only  be  surmised ;  but  certain  it  is  that  he  had  not  been 
six  months  on  the  throne  before  he  sought  an  interview  with 
Bismarck,  and  from  that  time  was  always  guided  more  or  less 
by  his  influence.  A  meeting  of  William  I.  and  the  new 
monarch  took  place  at  Dantzic  on  the  Baltic  in  the  autumn 
of  1881;  and  though  we  know  nothing  of  the  conference 
which  followed,  the  Berlin  editorials,  supposed  to  be  inspired 
by  the  chancellor  after  his  return,  gave  most  hopeful  indica- 
tions of  the  result  of  this  interview  for  the  welfare  of  Ger- 
many and  the  peace  of  Europe.  Its  immediate  object  ap- 
peared soon  afterwards  in  the  form  of  an  extradition  treaty 
between  Russia  and  Germany  for  the  benefit  of  Nihilists  and 
other  kinds  of  dynamiters ;  and  as  the  French  government 
had  declined  previously  to  surrender  Hartmann,  one  of  the 
would-be  assassins  of  Alexander  II.,  it  was  very  natural  after 
this  that  the  relations  between  the  court  of  William  I.  and 
of  Alexander  III.  became  more  friendly. 

European  statesmen  were  fairly  astonished  the  following 
year  when  Prince  Gortchakoff  retired  from  office  and  Baron 
de  Giers  was  appointed  in  his  place.  It  was  supposed  that 
the  long  ascendancy  of  Gortchakoff  in  Russian  politics  would 
enable  him  at  least  to  designate  his  successor.  His  term  of 
office  had  been  much  beyond  Bismarck's,  and  his  extreme 
age  might  be  taken  as  a  sufficient  reason  for  resigning  the 

360 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

cares  of  state ;  but  De  Giers  was  a  German  by  descent,  a  man 
from  near  the  middle  of  the  Russian  thirteen  classes,  who  had 
raised  himself  by  merit  and  ability  to  the  front  rank,  and, 
though  he  had  preserved  a  diplomatic  neutrality  during 
Gortchakoff's  regime,  was  understood  to  be  opposed  to  his 
predecessor's  policy.  This  soon  became  evident  in  the  more 
friendly  correspondence  between  the  governments  of  Russia, 
Austria,  and  Germany ;  and  Count  Kalnoky,  who  had  suc- 
ceeded Andrassy  in  Austria,  assured  the  Hungarian  delega- 
tion in  the  following  October  that  the  Austro  German  alli- 
ance had  now  been  supplemented  by  such  pacific  assurances 
from  Alexander  III.  that  the  prospect  of  amicable  relations 
with  neighboring  states  had  never  been  more  favorable. 

Still,  Panslavism  was  an  active  and  fomenting  ingredient 
in  the  Russian  body-politic,  and  De  Giers  was  obliged  to  find 
an  outlet  for  it  in  some  direction ;  and  this  soon  came  to  pass 
in  the  direction  of  India.  Beaconsfield's  Afghanistan  blunder 
had  been  followed  by  a  grievous  political  mistake  on  the  part 
of  Gladstone.  Why  the  -  Grand  Old  Man"  should  have 
imagined  an  appalling  danger  to  England  and  civilization 
from  the  Austro-German  alliance  can  only  be  explained  by  a 
lamentable  ignorance  of  continental  politics.  Gladstone's 
Midlothian  attacks  on  Bismarck  and  the  alliance  were  not 
more  injudicious  than  they  were  unjust.  Writers  in  Liberal 
periodicals  designated  the  German  chancellor  as  the  demon 
of  Berlin, — with  corresponding  American  echoes, — and  the 
one  man  in  Europe  who  was  most  desirous  of  preserving  the 
peace  was  represented  as  continually  intriguing  for  war  and 
conquest.  A  statement  made  by  Bismarck,  as  applied  to 
German  annexations  in  Africa,  that  the  existence  of  a  great 
empire  necessitated  the  idea  of  its  extension,  was  distorted 
into  a  scheme  for  the  conquest  of  Greece  by  Austria,  and  the 
absorption  of  Holland  and  Denmark  by  Germany.  What 
Russia  and  France  would  be  doing  in  such  an  eventuality  did 
not  occur  to  these  ready-witted  magazinists.  The  more  im- 
probable these  assertions  the  more  readily  they  would  seem 
to  have  been  believed.  It  was  in  vain  that  Lord  Salisbury 
made  a  dignified  statement  to  prove  that  the  Austro-German 

361 


LIFE  OF   BISMARCK 

alliance  was  of  great  benefit  to  England,  and  that  the  ad- 
vanced age  of  William  I.  and  the  good  will  of  the  crown 
prince  were  an  adequate  guarantee  against  all  suppositions 
of  German  conquests ;  Gladstone  and  the  philistines  carried 
everything  before  them.  The  fact  was  that  the  English 
Liberal  party  had  grown  old  with  its  distinguished  leader, 
and  had  outlived  its  days  of  usefulness.  It  had  no  policy 
except  the  ambition  for  power;  no  better  motive  than  the 
love  of  office ;  and  as  a  party  it  was  ready  to  make  use  of 
any  means  that  would  attain  this  object. 

The  net  result  of  this  was  that  Great  Britain  was  left  with- 
out an  ally  in  Europe,  and  her  enemies  were  not  long  in 
taking  advantage  of  this.  After  Arabi  Pasha  had  been  sub- 
dued, the  Arabs  revolted  in  the  Soudan.  The  Panslavist 
party,  led  by  Ignatieff  and  Skobelefif,  pushed  forward  the 
Russian  boundaries  to  Afghanistan,  and  inaugurated  a  trouble- 
some policy  of  higgling  about  the  frontier,  which  might  have 
resulted  in  open  war  but  for  the  firmness  of  Alexander  and 
De  Giers.  It  is  certain  that  there*  was  a  strong  war  party  at 
St.  Petersburg,  and  that  for  some  days  the  decision  of  the  gov- 
ernment was  suspended  in  the  balance.  When  General  Sko- 
beleff  urged  the  Tsar  to  permit  an  advance  of  the  Russian 
forces  towards  Herat,  Alexander  replied,  "  The  destiny  of 
Russia  does  not  depend  on  any  single  movement  or  political 
decision.  It  moves  forward  continually,  and  is  as  irresistible 
as  the  rising  of  the  tide."1  The  Governor- General  of  India 
made  the  Ameer  of  Herat  a  present  of  a  park  of  artillery,  and 
the  British  government  chartered  transatlantic  steamers  for 
the  conveyance  of  troops.  The  political  horizon  looked  dark 
and  threatening.  Late  in  the  summer  of  1885  Gladstone  was 
outvoted  in  the  House  of  Commons ;  the  Liberal  ministry 
resigned,  and  this  political  witches'  dance,  which  had  been 
encouraged  by  his  policy,  suddenly  came  to  an  end.  Glad- 
stone was  more  high-minded  than  Bismarck  in  theory,  but 
not  in  practice.  It  is  well  known  that  there  was  no  parlia- 
mentary trick  he  would  not  employ  to  carry  his  point.  In 

1  At  least,  a  statement  to  this  effect  was  telegraphed. 
362 


LIFE  OF   BISMARCK 

1 86 1  he  eulogized  Jefferson  Davis  as  the  founder  of  a  new 
republic ;  and  many  of  his  statements  on  the  Irish  question 
were  rather  dubious,  to  say  the  least.  He  did  not  lead  his 
party,  but  was  led  by  it. 

^During  this  period  Bismarck  sat  behind  his  chancellor's 
table  in  the  Reichstag,  steadily  transacting  business,  replying 
to  attacks  on  the  government,  and  making  notes  with  the  long 
yellow  pencils  which  have  become  so  famous*.1  The  Reichs- 
tag became  more  and  more  divided,  and  consequently  more 
difficult  to  deal  with.  Bismarck  had  his  successes  and  his 
defeats  in  it,  but  chiefly  in  regard  to  matters  of  inconsider- 
able importance, — economical  questions  and  the  like,  such 
as  do  not  enter  into  universal  history.  He  accepted  both, 
like  an  experienced  man  of  business  who  has  become  accus- 
tomed to  the  fickleness  of  fortune.  He  was  virtually  emperor 
of  Germany  now ;  for,  though  William  I.  was  still  vigorous  in 
mind  and  body  to  a  degree  which  astonished  those  about 
him,  and  caused  the  Germans  to  be  more  proud  of  him  than 
ever,  the  long-confirmed  habit  of  deferring  to  his  chancellor's 
opinion  was  now  fastened  irrevocably  upon  him.  The  priests 
no  longer  caused  Bismarck  any  trouble,  and  the  socialists 
were  little  more  than  a  whetstone  for  his  argument.  He  had 
spent  his  whole  public  life  in  contention,  and  needed  a  strong 
opposition  of  some  kind  for  the  exercise  of  his  faculties.  His 
later  speeches  have  an  air  of  easy  confidence,  brightened 
with  occasional  touches  of  humor,  which  suggests  that  he 
was  beginning  to  take  more  comfort  in  life.  He  would  have 
been  less  than  human  not  to  have  taken  notice  occasionally 
of  Gladstone's  mistakes  and  vulnerable  performances,  for  he 
wished  to  be  on  friendly  terms  with  the  British  government, 
and  it  was  chiefly  Gladstone  who  prevented  this.  Lord 
Granville  was  the  English  minister  of  foreign  affairs,  and,  as 
his  own  party  afterwards  confessed,  he  conducted  them  in  a 
very  unskilful  manner.  One  day  in  the  spring  of  1884,  Bis- 
marck amused  the  Reichstag  by  stating  that  their  corre- 

1  These  pencils,  so  it  is  said,  had  to  be  renewed  every  day  of  the  session, 
for  some  deputy  or  other  was  sure  to  purloin  the  one  that  Bismarck  had  used,  as 
a  souvenir  for  his  wife  or  children. 

363 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

spondence  with  the  English  foreign  office  during  the  past 
six  months  exceeded  in  quantity  that  with  all  other  European 
governments  for  several  years.  When  the  Reichstag  passed 
a  constitutional  amendment  for  the  daily  compensation  of 
its  members,  Bismarck  did  not  even  permit  the  bill  to  go  to 
the  House  of  Peers,  but  vetoed  it  at  once,  saying,  "  Such  a 
measure  in  a  country  which  was  badly  governed,  like  Eng- 
land, might  accomplish  mischief,  but,  thank  heaven,  I  know 
my  place  better  than  to  mix  up  monarchical  institutions  with 
republican  practices."  It  does  not  seem  fair  or  reasonable 
that  a  poor  man  of  good  ability  should  be  prevented  from 
serving  his  country  as  legislator  on  account  of  the  lack  of 
compensation ;  but  the  gratuitous  service  of  parliamentary 
members  in  Great  Britain  and  Germany  certainly  prevents 
politics  from  becoming  a  trade,  and  is  believed  to  preserve 
a  higher  moral  tone  in  the  national  assembly. 

THE   SEVENTIETH    BIRTHDAY 

The  Reichstag  revenged  itself  for  the  salary  veto  on  De- 
cember 15,  1884,  by  refusing  to  grant  Bismarck  twenty  thou- 
sand marks  a  year  for  a  third  assistant  in  the  ministry  of 
foreign  affairs,  although  he  endeavored  to  convince  the 
house  that  his  own  strength  was  not  what  it  had  been,  and 
that  the  business  of  the  office  was  continually  increasing  with 
the  ever-extending  foreign  relations  of  the  empire.  In  fact, 
quite  a  number  of  his  associates  had  given  out,  from  time  to 
time,  and  been  obliged  to  resign  or  be  transferred  to  other  and 
less  arduous  positions.1  "  It  is  the  telegraph,"  said  Bismarck, 
once,  "  that  produces  the  strain  in  the  management  of  foreign 
affairs.  In  old  times,  when  everything  came  by  mail-coaches, 
statesmen  had  plenty  of  leisure,  and  time  enough  to  consider 
what  they  were  going  to  do.  Now  everything  is  rush  and 
hurry,  and  it  is  only  a  man  of  exceptional  constitution  who 
can  stand  it." 


1  One  of  Bismarck's  secretaries  informed  an  American  that  he  never  dared  to 
go  to  evening  parties  or  even  to  the  theatre,  for  he  might  be  summoned  to  the 
foreign  office  day  or  night  at  any  hour. 

364 


LIFE  OF   BISMARCK 

This  action  of  the  Reichstag  was  severely  criticised  at  home 
and  abroad,  and  Bismarck's  friends  were  highly  indignant  at 
what  they  called  the  vindictive  parsimony  of  the  legislative 
body.  It  was  claimed  that  in  refusing  to  accept  the  salary  bill 
the  chancellor  had  acted  from  principle  and  not  from  any  un- 
willingness to  have  the  government  pay  its  just  dues.  As  his 
seventieth  birthday  was  now  approaching  it  was  proposed  to 
make  him  a  subscription  present,  which  would  defray  the 
expense  of  additional  clerk  hire  and  something  more.  The 
plan  for  a  "  Bismarck  gift"  quickly  ripened,  and  the  result 
exceeded  the  expectation  of  its  originators.  Before  the  1st 
of  April,  1885,  2,400,000  marks  were  collected,  and  with  a 
portion  of  this  the  estate  at  Schonhausen,  the  greater  part  of 
which  had  been  alienated  from  the  Bismarck  family  in  unfa- 
vorable times,  was  redeemed  and  restored.  From  the  remain- 
der Bismarck  donated  a  fund  of  1,200,000  marks,  or  about 
$300,000,  for  the  purpose  of  assisting  indigent  young  Germans 
for  an  education  as  teachers  of  the  higher  branches  in  the 
public  schools.  His  birthday  was  celebrated  at  Schonhausen, 
and  was  also  made  a  national  celebration.  Emperor  William 
attended  his  reception  with  many  of  the  royal  family,  and  the 
most  distinguished  persons  in  the  realm  besides.  It  was  com- 
pared with  the  visit  of  Henry  VIII.  to  Cardinal  Wolsey.  If 
Bismarck's  reputation  suffered  from  jealous  and  unfriendly 
tongues  in  foreign  countries,  he  had  no  lack  of  appreciation 
in  his  own. 

AFRICAN   ANNEXATIONS 

The  prosperity  of  Germany  produced  its  natural  effect  in  a 
tendency  to  colonization.  In  spite  of  the  immense  emigration 
to  America,  the  population  of  the  German  empire  was  in- 
creasing more  rapidly  than  that  of  any  other  country  in 
Europe.  Italy  came  next  on  the  census  list,  and  for  the  same 
causes, — national  unity  and  internal  reforms, — while  the  pop- 
ulation of  France  was  almost  stationary.  Emigration  to 
America  could  not  give  employment  to  German  capital,  and 
the  enterprising  merchants  of  Hamburg  and  Bremen  were 
looking  about  for  chances  in  various  parts  of  the  globe.  A 
merchant  named  Leideritz  thought  he  had  discovered  rich 

365 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 


prospects  in  southwestern  Africa,  near  the  mouth  of  the 
Niger,  and  established  factories  there  at  considerable  expense. 
The  success  of  his  experiment  attracted  others  to  the  same 
neighborhood,  and  quite  a  German  colony  was  formed  m  that 
vicinity.  The  development  of  this  settlement  into  a  German 
territorial  acquisition  resembled  the  British  conquest  of  India. 
As  the  community  grew  it  required  military  protection,  and 
Bismarck  recognized  the  necessity  of  this,  though  accounts 
agree  that  in  the  beginning  he  was  opposed  to  colonization,  and 
only  consented  to  this  new  departure  through  the  mercantile 
pressure  that  was  brought  to  bear  on  him.  The  imperial  flag 
was  accordingly  unfurled  in  the  territory  of  Togo,  and  the 
process  of  annexation  proceeded  rapidly.  On  the  principle 
that  he  might  as  well  be  hung  for  a  sheep  as  a  lamb,  Bismarck 
next  took  possession  of  the  large  tract  in  southwestern  Africa 
known  to  traders  as  the  Cameroons,  and  also  a  large 
portion  of  Zanzibar,  a  tract  extending  inwards  to  Lake  Vic- 
toria Nyanza,  from  which  the  Nile  rises.  The  area  of  these 
territories  is  greater  than  the  whole  of  Germany,  but  their 
actual  value  is  less  than  Alsace  and  Lorraine.  Yet  the  pro- 
ductive power  of  nature  is  so  great  on  the  dark  continent  that 
it  is  said  a  negro  can  support  himself  and  his  family  by  work- 
ing only  three  weeks  in  the  year.  Subsequentlv^the  north- 
eastern portion  of  New  Guinea  was  seized  by  the  German 
government,  with  the  groups  of  islands  to  the  right  of  it, 
which  were  christened  the  Bismarck  Archipelago.  To  make 
these  new  provinces  profitable,  lines  of  steamers  to  east  and 
west  Africa  and  to  the  South  Sea  had  to  be  subsidized,  and 
the  means  for  this  were  extorted  from  the  Reichstag  almost  by 
main  force.  The  subsidies  were  refused  in  1884,  and  only 
obtained  in  1885  after  a  desperate  parliamentary  struggle. 
People  wondered  how  Bismarck's  strength  could  hold  out  at 
his  age  after  so  much.  It  was  thought  that  his  indomitable 
will  still  kept  him  in  the  harness,  and  but  for  that  he  would 
long  since  have  surrendered  his  office.  That  Bavaria  and 
Wiirtemberg,  being  inland  states,  should  oppose  this  new  de- 
velopment of  the  empire  was  to  have  been  expected. 

The  sudden  entrance  of  Germany  into  the  commercial  arena 

366 


LIFE   OF   BISMARCK 

raised  a  general  outcry  along  the  banks  of  the  Thames,  and 
the  British  government,  which  is  really  controlled  by  the 
commercial  interest,  made  the  settlement  of  these  new  states 
as  difficult  as  possible.  The  new  African  possessions  were 
all  bounded  on  one  side  at  least  by  British  territory.  Special 
treaties  were  required,  and  boundaries  had  to  be  definitely 
adjusted.  A  voluminous  correspondence  between  the  foreign 
offices  at  London  and  Berlin  commenced,  and  continued  until 
the  final  retirement  of  Gladstone  in  July,  1886.  If  Earl  Gran- 
ville  had  a  genius  for  anything  it  was  for  shifting  his  ground, 
and  in  this  way  he  prevented  Bismarck  from  coming  to  any 
definite  conclusions  with  him  for  nearly  two  years,  while  the 
London  papers  sustained  a  vigorous  chorus  of  4<  unprincipled 
acquisitions"  and  the  "  rights  of  original  proprietors"  !  Bis- 
marck had  also  to  deal  with  the  Sultan  of  Zanzibar,  who 
suddenly  discovered  that  he  was  no  longer  an  independent 
potentate.  But  this  obstacle  was  soon  removed  by  the 
presence  of  a  German  fleet  off  the  Zanzibar  coast  and  a  lib- 
eral "  hongo"  to  his  African  majesty. 

The  logic  of  the  matter  was  that  all  the  powers  of  Europe 
were  now  seizing  on  whatever  they  could  obtain  in  Asia  and 
Africa,  and  there  was  no  good  reason  why  Germany  should 
not  have  her  share.  Portugal  had  annexed  the  strip  of  coast 
between  the  mouth  of  the  Congo  and  British  South  Africa, 
and  was  already  in  troubled  water  with  Great  Britain  on  that 
account.  France  was  carrying  on  war  in  Tonquin,  and  it  was 
not  long  before  the  British  government  took  possession  of 
Burmah  and  annexed  it  to  India  in  the  same  fashion  that 
Bismarck  had  annexed  Togo.  There  was  even  danger  that 
France,  England,  and  Portugal  would  fall  out  over  the  pos- 
session of  the  rich  interior  discovered  by  Stanley  on  the 
Congo  River,  but  this  was  obviated  by  the  self-appointed 
arbitration  of  King  Leopold  of  Belgium,  who  had  taken  an 
enthusiastic  interest  in  African  explorations,  and  succeeded  in 
organizing  the  Congo  Free  State  on  sound  international  prin- 
ciples,— a  rare  accomplishment  for  the  ruler  of  so  small  a 
state,  and  a  well-deserved  monument  to  his  memory. 

Africa  was  becoming  a  reflected  copy  of  the  map  of  Europe, 

367 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

and  Bismarck  foresaw  that,  unless  some  order  and  method 
was  introduced  in  the  internal  relations  of  this  new  family  of 
subordinate  nations,  there  was  danger  that  before  long  the 
powers  of  Europe  would  be  involved  in  a  conflict  on  their 
account.  It  was  with  this  end  in  view  that  he  invited  repre- 
sentatives of  all  parties  concerned  to  meet  at  Berlin  in  No- 
vember, 1884,  and  hold  a  conference  to  determine  the  proper 
grounds  for  annexation  of  uncivilized  territory,  and  to  estab- 
lish a  uniform  system  of  laws  and  regulations  for  interco- 
lonial relations.  It  was  likely  that  Granville  would  have 
declined  to  submit  the  foreign  policy  of  England  to  the  pos- 
sible limitations  of  such  a  tribunal  but  for  the  intervention  of 
Gladstone,  who  was  beginning  to  feel  the  strain  of  compli- 
cations in  so  many  different  countries,  and  recognized  the 
advantage  of  a  court  of  appeal  for  the  various  provinces  of 
Africa.  As  for  France,  Belgium,  and  Portugal,  their  foreign 
ministers  were  well  enough  pleased  with  any  arrangement 
which  would  tie  down  the  tyrant  of  the  seas  to  a  definite 
course  of  procedure,  even  if  England  dictated  that  course 
herself.  The  Berlin  conference  lasted  nearly  five  months,  and 
its  proceedings  were  thoroughly  sifted  by  the  ablest  jurists  of 
the  different  countries  represented.  After  the  accession  of 
Lord  Salisbury  in  1886  the  friction  between  Great  Britain  and 
Germany  was  almost  entirely  removed,  and  a  year  later  Bis- 
marck was  enabled  to  state  in  the  Reichstag  that  England 
no  longer  "  behaved  like  a  raging  bull,  or  a  comfortable  ox 
chewing  its  cud,"  but  could  be  depended  on  as  a  promoter 
of  peace  and  international  justice  in  the  European  system.1 
In  fact,  Great  Britain  had  in  an  informal  manner  joined  the 
alliance  of  Germany,  Austria,  and  Italy,  and  there  was  no 
longer  the  possibility  of  any  other  power  making  a  serious 
disturbance  in  the  European  family. 

It  is  too  soon  to  judge  of  the  success  of  Germany's  colonial 
policy.  The  good  or  bitter  fruit  of  such  large  enterprises  is 
only  gathered  after  a  long  season.  Some  of  the  companies 
organized  for  Africa  and  the  South  Sea  have  paid  good  divi- 


Report  to  the  Associated  Press. 
368 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

dends,  others  little  or  nothing,  and  subsidies  are  still  required 
for  some  of  the  steamship  lines.  On  the  whole,  the  prospect 
thus  far  is  considered  a  favorable  one,  and  optimists  predict 
better  results  in  the  future.  Bismarck's  attempt  to  obtain  a 
foothold  in  the  Caroline  Islands  was  the  only  decided  failure. 
The  right  of  Germany  was  immediately  challenged  by  the 
Spanish  government,  and  Bismarck  prudently  referred  the 
dispute  to  Pope  Leo  as  arbitrator,  who  decided  in  favor  of 
Spain  after  a  thorough  legal  examination  of  the  question  at 
issue.  The  loss  of  a  number  of  war-ships  of  different  nations, 
German  and  others,  by  a  terrific  hurricane  off  Samoa  while 
the  suit  was  pending,  made  a  gloomy  and  unhappy  conclu- 
sion to  this  episode. 

END   OF   THE    KULTURKAMPF 

How  was  the  Kulturkampf  to  come  to  an  end  ?  The  resig- 
nation of  the  inexorable  Dr.  Falk,  in  the  autumn  of  1878,  and 
the  appointment  of  Von  Putkammer,  a  man  of  mild  and  con- 
ciliatory methods,  did  not  surprise  those  who  were  watching 
the  course  of  events.  After  this  there  was  neither  active 
resistance  on  the  part  of  the  bishops  nor  persecution  on  the 
part  of  the  government.  Von  Putkammer  evidently  intended 
to  interfere  as  little  as  possible.  An  immense  number  of 
Catholic  parishes  were  devoid  of  officiating  priests.  In  some 
instances  these  vacancies  were  filled  up  by  giving  proper  noti- 
fication to  the  authorities  of  the  intended  appointments ;  in 
others  the  former  incumbents  returned  quietly  to  their  duties 
without  being  molested.  There  was  evidently  an  understand- 
ing between  Bismarck  and  Pope  Leo,  and  what  could  their 
agreement  be,  other  than  to  let  the  questions  at  issue  grad- 
ually subside  into  the  background,  and  to  treat  the  dogma  of 
infallibility  as  if  it  were  a  dead  letter, — a  thing  of  the  past  ? 

There  was  no  other  course  for  either  party  to  follow. 
Neither  could  very  well  admit,  if  they  felt  inclined  to  do  so, 
having  been  in  the  wrong.  The  Church  of  Rome  never  takes 
a  backward  step.  Leo  could  not  call  another  ecumenical 
council  in  order  to  reverse  the  decision  of  1869  without  se- 
riously undermining  the  authority  of  the  Vatican.  Bismarck 
24  369 

V 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

could  no  more  face  the  Reichstag  with  a  confession  that  all 
his  anti-infallibility  legislation  had  been  a  mistake.  The 
dogma  of  infallibility,  however,  could  be  thrown  aside  for  the 
time  and  left  to  an  innocuous  desuetude.  The  object  for 
which  it  was  originated — in  order  to  check  the  encroachments 
of  Victor  Emmanuel — had  proved  a  failure.  The  authority  of 
the  pope  in  the  States  of  the  Church  was  gone,  and  there  was 
very  faint  hope  that  it  could  ever  be  regained.  Victor  Emman- 
uel was  also  gone,  and  the  personal  antagonism  which  was 
felt  towards  him  in  the  Vatican  was  not  inherited  to  the  same 
extent  by  King  Humbert.  Infallibility  had  lived  its  short 
career,  and  strutted  on  its  political  stage,  causing  a  great  sen- 
sation for  the  time  being,  but  its  day  was  done,  and  nobody 
cared  for  it  any  longer.  If  the  priest  who  was  deposed  by 
the  Bishop  of  Ermland  and  the  Catholic  professors  at  Bonn 
had  not  raised  their  voices  against  it,  perhaps  the  Kulturkampf 
would  never  have  taken  place ;  but  if  a  powder-train  is  laid 
anywhere  it  commonly  happens  that  the  magazine  is  fired 
sooner  or  later. 

It  would  be  neither  interesting  nor  profitable  to  follow  the 
gradual  modification  of  the  May  Laws  from  1878  to  1887, 
when  they  practically  came  to  an  end.  Almost  every  session 
of  the  Reichstag  witnessed  some  alteration  in  them,  which 
Bismarck  explained  in  an  off-hand  manner,  as  if  his  hearers 
understood  already  what  he  intended  to  say,  and  there  was 
no  need  of  a  convincing  argument.  Every  downward  step  in 
this  change  of  policy  appears  to  have  required  a  change  in 
the  ministry  of  public  worship,  and  Dr.  Falk's  successors 
were  as  numerous  as  unimportant  in  the  record  of  events. 

Dr.  Windhorst  was  now  one  of  Bismarck's  most  faithful 
supporters  (a  strong  force  in  his  way),  and  it  was  not  without 
some  reason  that  the  Liberals  insinuated  that  his  services 
were  paid  for  in  "  money  of  Canossa."  Bismarck  had  become 
long  accustomed  to  the  taunt  of  inconsistency,  and  he  could 
reply  with  quite  as  much  truth  that  the  May  Laws  were  still 
on  the  statute  books  and  could  be  enforced  whenever  the 
government  considered  it  expedient. 

The  alliance  between  Germany,  Austria,  and  Italy  had  been 

37° 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

supplemented  by  a  convenient  commercial  treaty ;  the  cry  of 
Guelph  and  Ghibellines  was  no  longer  heard  in  Italy,  and  a 
current  of  similar  ideas  circulated  through  the  three  coun- 
tries from  the  North  Sea  to  the  Straits  of  Messina.  The 
word  that  went  forth  from  Berlin  was  echoed  in  Vienna  and 
again  in  Rome.  Never  since  the  Roman  empire  had  the 
population  of  so  vast  a  tract  been  animated  by  an  equally 
sympathetic  spirit.  German  seriousness  and  moderation 
tempered  the  less  stable  and  more  impulsive  Italian  nature. 
The  Italian  government,  which  for  a  time  seemed  to  be 
drifting  on  a  dangerous  reef,  weathered  the  promontory,  and 
once  more  kept  its  even  course.  No  wonder  that  Lord  Salis- 
bury admitted  to  a  London  audience  that  one  man  ruled  the 
whole  of  Europe.  "  However,"  he  added,  "  I  do  not  think 
he  is  unfriendly  to  England,  but  quite  the  reverse." 

The  monastic  orders  were  permitted  to  return  to  Germany,1 
all  except  the  Jesuits;  and  when,  in  April,  1887,  the  May 
Laws  were  finally  repealed,  with  the  exception  of  some  simple 
regulations  concerning  the  appointments  of  parochial  priests, 
people  asked  the  question  whether  Bismarck  had  actually 
gone  to  Canossa,  after,  all  his  defiant  protestations.  No ;  he 
had  not  gone  to  Canossa,  any  more  than  Canossa  had  come 
to  him.  You  may  call  it  a  stalemate,  if  you  please ;  but  the 
object  for  which  the  May  Laws  were  enacted  had  been  sub- 
stantially attained, — the  assertion  of  the  supremacy  of  the 
civil  law.  Infallibility  was  dead  as  a  door-nail.  There  is  no 
surer  way  of  killing  an  idea  or  a  dogma  than  by  overdoing 
it.  Everybody  was  utterly  sick  of  infallibility,  and,  it  may  be 
said,  of  the  Kulturkampf  also,  and  wished  to  hear  no  more  of 
it.  Requiescat  in  pace  was  the  sentiment  in  Germany  in  re- 
gard to  the  whole  affair,  and  Bismarck  shared  in  this.  The 
priests  might  believe  in  the  dogma  so  long  as  they  liked, 
provided  only  that  they  did  not  obtrude  it  before  the  public. 
It  had  been  a  tough,  obstinate  struggle ;  but  the  Church  of 
Rome  was  the  only  sufferer.  If  Bismarck  had  not  discon- 
certed Kullman's  aim  by  raising  his  hand  for  the  frequent 

1  It  was  called  "  the  migration  of  the  rooks." 
371 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

salutation,  the  balance  would  have  been  largely  on  the  Cath- 
olic side ;  so  narrow  a  line  is  there  often  between  success  and 
failure  in  the  most  important  enterprises.  The  good  under- 
standing between  Bismarck  and  Leo  XIII.  continued  to  the 
end,  and  the  latter  expressed  himself  as  feeling  highly  com- 
plimented for  having  been  chosen  arbitrator  of  the  dispute 
over  the  Caroline  Islands.  At  the  close  of  the  same  year  he 
presented  the  German  chancellor  with  the  order  of  Jesus 
Christ  set  in  diamonds,  which  had  never  before  been  pre- 
sented to  a  Protestant  prince ;  and  he  wrote  him  at  the  same 
time  an  autograph  letter  expressing  a  respectful  recognition 
of  his  good  services  in  church  and  state. 

FOREIGN   RELATIONS 

From  1871  for  the  next  decade  Gambetta  was  the  most 
popular  man  in  France.  He  upset  the  septennate  of  Presi- 
dent MacMahon  on  suspicion  of  Bonapartist  intrigues,  whether 
well  grounded  or  not  is  uncertain.  Von  Beust  considers  that 
there  was  really  no  need  of  MacMahon's  resigning,  and  that 
he  might  have  remained  in  office  until  his  seven  years  were 
finished,  whether  the  national  assembly  liked  it  or  not. 
Gambetta  obtained  the  passage  of  a  law  to  place  the  appoint- 
ment of  general  officers  under  the  control  of  the  national 
assembly,  a  measure  sufficient  of  itself  to  shipwreck  the 
French  army  in  a  protracted  campaign.  After  the  election 
of  President  Grevy  ministries  were  formed  and  resigned  so 
frequently  that  their  average  duration  was  less  than  six 
months.  Gambetta  was  the  leader  who  wrought  these  re- 
markable changes,  which  gave  the  French  republic  an  ap- 
pearance of  political  instability.  He  declined  to  accept 
office  himself,  but  finally  was  obliged  to  do  this  in  order  to 
escape  from  the  inconsistency  of  his  position.  He  had  no 
sooner  done  so  than  the  unpractical  character  of  the  man  be- 
came ^apparent.  His*  first  manoeuvre  was  to  seek  an  inter- 
view with  Bismarck,  and  the  German  chancellor  must  have 
been  greatly  amused  at  the  idea  of  being  outwitted  by  this 
inexperienced  disciple  of  Rousseau.  If  Gambetta  was  twitted 
at  this  meeting  for  his  incendiary  philippics  against  Germany, 

372 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

it  is  no  more  than  he  might  have  expected.  A  coalition  had 
already  taken  root  against  him  before  he  returned  to  Paris. 
The  constitution  did  not  satisfy  him ;  he  wished  to  make 
changes  in  the  suffrage  laws,  was  outvoted  in  the  Chamber 
of  Deputies,  and  retired  from  office.  Neither  did  he  live  long 
after  this.  Jules  Ferry  was  the  first  premier  since  Thiers's 
resignation  who  evinced  the  capacity  to  deal  with  the  ele- 
ments about  him.  It  was  during  his  administration  that 
Tunis  was  annexed  to  Algeria,  and  this  was  accomplished  in 
a  very  adroit  and  skilful  manner.  He  wished  to  divert  his 
countrymen  from  home  politics  by  giving  them  a  foreign  in- 
terest, and  it  was  with  him  that  the  annexation  of  Tonquin  in 
Cochin  China  originated, — a  country  almost  as  rich  as  India  in 
oriental  products.  Bismarck  congratulated  him  on  his  suc- 
cess in  governing  the  French,  but  spoiled  the  compliment  by 
adding  that  no  people  obey  better  when  they  feel  the  strong 
hand.  This  may  even  have  assisted  in  weakening  Ferry's 
popularity,  which  was  wholly  upset  by  a  defeat  in  the  China 
seas,  and  he  disappeared,  like  the  others  before  him,  never  to 
come  to  the  top  again.  These  continuous  changes  indicated 
a  decided  weakness  in  the  French  constitution,  for  a  system- 
atic foreign  policy  is  impossible  under  such  conditions.  It 
was  the  logical  consequence  of  imitating  the  English  form  of 
government,  which  is  much  better  suited  to  a  sober,  phleg- 
matic people  than  to  the  excitable,  capricious  French.  If  the 
French  had  modelled  their  institutions  in  1871  more  after  the 
pattern  of  the  United  States,  with  an  independent  president 
and  cabinet,  they  might  have  achieved  better  results  in  the 
long  run,  and  founded  their  repubjic  on  a  more  enduring 
basis. 

Old  Manteuffel  was  made  governor  of  Alsace  and  Lor- 
raine in  1873,  and,  though  he  could  not  prevent  young  Prus- 
sian officers  from  swaggering  in  the  streets  of  Strasburg,  he 
filled  the  position  in  an  exemplary  manner,  dealing  equal  and 
exact  justice  to  friend  and  foe.  Wherever  Manteuffel  went 
order  reigned,  and  confusion  fled  before  him.  The  anti- 
German  agitation,  which  had  been  largely  stimulated  by  the 
priests,  subsided  after  the  election  of  Leo  XIII.,  and  even 

373 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

when  Emperor  William  visited  the  two  provinces  in  1877  he 
was  received  in  a  cordial  and  friendly,  if  not  the  most  enthu- 
siastic manner.  The  Alsatians  have  too  much  local  pride  not 
to  feel  a  certain  satisfaction  in  the  military  prestige  3f  the 
new  German  empire,  and  this  was  a  partial  compensation  for 
their  involuntary  separation  from  France.  It  could  not  be 
said  that  the  French  had  yet  become  reconciled  to  the  events 
of  1870;  but  as  time  went  on  they  felt  continually  less  in- 
clined to  try  conclusions  again  with  the  German  army,  and 
President  Grevy  is  credited  with  the  statement  that  the  man 
who  contemplated  another  campaign  on  the  Rhine,  so  long 
as  Moltke  and  Bismarck  were  alive,  lacked  common  sense. 
The  acquisition  of  Tunis  was  gratifying  to  the  national  pride, 
and,  coming  as  a  free  gift  from  the  German  chancellor,  it 
helped  much  to  ameliorate  the  feeling  towards  him. 

After  the  Italian  alliance  the  outlook  for  peace  was  particu- 
larly good,  but  Bismarck  was  not  satisfied  until  he  had  drawn 
Russia  into  the  same  net.  In  September,  1884,  he  effected  a 
meeting  of  the  three  emperors,  with  their  respective  min- 
isters, at  Skierniviece  in  Poland,  intended  specially  to  satisfy 
the  Tsar  and  De  Giers  that  the  Triple  Alliance  was  not  in 
any  respect  inimical  to  Russian  interests.  It  was  also  given 
out  that  Bismarck  was  endeavoring  to  harmonize  the  relation 
between  Russia  and  England  in  the  Balkan  states ;  but  it  is 
equally  certain  that  he  did  not  succeed  in  this,  as  appeared 
not  long  afterward  in  the  Bulgarian  imbroglio.  This  pacific 
outlook,  however,  did  not  last  above  two  years,  when  it  was 
seriously  disturbed  by  the  waywardness  of  Prince  Alexander 
of  Bulgaria  in  the  east,  and  in  the  west  by  one  of  the  most 
singular  phenomena  of  the  past  fifty  years. 

Somewhere  about  1885  the  populace  of  Paris  fell  under 
the  influence  of  an  unprincipled  adventurer  named  Boulanger. 
He  was  not  a  man  of  exceptional  ability  or  good  judgment; 
audacious  rather  than  brave,  and  possessed  of  enormous  self- 
confidence.  He  had  served  with  credit  in  the  campaign  of 
1870,  and  had  been  promoted  rapidly  to  the  rank  of  major- 
general.  He  was  thoroughly  unprincipled,  and  subsequent 
events  proved  that  his  pretended  patriotism  was  nothing  better 

374 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

than  personal  ambition.  He  was  ready  to  sell  his  soul  to  any 
political  devil,  or  political  party,  for  the  sake  of  advancement ; 
but  he  could  deliver  a  lively  off-hand  speech,  and  had  that 
ready  good-natured  manner  which  is  often  mistaken  for  gen- 
uine bonhomie.  How  such  an  empty  character  became  the  idol 
of  Paris  it  is  difficult  to  imagine,  and  certainly  is  not  much  to 
the  credit  of  the  Parisians;  but  General  Boulanger  was  so 
popular  in  1886  that  he  was  made  minister  of  war  chiefly  on 
that  account.  He  now  succeeded  to  Gambetta's  role  as 
preacher  of  a  crusade  of  vengeance  against  Prussia,  and  he 
did  this  so  openly  and  energetically  that  under  different  con- 
ditions it  might  easily  have  caused  the  outbreak  of  war.  He 
was  secretly  supported  in  this  course  by  the  royalists,  who 
hoped  to  recover  lost  ground  through  the  confusion  which 
Boulanger  created,  and  openly  by  the  more  sensational  news- 
papers and  a  noisy  group  of  followers  in  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies.  The  aspect  of  France  was  not  more  belligerent 
after  the  Austrian  campaign  of  1866.  People  of  unregulated 
imagination  already  saw  in  Boulanger  a  conquering  hero,  who 
would  recover  the  laurels  and  redeem  the  military  honor  of 
the  French  nation.  Slight  collisions  which  occurred  on  the 
frontier  about  this  time  excited  the  animosity  of  certain  classes 
in  both  countries,  and  tended  to  aggravate  the  situation. 

Bismarck  knew  that  diplomacy  would  avail  little  with  such 
an  undiplomatic  cabinet  as  that  in  which  Boulanger  partici- 
pated, and  perhaps  he  had  learned  from  the  Kulturkampf 
that  attempts  to  muzzle  the  press  of  a  foreign  country  were 
of  little  avail.  He  felt  strong  in  the  triple  alliance,  but  he 
thought  Germany  ought  to  be  able  to  deal  with  France 
single-handed,  and  he  knew  that  other  governments  would 
look  at  it  in  that  light.  Moltke  informed  him,  however,  that 
the  present  military  establishment  of  France  largely  exceeded 
that  of  Germany.  He  could  not  feel  confident  of  success 
without  an  increase  of  forty  thousand  men  in  the  active  ser- 
vice of  the  German  army.  Accordingly,  in  the  autumn  of 
1886,  Bismarck  went  to  the  Reichstag  with  a  measure  to  this 
effect.  "  In  France,"  he  said,  "  the  unexpected  may  happen 
at  any  time,  and  we  ought  to  be  prepared  for  it  beforehand. 

375 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

An  armed  peace  is,  after  all,  better  than  war ;  and  if  we  pre- 
pare ourselves  for  war  we  shall  be  less  likely  to  encounter  it 
than  if  we  do  not."  He  asked  for  an  increase  of  fifty  thou- 
sand men  for  seven  years  to  tide  over  the  emergency.  -  The 
Reichstag,  however,  looked  on  this  rather  as  an  attempt  to 
obtain  an  additional  support  to  the  imperial  authority,  and 
refused  to  grant  it ;  whereupon  Bismarck  dissolved  the  par- 
liament in  a  rage,  and  appealed  to  the  constituencies.  As 
happened  on  previous  occasions,  the  German  people  sup- 
ported their  chancellor,  and  the  new  Reichstag,  elected  in  the 
autumn  of  1887,  proved  more  favorable  to  his  foreign  policy. 
He  opened  the  subject,  when  the  delegates  had  assembled,  in 
a  celebrated  speech,  from  which  we  cull  the  following  extract: 

"That  the  present  bill  is  not  to  be  looked  on  in  the  light  of  a 
momentary  arrangement — this,  I  think,  will  be  clearly  seen,  if  I 
may  request  you  to  consider  with  me  the  dangers  of  war  to  which 
we  have  been  exposed  within  the  last  forty  years,  without,  however, 
becoming  at  any  time  a  prey  to  nervous  apprehensions. 

"If  in  my  enumeration  I  should  have  omitted  one  single  year 
of  all  these  years,  in  the  terrible  experiences  of  which  you  have  all 
yourselves  participated,  one  would  not  have  the  impression  that  this 
state  of  fear  of  great  wars,  of  further  complications,  the  results  of 
which  as  to  any  possible  alliances  nobody  can  judge  of  in  advance, 
— that  this  state  is  a  permanent  one  with  us,  and  that  we  must  pre- 
pare ourselves,  once  and  for  all,  to  deal  with  it ;  independently  of 
the  present  conditions,  we  must  be  strong,  that  we,  fully  conscious 
of  being  a  great  nation,  which,  if  required,  is  sufficiently  powerful 
to  take  her  destiny  in  her  own  hand,  even  against  any  and  every 
coalition,  with  the  self-confidence  and  the  trust  in  God  which  is 
born  of  the  consciousness  of  one's  own  strength  and  the  justness 
of  one's  cause,  which  will  ever  be  on  the  side  of  Germany  as  far 
as  this  is  in  the  power  of  the  government, — that  thus,  I  say,  we 
can  look  every  contingency  in  the  face,  and  that  with  tranquillity. 

"In  short,  in  these  times  we  will  have  to  strengthen  our  forces 
to  the  utmost ;  and  if  it  is  possible  for  us  to  be  stronger  than  any 
other  country  of  a  like  number  of  individuals,  it  would  be  a  crime 
not  to  make  use  of  this  possibility.  If  we  do  not  need  our  military 
power,  we  need  not  call  out  the  same.  The  principal  point  here 
is  the  money  question,  which  does  not  involve  a  very  great  ex- 

376 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

penditure,  if  one  considers  that  France  has  spent  three  thousand 
millions  within  the  last  twenty  years  for  the  improvement  of  her 
military  forces,  while  we  invested  scarcely  fifteen  hundred  millions, 
including  the  amount  for  which  we  now  ask  you. 

"  When  I  say  that  we  must  perpetually  aim  to  be  always  ready 
for  any  contingency,  I  herewith  lay  claim  that  on  account  of  our 
geographical  position  we  must  make  still  greater  efforts  than  other 
nations  do  for  the  same  purpose.  We  lie  in  the  centre  of  Europe. 
We  offer  three  sides  where  we  can  be  attacked.  France  can  only 
be  attacked  on  its  eastern  frontier,  Russia  only  at  its  western. 
Besides  that,  we  are  more  than  any  other  nation  exposed  to  the 
danger  of  coalitions,  according  to  the  development  of  the  history 
of  the  world,  according  to  our  geographical  situation,  and  also 
because  of  the  looser  organization  of  the  Germans  up  to  the  present 
time  as  compared  with  other  nations.  God  has  put  us  in  a  place 
where  our  neighbors  prevent  us  from  degenerating  through  indo- 
lence and  stagnation. ' ' 

Bismarck  then  dwelt  on  the  fact  that  the  war  party  in 
Russia  had  caused  an  estrangement  to  take  place  between 
the  German  and  Russian  empires;  and  afterwards  gave  a 
history  of  the  origin  of  the  Austro-German  alliance  which 
is  substantially  what  we  have  already  stated.  He  then  said  : 

"  There  is  no  doubt  that  if  the  present  bill  is  passed  the  alliance 
with  Austria  will  gain  tremendously  in  power,  inasmuch  as  the 
power  of  that  side  of  the  alliance  represented  by  Germany  will  be 
very  largely  augmented.  As  soon  as  we  have  the  guns  for  the 
increase  in  numbers  provided  for  in  the  bill,  this  very  same  bill 
will  represent  a  strengthening  of  the  sureties  of  peace  as  well  as  a 
strengthening  of  that  peace  alliance,  as  powerful  as  if  a  fourth  great 
power  had  joined  the  league  with  an  army  of  seven  hundred 
thousand  men." 

He  then  went  on  to  say  that  he  did  not  consider  that  there 
was  any  necessary  apprehension  of  an  immediate  conflict 
with  either  France  or  Russia.  All  that  was  necessary  for 
Germany  was  that  she  should  be  prepared  to  meet  any  emer- 
gency which  might  arise.  The  difficulty  of  preserving  peace 
was  greatly  increased  by  the  threatening  articles  in  foreign 
newspapers.  Again  he  said : 

377 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

"I  would  particularly  admonish  foreign  countries  to  drop  these 
threats.  They  lead  to  nothing.  The  threat  which  is  offered  to 
us — not  from  the  government,  but  from  the  press — is,  strictly  speak- 
ing, incredible  nonsense,  when  one  imagines  that  a  powerful  and 
proud  nation,  such  as  the  German  empire,  could  be  intimidated  by 
a  highly  belligerent  attitude  in  printer's  ink  or  by  a  conglomeration 
of  words.  This  should  be  dropped  ;  then  it  would  be  easier  for  us 
to  take  a  more  conciliatory  stand  towards  our  two  neighbors.  Every 
country  will  in  the  long  run  be  made  responsible  for  the  windows 
which  are  broken  by  its  press,  the  bill  for  which  will  be  presented 
some  time  or  other  by  the  other  nation  being  seriously  offended. 
We  can  be  easily  impressed  by  friendliness  and  good -will, — per- 
haps too  easily, — but  certainly  never  by  threats.  WE  GERMANS 

FEAR   GOD,  BUT  WE  FEAR  NOTHING    ELSE    IN    THIS  WORLD  ;    and  it  is 

the  fear  of  God  which  induces  us  to  love  and  cultivate  peace. ' '  * 

This  was  the  last  of  Bismarck's  more  important  speeches, 
and  in  the  opinion  of  many  the  greatest  of  them  all.  Its 
delivery  consumed  nearly  two  hours,  and  during  that  time 
Bismarck  refreshed  himself  with  more  than  a  dozen  glasses 
of  water.  It  was  a  mighty  effort  for  a  man  nearly  seventy- 
three,  and  these  short  extracts  do  it  little  justice.  It  must  be 
taken  as  a  whole,  and  it  represented  in  itself  the  chancellor's 
whole  public  career.  It  was  felt  to  be  a  justification  of  his 
life-work,  and  brought  to  the  Reichstag  a  realizing  sense  of 
the  man's  greatness  as  never  before, — especially  that  he  was 
at  heart  a  man  of  peace,  and  had  brought  with  him  a  sword 
so  that  he  might  establish  peace  on  an  enduring  basis.  After 
the  oration  was  finished  Count  von  Moltke  came  forward  and, 
ascending  the  steps  to  the  chancellor's  table,  shook  hands 
with  him  and  congratulated  him  on  his  unusual  success.  The 
Reichstag  then  adjourned  and  escorted  the  chancellor  to  the 
Radziwill  Palace  in  a  body,  while  the  audience  who  had  lis- 
tened in  the  galleries  dispersed  and  filled  Berlin  with  their 
enthusiastic  accounts  of  it. 

When  the  army  bill  came  to  a  final  decision  all  parties 

1  Bismarck's  Speeches,  Speemann  ed.,  xvi.  135.     Speech  delivered  Febru- 
ary 6. 

378 


LIFE   OF   BISMARCK 

united  in  its  support,  except  the  Social  Democrats,  whose 
votes  were  the  only  ones  cast  in  opposition  to  it.  The  Lon- 
don Times  said,  next  morning,  "  The  passage  of  Bismarck's 
bill  for  the  increase  of  the  German  army  will  give  an  effectual 
chill  to  the  belligerent  party  in  France ;  nor  is  it  likely  that 
we  shall  hear  any  more  for  the  present  about  campaigns  for 
revenge."  This  proved  to  be  true,  and,  though  twelve  or 
more  years  have  passed  since  the  speech  was  delivered,  there 
has  been  no  further  need  of  legislation  on  the  subject,  nor 
have  the  French  people  required  further  admonition.  Bou- 
langer's  downfall  followed  close  upon  it  (February  and  March, 
1888),  so  that  it  almost  might  seem  as  if  one  were  the  conse- 
quence of  the  other.  His  turbulent  agitation  led  to  his  court- 
martial  for  insubordination  as  an  army  officer,  and  he  was  dis- 
missed from  the  service.  He  then  obtained  an  election  to  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies,  where  he  distinguished  himself  by 
equally  violent  harangues  and  by  his  duel  with  Floquet,  the 
president  of  the  assembly.  A  year  later  he  was  charged 
with  embezzlement  while  minister  of  war,  and  went  into  vol- 
untary exile  to  escape  conviction.  It  was  found,  however, 
by  a  trial  election  that  he  had  a  million  supporters  among  the 
voters  of  the  French  people. 


379 


CHAPTER    XVI. 

FREDERICK    III.    AND    WILLIAM    II. 

DURING  the  last  years  of  Bismarck's  parliamentary  service 
he  presented  a  picture  of  terrible  and  almost  demoniac  en- 
ergy. Seated  behind  his  chancellor's  table,  in  the  white 
uniform  of  the  Magdeburg  Guards,  with  a  stiff  yellow  collar 
and  gold  epaulets,  his  perfectly  bald  cranium  (much  larger 
than  the  average  man's)  rose  above  his  shaggy  white  brows, 
which  half  concealed  the  nebulous  eyes,  whose  falcon-like 
gleams  flashed  through  the  chamber  at  every  fresh  statement 
or  telling  argument  of  his  opponents.  His  stubby  nose,  ob- 
stinate as  Martin  Luther's,  heavy  white  mustache,  and  firmly 
set  chin  completed  a  portrait  unlike  any  other  in  the  present 
century. 

More  impatient  than  ever,  more  determined  of  his  points, 
and  more  indifferent  to  appearances,  his  oratory  was  such  as 
might  have  made  a  child  laugh,  or  excited  a  feeling  of  con- 
tempt in  a  young  lady  of  fashion,  but  there  was  neither 
laughter  nor  contempt  for  it  in  the  Reichstag.  Towering 
awkwardly  above  his  table,  swaying  slightly  to  the  rhythm  of 
his  sentences,  nervously  clutching  his  coat-buttons,  the  papers 
on  his  desk,  or  any  other  object  that  might  be  within  his 
reach,  he  poured  forth  sentence  after  sentence  of  the  most 
telling  argument,  not  like  a  man  who  is  reading  from  a  book, 
but  rather  as  if  he  were  writing  out  his  statement,  hesitating 
and  revising  it  as  he  went  along.  Sentence  crowded  on  sen- 
tence as  if  one  were  pushing  another  out  of  his  mind.  Mean- 
while, he  would  continually  refresh  himself  with  what  appeared 
to  be  water,  but  which  was  well  known  to  contain  a  homoeo- 
pathic quantity  of  alcoholic  stimulant. 

When  the  debate  in  the  Reichstag  became  tedious  Bis- 
marck sometimes  retired  to  an  anteroom  on  the  same  floor, 
where  he  could  continue  his  work  to  better  advantage.  On 

380 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

one  occasion  when  he  did  so  the  Radicals  and  Socialists  made 
a  desperate  attack  on  some  measure  he  had  in  hand,  and  chal- 
lenged him  to  come  out  and  reply  to  it  on  the  floor,  and  not 
insult  the  Reichstag  by  his  absence  while  it  was  in  session. 
The  chancellor  stepped  to  the  door  of  his  room,  and  informed 
them  that  he  could  hear  all  that  was  necessary  and  essential 
of  their  remarks  where  he  was ;  which  did  not  much  improve 
the  temper  of  his  adversaries.  Bismarck  had  long  since  be- 
come a  privileged  character,  even  to  Emperor  William,  and, 
like  all  such,  was  often  a  trial  to  his  friends  and  an  aggrava- 
tion to  others.  No  man  could  be  more  polite  or  considerate 
if  one  happened  to  catch  that  side  of  his  nature,  but  when  his 
thoughts  were  absorbed  in  great  designs  he  paid  little  atten- 
tion to  those  about  him.  His  sleeplessness  was  a  national 
inconvenience,  and  the  most  important  affairs  were  sometimes 
obliged  to  wait  for  days  until  he  felt  equal  to  the  transaction 
of  business. 

That  Bismarck  was  sometimes  abusive  in  the  heat  of  debate 
is  not  to  be  denied.  He  was  in  the  habit  of  complaining  that 
his  opponents  distorted  the  facts  in  their  statements  and  mis- 
represented his  own.  He  sometimes  complained  of  their 
mendacity,  when  the  truth  might  be  a  matter  of  opinion.  At 
the  same  time,  his  friends  have  always  asserted  that  he  never 
intentionally  "  struck  below  the  belt,"  and  his  arguments  in 
his  speeches  which  have  been  published  are  not  of  the  sophis- 
tical sort.  On  one  occasion,  when  he  animadverted  on  the 
Socialists  for  their  vote  upon  the  army  bill,  and  one  of  them 
called  "  Pfui"  (fie)  to  him,  Bismarck  rejoined,  "  Whoever  says 
'  pfui'  to  me  is  insulting.  As  a  Christian  I  may  pocket  it,  but 
as  chancellor  of  the  empire  I  must  resent  it,  and  inform  my 
opponent  that  I  can  return  insult  for  insult.  We  did  not 
make  war  on  France  in  order  to  be  inoculated  by  fifteen  or 
twenty  Socialists  in  our  own  country.  The  member  must 
understand  that  this  assembly  is  a  meeting  of  gentlemanly 
and  orderly  persons,  and  if  he  meets  with  different  treatment 
here  it  is  because  he  introduces  it  himself." 

This  was  called  Bismarck's  broadsword  style,  and  it  is  one 
which  he  frequently  resorted  to.  Plato,  and  not  Menander 

381 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 


as  Goethe  says,  was  the  first  to  preach  that  it  is  better  to 
endure  insults  than  to  return  them,  but  it  is  to  be  feared  that 
such  an  elevated  code  would  hardly  appeal  to  a  class  of  men 
like  the  German  Socialists.  They  would  probably  have  looked 
upon  it  as  a  confession  of  weakness,  and  weakness  in  Bis- 
marck's position,  either  real  or  imaginary,  was  not  to  be 
thought  of.  He  said  himself,  in  regard  to  the  behavior  of  the 
French  troops  in  killing  wounded  Germans  on  the  battle-field, 
that  their  wars  against  barbarians  in  Algeria,  Mexico,  and 
Cochin  China  had  made  them  also  semi-barbarous.  So  Bis- 
marck, in  his  long  parliamentary  warfare  with  the  Socialists, 
had  acquired  something  of  the  methods  and  manners  of  his 
antagonists. 

THE  BATTENBERGER 

The  organization  of  the  Balkan  or  Christian-Turkish  states, 
after  the  Congress  of  Berlin,  proved  a  matter  of  unusual  dif- 
ficulty. There  was  a  conflict  of  Russian,  Turkish,  and  Eng- 
lish interests  in  most  of  them  which  left  the  native  population 
small  chance  to  express  its  own  wishes.  The  only  one,  how- 
ever, whose  fortunes  are  directly  connected  with  the  life  of 
Bismarck  is  Bulgaria,  of  which  Prince  Alexander  of  Batten- 
berg  was  chosen  ruler  by  the  national  assembly,  with  the 
advice  and  consent  of  the  signatory  powers,  in  April,  1879, 
and  in  July  he  was  crowned  in  the  capital  of  Sofia,  and  com- 
menced his  rule  in  a  vigorous  and  conservative  manner.  As 
the  national  assembly  proved  too  radical  for  his  ideas  he  dis- 
solved it  and  required  fresh  elections.  As  this  did  not  help 
the  matter  much  he  resorted  to  a  coup  d'etat, — supposed  to 
have  been  instigated  at  St.  Petersburg, — dissolved  the  assem- 
bly again  and  abolished  the  constitution.  Thus  we  find  him 
at  the  outset  of  his  reign  acting  under  Russian  influences, 
and  in  direct  opposition  to  the  wishes  of  the  Bulgarians,  who 
are,  however,  an  ignorant  and  uncultivated  people,  by  no 
means  well  fitted  for  self-government. 

The  war  followed  between  Servia  and  Bulgaria  in  conse- 
quence of  the  annexation  of  East  Roumelia,  and  the  victo- 
rious Bulgarians,  having  arms  in  their  hands,  demanded  the 

382 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

restoration  of  the  constitution,  and,  though  this  was  opposed 
by  a  majority  of  the  officers,  especially  those  of  higher  grades, 
Prince  Alexander  concluded  it  was  best  to  comply.  This 
placed  him,  however,  between  two  fires,  and  his  position  was 
certainly  a  difficult  one.  A  foreigner,  and  separated  from 
those  about  him  by  the  gulf  of  authority,  and  perhaps  also 
influenced  by  the  Crown  Princess  of  Prussia,  it  was  inevitable 
that  Alexander  of  Battenberg  should  seek  encouragement 
against  Panslavism  in  the  direction  where  it  was  most  easily 
obtained.  Unfortunately,  this  was  in  a  quarter  whence  he 
was  likely  to  derive  the  least  material  support.  It  was  soon 
rumored  in  St.  Petersburg  that  Alexander  was  acting  under 
English  advice,  and  directing  the  policy  of  Bulgaria  in  the 
interests  of  Great  Britain.  That  there  was  some  truth  in  this 
is  plainly  apparent  from  the  course  of  subsequent  events. 
Alexander  travelled  about  his  principality  in  company  with 
the  English  envoy  in  rather  an  ostentatious  manner;  and 
nothing  could  have  been  more  imprudent,  for  it  not  only 
offended  the  Russians,  but  diminished  the  respect  felt  for 
him  by  his  own  people.  It  was  considered  undignified  as 
well  as  impolitic.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  he  listened 
to  the  advice  of  the  English  envoy,  and  received  from  him 
expectations  of  support  which  were  not  afterwards  fulfilled. 
There  was,  in  fact,  little  that  the  British  cabinet  could  do  to 
sustain  him  in  his  position,  except  through  a  tedious  course 
of  diplomatic  manoeuvring.  The  blow  which  prostrated  him 
was  too  sudden  to  be  parried  by  diplomacy.  Only  Bismarck 
could  have  saved  him,  and  he  does  not  appear  to  have  con- 
sulted the  German  chancellor  at  this  juncture.  Alexander 
of  Battenberg  was  nephew  to  the  Tsar  Alexander,  and  that, 
in  the  strained  relations  between  England  and  Russia,  he 
should  have  permitted  himself  to  be  influenced  by  English 
interests  in  opposition  to  his  own  kindred  exasperated  the 
Tsar  and  helped  to  precipitate  the  events  which  followed. 

On  the  night  of  August  21,  1886,  his  prime  minister  Kar- 
aveloff  entered  the  royal  palace,  accompanied  by  a  delegation 
of  other  officials,  and  announced  to  Prince  Alexander  that 
Bulgarian  opinion  was  dissatisfied  with  the  policy  he  was 

383 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 


pursuing,  and  that  his  deposition  was  in  order.  The  con- 
spiracy had  been  kept  so  perfectly  secret  that  Alexander  was 
astonished,  and  knew  not  how  to  help  himself.  "  I  see  no 
friends  here,"  he  said;  "I  cannot  resist  you."1  This  xeply 
was  dignified  but  conclusive. 

He  was  escorted  by  a  detachment  of  Russian  cavalry  to 
Widdin,  and  thence  on  board  ship  to  Severin  in  Roumania, 
where  he  was  set  at  liberty.  Great  indignation  was  expressed 
at  this  outrage  in  Vienna  and  London,  but  the  indignation  in 
Germany  was  of  an  unofficial  character.  The  Roumanian 
people,  and  especially  the  citizens  of  Sofia,  felt  that  the 
nation  had  been  insulted  by  this  clandestine  removal  of  their 
chief  magistrate,  and  expressed  themselves  accordingly. 
Under  cover  of  this  popular  outcry  Alexander  returned  from 
Austria  in  a  few  days,  but  he  found  that  the  conspiracy 
against  him  was  so  wide-spread,  and  implicated  so  many  of 
the  highest  officials,  that  he  decided  to  resign  in  a  dignified 
manner  and  returned  to  Germany.  He  is  reported  to  have 
said  that  to  have  punished  the  guilty  would  have  involved  a 
massacre,  and  was  practically  impossible. 

Immediately  on  the  return  of  the  Battenberger  he  was  in- 
vited to  Berlin  by  the  Crown  Prince  of  Prussia  and  enter- 
tained with  every  mark  of  distinction.2  Upon  this  there  were 
not  wanting  others  to  follow  so  illustrious  an  example,  and 
newspapers,  taking  their  cue  from  the  heir  to  the  imperial 
throne,  raised  a  chorus  of  denunciation  against  the  Bulgarian 
conspiracy,  with  slightly  disguised  insinuations  concerning 
the  Russian  government.  Bismarck,  however,  said  gruffly 
that  Alexander  would  have  done  better  if  he  had  not  fished 
in  troubled  waters.  The  attention  of  the  crown  prince  and 
princess  plainly  indicated  the  origin  of  a  policy  which,  if  it 
had  been  permitted  to  continue,  might  have  taken  a  permanent 

1  Despatch  to  the  Vienna  Press,  August  23,  1886. 

a  The  London  Times  was  furious.  It  said :  "  The  arrogance  of  Russia  and 
the  fall  of  Alexander  were  due  directly  to  the  cynical  attitude  of  Germany  and, 
in  a  less  degree,  of  Austria-Hungary.  .  .  .  Prince  Bismarck  has  been  willing  to 
give  Russia  a  '  free  hand'  in  order  to  lessen  the  chances  of  a  Russo-French 
alliance." 

384 


LIFE  OF   BISMARCK 

root.  Emperor  William  was  now  eighty-nine,  and  though 
apparently  in  robust  health,  so  that  he  surprised  his  attend- 
ants by  the  slight  assistance  he  required,  it  was  equally  certain 
that  the  crown  prince,  with  his  English  wife  and  British  pro- 
clivities, might  any  day  be  called  to  the  throne.  Lord  Salis- 
bury had  succeeded  Gladstone,  and  wiseacres  predicted  that 
the  Home-Rule  agitation  would  give  him  a  long  lease  of 
power.  Then  Bismarck  would  go  out  of  office,  and  an  anti- 
Russian  alliance  would  be  formed  between  England  and  Ger- 
many. That  the  crown  prince  should  have  been  so  destitute 
of  political  judgment  as  to  lend  himself  to  such  an  intrigue, 
which  could  only  result  in  disasters  to  Germany,  even  if  it 
brought  advantage  to  Great  Britain,  seems  almost  incredible, 
but  his  subsequent  course  renders  the  fact  incontestable.  The 
old  emperor,  more  and  more  devoted  to  his  son,  appeared  to 
be  oblivious  of  what  was  going  forward  right  under  his  eyes, 
and  Bismarck  may  have  considered  it  the  most  prudent  course 
not  to  call  his  attention  to  it. 

The  demonstrations  at  Berlin  in  favor  of  the  Battenberger, 
however,  were  too  conspicuous  not  to  attract  attention  in  St. 
Petersburg,  and  they  had  even  become  the  subject  of  diplo- 
matic correspondence  before  the  surprising  announcement 
was  made  that  an  alliance  was  in  prospect  between  Prince 
Alexander  and  the  daughter  of  the  crown  prince,  Victoria's 
grand-daughter.  Already  two  years  previous  the  crown 
princess  had  attempted  to  bring  this  about,  but  William  I. 
had  set  his  foot  down  that  it  should  not  be  done,  for  reasons 
of  state  expediency.  Too  much  depends  on  alliances  be- 
tween sovereign  houses  to  permit  personal  inclination  to 
have  much  of  a  share  in  them.  Now  the  courtship  was  being 
renewed  with  better  prospect  of  success.  The  crown  prince 
did  not  oppose  it,  and  Victoria  encouraged  it,  but  a  murmur 
of  dissatisfaction  went  through  Germany  from  east  to  west. 
Bismarck  perceived  that  a  storm  was  coming  and  prepared 
himself  to  meet  it.  It  appears  to  have  been  at  this  time 
that  he  promised  the  Tsar  that  so  long  as  he  remained 
chancellor  the  Battenberger  should  never  marry  into  the 
Prussian  royal  family.  The  excitement  suddenly  subsided 
25  385 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

again,  and  nothing  more  was  heard  of  the  proposed  match 
for  nearly  a  year. 

Apart  from  its  moral  character  the  kidnapping  of  Prince 
Alexander  was  a  stroke  of  genius.  Bismarck  and  Count 
Kalnoky  knew  the  situation  perfectly,  and  would  no  doubt 
have  interfered  in  favor  of  the  Battenberger  if  he  had  been  the 
right  man  for  Bulgaria.1  They  understood  what  the  editor  of 
the  Times  failed  to  consider,  that  the  Tsar  of  Russia,  though 
nominally  an  autocrat,  was  no  more  a  free  agent  than  an 
English  schoolmaster  is;  that  there  were  two  parties  in 
Russia,  the  Panslavists  and  the  party  of  peace,  and  that, 
although  the  Tsar  belonged  to  the  latter  and  supported  it, 
he  was  also  obliged  to  conciliate  the  former  or  have  his  way 
blocked  for  him  in  every  direction.  They  realized  that  it 
was  their  duty  to  assist  Alexander  III.  in  this,  so  far  as  they 
could,  for  the  good  of  Germany  and  Austria.  The  Tsar 
needed  all  the  help  he  could  get,  and  this  fact  sufficiently 
explains  Bismarck's  attitude  towards  the  Bulgarian  abduc- 
tion. Kalnoky's  reticence  is  also  significant.  The  Austrian 
government  did  not  fail  to  interfere  from  lack  of  a  bold  policy, 
as  was  proved  soon  afterwards,  but  evidently  because  the 
emperor  and  Kalnoky  did  not  consider  it  expedient. 

The  following  April  Prince  Ferdinand  of  Saxe-Coburg  was 
chosen  by  the  signatory  powers,  and  accepted  by  the  Bulga- 
rian assembly,  as  the  Battenberger's  successor.  He  does  not 
appear  to  have  encountered  the  same  difficulties  as  Alex- 
der,  but  proved,  on  the  whole,  an  acceptable  ruler  to  the 
Slavic  population. 

In  the  summer  of  1887  Emperor  William  resorted  to  Ems 
as  usual,  and  visitors  from  foreign  countries  were  astonished 
to  see  a  sovereign  of  ninety  years  so  bright  in  mind,  erect  in 
his  carriage,  and  elastic  in  his  step.  Optimists  predicted  that 
he  might  yet  become  a  centenarian ;  but  the  man  who  had 

1  Minchin  says :  "  He  knew,  no  doubt,  that  English  sympathy  was  with  him, 
but  that  material  aid  was  not  forthcoming  from  that  quarter.  If  he  had  only  had 
Bismarck  on  his  side  he  might  have  remained,  but  the  German  chancellor  had 
become  the  colleague  of  the  Russian  chancellor." — The  Balkan  Peninsula, 
p.  296. 

386 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

never  yet  known  misfortune  was  doomed  to  a  severe  disap- 
pointment in  the  last  hour  of  his  life.  The  crown  prince  was 
already  troubled  with  a  slight  swelling  in  his  throat,  but  this 
was  not  sufficiently  advanced  for  the  doctors  to  give  a  decided 
opinion  in  regard  to  it.  Early  in  the  autumn  it  began  to  be 
whispered  in  Berlin  that  the  crown  prince's  trouble  was  of  a 
malignant  nature,  but  an  English  physician,  Sir  Morrell  Mc- 
Kenzie,  who  had  been  sent  for  by  the  crown  princess,  made  a 
public  denial  of  this.  The  popular  impression  that  if  the 
prince  was  mortally  ill  he  could  not,  by  Prussian  usage,  suc- 
ceed to  the  throne  if  it  became  vacant,  has  been  denied  by 
Bismarck  in  his  memoirs.  Emperor  William  was  not,  appar- 
ently, deceived  by  this  stratagem,  and  recognized  the  true 
nature  of  the  malady  with  fearful  clearness.  His  physical  con- 
dition changed  so  much  that  it  seemed  as  if  he  preferred  not  to 
live,  in  order  that  his  son  might  at  least  leave  his  name  upon 
the  list  of  German  emperors.  Bismarck  desired  to  have  a 
regent  appointed  on  account  of  the  age  of  William  and  the 
invalid  condition  of  the  crown  prince ;  but  William  deferred 
the  matter  to  his  son,  who  either  objected  to  the  plan  or  post- 
poned its  consideration.  On  the  approach  of  cold  weather 
the  crown  prince  was  advised  by  Dr.  McKenzie  to  go  to 
Mentone  on  the  Gulf  of  Genoa,  where  he  would  not  only  enjoy 
a  more  favorable  climate,  but  also  his  condition  could  be 
more  easily  concealed.  It  is  said  that  from  this  time  the  old 
emperor  did  nothing  but  weep,  until  he  finally  died,  on  the  Qth 
of  March,  within  two  weeks  of  his  ninety-first  birthday.  He 
was  interred  in  the  royal  church  at  Potsdam,  where  the  dust 
of  Frederick  the  Great  rests  in  a  metal  casket.  Never  had 
Berlin  beheld  such  funeral  obsequies,  for  not  only  did  the 
position  of  the  man  recall  the  grandeur  of  the  Hohenstau- 
fens,  but  all  Europe  respected  his  character  as  one  that  would 
have  distinguished  him  in  a  private  station,  and  was  the 
finest  jewel  in  the  imperial  crown.  It  is  with  rather  too  much 
effort,  however,  that  his  successors  attempt  to  designate  him 
as  William  the  Great.  Such  a  title  falls  to  the  lot  of  few  in 
history,  and  only  by  universal  acclamation.  Compared  with 
Frederick,  or  Charlemagne,  or  Alexander  he  does  not  appear 

387 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

to  such  advantage  as  he  does  among  the  sovereigns  of  his 
own  time. 

The  crown  prince  was  in  a  very  low  condition  at  Mentone, 
but  he  decided  at  once  to  return  to  Berlin  and  take  the  reins 
of  government  in  hand  for  the  short  time  that  remained  to 
him  on  earth.  He  signed  himself  Frederick,  without  the 
William,  as  if  to  designate  that  he  was  the  true  successor  of 
Frederick  II.,  and  to  this  his  military  reputation  gave  him 
some  title.  King  Humbert  of  Italy  intercepted  him  en  route, 
having  made  a  day's  journey  for  the  purpose,  and  held  an 
interview  with  him  in  the  railway  carriage.  Frederick  said 
to  him,  "  I  face  my  malady  as  I  did  the  bullets  of  Koniggratz 
and  Worth."  The  day  after  he  arrived  at  Berlin,  Frederick  III. 
summoned  Bismarck  to  his  couch,  received  him  cordially,  and 
conversed  eagerly  on  public  affairs  so  long  as  he  was  able,  the 
empress  remaining  in  the  chamber  all  the  while.  The  fol- 
lowing day  Bismarck  called  again,  and  finding  the  empress 
also  with  him,  showed  some  embarrassment,  and  finally  ex- 
plained to  the  emperor  that  he  could  not  converse  with  such 
freedom  as  he  would  like  in  the  presence  of  a  third  person. 
The  empress  accordingly  withdrew.  It  is  probable  that  the 
Battenberg  marriage  was  brought  forward  by  Frederick 
during  these  first  days  of  his  authority,  and  that  Bismarck 
respectfully  but  firmly  refused  to  consider  it,  so  the  matter 
remained  in  abeyance.1 

On  March  21  an  imperial  edict  was  issued,  authorizing  the 
Crown  Prince  William  to  act  for  his  father  in  the  considera- 
tion or  settlement  of  such  state  affairs  as  the  emperor  should 
submit  to  his  decision ;  and  a  few  days  later  the  project  of  a 
marriage  between  Prince  Alexander  of  Battenberg  and  the 
Princess  Victoria  was  again  brought  forward.  Now  the 
storm  broke,  not  only  in  the  royal  palace  but  throughout 
Prussia.  Bismarck  declared  that  he  would  resign  before  such 
a  catastrophe  should  happen  in  the  affairs  of  Germany.  He 
argued  that  the  marriage  was  particularly  objectionable  to  the 

1  Bismarck  alleges  that  Frederick  III.  was  glad  of  his  support  at  this  critical 
moment,  as  against  the  pressure  of  his  wife  and  her  relatives. 

388 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

Tsar,  and  would  be  certain  to  disturb  the  good  understanding 
between  the  two  governments,  which  for  so  many  years  had 
rested  on  a  most  delicate  balance,  and  required  the  greatest 
care  for  its  preservation.  "  I  should  have  been  false  to  my 
old  master  and  remiss  in  my  duty  to  the  Fatherland,"  he 
stated  afterwards,  "  if  I  had  not  exercised  all  my  influence 
against  giving  to  the  Battenberger  the  advantage  of  this  dis- 
tinction." That  he  felt  any  personal  animosity  to  the  prince 
is  quite  improbable,  but  he  considered  the  welfare  of  nations 
of  more  importance  than  the  sentiments  of  individuals. 

Not  only  the  ministry  supported  Bismarck,  but  most  of 
the  Prussian  newspapers  and  members  of  the  Reichstag. 
When  he  threatened  to  resign  petitions  were  drawn  up  to 
Emperor  Frederick,  signed  by  notable  members  of  the  Con- 
servative and  National  Liberal  parties,  urging  him  to  retain 
the  chancellor  in  office.  The  people  who  conversed  in  beer- 
gardens,  the  soldiers  on  duty,  even  the  newsboys  in  the  street, 
were  of  one  opinion  in  regard  to  the  proposed  marriage. 
Everybody  seemed  to  understand  the  question  at  issue  except 
Frederick  himself.  The  Crown  Prince  William  was  inclined 
at  first  to  support  the  cause  of  his  sister,  for  whom  he  felt  a 
great  affection ;  but  Bismarck  either  satisfied  him  or  talked 
him  over,  so  that  he  also  joined  the  opposition,  though  this 
brought  him  in  conflict  with  his  own  mother.  With  a  dying 
sovereign  and  a  refractory  heir  apparent  the  idea  of  dispensing 
with  Bismarck's  services  was  not  to  be  thought  of.  The  situ- 
ation was  too  critical  to  permit  of  such  a  radical  change  in 
state  affairs.  Queen  Victoria  started  for  Berlin  to  assist  the 
cause  of  her  daughter,  but  her  presence  there  only  served  to 
pour  oil  on  the  flames.  No  people  conscious  of  their  own 
dignity  can  brook  foreign  interference  in  their  domestic  affairs, 
and  this  only  served  to  increase  the  odium  which  was  now  felt 
towards  all  the  Guelfs.  The  papers  openly  declared  that 
the  empress  was  sacrificing  Germany  to  English  interests,  and 
that  though  she  had  lived  so  long  among  them  she  still 
remained  a  foreigner,  and  could  only  be  considered  as  a 
foreigner. 

To  the  emperor  this  seemed  like  personal  abuse,  and  he 

389 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

blamed  the  ministry  for  not  preventing  it  and  prosecuting  the 
editors,  as  they  had  a  legal  right  to  do.  One  of  the  last  acts 
of  his  life  was  to  remove  Von  Putkammer,  who  was  Bis- 
marck's nephew-in-law,  from  the  ministry  on  this  gro'und. 
The  day  before  his  death,  however,  he  performed  an  act  of 
magnanimity  for  which  he  should  always  receive  due  credit : 
he  summoned  Bismarck  again  to  his  chamber,  called  for  the 
empress,  and,  though  speechless,  joined  their  hands  in  his 
presence.  Bismarck  was  the  man  to  appreciate  such  an  ac- 
tion, and  accepted  this  reconciliation  with  his  former  enemy 
in  his  most  gracious  manner. 

Frederick  III.  reigned  exactly  ninety-nine  days,  and  Ger- 
many lost  two  emperors  within  four  months.  After  his  death 
his  widow  retired  to  her  castle  at  Kromberg,  near  Frankfort- 
on-the-Main,  where  she  still  continues  to  reside,  with  a  yearly 
income  of  four  hundred  thousand  marks  from  the  German 
people,  who  have  not  yet  forgotten  the  Battenberg  intrigue, 
and  pay  it  very  unwillingly.  So  ended  Bismarck's  last  great 
struggle. 

FREEDOM   LIVES    HENCE 

William  II.  commenced  his  reign  on  June  18,  1888,  amid  a 
lively  journalistic  agitation  caused  by  the  Battenberg  affair  in 
England  and  America.  It  was  said  that  he  and  his  father 
never  could  agree ;  that  he  virtually  imprisoned  his  mother 
after  ascending  the  throne;  that  he  was  very  ambitious,  and 
would  certainly  lead  Germany  into  endless  difficulties;  that 
he  hated  the  English,  and  intended  to  make  war  on  France ; 
that  he  intended  to  annex  Denmark ;  that  he  had  a  withered 
arm,  and  that  there  was  an  ancient  prophecy  in  regard  to  this 
which  boded  no  good. 

There  was  a  certain  coloring  for  these  assertions  in  the  fact 
that  William  had  already  shown  himself  a  stubborn  and  self- 
willed  young  man,  what  the  Germans  call  "  starrkopf ;"  but 
Maria  Teresa  used  to  call  Joseph  II.  "starrkopf,"  and  he 
was  the  best  sovereign  that  Austria  ever  had.  The  true  ex- 
planation for  the  condition  of  his  arm  is  that  when  he  was  a 
baby  his  mother  employed  an  English  nurse,  who  dropped 

390 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

him  on  his  right  shoulder,  and  so  injured  the  arm-socket  that 
an  operation  was  afterwards  required,  and  his  arm  was  ren- 
dered practically  useless.  Of  course,  German  women  of  a 
certain  class  all  believe  that  if  the  nurse  had  been  a  German 
this  accident  would  not  have  happened,  and  it  is  thought 
that  the  servants  about  the  prince  during  boyhood  instilled 
this  notion  into  his  head.  The  suffering  which  it  has  caused 
him  is  apparent  in  the  expression  of  his  face,  which  other- 
wise is  frank  and  manly.  He  has  not,  however,  the  intellec- 
tual breadth  of  his  father,  or  the  finely  proportioned  dignity 
of  his  grandfather.  He  looks  like  a  person  of  more  energy 
than  brains. 

He  was  not  long  in  giving  proof  that  he  intended  to  man- 
age his  own  affairs.  No  sooner  was  he  crowned  than  he 
started  on  an  iron-clad  voyage  to  Cronstadt,  for  an  interview 
with  Alexander  III.  Immediately  on  his  return  to  Berlin  he 
went  to  visit  the  venerable  Francis  Joseph  in  Vienna.  What 
did  Francis  Joseph  think  of  him?  From  Vienna  he  pro- 
ceeded to  Rome  for  an  interview  with  King  Humbert,  and  to 
pay  his  respects  to  Leo  XIII.  If  he  treated  the  others  in  the 
same  manner  as  the  pope,  there  could  not  have  been  much 
satisfaction  in  these  imperial  visits.  Leo  afterwards  stated : 
"  I  would  have  liked  to  have  conversed  with  the  Emperor  of 
Germany  on  politics,  but  as  soon  as  I  entered  on  the  subject 
he  introduced  me  to  his  brother,  and  I  did  not  see  much  more 
of  him."  His  characteristics  belong  to  the  Guelfs  rather 
than  the  Hohenzollerns,  and  in  certain  traits  he  resembles  his 
uncle,  the  Prince  of  Wales. 

It  is  also  true  that,  having  been  brought  up  amongst  the 
most  distinguished  men  of  his  time,  and  educated  in  great 
events,  he  has  the  kind  of  ambition  which  naturally  arises 
from  this.  He  wishes  to  do  something  to  distinguish  him- 
self, but  does  not  quite  know  how.  In  fact,  there  is  nothing 
at  present  of  special  importance  for  him  to  do,  except  to  run 
the  machine  which  Bismarck  and  others  have  constructed ; 
and  this,  with  a  corps  of  assistants  who  have  been  trained  up 
at  the  court  of  William  I.,  is  by  no  means  difficult.  He  has 
attempted  some  slight  innovations,  but  most  of  them  have 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

failed  to  pass  the  Reichstag,  and  have  not  been  supported  by 
public  opinion.  His  desire  to  improve  the  physical  condition 
of  the  German  people,  who  so  often  suffer  from  over-study  or 
from  exclusive  devotion  to  one  employment,  is  a  commend- 
able one.  "  I  want  able-bodied  men  for  my  army,"  he  said, 
"  and  not  invalids  with  spectacles."  At  the  same  time,  Ger- 
many would  not  be  Germany  unless  it  were  the  best  educated 
of  nations  ;  and  the  most  important  reform  in  this  direction — 
that  of  exchanging  their  mediaeval  black-letter,  which  causes 
so  much  short-sightedness,  for  Roman  type — does  not  seem 
to  have  occurred  to  him. 

The  alarmists  forgot — or  probably  never  troubled  them- 
selves to  learn — that  the  Emperor  of  Germany  has  no  consti- 
tutional right  to  declare  aggressive  war  without  the  consent 
of  the  Kings  of  Saxony,  Bavaria,  and  Wurtemberg;  so  that 
William  II.,  even  if  he  desired  to  play  the  role  of  a  conquering 
hero,  would  find  himself  shut  off  in  this  direction  at  the  very 
commencement;  and  he  is,  besides,  too  kindly  and  good- 
humored  a  man  to  deliberately  sacrifice  the  lives  of  his  people 
for  personal  glory.  Whether  he  possesses  the  military  genius 
which  has  appeared  so  frequently  in  the  Hohenzollern  family 
may  never  be  known ;  but  he  is  endowed  with  one  talent  which 
is  rare,  if  not  unique,  among  persons  born  in  his  position, — the 
gift  of  speech-making.  Under  the  most  favorable  circum- 
stances he  might  not  become  a  great  orator ;  but  there  is  no 
man  like  him  to  dedicate  a  statue,  or  to  make  an  address 
to  a  delegation  of  citizens.  His  speeches  are  not  eloquent, 
but  nicely  finished,  and  delivered  with  grace  and  facility.  At 
first  he  showed  a  tendency  to  make  injudicious  statements, — 
as  when  he  advised  the  Bavarian  army  that  they  should  make 
up  their  minds  to  shoot  at  their  fathers  and  brothers  if  he 
ordered  them  to  do  so, — but  as  he  grows  older  he  has  be- 
come more  prudent  in  this  respect. 

Closely  allied  to  this  is  his  talent  for  dramatic  situations — 
for  grand  public  effects.  Some  people  are  born  actors  and 
actresses  from  the  cradle,  and  in  such  cases  it  rarely  happens 
that  they  discover  the  fact  themselves.  The  newswriter  who 
spoke  of  William  II.  as  the  Edward  Irving  of  the  political 

392 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

stage  was  not  much  out  of  the  way.  Neither  is  it  difficult  to 
see  through  these  performances,  and  they  give  to  the  present 
emperor's  actions  an  air  of  unreality  which  detracts  from  the 
dignity  of  his  position. 

William  II.  sent  fine-sounding  telegrams  from  foreign  courts 
to  the  government  at  Berlin,  but  these  had  the  less  value  be- 
cause any  information  of  real  importance  which  he  had  to  com- 
municate would  not  have  been  made  public.  After  his  return 
the  wheels  of  state  moved  smoothly  enough ;  Bismarck  and 
Moltke  were  treated  with  distinguished  honors;  the  Bat- 
tenberg  marriage  was  relegated  to  the  limbo  of  unsuccess- 
ful intrigues,  and  the  shrewdest  weather-prophets  could  not 
discover  a  cloud  on  the  political  horizon.  The  only  question 
seemed  to  be  how  many  years  longer  could  Bismarck's 
strength  suffice  for  his  arduous  position.  In  October,  1889, 
Alexander  III.  paid  William  II.  a  return  visit  at  Berlin,  with 
mutual  assurances  of  good-will  and  peaceable  intentions.  As 
a  matter  of  fact,  the  peace  of  Europe  was  not  in  the  slightest 
danger,  but  there  is  a  continual  change  in  the  political  pano- 
rama to  which  the  minds  of  statesmen  are  obliged  to  adjust 
themselves.  In  January,  1890,  there  was  an  Industrial  Con- 
gress held  at  Berlin  to  consider  the  condition  of  the  laboring 
classes,  which  was  largely  attended  by  delegates  from  other 
countries,  though  not  in  an  official  manner.  William  II.  ex- 
pressed a  decided  interest  in  this  subject,  and  there  is  no  reason 
for  doubting  his  sincerity.  Already,  in  the  spring  of  1889,  when 
a  widely  extended  strike  of  mill  operatives  took  place,  he  sum- 
moned a  delegation  of  the  disaffected  workmen  to  Berlin,  in- 
quired into  their  grievances,  and  appointed  a  board  of  com- 
missioners to  adjust  their  difficulties;  but  he  also  informed 
them  that  such  independent  demonstrations  could  not  be  per- 
mitted in  the  future,  as  they  inflicted  injury  on  too  large  a 
number  of  persons  who  were  in  no  ways  responsible  for  them. 
If  the  working-men  had  good  cause  for  complaint  they  should 
apply  to  him  and  he  would  order  an  investigation. 

A  council  of  state  was  convened  at  Berlin  on  February  14, 
1890,  for  a  consideration  of  the  labor  question,  and  William 
II.  presided  in  person.  He  made  an  excellent  opening  address, 

393 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

in  which  he  reviewed  the  objects  of  the  convention,  and  said 
especially : 

"The  state  council  should  endeavor  to  frame  a  scheme  for  the 
protection  of  working-men  from  the  arbitrary  systems  and  opera- 
tions of  employers  by  which  gross  advantage  is  taken  of  their  needs 
and  their  inability  to  help  themselves  by  any  other  means  than  the 
desperate  remedy  of  strikes.  It  should  also  attempt  to  protect 
women  and  children  against  protracted  hours  of  labor.  At  the 
same  time  due  regard  should  be  given  as  to  how  far  German  in- 
dustry will  bear  the  increased  burdens  thus  placed  on  the  cost  of 
production  without  jeopardy  to  Germany's  position  as  a  competitor 
in  the  markets  of  the  world.  If  that  is  overlooked  the  changes  I 
propose,  instead  of  resulting  in  the  improvement  I  desire,  would 
lead  to  the  deterioration  of  the  working-men's  position.  To  avert 
this  danger  a  great  measure  of  wise  reflection  will  be  needed.  The 
settlement  of  these  questions  is  essential  as  bearing  upon  the  agree- 
ment as  to  labor  questions,  which,  it  is  to  be  hoped,  we  shall  estab- 
lish through  an  international  conference." 

This  is  rather  better  than  the  average  of  convention  ad- 
dresses. The  young  emperor  had  evidently  taken  up  the 
subject  in  earnest  and  in  full  confidence  that  he  could  im- 
prove the  relations  between  the  government  and  the  Social 
Democrats  by  persuading  the  laboring  classes  that  he  was 
really  their  friend.  He  had  yet  to  learn  how  impossible  this 
is,  and  that  what  the  socialists  actually  desire  is  not  charity 
but  power y  and  the  subversion  of  society  in  order  to  obtain  this. 

This  convention  was  followed  by  an  imperial  rescript  on 
the  labor  question,  of  which  Bismarck  disapproved,  and,  as 
the  subsequent  elections  resulted  unfavorably  for  the  govern- 
ment, Bismarck  was  convinced  that  this  action  of  the  young 
emperor  had  produced  an  injurious  effect  on  public  opinion. 
Dr.  Busch  tells  us  that  on  the  24th  inst.  Bismarck's  secretary 
came  to  him  for  the  purpose  of  suggesting  that  he  should 
write  a  letter  to  the  London  Daily  Telegraph  expressing  this 
opinion  and  explaining  the  influence  of  the  rescript  accord- 
ing to  the  chancellor's  theory.  Although  the  letter  was  not 
published,  and,  if  it  had  been,  could  hardly  be  considered 

394 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

in  the  light  of  an  intrigue,  it  was  an  indirect  proceeding 
which,  if  it  had  come  to  the  emperor's  knowledge,  would  cer- 
tainly have  caused  great  indignation.  Whether  Bismarck  was 
responsible  for  other  proceedings  of  a  like  nature  at  this  time, 
we  do  not  know,  but  it  is  certain  that  William  II.  became 
suspicious  that  his  chancellor  was  not  dealing  fairly  with  him. 

In  April  the  anti-socialist  law  would  come  up  for  con- 
sideration in  the  Reichstag  for  the  fourth  time,  and  a  definite 
government  programme  must  be  decided  on  previously. 
Whether  the  emperor  desired  to  have  it  die  a  natural 
death,  or  wished  for  some  modification  of  it  which  Bis- 
marck considered  impracticable,  still  remains  uncertain,  but 
as  soon  as  their  disagreement  became  known  in  the  ministry 
it  suddenly  called  into  existence  an  anti-Bismarck  clique,  the 
leader  of  which  was  Von  Botticher,  minister  of  the  home 
department.1  As  already  stated,  Bismarck  had  for  some 
years  previously  been  practically  emperor,  and  his  colleagues 
often  felt  this  severely.  It  had  long  been  a  saying  that  Bis- 
marck considered  himself  infallible ;  and  no  wonder  if  he  did. 
He  had  long  passed  the  age  when  a  general  in  the  army 
would  have  been  retired  from  active  service.  However,  a 
majority  of  the  ministry  and  of  other  high  officials  of  the 
government  still  considered  him  indispensable,  and  were  will- 
ing to  endure  much  for  the  advantage  which  they  supposed 
he  might  still  be  to  the  state.  Others  were  of  the  opinion 
that  he  was  already  too  old  and  could  as  well  be  dispensed 
with. 

"  Suspicion,"  says  Auerbach,  "  is  a  monster  with  a  thou- 
sand eyes."  About  this  time  it  also  appears  that  Von  Bot- 
ticher insinuated  to  his  imperial  highness  that  Bismarck  was 
almost  living  upon  morphia, — was  obliged  to  use  it  all  the 
time ;  a  base  and  groundless  calumny.  Yet  no  evidence  has 
come  to  light  that  Bismarck  was  dealing  less  frankly  and 
sincerely  with  William  II.  than  he  always  had  with  Wil- 
liam I. ;  nor  was  there  in  his  directions  to  Dr.  Busch  any- 
thing more  than  he  had  stated  openly  to  the  emperor  himself. 

1  Same  as  secretary  of  the  interior. 
395 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

It  is  significant  that  when  he  requested  Dr.  Busch  to  have 
some  important  documents  copied  for  him,  and  the  latter 
suggested  that  there  was  danger  that  the  copyist  would 
retain  copies  of  his  own,  Bismarck  replied,  "  I  care  little  if  he 
does ;  I  have  nothing  to  conceal." 

One  of  Bismarck's  first  requests  of  William  II.  had  been 
to  reinstate  Von  Putkammer  in  his  former  position  in  the 
ministry,  and  the  emperor  agreed  to  do  so  after  a  certain 
time  had  elapsed ;  but  when  Bismarck  mentioned  the  matter 
again  William  II.  declined  to  reinstate  Von  Putkammer,  on 
the  ground  that  he  had  become  accustomed  to  his  successor, 
Von  Herrfurth,  as  under-secretary  of  state,  and  did  not  wish 
to  part  with  him.  It  was  not  long  after  this  before  Bismarck 
discovered  that  Von  Herrfurth  was  holding  consultations 
with  the  emperor  without  making  any  report  to  the  chan- 
cellor concerning  them.  This  was  contrary  to  the  order  of 
September  8,  1852,  which  made  the  minister-president  re- 
sponsible for  the  policy  of  the  ministry  as  a  whole.  It  was 
not  until  February,  1890,  however,  that  Bismarck  considered 
it  advisable  to  make  a  decided  protest  against  this,  and  the 
immediate  consequence  was  that  William  II.  requested  him 
to  draft  an  order  revoking  the  decree  of  1852,  by  which  the 
relations  of  the  minister-president  and  his  colleagues  were 
regulated.  Bismarck  declined  to  do  this,  and  the  emperor's 
next  move  was  to  substitute  a  request  that  Bismarck  should 
resign  his  position  in  the  Prussian  ministry  and  retain  that 
of  foreign  affairs  for  the  German  empire.  This  would  have 
placed  Bismarck  in  an  embarrassing  position  in  which  he 
would  have  been  deprived  of  all  direct  influence  in  govern- 
ment affairs.  How  far  Bismarck  had  encroached  upon  the 
prerogatives  of  his  fellow-ministers  during  his  long  term  of 
office  it  is  impossible  to  determine,  but  there  can  be  no  doubt 
that  he  had  done  so  to  some  extent. 

For  the  events  that  followed  only  two  explanations  are 
possible  :  either  that  the  emperor  was  suspicious  of  Bismarck 
and  feared  that  he  was  secretly  working  to  prevent  the  fulfil- 
ment of  the  agreement  between  them,  or,  what  is  more  prob- 
able, that  he  had  previously  made  up  his  mind  to  remove  the 

396 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

chancellor,  and  deliberately  forced  a  quarrel  with  him  for  that 
purpose.  The  motive  in  one  case  would  be  as  little  to  his 
credit  as  was  his  method  in  the  other. 

On  or  about  the  I5th  of  March  Dr.  Windhorst  made  a  call 
at  the  Radziwill  Palace.  This  was  an  exceptional  occur- 
rence, but  there  was  no  reason  why  it  should  attract  particular 
attention,  for  the  two  old  antagonists  had  been  on  cordial 
terms  for  the  past  ten  years,  and  entertained  a  mutual  respect 
for  each  other's  abilities.  Whether  William  II.  was  suspicious 
that  Bismarck  intended  to  play  false  with  him  in  regard  to  the 
anti-socialist  bill,  and  wished  to  make  Windhorst  his  accom- 
plice in  the  transaction,  or  whether  he  was  merely  seeking  a 
pretext  for  a  quarrel,  he  pretended  to  be  highly  displeased  at 
this  interview,  and  sent  a  peremptory  request  (as  we  may  judge 
by  Dr.  Busch's  statement)  to  the  chancellor  not  to  hold  secret 
consultations  with  members  of  the  Reichstag. 

Such  a  message  was  insulting  and  tyrannical.  The  emperor 
would  seem  to  have  thought  that  he  was  back  in  the  age  of 
Frederick  the  Great,  instead  of  being  the  sovereign  of  con- 
stitutional Germany.  He  had  no  more  right  to  deliver  such 
an  order  than  Bismarck  had  to  make  the  same  request  of 
him.  Would  it  have  been  wiser  if  the  chancellor  had  taken 
no  notice  of  this  affront  ?  If  it  was  suspicion  by  which  Wil- 
liam II.  was  actuated,  the  thunderstorm  might  have  passed 
over  without  taking  effect;  but  if  the  emperor  wished  for 
a  rupture  with  his  prime  minister  the  insult  would  certainly 
have  been  repeated.  Bismarck  acted  with  his  customary 
frankness.  He  sent  back  word  that  it  was  impossible  to 
comply  with  such  a  request ;  and  this  was  perfectly  true,  for 
if  he  declined  all  visits  from  members  of  the  Reichstag  it 
would  certainly  cause  great  offence  and  produce  inextricable 
confusion  among  supporters  of  the  government. 

William  II.  then  sent  a  notification  to  Bismarck  that  his 
resignation  would  be  acceptable ;  and  Bismarck  replied  to  this 
with  an  inquiry  for  the  reasons  for  his  dismissal.  Having 
received  no  reply  to  this  request,  after  a  proper  interval  Bis- 
marck tendered  his  resignation  to  the  emperor  with  a  state- 
ment of  his  own  reasons  for  doing  so.  This  was  followed  by 

397 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

an  order  from  the  emperor  for  him  to  leave  Berlin  and  retire 
to  his  estates. 

The  Countess  von  Krockrow  states  that  the  last  interview 
between  the  emperor  and  his  first  chancellor  was  a  stcfrmy 
one,  and  common  report  in  Germany  supports  this  opinion. 
Bismarck,  however,  has  denied  this,  and  there  is  no  authentic 
testimony  in  its  favor.  The  anonymous  author  of  "  Bismarck 
and  the  Emperor"  declares  that  at  no  time  previous  to  his 
writing  had  Bismarck  learned  what  were  the  actual  reasons 
for  his  dismissal.  He  continues  : 

'•  One  can  say,  therefore,  that  Bismarck  asked  for  the  cause  of 
his  dismissal  from  a  fourfold  reason :  first,  out  of  respect  for  the 
German  nation,  which  felt  such  heartfelt  sympathy  with  all  the 
important  events  in  politics,  and  especially  in  Bismarck's  life ;  sec- 
ondly, out  of  respect  for  the  office  itself,  the  dignity  of  which  had 
become  a  part  of  himself;  thirdly,  out  of  regard  to  his  successors; 
and,  fourthly,  out  of  regard  for  his  personal  susceptibility, — cer- 
tainly enough  reasons  to  warrant  his  demanding  for  the  cause.  He 
never  received  an  answer. 

"  Considering,  therefore,  the  absolutely  mysterious  manner  of  his 
dismissal  (forced  resignation),  it'  can  easily  be  conceived  that  in 
Bismarck's  head,  as  well  as  in  the  heart  of  the  nation,  all  possible 
and  impossible  reasons  were  discussed  in  regard  to  an  event  of  such 
deep  import.  Bismarck,  at  last,  came  to  suspect  intrigues  and 
cabals,  and  probably  still  keeps  to  this  idea.  The  people,  on  the 
other  hand,  showed  a  hankering  for  more  dramatic  motives,  and 
thus  it  happened  that  not  only  at  that  time  but  even  to-day,  after 
five  years,  those  that  made  the  most  noise  have  the  greatest  chance 
of  being  believed." 

It  would  be  surprising  if  some  temper  had  not  been  dis- 
played on  this  occasion,  for  Bismarck  must  have  been  raging 
with  indignation.  Looked  at  from  any  point  of  view,  it  was 
outrageous  treatment  for  a  time  honored  public  servant,  whose 
intentions  had  never  once  been  mistrusted  in  an  employment 
of  nearly  forty  years.  However,  all  that  we  know  of  the 
interview  with  certainty  is  Bismarck's  expression,  "  The  will 
of  his  Majesty  the  Emperor  has  its  boundary  at  the  door  of 

398 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

my  wife's  drawing-room." r  This  was  a  fitting  reply,  and 
ought  to  have  brought  William  II.  to  his  senses.  The  form 
of  statement  would  indicate  that  the  interview  took  place  at 
the  Radziwill  Palace, — and  that  a  request  for  the  chancellor's 
resignation  followed  it.  Bismarck  in  the  letter  published 
after  his  death  by  Dr.  Busch  gives  his  reasons  in  full  for  re- 
signing, and  claims  that  the  emperor  had  imposed  limits  on 
his  official  position  which  did  not  permit  him  either  to  retain 
a  proper  share  in  the  transaction  of  state  business  and  its 
supervision,  or  freedom  of  action  in  ministerial  decisions,  or 
for  such  communications  with  members  of  the  Reichstag  as 
his  constitutional  responsibility  required.  He  also  declares 
that  it  would  be  impossible  for  him  to  carry  out  the  instruc- 
tions which  the  emperor  had  lately  submitted  to  him  with 
respect  to  foreign  affairs.  He  finally  concluded  in  this  wise  : 
"According  to  the  impressions  I  have  received  during  the  last 
few  weeks,  as  well  as  communications  from  your  Majesty's 
military  and  civil  household,  I  may  assume  that  my  request 
to  resign  agrees  with  your  Majesty's  wishes,  and  that  I  may, 
therefore,  certainly  rely  upon  its  gracious  acceptance."  He 
was  accordingly  dismissed  from  office  on  March  20  with  a 
request  to  retire  to  his  own  estates.  This  was  really  the 
most  politic  course  which  Bismarck  could  have  adopted,  for 
it  compelled  William  II.  to  place  himself  on  record  in  a  way 
which  would  be  condemned  throughout  Prussia,  if  not  all 
Germany.  To  counteract  this  again,  and  obviate  the  evil 
consequences  to  his  popularity,  William  pretended  to  feel  the 
deepest  regret  at  the  ex-chancellor's  departure;  created  him 
Herzog  von  Lauenburg  and  a  major-general  in  the  army.  It 
was  now  Bismarck's  turn  to  play  his  last  trump  by  declining 
these  empty  honors  and  retiring  to  Friedrichsruhe  in  sullen 
indignation.  As  an  old  reader  of  Shakspeare  he  may  have 
said,  like  Kent  in  "  King  Lear," — 

"  Fare  thee  well,  king :  since  thus  thou  wilt  appear, 
Freedom  lives  hence,  and  banishment  is  here." 


Bismarck  and  the  Emperor. 
399 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

It  was  well  enough  that  Bismarck  should  also  pass  through 
this  experience,  and  know  something  of  the  evil  side  of  for- 
tune while  he  still  lived  on  earth.  Trouble  enough  he  had 
met  with  before, — difficulties  almost  insuperable, — but  >here 
was  a  difficulty  of  a  new  order  that  he  could  not  overcome. 
Looked  at  in  its  true  light  it  was  not  a  fall  but  a  rise  in  life  to 
him ;  but  it  does  not  appear  that  he  accepted  his  dismissal  in 
a  philosophical  manner. 

When  Von  Beust  was  relieved  by  Francis  Joseph  from  the 
highest  position  in  the  Austrian  government,  the  emperor 
summoned  him  to  his  presence  and  merely  said,  "  I  am  obliged 
to  you  for  the  assistance  you  have  given  me,  but  I  shall  no 
longer  require  your  services."  This  was  simple  and  dignified. 
If  William  II.  had  treated  Bismarck  in  a  similar  manner  they 
might  always  have  continued  to  be  friends. 

It  was  now  that  Bismarck  discovered  who  his  best  friends 
actually  were.  The  rumor  of  his  resignation  had  created 
surprise  in  Berlin,  but  as  no  one  knew  the  actual  facts  little 
indignation  was  expressed.  When,  however,  it  was  positively 
affirmed  that  he  would  leave  the  Radziwill  Palace  an  immense 
crowd  collected  in  front  of  the  building,  and,  although  this 
was  contrary  to  law,  the  police  made  no  attempt  to  interfere 
with  it.  As  soon  as  Bismarck  appeared  to  take  his  carriage 
to  the  railway  he  was  greeted  with  prolonged  and  deafening 
cheers.  Never  since  the  news  of  the  battle  of  Sedan  had  such 
enthusiasm  been  seen  in  the  city.  The  crowd  followed  Bis- 
marck's carriage  to  the  station,  where  another  great  throng 
had  collected;  men  wept  and  ran  to  his  carriage-windows 
begging  leave  to  kiss  his  hand.  Bismarck  was  everything, 
the  emperor  was  nothing ;  and  it  is  easy  to  believe  that  the 
ex-chancellor  made  his  journey  homeward  with  a  lighter 
heart  than  any  member  of  the  German  government  felt  that 
day. 

Bismarck's  personal  friends  and  political  supporters  re- 
ceived his  dismissal  in  dignified  silence.  While  the  North 
German  Gazette,  which  had  always  been  Bismarck's  -stanch 
friend,  spoke  of  the  event  as  one  which  should  not  be  consid- 
ered in  the  light  of  either  good  or  bad  fortune,  for  the  great 

400 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

statesman  had  fairly  accomplished  the  work  of  his  life,  and 
at  his  present  age  he  could  not  be  expected  to  guide  the 
policy  of  the  empire  many  years  longer,  the  Krenz  Zeitung, 
which  was  the  organ  of  the  court,  congratulated  the  people 
on  the  great  things  that  had  been  accomplished  by  William  I. 
and  Bismarck  for  Germany,  but  believed  that  the  time  had 
come  for  a  new  departure.  In  the  Reichstag,  Count  Stirum, 
after  waiting  until  Richter  and  other  Socialist  jackals  had 
vented  their  spite  on  the  dead  parliamentary  lion,  made  a 
simple  and  dignified  eulogy  of  the  character  and  achieve- 
ments of  the  ex-chancellor  in  the  name  of  the  Conservatives 
and  National  Liberals.  Professor  Haeckel,  of  Jena,  came 
out  with  an  intrepid  declaration,  enough  to  show  that  free 
speech  is  still  possible  in  Germany.  He  declared  that  the 
removal  of  Bismarck  was  a  national  calamity ;  that  his  days 
of  usefulness  had  by  no  means  expired ;  and  that  Germany 
never  required  his  watchful  eye  and  steady  hand  in  its  public 
affairs  more  than  at  that  moment.1  Bismarck  had  his  well- 
wishers  even  in  Paris,  and  a  French  count  said  of  him  at  this 
time,  "  He  was  the  capstone  of  the  edifice  which  he  had  con- 
structed, and  his  retirement  is  a  matter  of  serious  concern 
to  all  who  take  an  interest  in  German  national  unity."  In 
America  the  event  was  looked  upon  of  not  so  much  im- 
portance in  itself  as  indicative  of  the  character  and  ambition 
of  William  II.  The  choice  of  his  successor  created  hardly 
less  surprise.  General  Caprivi  had  held  the  position,  for  some 
years,  of  minister  of  the  navy,  and  was  a  fairly  efficient  par- 
liamentary speaker ;  but  he  was  not  considered  a  man  of  ex- 
ceptional ability,  nor  had  he  acquired  such  experience  as 
might  render  him  capable  and  fit  for  his  exalted  position. 
Following  after  Bismarck,  he  was  almost  like  a  reductio  ad 
absurdum,  and  it  was  plain  to  many  that  the  emperor's  chief 
motive  was  to  give  the  impression  that  he  governed  Germany 
himself,  which  he  certainly  could  not  do  so  long  as  Bismarck 

1  Haeckel  also  said,  "  It  is  deeply  painful  for  us  to  find  ourselves  opposed  in 
this  view  to  the  personal  opinion  of  Emperor  William  II.  But  our  estimate  is 
the  same  as  that  which  the  emperor's  grandfather  had  of  Bismarck  to  the  end 
of  his  life." 

26  401 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

remained  at  the  head  of  affairs.  It  would  have  been  better 
for  his  own  reputation,  however,  as  a  man  of  sagacity,  if  he 
had  continued  Bismarck  in  office.  How  cutting  to  him  must 
have  been  the  silence  of  the  ex-chancellor's  friends ! 

From  Berlin  Bismarck  went  first  to  Potsdam,  and  entering 
the  royal  church  of  the  Hohenzollern  family,  draped  with  the 
battle-flags  captured  by  Frederick  the  Great,  he  knelt  down 
before  the  sarcophagus  of  William  I.,  and  remained  there 
several  minutes  in  prayer  or  meditation ;  then  to  Friedrichs- 
ruhe,  to  pass  the  remainder  of  his  days  with  the  aged  wife 
who  had  been  his  faithful  support  in  all  the  difficulties  and 
vicissitudes  of  his  turbulent  life.  She  lived  to  witness  the 
reconciliation  between  her  husband  and  William  II. ;  and 
these  last  four  years  of  peaceful  retirement  must  have  been  a 
great  satisfaction  to  her,  whatever  they  may  have  been  to 
Bismarck  himself.  "  He  who  has  been  accustomed,"  says 
Goethe,  in  "  Egmont,"  "  to  care  for  the  welfare  of  millions, 
descends  from  the  throne  as  into  the  grave."  Bismarck's 
friends  bear  testimony  that  even  at  seventy-five  he  was  as  full 
of  youthful  ardor  and  as  deeply  interested  in  public  affairs  as 
thirty  years  before.  The  long-continued  habit  of  masterful 
effort  was  fixed  on  him,  and  he  could  not,  like  Diocletian,  re- 
linquish the  cares  of  an  empire  for  a  vegetable  garden.  The 
energy  within  him,  swelling  like  an  Alpine  flood,  must  find 
an  outlet,  and  any  accident  might  determine  what  direction 
this  would  take. 

Unluckily,  Chancellor  Caprivi,  in  his  opening  address  to 
the  Reichstag,  had  referred  to  his  predecessor  in  no  compli- 
mentary terms.  The  late  chancellor  had  often  neglected  to 
appear  in  the  Reichstag  when  his  presence  was  desired  there ; 
he  had  been  remiss  in  suitable  acts  of  courtesy  to  important 
members  of  the  government ;  he  had  not  permitted  sufficient 
independence  to  the  heads  of  departments  ;  he  had  not  treated 
his  opponents  with  respect,  nor  his  own  party  with  considera- 
tion. "  All  these  abuses,"  says  Caprivi,  "  will  be  remedied  in 
the  new  administration  of  affairs." 

Can  we  suppose  that  the  emperor  directed  Caprivi  to  make 
this  statement  ?  Certainly  it  was  most  injudicious,  and  could 

402 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

not  fail  to  give  offence  in  many  quarters ;  and  though  there 
might  be  truth  in  it,  Bismarck's  venerable  age  would  seem  to 
require  the  mantle  of  palliation  for  his  moss-grown  faults. 
Immediately  afterwards  the  Kreuz  Zeitung  published  a  suc- 
cession of  editorial  paragraphs  in  regard  to  the  change  in  the 
ministry,  in  which  various  reasons  were  alleged  for  its  neces- 
sity,— that  a  young  emperor  and  an  old  chancellor  could  not 
well  agree  together ;  that  Bismarck  was  frequently  absent  at 
Friedrichsruhe,  attending  to  a  saw-mill  which  he  had  erected 
there,  when  public  business  required  his  presence  in  Berlin ; 
that  he  had  been  endeavoring  to  bring  the  young  sovereign 
entirely  under  his  power,  and  prevent  the  youthful  develop- 
ment of  the  emperor's  personality.  If  there  had  been  a  com- 
plicated political  problem  on  Bismarck's  tablets  at  this  time, 
he  might  have  taken  slight  notice  of  these  cutting  animadver- 
sions ;  but  they  came  at  a  moment  when  he  was  least  able  to 
endure  them  with  patience  and  had  no  means  of  distracting 
his  mind  from  them.  A  warfare  with  Caprivi  sprang  up  in 
this  manner,  which  was  continued  in  a  number  of  news- 
papers ;  and  this,  which  had  begun  in  self-defence,  extended 
itself  to  the  policy  of  the  new  administration,  which  Bismarck 
criticised  unmercifully  whenever  it  disagreed  with  the  plans 
which  he  had  himself  laid  down,  until,  finally,  the  emperor,  in 
1892,  felt  himself  called  upon  to  interfere,  and  threatened 
Bismarck  with  prompt  and  earnest  prosecution/  unless  he 
controlled  the  force  of  his  invective.2  Perhaps  it  was  only 
fair  that  Bismarck's  own  weapon  against  the  socialists  should 
be  finally  turned  against  him  in  this  manner.  He  even 
thought  of  obtaining  a  seat  in  the  Reichstag,  or  the  electors 
of  his  district  may  have  suggested  it  to  him,  so  that  he  could 
combat  his  enemy  face  to  face ;  but  either  his  friends  or  his 
own  better  judgment  prevailed  over  this  temptation,  and  he 
declined  to  permit  the  use  of  his  name.  Yet  there  was  an 

1  Especially  in  regard  to  the  publication  of  the  secret  treaty  between  Germany 
and  Russia,  in  a  Hamburg  paper,  which  was  considered  a  breach  of  state  confi- 
dence ;  though,  as  Bismarck  was  no  longer  in  the  government  service,  what  he 
chose  to  divulge  was  a  question  of  good  judgment. 

2  Chancellor  Caprivi's  decree  of  May  23. 

403 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

honorable  precedent  for  this  course  in  the  proceedings  of  the 
Earl  of  Chatham  after  his  removal  by  George  III. 

To  a  delegation  of  manufacturers,  who  called  to  obtain  his 
opinion  as  to  whether  the  expectation  of  continued  peace  on 
the  part  of  European  governments  was  sufficiently  good  to 
justify  their  making  extensive  improvements,  he  replied  in  a 
rather  ironical  vein :  "  Yes,  every  government  is  grasping  at 
the  latest  offensive  and  defensive  invention  in  firearms,  and 
each  feels  too  weak  to  attack  its  neighbor.  I  think  you  can 
depend  on  the  present  condition  of  political  affairs  lasting 
for  a  long  time  to  come."  He  received  a  great  many  such 
delegations  at  Friedrichsruhe,  and  talked  to  every  one  of 
them  as  if  he  were  thoroughly  versed  in  their  profession  or 
business  affairs.  This  was  a  new  view  of  him  to  the  German 
people,  and  naturally  served  to  increase  his  popularity.  An 
enthusiastic  Teuton  said  of  him  in  1895  :  "  If  the  blows  which 
the  fiery  hero  has  dealt  right  and  left,  from  above  and  below, 
so  that  they  whistled  through  the  air  the  last  five  years,  had 
hit  their  mark  abroad  instead  of  at  home,  Germany  would 
have  been  infinitely  better  off  than  she  is  now." 

Caprivi's  administration  could  not  be  called  a  success, 
though  it  was  far  from  being  disastrous.  He  allowed  the 
anti-socialist  law  to  go  out  of  existence  without  gaining 
thereby  any  votes  for  the  support  of  the  government.  In 
fact,  the  socialists  appeared  disappointed  that  their  persecu- 
tion had  come  to  an  end,  for  it  gave  them  the  only  real  im- 
portance they  had.  He  found  favor  in  England  by  slight 
modifications  of  the  tariff,  and  arranged  commercial  treaties 
with  Switzerland,  Belgium,  and  Russia,  which  was  supposed 
to  be  a  beginning  towards  a  return  to  anti-Bismarck  trade 
regulations ;  but  the  German  people  as  a  whole  did  not  wish 
for  this,  and  the  newspapers  opposed  any  further  reduction. 
A  reactionary  measure  in  regard  to  primary  education,  drafted 
by  Caprivi  according  to  the  emperor's  wishes,  was  laid  before 
the  Reichstag,  but  created  such  popular  indignation  that  it 
never  came  to  a  vote.  The  hand  of  William  II.  was  also 
visible  in  a  measure  to  modify  the  organization  of  the  army. 
He  wished  to  reduce  the  number  of  years  of  military  service, 

404 


LIFE   OF   BISMARCK 

but  in  order  to  do  so  he  would  be  obliged  to  increase  the 
number  of  men  in  the  standing  army.  This  would  have 
largely  augmented  the  expense  of  the  military  budget,  and 
was  obstinately  resisted  on  that  account  by  the  National  Lib- 
erals. A  majority  of  the  German  general  staff  officers  were 
also  opposed  to  it.  Neither  were  his  negotiations  concerning 
the  German  territories  in  Africa  and  the  Pacific  such  as  gave 
satisfaction  to  the  merchants  who  were  interested  in  those 
new  acquisitions.  It  was  generally  felt  that  the  strong  man 
was  gone  and  a  weak  one  had  taken  his  place. 

Count  Herbert  von  Bismarck  was  appointed  secretary  of 
legation  at  London  in  1882,  and,  having  resigned  two  years 
later,  in  March,  1885,  he  was  appointed  special  ambassador 
to  the  British  government  for  the  purpose  of  defining  the 
frontiers  of  the  new  colonial  territories.  He  was  a  popular 
person  in  London  society,  which  for  a  German  in  those  times 
was  quite  remarkable.1  We  do  not  hear  of  him  again  until 
June,  1892,  when  he  went  to  Vienna  to  marry  the  Hungarian 
Countess  Margaret  Hoyos.  There  is  a  certain  significance  in 
the  union  of  Bismarck's  eldest  son  to  a  lady  of  that  race,  who 
indirectly  owe  their  present  independence  to  him.  The  alli- 
ance between  Prussia  and  Hungary  was  thus  repeated  again 
in  domestic  life.  Prince  Bismarck  and  the  Furstin  accompa- 
nied their  boy,  and  were  everywhere  received,  even  in  Dres- 
den and  Vienna,  with  the  highest  enthusiasm  by  the  people ; 
but  the  doors  of  government  were  closed  against  them. 
Mayors  and  deputations  of  prominent  citizens  waited  on  the 
Bismarck  family  with  complimentary  addresses,  but  there 
were  no  invitations  from  kings  and  princes.  This  may  not 
have  troubled  the  ex-chancellor  very  much,  as  seems  likely 
when  we  recollect  his  remark  to  Abeken  at  the  battle  of 
Sedan,  "  For  God's  sake,  let  princes  be  princes."  Even  old 
Metternich,  always  subservient  to  royalty,  could  not  help  re- 
lieving his  mind  in  regard  to  the  ennui  which  his  court  life 
occasioned  him.  The  wedding  passed  off  happily,  with  any 
number  of  notable  Magyars  of  the  highest  rank  in  attend- 

1  G.  W.  Smalley's  letter  to  the  Tribune. 
405 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

ance ;  but  the  German  people  were  displeased  with  the  slight 
shown  by  the  Vienna  court  to  their  national  hero,  and  ar- 
ranged a  celebration  for  him  on  his  return,  which  must  have 
done  much  to  console  his  spirits,  if  he  required  consolation. 
His  daughter,  Maria  Elizabeth  Johanna  von  Bismarck,  had 
been  married  to  Count  Kuno  von  Rantzau  some  years  previ- 
ously. 

An  affecting  episode  occurred  at  the  celebration  of  Bis- 
marck's seventy-eighth  birthday,  when  a  delegation  of  friends 
and  admirers  called  at  Friedrichsruhe  to  congratulate  him  on 
the  perfect  completion  of  his  life's  work.  In  response  to  this 
compliment  the  prince  attempted  a  eulogy  of  his  former 
master,  William  L,  but  became  completely  unnerved  in  at- 
tempting to  do  his  virtues  justice.  He  wept  bitterly  when  he 
said,  "  What  could  I  have  accomplished  without  him,  and 
without  our  powerful  army  ?"  As  soon  as  he  could  master 
himself  he  continued: 

"Thanks  to  our  Emperor  William  I.  and  his  federated  sovereigns, 
more  was  done  than  any  diplomat  could  do.  If  the  emperor  had 
not  ordered  the  mobilization  of  the  armies  of  1866-70,  what  would 
have  become  of  Germany  ?  As  long  as  we  can  rely  upon  this  true 
national  feeling  of  our  princes  I  shall  not  be  alarmed  for  the  future 
of  the  empire. 

"  I  am  not  well  enough  to  co-operate  with  you  practically 
[hurrahs,  and  cries  of  *  Yes,  you  are'],  but  my  ideas  are  with  you, 
perhaps  more  than  is  proper  for  an  old  man  like  myself.  You  must 
hold  fast  to  the  national  idea,  and  remember  that  in  Prussia,  also, 
we  do  not  follow  the  Brandenburg  or  Prussian  policy,  but  the  im- 
perial German  policy.  In  this  sense  I  call  upon  you  for  three 
cheers  for  the  Kaiser." 

The  ex-chancellor  retired  for  luncheon  with  the  presidents 
of  the  bodies  represented.  The  deputies  departed  for  their 
homes  on  three  special  trains.1 

Nothing  could  better  indicate  for  us  how  Bismarck  felt 
during  this  period  of  retirement. 

1  Despatch  to  the  Associated  Press. 
406 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

The  most  dangerous  movement  of  Gen.  Caprivi's  term  did 
not  come  to  the  surface  of  parliamentary  affairs,  but  was  whis- 
pered about  in  government  circles,  discussed  at  court  enter- 
tainments, and  hinted  at  in  the  Kreuz  Zeitung  and  other 
official  publications.  It  was  to  the  effect  that  German  unity 
could  not  become  complete  until  all  governments  in  the 
country  were  abolished  but  one ;  that  as  France  and  Great 
Britain  had  but  one  capital,  so  Germany  should  have  but  one ; 
that,  Prussia  having  already  absorbed  Hanover,  Cassel,  and 
Nassau,  there  was  nothing  to  prevent  its  taking  possession  of 
Saxony  and  the  South  German  states  in  the  same  manner, 
and  thus  producing  a  truly  homogeneous  nation.  That  there 
were  certain  advantages  to  be  derived  from  this,  especially  in 
the  reduction  of  taxes,  was  not  to  be  denied,  and  the  old 
Prussian  Particularist  spirit  revived  under  its  influence. 

Did  this  plan  also  originate  with  William  II.  ?  Was  it  one 
of  the  grand  schemes  by  which  he  trusted  to  further  civiliza- 
tion? It  could  only  be  accomplished  by  a  violent  revolu- 
tion ;  and  when  a  revolution  once  begins,  who  can  predict 
the  course  it  will  take  ?  At  best  it  would  have  required  the 
abrogation  of  the  imperial  constitution,  and  would  have  been 
a  breach  of  faith  towards  the  rulers  of  the  smaller  German 
states.  It  would  have  divided  northern  and  southern  Ger- 
many into  two  hostile  camps,  and  probably  have  provoked  a 
war  with  Russia.  Bismarck  felt  no  inclination  for  such  a 
programme.  He  frowned  upon  it,  and  his  frown  scattered  its 
adherents  as  a  blast  from  the  northwest  scatters  the  clouds  of 
an  incipient  rain.  He  spent  the  summer  of  1893,  as  usual,  at 
Kissingen,  and  on  the  third  Sunday  in  August  a  delegation 
of  seven  hundred  Thuringians  came  to  pay  him  their  compli- 
ments and  presented  an  address  to  him. 

In  his  reply  the  prince  dwelt  especially  on  the  subject  of 
German  unity  and  the  necessity  of  preserving  the  imperial 
constitution.  He  apprehended  no  further  danger  from  France. 
The  time  was  now  past  since  the  French  regarded  a  campaign 
in  Germany  as  a  sort  of  pleasure  excursion ;  but  there  was 
always  some  danger  in  view,  and  the  present  one  lay  in  the 
direction  of  new  experiments  and  innovations.  He  said: 

407 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

"I  refer  to  the  semi-official  utterances  directed  towards  the  at- 
tainment of  a  'greater  Prussia.'  I  am  sorry  to  see  in  the  decline 
of  my  life  the  principles  of  the  constitution  being  undermined  by 
people  who  are  trying  to  procure  the  centralization  of  the  imperial 
power. 

"  My  heart  is  no  murderer's  den.  I  have  not  learned  to  lie,  even 
as  a  diplomat.  The  people  now  begin  to 'see  what  I  meant  three 
years  ago  when  I  said  here  that  the  constitution  ought  to  be  the  first 
object  of  care.  The  constitution  is  good.  It  cost  hard  work  and 
blood  and  lives  enough.  I  feel  anxious  lest  it  should  be  meddled 
with." 

The  amiability  with  which  Bismarck  received  these  con- 
tinual deputations  is  not  more  remarkable  than  the  manner 
in  which  he  turned  them  to  account. 

THE   RECONCILIATION 

Bismarck  had  only  three  years  and  a  half  to  wait  for  his 
revenge.  At  a  banquet  given  at  Konigsberg,  in  old  Prussia, 
in  September,  1893,  at  which  the  emperor  and  many  impor- 
tant magnates  were  present  (but  Chancellor  Caprivi  signifi- 
cantly absent),  William  II.  made  a  stirring  speech,  in  which 
he  attacked  the  attitude  of  the  Socialists  towards  the  govern- 
ment as  ungrateful  and  unconciliatory,  and  hinted  strongly 
that  it  might  be  necessary  to  restore  the  penal  code  against 
them.  This  was  a  sufficient  notification  to  Caprivi,  as  well  as 
to  the  general  public,  that  the  emperor  had  gyrated,  and  a 
change  of  policy  might  be  looked  for.  Count  Eulenberg  was 
requested  by  William  II.,  at  a  meeting  of  the  ministry,  to 
draft  a  new  set  of  anti-socialist  laws ;  and  it  was  not  long 
after  that  before  a  personal  attack  on  Eulenberg  and  his  family 
appeared  in  the  Cologne  Gazette,  and  Eulenberg  accused 
Caprivi  to  the  emperor  of  having  instigated  it.  Caprivi  was 
requested  by  William  II.  to  deny  this  if  he  could ;  but,  having 
the  fate  of  Von  Arnim  before  his  eyes,  he  concluded  it  would 
be  preferable  to  hand  in  his  resignation ;  and  shortly  after- 
wards (October,  1893)  Eulenberg  also  resigned.  Germany 
was  electrified. 

William  II.  must  have  perceived  before  this  that  he  had 

408 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

committed  a  blunder,  and  no  doubt  repented  of  his  rashness. 
The  Reichstag  had  refused  to  pass  his  new  army  bill,  and  had 
consequently  been  dissolved  early  in  the  summer.  A  fresh 
election  had  been  ordered,  but  its  prospects  were  not  favor- 
able for  the  government.  The  ungrateful  Socialists  paid  no 
regard  to  the  emperor's  moderation,  or  to  his  interest  in  the 
Industrial  Congress.  What  they  evidently  desired  was  to 
obtain  possession  of  the  government  by  force  of  numbers, 
and  they  would  be  content  with  nothing  less.  The  National 
Liberals  were  disaffected,  and  would  listen  to  no  compromises. 
The  emperor  had  come  up  against  a  blank  wall,  and  found 
that  he  would  have  to  take  the  back  track.  Bismarck's  ill- 
ness at  Kissingen  in  the  autumn  of  1893  afforded  a  favorable 
opening.  The  emperor  telegraphed  to  him  a  sympathetic 
message,  and  advised  him  not  to  return  to  the  cold,  cloudy 
region  of  Friedrichsruhe,  but  to  accept  his  imperial  hospi- 
tality at  some  residence  in  a  milder  climate.  His  telegram 
closed  with  the  words,  "  I  will  consult  with  my  court-marshal 
to  designate  the  most  suitable  chateau  for  your  Highness." 
Bismarck,  however,  was  not  the  fox  to  be  caught  in  such  a 
trap,  and  had  no  intention  of  endorsing  the  emperor's  policy 
before  he  knew  what  it  was  going  to  be.  He  therefore  de- 
clined the  offer  politely,  alleging  that  his  trouble  was  a  ner- 
vous one,  and  that  the  quiet  and  repose  of  his  own  home 
would  be  more  favorable  for  him  than  any  new  and  strange 
location. 

There  were  many  now  who  expected  to  see  Bismarck  re- 
called to  the  helm ;  but  this  was  practically  impossible.  His 
present  illness  precluded  it  for  the  time  being ;  he  was  seventy- 
nine,  and  the  chances  were  that  if  reappointed  he  would  have 
to  be  retired  again  in  a  year  or  two  more.  Old  men  are  apt 
to  forget  that  they  are  no  longer  equal  to  their  former  selves ; 
and  Prince  Kaunitz,  of  Austria,  continued  in  office  until  he 
became  so  senile  that  his  secretaries  were  accustomed  to  trace 
his  signature  on  public  documents  ;x  but  that  would  not  do  for 
modern  Germany.  However,  a  chancellor  might  be  found 

1  Annals  of  the  Court  of  Austria,  vol.  ii. 
409 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

who  would  agree  with  Bismarck,  and  could  consult  with  him 
on  important  occasions.  Prince  Hohenlohe-Schillingsfurst 
would  seem  to  be  the  man.  He  had  been  trained  for  the 
diplomatic  service  under  Bismarck's  eye,  and  had  held  the 
two  most  important  positions  connected  with  the  German 
government  during  the  past  twenty  years.  He  had  succeeded 
Count  Henry  von  Arnim  as  envoy  at  Paris,  and  had  assisted 
Bismarck  in  exposing  Arnim's  misdemeanors.  When  old 
Manteuffel  retired  from  his  last  post  of  duty,  Hohenlohe  suc- 
ceeded him  as  military  governor  of  Elsass  and  Lothringen, 
and  acquitted  himself  in  that  trying  position  with  discretion 
and  good  judgment.  There  was  no  one  else  so  well  qualified 
to  succeed  to  the  chancellorship, — a  man  of  rare  accomplish- 
ments, and  with  a  face  beaming  with  intellectual  life.  The 
German  people  were  delighted,  for  they  knew  that  public 
affairs  would  now  have  the  advantage  of  Bismarck's  sage 
counsel,  although  his  hand  might  not  appear  in  their  man- 
agement. Hohenlohe  has  proved  the  good  genius  of  Wil- 
liam II. 

As  yet  there  was  no  reconciliation,  but  an  entering  wedge 
had  been  driven  in.  Bismarck's  face  looked  brighter,  and  the 
tone  of  his  communications  was  more  cheery.  He  again  had 
a  hand  in  public  affairs,  for  members  of  the  Reichstag  came 
to  Friedrichsruhe  to  consult  with  him  on  the  army  bill  and 
the  Socialist  laws.  He  advised  them  to  support  the  former 
with  some  modifications,  and  especially  advocated  a  larger 
number  of  non-commissioned  officers.  "  Victory,"  he  said, 
"  will  rest  with  the  side  which  wins  the  first  battles,  and  non- 
commissioned officers  give  the  best  support  to  the  private 
soldier."  In  regard  to  the  laws  against  Socialists,  he  believed 
that  a  long  term  of  years  would  be  required  to  give  them  a 
proper  trial.  The  trouble  was  a  deep-seated  one ;  but  if  the 
laboring  classes  could  finally  be  made  to  realize  that  no  other 
organization  of  society  was  possible,  and  that  those  who  were 
more  fortunate  than  themselves  were  willing  to  share  with 
them,  so  far  as  this  was  feasible,  the  agitation  would  finally 
die  out  of  its  own  inertia.  He  did  not  regret  that  Caprivi's 
experiment  had  been  tried,  for  it  showed  conclusively  that  no 

410 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

amount  of  toleration  or  magnanimity  had  much  effect  on  the 
Socialists. 

It  was  reported  all  over  the  world  that  at  his  Christmas 
dinner  Prince  Bismarck  proposed  and  drank  the  health  of  the 
German  emperor.  Following  this,  on  the  26th  of  January, 
1894,  William  II.  sent  his  aide-de-camp,  Colonel  von  Moltke, 
to  Friedrichsruhe  with  a  bottle  of  Johannisberg, — called  by  a 
witty  editor  Lachrymce  Caprivi,1 — and  with  an  invitation  to 
attend  the  emperor's  birthday  celebration  on  the  following 
day  at  Berlin.  There  could  be  no  more  friendly  testimonial 
than  this,  and  Colonel  von  Moltke  reported  that  Bismarck 
had  accepted  the  olive-branch  which  was  thus  proffered  to 
him.  On  the  27th  the  emperor  met  Bismarck  unceremoni- 
ously at  the  railway  station,  shook  hands  with  him,  kissed 
him  on  both  cheeks, — not  the  most  pleasant  subject  for  that 
purpose, — and  accompanied  him  to  the  imperial  palace,  where 
he  was  made  honorary  colonel  of  the  Seventh  Cuirassiers,  a 
famous  regiment  in  Prussian  history.  The  Cuirassiers  es- 
corted Bismarck  back  to  the  railway,  amid  the  acclamation 
of  thousands.  TheJBerliners  were  delighted. 

This  ovation  was  succeeded  by  a  visit  of  the  emperor  to 
Friedrichsruhe  in  the  following  month,  and  birthday  presents 
on  the  first  of  April.  The  reconciliation  might  now  be  called 
complete,  but  it  is  questionable  whether  Bismarck  and  Wil- 
liam II.  were  ever  on  wholly  cordial  terms  again.  The 
political  capital  which  William  II.  made  out  of  his  visits  to 
the  ex-chancellor  must  have  interfered  with  this,  and  Bis- 
marck was  finally  obliged  to  call  public  attention  to  the  fact 
that  Prince  Hohenlohe  had  introduced  a  certain  measure  in 
the  Reichstag  immediately  after  one  of  them,  as  if  to  give  the 
impression  that  it  resulted  from  a  consultation  with  him, 
whereas  it  was  a  proposition  for  which  he  felt  no  inclination. 

1  After   the   wine    made   from   the   grapes    on   Vesuvius,   called   Lachrymce 
Christi. 


411 


CHAPTER    XVII 

NEARING   THE    GOAL 

FURSTIN  VON  BISMARCK  lived  to  see  the  good  understanding 
renewed  between  her  husband  and  the  emperor,  to  her  very 
great  joy,  but  her  death  followed  soon  after  this.  As  Jules 
Simon  says,  "  Bismarck  always  wore  his  heart  upon  his 
sleeve," — in  private  life  one  of  the  simplest  and  most  unaf- 
fected men, — and  he  made  no  attempt  to  play  the  Spartan  and 
disguise  the  irrevocable  loss  which  he  felt  in  the  death  of  his 
life's  companion.  He  hated  publicity  on  such  occasions,  and 
the  funeral  ceremonies  were  only  attended  by  the  family  and 
their  nearest  relatives.  The  emperor  and  empress  sent  mes- 
sages of  condolence,  which  we  can  believe  in  this  instance 
were  devoid  of  political  purpose  or  any  interested  motive. 

Bismarck,  unlike  Burleigh  and  many  other  statesmen,  never 
attempted  to  advance  his  sons  to  positions  beyond  their  true 
deserving.  In  1895  his  second  boy,  William,  was  appointed 
governor  of  East  Prussia,  and  holds  that  position  at  the 
present  date.  The  expectation  that  Herbert  Bismarck  would 
be  employed  in  state  affairs  after  his  father's  retirement  has 
not  been  fulfilled, — and  this,  considering  his  training  and  ex- 
perience, would  seem  to  be  a  loss  to  the  diplomatic  service. 

Bismarck's  birthdays  had  now  come  to  be  affairs  of  European 
importance,  and  his  eightieth,  following  so  soon  after  the  recon- 
ciliation, naturally  became  an  exceptional  occasion.  There 
was  even  felt  to  be  danger  that  his  now  fragile  life  would  be 
crushed  out  of  him  by  the  accumulated  attentions  of  inju- 
dicious admirers,  and  faithful  Dr.  Schweninger — the  only  man, 
it  is  said,  whom  Bismarck  was  ever  afraid  of — was  on  guard 
to  protect  him  against  the  effects  of  over-exertion.  The 
number  of  presents  sent  to  him,  not  only  from  Germany  but 
from  all  parts  of  the  world  (including  a  Chickering  piano  from 
the  United  States),  filled  three  additional  baggage-vans,  and 

412 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

were  considered  sufficient  to  refurnish  Friedrichsruhe  from 
gable  to  foundation.  The  railway  station  at  Friedrichsruhe 
was  decorated  with  banners  of  all  the  German  states,  and 
with  the  flags  of  the  allies  of  Germany,  besides  being  orna- 
mented with  boughs  of  evergreen.  A  company  of  infantry, 
a  company  of  pioneers,  a  squadron  of  hussars,  and  a  battery 
of  artillery  were  ordered  by  the  emperor  to  assemble  at 
Ahmeule,  the  next  station  to  Friedrichsruhe,  where  William 
II.  himself  alighted  from  a  special  train,  and  placing  himself 
at  the  head  of  his  small  army  marched  with  flying  colors  to 
Bismarck's  residence. 

On  March  24  previous  a  complimentary  resolution  to 
Prince  Bismarck  had  been  defeated  in  the  Reichstag  by  a 
narrow  majority,  but  the  emperor  telegraphed  the  resolutions 
to  Friedrichsruhe  on  his  own  responsibility.  The  London 
Times  remarked  at  this  :  "  There  can  be  no  question  that  the 
emperor's  telegram  to  Bismarck  expressed  the  true  sentiments 
of  the  German  people.  The  vote  injured  none  but  the  Reichs- 
tag." It  is  difficult  to  see  how  it  could  in  any  manner  injure 
an  old  man  of  eighty,  who  had  retired  from  public  life,  and 
whose  bitterest  enemies  could  accuse  him  of  nothing  worse 
than  they  were  guilty  of  themselves. 

There  is  a  noble  kind  of  pathos  in  the  gradual  extinction 
of  the  powers  of  genius  by  the  course  of  time,  and  we  feel 
this  especially  in  the  old  age  of  men  like  Michael  Angelo 
and  Bismarck.  The  hand  moves  on  the  dial,  and  the  man 
changes  with  it  irresistibly.  As  Emerson  said  at  a  much 
earlier  period, — 

"  I  feel  the  hastening  of  the  stream, 
I  hear  the  roaring  of  the  fall." 

Not  only  Bismarck  himself  felt  this,  and  his  family  felt  it,  but 
all  Germany  was  conscious  of  the  same  thing,  and  dreaded 
the  sudden  shock  which  would  take  their  world-hero  from 
them.  All  that  a  man  lives  after  eighty  is  a  free  gift  of  nature, 
and,  though  Bismarck's  constitution  evidently  intended  him 
for  a  centenarian,  Dr.  Schweninger  forgot  his  sleepless  nights, 

413 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

his  late  hours  of  concentrated  work,  his  severe  journeys,  and 
mighty  efforts  in  the  Reichstag,  when  he  opined  that  Bis- 
marck might  yet  see  his  ninetieth  year.  Happy  is  the  man 
on  this  advanced  stage  of  life  whose  faith  in  God  and  immor- 
tality remains  unshaken.  We  know  that  Bismarck  had  this 
faith.  He  did  not  believe,  like  the  German  physicists  and 
the  English  Darwinians,  in  an  impersonal,  scientific  deity,  but 
in  the  God  of  Moses,  Isaiah,  and  Luther — the  God  of  heroes 
and  sages  and  poets,  whom  all  truly  great  and  noble  men 
have  reverenced  in  all  centuries  and  countries.  He  believed 
also  that  he  was  accountable  for  his  sins,  but  he  must  have 
been  conscious  that  the  main  effort  of  his  life  (and  such  an 
effort  as  it  was)  had  been  for  the  good  of  his  country,  and 
through  Germany  for  the  good  of  mankind.  Whatever  he 
might  be  called  to  account  for  hereafter,  he  knew  that  the 
deadliest  sin  of  the  nineteenth  century,  the  sin  of  cant,  pre- 
tension, and  hypocrisy,  had  left  no  stain  upon  his  mantle.  In 
fact,  his  whole  public  life  had  been  a  continual  warfare  against 
it.  The  constellation  of  great  men  of  which  he  had  formed 
the  centre  in  middle  life  had  all  gone  before  him.  William 
I.,  who  had  greeted  him  at  court  as  a  the  young  advocate  of 
justice,"  and  to  whom  he  owed  all  his  chances  in  life,  was 
gone ;  Von  Moltke,  Manteuffel,  the  Crown  Prince  Frederick, 
Prince  Frederick  Charles,  and  Von  Roon  were  all  gone.  So 
were  Louis  Napoleon  and  Victor  Emmanuel.  Francis  Joseph 
alone  was  left,  after  a  long  reign  of  nearly  fifty  years.  Bismarck 
had  outlived  his  best  friends  and  fellow-workers,  and  all  the 
delegations  to  Friedrichsruhe,  all  the  plaudits  of  the  Berlin 
streets  could  not  make  him  forget  this. 

In  the  autumn  of  1897  complications  between  the  Russian 
and  the  English  governments  in  the  China  Seas  assumed  a 
threatening  aspect,  and  Hohenlohe  considered  it  necessary  to 
send  a  German  squadron  to  the  scene  of  action  for  the  pro- 
tection of  German  interests.  Before  the  fleet  sailed  its  com- 
mander went  to  Friedrichsruhe  and  held  a  lengthy  consulta- 
tion with  Bismarck  in  regard  to  the  course  he  should  pursue 
in  the  various  contingencies  which  might  arise  through  the 
uncertain  proceedings  of  two  such  hostile  governments.  Sub- 

414 


LIFE   OF  BISMARCK 

sequent  events  justified  the  wisdom  of  the  ex-chancellor's 
advice,  and  the  best  proof  of  this  is  that  the  presence  of  the 
German  iron-clads  produced  no  irritation  either  to  the  Eng- 
lish, Russian,  or  Chinese. 

This  was  the  last  of  Bismarck's  services  to  Germany.  On 
January  9  a  report  was  telegraphed  that  he  was  dangerously 
ill:  facial  neuralgia  and  swelling  of  the  veins,  which  caused 
him  intense  pain.  Dr.  Schweninger,  however,  succeeded  in 
relieving  the  disorder  in  the  course  of  some  weeks,  and  on 
April  I  Bismarck  was  able  to  entertain  his  friends  at  dinner. 
As  pleasant  weather  came  on  and  he  was  able  to  obtain  more 
air  and  exercise,  he  felt  still  better,  but  his  family  were  aware 
that  the  sand  in  the  hour-glass  was  running  low.  Dr.  Schwen- 
inger spent  the  greater  part  of  his  time  on  the  railway  be- 
tween Berlin  and  Friedrichsruhe.  It  was  thought  that 
Bismarck  would  live  through  the  summer,  but  another  sud- 
den attack  of  neuralgia  seized  him  on  July  20  and  confined 
him  to  his  bed,  from  which  he  never  rose  again.  His  suffer- 
ings during  the  last  ten  days  were  like  those  of  a  man  con- 
sumed in  a  fire,  but  he  endured  them  with  unwavering  deter- 
mination. The  final  scene  is  said  to  have  been  distressing 
and  very  affecting,  for  not  only  his  family  but  all  his  domes- 
tics were  devotedly  attached  to  him.  He  died  July  30,  at 
eleven  P.M.  He  was  eighty-three  years  and  four  months  old, 
almost  exactly  the  same  age  as  Goethe. 

Bismarck's  body  was  embalmed  to  await  the  erection  of  a 
mausoleum  in  Berlin,  of  which  William  II.  had  already  noti- 
fied his  family.  This  is  an  honor  that  has  never  before  been 
conferred  upon  a  German,  or  any  modern  except  Napoleon. 
One  of  his  last  requests  was  that  his  remains  should  be 
spared  what  he  called  "  the  monkey  show"  of  a  state  funeral. 
This  was  dignified  and  worthy  of  him.  There  was  not  a  drop 
of  vain  blood  in  his  body,  and  though  the  emperor  made  a 
request  for  it,  as  Bismarck  may  have  expected,  Prince  Herbert 
Bismarck  positively  declined  it  as  contrary  to  his  father's  ex- 
pressed wishes. 

The  funeral  services  took  place  late  in  the  afternoon  of 
August  2.  Orrly  the  emperor,  the  empress,  and  a  few  of  the 

415 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

chancellor's  most  intimate  friends  were  permitted  to  attend  it, 
but  an  immense  crowd,  chiefly  of  Hamburgers,  collected 
about  the  grounds  and  at  the  railway  station,  while  the  peas- 
ants of  the  neighborhood  stood  respectfully  with  uncovered 
heads  in  a  group  by  themselves.  Bismarck's  two  sons  met 
the  emperor  at  the  station  and  were  greeted  by  him  with 
royal  cordiality.  Prince  Herbert  conducted  the  empress  into 
the  death-chamber,  and  the  emperor  followed  with  the  Prin- 
cess von  Bismarck,  after  whom  came  a  few  members  of  the 
emperor's  suite  and  the  rest  of  the  Bismarck  family,  together 
with  Dr.  Schweninger.  All  knelt  down  while  Dr.  Westphal, 
Bismarck's  country  pastor,  offered  a  prayer;  after  which  a 
hymn  was  sung  and  Dr.  Westphal  delivered  a  short  discourse. 
Then  a  second  hymn  was  sung,  and  the  service  was  closed 
with  a  benediction.  The  emperor  deposited  a  beautiful  cross 
of  flowers  on  the  casket,  and  the  empress  a  wreath  of  white 
roses.  On  their  return  at  the  railway  station  the  emperor 
kissed  Prince  Herbert  Bismarck  and  shook  hands  with  Count 
William,  speaking  to  them  both  in  a  very  sympathetic  manner. 
The  text  of  Dr.  Westphal's  discourse  had  been  chosen  by 
Bismarck  himself  in  the  last  days  of  his  illness.  It  was  from 
Paul's  First  Epistle  to  the  Corinthians,  xv.  53-57,  and  ex- 
presses the  most  confident  belief  in  a  future  life :  "  For  this 
corruptible  must  put  on  incorruption,  and  this  mortal  must  put 
on  immortality.  .  .  .  O  death,  where  is  thy  sting?  O  grave, 
where  is  thy  victory  ?  .  .  .  But  thanks  be  to  God,  who  giveth 
us  the  victory  through  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ."  Such  was 
the  end  of  Otto  Edward  Leopold  von  Bismarck,  who  ruled  the 
continent  of  Europe  for  twenty  years,  moulded  sovereigns  to 
his  will,  and  filled  the  earth  with  his  fame.  I  think  we  may 
say  of  him,  in  the  words  of  Schiller's  apostrophe  to  Ajax, 

"  Rest  in  peace,  proud  name  thou  leavest" 

CONCLUSION 

The  tendency  of  the  present  age,  especially  in  England  and 
America,  is  to  judge  of  men  rather  by  good  intentions  and 
the  absence  of  faults  than  by  positive  virtues  and  actual  accom- 

416 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

plishment.  Such  a  measure  can  hardly  be  applied  to  Bis- 
marck in  fairness  and  equity.  Rather  he  reminds  us  of  the 
Greek  sculptor,  who,  when  his  guild  were  invited  to  compete 
for  a  colossal  statue  to  be  placed  on  the  roof  of  the  senate 
house,  easily  obtained  the  prize  by  requesting  the  commis- 
sioners to  set  up  his  strange-looking  model  in  the  position  for 
which  it  was  destined,  and  to  consider  how  it  would  appear 
from  that  distance.  At  the  base  of  the  mountain  its  summit  is 
obscured  by  foothills,  and  only  those  who  ascend  above  these, 
or  who  retire  to  a  distance  from  them,  can  see  it  in  its  beauty 
and  in  its  grandeur.  Thus  it  happens  that  only  those  whose 
lives  have  raised  them  to  a  more  or  less  elevated  position  are 
now  able  to  recognize  Bismarck  for  what  he  was ;  but  as  time 
goes  on  he  will  loom  up  more  and  more  grandly  in  the  rec- 
ords of  the  past  as  the  mountain  rises  behind  us  while  we  are 
being  hurried  away  from  it.  In  the  course  of  another  century 
mankind  will  have  changed  its  opinions,  the  echoes  of  party 
passion  and  the  feeling  of  party  antagonism  will  have  died 
away.  No  one  will  care  whether  Bismarck  made  war  on 
Austria,  persecuted  the  Catholics,  or  domineered  over  the 
Reichstag ;  but  the  question  will  be  asked,  was  he  a  useful 
man  in  his  time,  and  helpful  to  the  human  race  ?  To  answer 
this  now  we  have  only  to  consider  what  he  accomplished  for 
Germany,  and  what  Germany  is  to  Europe, — the  most  sober, 
well-educated,  and  spiritual-minded  of  nations.  It  is  only  in 
Germany  that  an  American  chemist — to  take  a  single  instance 
— is  able  to  publish  the  fruit  of  his  labors  and  receive  due 
credit  for  tfeern. 

On  hearing  of  Bismarck's  death  the  secretary  of  the  navy 
said,  "  He  had  a  marvellous  career,  and  reached  a  ripe  old 
age."  The  secretary  of  war  said,  "  In  my  estimation,  he  was 
the  greatest  man  of  his  day."1  Persons  in  their  position 
know,  much  better  than  the  average  journalist,  the  difficulties 
which  a  great  statesman  has  to  contend  with  and  the  allow- 
ances which  ought  to  be  made  for  him ;  as  we  have  to  allow 
also  for  the  difficulties  and  temptations  of  journalism.  The 

1  Mr.  Long  and  Mr.  Alger. 
27  4^7 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

most  creditable  witness  to  Bismarck's  character  is  the  French 
statesman,  Jules  Favre,  one  of  the  greatest  of  his  political 
antagonists,  and  certainly  the  most  high-minded.  Among 
his  German  opponents  in  and  out  of  the  Reichstag — Wind- 
horst, Lasker,  Eugene  Richter,  Von  Beust,  and  others — there 
is  not  one  who  can  be  compared  with  Favre  in  the  general 
estimation  of  Europe.  In  his  report  on  the  Government  of 
the  National  Defence  in  1870  he  says : 

"  Although  fifty  five  years  of  age,  Count  Bismarck  appeared  in 
full  vigor.  His  tall  figure,  his  powerful  head,  his  strongly-marked 
features  gave  him  an  aspect  both  imposing  and  severe,  tempered, 
however,  by  a  natural  simplicity  amounting  to  good-nature.  His 
manners  were  courteous  and  grave,  quite  free  from  stiffness  or  affec- 
tation. As  soon  as  the  conversation  commenced  he  displayed 
a  communicativeness  and  good  will  which  he  preserved  while  it 
lasted.  He  certainly  regarded  me  as  a  negotiator  quite  unworthy 
of  him,  but  he  had  the  politeness  not  to  let  this  be  seen,  and  ap- 
peared interested  by  my  sincerity.  For  myself,  I  was  immediately 
struck  with  the  clearness  of  his  ideas,  his  vigorous  good-sense,  and 
originality  of  mind.  His  freedom  from  all  pretension  was  no  less 
remarkable.  I  consider  him  to  be  an  extraordinary  political  busi- 
ness man,  taking  account  only  of  what  is,  occupied  with  positive 
and  practical  solutions,  indifferent  to  everything  which  does  not 
lead  directly  to  a  useful  end.  Since  then  I  have  seen  much  of 
him ;  we  have  treated  numerous  questions  of  detail  together,  and  I 
have  always  found  him  the  same.  The  great  power  he  has  causes 
him  no  illusion,  neither  is  he  haughty ;  but  he  is  tenacious  of  it 
and  does  not  attempt  to  hide  the  sacrifices  he  makes  to  preserve  it. 
Convinced  of  the  worth  of  his  talents,  he  continues  to  apply  them 
to  the  work  in  which  he  has  succeeded  so  well ;  and  if  to  accom- 
plish it  he  has  to  go  further  than  he  desires,  he  resigns  himself  to 
do  so.  For  the  rest,  impressionable  and  nervous,  he  is  not  always 
master  of  his  impetuosity.  I  have  found  in  him  repulsions  and 
indulgencies  to  me  inexplicable.  I  had  heard  much  of  his  great 
ability  ;  he  has  never  disappointed  me  ;  he  has  often  wounded  me, 
even  revolted  me,  by  his  severity  and  exactions ;  in  everything  I 
have  always  found  him  upright  and  correct."  * 


1  Government  of  National  Defence,  p.  119. 
418 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

This  is  the  typical  Prussian  character,  and  something  more, 
and  it  corroborates  Von  der  Pfordten's  statement  in  1866 
that  Bismarck  was  simply  the  incarnation  of  Prussia.  John 
Lothrop  Motley  combines  the  friend,  the  statesman,  and  the 
historian  when  he  says  of  Bismarck : 

"  Such  enormous  results  were  never  before  reached  with  so  little 
bloodshed  in  comparison.  They  are  national,  popular,  natural 
achievements,  accomplished  almost  as  if  by  magic,  by  the  tremen- 
dous concentrated  will  of  one  political  giant.  .  .  .  Intellect,  sci- 
ence, nationality,  popular  enthusiasm  are  embodied  in  the  German 
movement.  They  must  unquestionably  lead  to  liberty  and  a  higher 
civilization.  Yet  many  are  able  to  see  nothing  in  it  but  the  triumph 
of  military  despotism. ' '  x 

Count  von  Beust  also  finally  concluded  that  Bismarck  was 
not  such  a  bad  sort  of  man.  He  says  in  relation  to  their 
last  official  interview  with  the  two  emperors  at  Gastein : 

"To  those  whom  he  likes  Prince  Bismarck  is  the  most  agreeable 
of  companions.  The  originality  of  his  ideas  is  only  surpassed  by 
his  expression  of  them.  He  has  a  spontaneous  and  therefore  pleas- 
ing bonhomie  which  mitigates  the  asperity  of  his  judgment.  One 
of  his  favorite  sayings  was,  '  Er  ist  ein  recht  dummer  Kerl'  (he  is  a 
right  stupid  fellow),  without  meaning  any  offence  to  the  person  to 
whom  he  referred.  '  What  do  you  do  when  you  are  angry  ?'  he 
once  asked  me  ;  '  I  suppose  you  do  get  angry  as  often  as  I  do.'  'I 
get  angry,'  was  my  answer,  'with  the  stupidity  of  mankind,  but 
not  with  its  malignity.'  '  Do  you  find  it  a  great  relief,'  he  asked, 
'  to  smash  things  when  you  are  in  a  passion  ?'  '  You  may  be  thank- 
ful,' said  I,  'that  you  are  not  in  my  place,  or  you  would  have 
smashed  everything  in  the  house.'  " a 

Great  reformers,  who  stir  human  nature  to  its  depths,  are 
certain  to  receive  a  large  share  of  the  world's  obloquy  in 
return  for  it,  even  if  they  are  still  permitted  to  live.  "  Crom- 
well," said  Bismarck,  "was  the  first  English  ruler  who  made 
Great  Britain  a  factor  in  European  politics."  He  was  the 

*  Curtis's  Correspondence  of  Motley. 
»  Memoirs  of  Count  Beust,  ii.  257-258. 
419 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

greatest  of  English  statesmen,  and  perhaps  the  greatest  of 
English  soldiers,  and  yet  he  was  obliged  to  wait  two  centuries 
for  his  country  to  do  him  justice.  Bismarck  has  already  re- 
ceived justice  in  his  own  country,  but  it  may  be  long  before 
he  obtains  it  in  others.  Yet  he  is  fortunate  in  escaping  the 
rather  vulgar  accusation,  which  is  brought  against  Caesar, 
Cromwell,  and  Napoleon,  of  "  having  aspired  to  the  sover- 
eignty." The  most  superficial  examination  of  his  life  shows, 
that  whatever  may  have  been  his  methods  of  dealing  with 
others,  he  did  not  advance  his  own  interests  at  the  expense 
of  his  rivals,  but  by  the  royal  appreciation  of  his  ability  and 
deserts.  What  are  called  ideal  characters  are  never  the  ablest 
kind  of  men,  for  to  reach  the  limit  of  one's  capability  requires 
a  freedom  of  action  which  conscientious  scruples  too  often 
interfere  with.  "  To  gain  something,"  said  Grant,  "  a  general 
must  risk  something ;"  and  it  is  the  same  in  morals  as  in  war. 
John  Adams  was  a  great  man  without  being  a  genius; 
Hawthorne  was  a  genius  without  being  a  great  man.  Bis- 
marck was  both,  and  yet  his  genius  was  so  inscrutable  that  it 
defies  all  analysis.  How  he  accomplished  what  he  did  no  one 
has  told.  We  can  study  a  chart  of  the  battle  of  Austerlitz, 
and  the  manner  in  which  the  victory  was  won  is  made  clear 
to  us  ;  but  how  Bismarck  gained  his  diplomatic  victories  may 
always  remain  a  mystery.  It  would  seem  to  have  been  an 
innate  quality  in  the  man  which  he  did  not  even  understand 
himself.  We  recognize  the  faculties  of  mind  and  character 
which  might  lead  to  such  results,  but  they  are  the  same  traits 
which  we  perceive  in  other  people,  only  in  his  case  magnified 
to  an  exceptional  degree.  If  his  peculiar  ability  were  to  be 
described  in  one  word  it  would  be  comprehensiveness, — the 
faculty  of  mentally  grasping  the  largest  number  of  facts  at  any 
one  time.1  The  extent  of  his  knowledge  was  enormous,  and 
it  always  seemed  to  be  available  at  the  moment  when  he  re- 
quired it.  Add  to  this  the  faculty  of  recognizing  any  situa- 
tion or  complicated  series  of  events  better  than  others  could ; 

*  In  his  memoirs  Bismarck  often  embraces  so  many  facts  in  a  sentence  that  it 
is  difficult  to  follow  his  reasoning. 

420 


LIFE  OF   BISMARCK 

to  decide  more  quickly  than  others,  and  to  act  always  accord- 
ing to  his  thought.  "The  foolish  think  as  they  will;  the 
wise  will  as  they  think."*  It  cannot  be  doubted  that  Bis- 
marck acquired  a  Shakespearian  knowledge  of  human  nature. 
Even  speculators  like  Jay  Gould  depend  on  that  for  their 
success.  Given  his  man,  Bismarck  could  always  reckon  how 
he  would  act  under  certain  conditions.  He  knew  just  how 
far  human  nature  could  be  trusted.  The  statesman  who 
imagines  people  are  better  than  they  are  becomes  popular 
very  readily,  but  is  certain  in  the  end  either  to  miscalculate 
or  be  deceived.  Even  Bismarck  was  occasionally  deceived  in 
his  man, — as  happened  in  Von  Arnim's  case, — but  the  few 
errors  he  made  he  repaired  in  a  masterly  manner.  Neither 
was  he  suspicious  or  sceptical  of  those  with  whom  he  dealt. 
Like  Napoleon,  he  saw  into  a  man  at  a  glance,  and  watched 
the  eye  of  his  interlocutor. 

Bismarck's  reasoning  was  of  the  topographical  order, — a 
kind  which  is  not  yet  taught  in  the  universities.  He  placed 
his  subject  before  him  as  if  it  were  a  chart,  and  studied  the 
relations  of  its  different  facts  to  one  another  as  he  would 
countries  on  a  map.  The  map  of  Europe  was  to  him  some- 
thing more  than  an  outline,  a  drawing  of  cities,  mountains, 
rivers,  and  seas ;  it  was  filled  with  human  life,  and  every 
nation  on  it  was  a  special  and  a  continuous  study  of  which  he 
had  volumes  already  in  his  head.  From  1862  to  1865,  when 
William  I.  could  see  nothing  before  him  but  darkness  and 
chaos,  Bismarck  never  forgot  that  Hungary  and  Venetia  were 
two  swords  pointed  at  the  throat  of  Austrian  absolutism,  and 
that  Napoleon  III.  could  never  afford  to  surrender  Rome  to 
the  Italians. 

One  evident  cause  of  his  success,  which  he  noticed  him* 
self,  was  his  entire  freedom  from  political  theories.  He  ob- 
jected to  theories  as  tending  to  dogmatism  and  the  illusion 
of  preconceived  notions.  Government  was  to  him  a  growth, 
or  rather  a  structure,  to  which  every  generation  of  men  made 
additions  or  changes,  and  his  study  was  to  discover  what 

1  David  A.  Wasson. 
421 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

were  the  most  necessary  and  suitable  additions  he  could 
make  to  it.  He  never  troubled  himself  with  Plato's  Republic, 
Machiavelli's  Prince,  or  Mill  on  Liberty,  but  went  to  the  Muse 
of  History  for  his  instruction,  and  studied  statesmanship  fn 
the  lives  of  statesmen.  A  keen  French  journalist,  who  visited 
him  in  June,  1866,  when  all  Germany  was  practically  in  a 
state  of  revolution,  told  Bismarck  plainly  that  he  treated  the 
Prussian  Landtag  as  Louis  XIV.  treated  the  French  Parlia- 
ment, and  yet  at  the  same  time  he  was  declaring  that  the 
popular  wish  of  Germany  for  political  unity  was  the  only 
foundation  for  a  national  government,  and  that  the  German 
Reichstag  was  the  only  cure  for  their  present  evils.  Was 
this  consistent,  or  was  it  even  sincere?  Bismarck  was  pleased 
with  the  frankness  of  his  visitor,  and  explained  the  whole 
subject  to  him  in  an  equally  candid  manner,1  finally  adding, 
"  I  am  obliged  to  use  such  materials  as  I  find  ready  at  hand : 
I  did  not  make  Germany  or  Prussia  as  they  are."  The  his- 
tory of  the  subsequent  five  years  showed  that  Bismarck  was 
consistent,  and  intended  what  he  said.  A  theoretical  mon- 
archist or  republican  would  not  have  succeeded  in  dealing 
with  the  situation.  It  was  a  transition  period,  and  required 
exceptional  methods. 

Bismarck's  death  produced  a  flood  of  anecdotes  in  regard 
to  him,  many  of  which  should  be  taken  with  due  allowance, 
while  others  are  no  doubt  apocryphal.  The  change  of  a 
single  word  in  a  sentence  will  often  pervert  its  original 
meaning,  and  it  should  be  remembered  that  these  incidents 
were  mostly  written  down  some  days,  or  perhaps  years,  after 
their  narration.  When  history  or  biography  gets  into  its  an- 
ecdotage  it  deteriorates  rapidly.  Many  statements,  like  Bis- 
marck's saying  that  "  God  made  man  in  his  own  image,  but 
Italy  in  the  image  of  Judas,"  have  a  relative  and  temporary 
significance.  He  was  probably  thinking  of  La  Marmora's  un- 
principled calumnies  against  him,  which  might  be  described 
as  the  very  essence  of  ingratitude.  Likewise  many  of  his 
French  criticisms,  reported  by  Dr.  Busch,  were  made  under 

1  Hesekiel's  Biography,  chap.  iv. 
422 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

the  influence  of  strong  belligerent  feeling.  The  most  unique 
story  that  we  have  of  him  is  that  of  the  death  of  his  mastiff 
Tyras,  called  the  Reichshund,  whom  Bismarck  refused  to 
leave  so  long  as  there  was  life  in  him.  His  son  Herbert  at- 
tempted to  draw  him  from  the  room,  but  one  look  from  his 
faithful  old  companion  decided  the  chancellor  that  he  ought 
to  remain,  and  so  he  did.  He  had  a  strong  liking  for  mas- 
tiffs, and  kept  a  succession  of  them.  In  fact,  he  was  himself 
the  mastiff  of  Germany. 

Professor  Francis  J.  Child  was  fond  of  relating  how  the 
Iron  Chancellor,  once  passing  through  Gottingen,  noticed  the 
old  janitor  of  the  University  walking  on  the  street,  and  im- 
mediately leaped  from  his  carriage,  ran  after  him,  embraced 
him,  and  detained  his  escort  some  twenty  minutes  while 
he  talked  with  this  old  friend  of  his  youth  on  the  sidewalk. 

Nothing  better  ever  came  from  his  pen  than  his  tribute  to 
the  character  of  William  I., — "  my  old  master," — as  expressed 
to  General  Grant  at  the  time  of  Hodel's  attempted  assassina- 
tion. He  said : 

"The  man  never  lived  who  had  a  more  simple,  magnanimous, 
and  humane  character  than  the  Kaiser.  He  is  different  in  many 
respects  from  those  who  are  usually  born  to  so  high  a  position. 
Princes  of  the  royal  blood,  as  you  may  know,  are  accustomed  to 
look  upon  themselves  as  made  of  different  material  from  ordinary 
men,  and  they  commonly  pay  little  regard  to  the  wishes  and  inter- 
ests of  others.  The  Kaiser,  on  the  contrary,  is  in  all  respects  a 
man.  I  do  not  believe  he  has  ever  wronged  another,  or  consciously 
injured  any  one,  or  treated  any  man  with  unnecessary  severity.  He 
is  one  of  those  persons  whose  kindness  of  nature  attracts  all  other 
hearts,  and  the  constant  aim  and  occupation  of  his  life  is  the  wel- 
fare of  his  subjects  and  of  those  who  surround  him.  I  cannot  im- 
agine a  more  high-minded,  pure-hearted,  more  amiable  or  benefi- 
cent type  of  a  sovereign,  or  a  man,  than  he  is."  x 

We  hear  a  good  deal  of  Bismarck's  humor,  but  the 
specimens  recorded  of  it  are  not  very  brilliant.  Like  many 
of  his  critical  sayings,  it  may  have  had  a  local  and  charac- 

1  Bismarck  after  the  War. 
423 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

teristic  value,  which  has  now  evaporated.  It  would  seem  to 
have  been  rather  a  kind  of  playfulness  which  pervaded  his 
actions  than  penetrating  wit.  His  enemies  likened  it  to  the 
playfulness  of  a  cat  who  has  caught  a  mouse ;  but  all  who 
knew  him  admit  that  it  added  much  to  the  pleasantness  of 
the  man.  It  indicated  that  Bismark  was  in  his  element  and 
enjoyed  his  work.  Louis  Napoleon  said  of  him :  "  What 
danger  can  there  be  in  a  person  who  thinks  aloud  ?"  Dan- 
gerous enough  to  the  French  emperor,  for  it  showed  that  Bis- 
mark was  intellectually  his  master.  No  man  was  ever  more 
capable  of  concealing  the  truth  when  necessary,  even  if  he 
appeared  to  be  thinking  aloud.  Such  is  the  measure  of  the 
diplomat. 

The  government  of  the  future  is  evidently  republican.  The 
worldly  extravagance  and  excessive  magnificence  of  royal 
life,  which  kept  nations  in  awe  during  the  middle  ages,  is  not 
in  harmony  with  the  modern  idea  of  government.  We  wish 
to  revert  to  Roman  and  Athenian  simplicity  during  the  best 
days  of  the  classic  epoch,  but  there  are  obstacles  in  the  way. 
What  was  possible  formerly  in  a  single  city  is  not  so  easily 
accomplished  in  many  cities  and  over  large  tracts  of  country. 
Those  who  can  appreciate  the  value  of  plain  living  and  high 
thinking  are  still  a  minority  in  the  most  favored  nations.  The 
greater  proportion  either  live  plainly  from  necessity,  or,  having 
obtained  riches,  surround  themselves  with  luxuries,  and  assert 
an  aristocratic  superiority  over  their  fellow-men.  Not  until 
this  order  of  affairs  becomes  the  exception  shall  we  have  a 
genuine  republic,  in  which  men  and  women  are  respected  for 
what  they  are  worth  morally  and  intellectually,  not  for  the 
money  they  can  spend  or  for  the  titles  they  inherit.  In  such 
a  state  the  franchise  will  not  become  the  right  of  every  igno- 
rant loafer,  simply  because  he  is  a  man  and  walks  on  two 
legs,  but  rather  the  privilege  of  a  good  citizen,  who  has 
proved  his  capacity  to  decide  in  regard  to  public  affairs  by  an 
efficient  management  of  his  own  and  a  proper  respect  for  the 
rights  of  his  neighbors. 

The  government  of  the  future,  therefore,  will  have  to  be 
exempt  from  socialism,  or  even  from  anything  that  appertains 

424 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

to  the  idea  that  the  will  of  the  people  echoes  the  voice  of 
God.  Only  right  and  justice  have  a  divine  emanation,  and  the 
question  for  the  law-giver  is  how  can  we  approximate  to 
these  as  closely  as  possible  ?  The  masses  of  mankind  must 
learn  that  politics  is  not  like  a  game  of  cards,  which  people 
play  for  their  amusement,  but  an  intensely  serious  matter,  on 
which  the  fortunes  of  their  posterity  depend,  and  that  it  is  not 
each  man's  individual  interests  that  he  is  to  consider  and  vote 
for,  but  the  interest  of  the  community  as  a  whole.  Until  this 
becomes  properly  realized  monarchical  institutions  will  still 
have  a  kind  of  justification,  and  a  large  portion  of  the  sensible 
and  thinking  classes  of  Europe  will  continue  to  give  them 
support.  France  has  finally  become  a  republic,  after  eighty 
years  of  revolution  and  reaction  and  the  loss  of  a  million 
human  lives.  No  wonder  if  Austria,  Germany,  and  Italy 
dread  such  a  change ;  nor  is  it  certain  that  the  French  have 
yet  escaped  the  worst  consequences  of  it,  although  the  signs 
are  more  favorable  now  than  they  were  twenty  years  ago. 

It  will  be  noticed  that  geographical  position  has  much  to 
do  with  the  form  of  government  in  Europe.  Russia  and 
Turkey  are  military  despotisms.  Germany,  Austria,  Italy, 
Spain,  and  the  smaller  central  states  are  constitutional  mon- 
archies. France  is  a  republic,  and  so  is  England,  practically, 
at  all  events,  when  the  Liberal  party  is  in  power.  There  is 
good  reason  for  this  in  the  fact  that  a  liberal  form  of  govern- 
ment would  be  hardly  possible  in  close  contact  with  Asia. 
So,  likewise,  the  form  of  government  in  Germany  and  Austria 
is  affected  by  the  contact  of  those  empires  with  Russia.  If 
the  revolution  of  1848  had  succeeded  in  transforming  Ger- 
many to  a  republic,  it  would  have  been  crushed  while  in  the 
process  of  formation,  as  the  Hungarian  revolution  was  crushed 
by  Russian  bayonets.  It  is  only  through  German  national 
unity  that  Germany  can  ever  become  a  republic.  So  long  as 
the  nation  was  divided  into  a  number  of  independent  states, 
each  with  a  sovereign  of  its  own,  an  attempt  at  revolution 
might  succeed  in  some  of  them,  but  would  be  quite  as  likely 
to  fail  in  others ;  and  even  if  it  succeeded  in  all,  there  would 
be  no  central  organization  by  means  of  which  the  different 

425 


LIFE  OF  BISMARCK 

states  and  provinces  could  act  in  concert.  One  part  of  the 
country  would  soon  place  itself  in  antagonism  to  another,  and 
such  confusion  would  prevail  that  orderly  and  sensible  people 
would  soon  be  glad  to  return  to  the  previous  condition  of 
affairs.  The  national  government  which  Bismarck  has  created 
and  the  military  system  which  Moltke  has  perfected  are  the  sure 
foundation  on  which  the  future  republicanism  of  Germany  will 
rest.  A  revolution  that  gains  possession  of  the  central  gov- 
ernment of  Berlin  would  control  the  whole  of  Germany  and 
be  well  prepared  to  resist  foreign  interference.  A  nation  of 
soldiers  is  a  nation  of  freemen  :  witness  Rome  in  the  time  of 
Scipio,  and  Athens  in  the  time  of  Pericles.  When  the  Ger- 
man army  shall  decide  that  a  republic  is  preferable  to  a  mon- 
archy they  can  obtain  it  without  a  blow ;  but  the  great  middle 
class  of  Germans  will  never  come  to  that  conclusion  so  long 
as  the  Social  Democrats  set  themselves  in  opposition  to  all 
constituted  authority  and  oppose  the  right  of  holding  and 
inheriting  private  property. 


426 


INDEX 


Abdul  Aziz,  deposed,  308 

Abeken,  Privy  Counsellor,  207 

Afghanistan,  362 

African  annexations,  365 

Alexander  II.,  Tsar  of  Russia,  161, 
311;  assassinated,  354 

Alexander  III.,  360 

Alexander  of  Battenberg,  382;  his 
downfall,  384 

Altona,  mass  meeting  at,  114 

Andrassy,  Austrian  premier,  259 ;  de- 
mands reform,  306,  347 

Arnim,  Count  Henry  von,  272  et  seq. ; 
intrigues  against  Bismarck,  277 ;  is 
sent  to  jail,  278 

Augusta,  Queen  and  Empress,  69,  91 

Augustenburg,  Duke  of,  105 

Austrian  diplomacy,  97 

Austro-German  alliance,  344 

Battle  of  Sedan,  209 

Bavarian  politics,  119,  233 

Bel  fort,  battle  of,  236 

Benedek,  Austrian  general,  134 

Benedetti,  French  envoy,  149,  166; 
interviews  William  I.,  193 

Bernard,  Duke  of  Weimar,  13 

Beust,  Von,  reforms  Austria,.  146 ;  de- 
nounces Bismarck,  152;  distrusts 
Napoleon,  176;  judges  Bismarck, 

325 

Bismarck,  Carl  Wilhelm  von,  14 
Bismarck,  Colonel  von,  13 
Bismarck,  Herbert  von,  202,  405,  412 
Bismarck,  Louisa  Menken  von,  14 
Bismarck,  Nicholas  von,  12 


Bismarck,  Otto  von,  his  birth,  15 ;  his 
education,  16;  his  conduct  at  school, 
1 8 ;  serves  at  a  duel,  21 ;  as  a  law- 
yer, 24 ;  as  a  soldier,  25 ;  as  a  far- 
mer, 26;  his  melancholy,  27;  his 
marriage,  30;  elected  to  the  White 
Chamber,  34;  his  children,  40;  cir- 
cular note  of  1863,  55;  faith  in 
God,  58;  letters  to  his  wife,  59; 
opposes  English  alliance,  66 ;  his 
ill  health,  74 ;  life  in  St.  Petersburg, 
75 ;  as  a  hunter,  77 ;  his  moral  char- 
acter as  a  man,  78;  his  proposed 
modification  of  the  Diet,  97;  his 
nullification  of  the  Diet,  98  ;  nego- 
tiates with  the  Danes,  103 ;  nego- 
tiates with  Count  Mensdorff,  108; 
intrigues  with  Napoleon  III.,  in; 
made  a  count,  1 13 ;  his  despatch 
to  Goltz,  118;  his  character,  122; 
his  circular  to  the  German  princes, 
128;  his  sovereignty,  130;  opposes 
annexation  of  Bohemia,  139;  ab- 
sorbs Hanover  and  Cassel,  143 ;  ob- 
tains constitutional  government  for 
Hungary,  147;  treats  with  the  Ba- 
varian government,  151  ;  concludes 
a  commercial  treaty,  164;  school- 
master of  the  Reichstag,  168;  inter- 
feres in  Roumania,  186;  wishes  for 
peace,  ^90^  outwits  Gramont,  194; 
publishes  the  king's  telegram,  195 ; 
talks  philosophy,  207  ;  favors  repub- 
licanism, 215  ;  negotiates  with  Bava- 
ria, 234 ;  protests  against  Gambetta, 
242  ;  his  small  tricks,  244 ;  his  severe 


427 


INDEX 


exactions,  244;  on  the  Paris  Com- 
mune, 250;  created  a  prince,  251; 
secularizes  German  schools,  265 ; 
will  not  go  to  Canossa,  267 ;  his 
wrath  at  Von  Arnim,  275 ;  his  dis- 
interestedness, 279;  /asserts  the  su- 
premacy of  the  statfry>N28^  recog- 
nizes the  Spanish  republic,  295 ; 
proposes  a  conference,  309 ;  explains 
his  policy  on  the  Eastern  question, 
313;  as  the  honest  broker,  31^; 
speaks  on  socialist  bill,  330 ;  wants 
a  tobacco  monopoly,  337  ;  his  argu- 
ment for  protectfbn.34.0 ;  buys  Po- 
lish estates,  351 ;  opposes  Semitic 
.  persecution,  353 ;  on  state  charities, 
356;  his  yellow  pencils,  363;  sev- 
entieth birthday,  364 ;  the  Bismarck 
gift,  365  ;  the  Bismarck  archipelago, 
366  ;  last  great  speech,  376  ;  a  privi- 
leged character,  381 ;  "  has  nothing 
to  conceal,"  396;  his  resignation, 
397»  39**  J  drinks  the  health  of 
William  II.,  41 1  ;  his  religion,  414  ; 
his  death,  415  ;  his  funeral,  416  ;  his 
genius,  420 ;  his  anecdotes,  422 

Bismarck,  the  name  of,  12 

Bismarck,  Wilhelm  von,  202,  412 

Black  Sea  restrictions,  230,  240 

Bombardment  of  Paris,  237 

Bonn,  professors  at,  264 

Bosnia,  revolution  in,  303  ;  transfer  to 
Austria,  320 

Boulanger,  French  general,  374;  his 
downfall,  379 

Bourbaki,  French  general,  237 

Brahmans,  284 

Bratianu  Joan,  of  Roumania,  185 

Bulgarian  massacres,  308 

Burnside,  American  general,  224 

Cameroons,  366 

Caprivi,  German  chancellor,  401,  404, 

408 

Carlists,  296 
Castelar,  296 
Cavour,  Count,  65,  67 


Chambord,  Count  de,  275 

Charles  Anthony,  Prince  of  Hohen- 
zollern-Sigmaringen,  184 

Chassepot  rifle,  173 

Christian  IX.,  King  of  Denmark,  100 

Civil  and  religious  marriages,  285 

Cohen,  the  assassin,  124 

Convention  of  Erfurt,  46 

Convention  of  Frankfort,  43 

Coronation  of  Emperor  William,  239 

Cretan  insurrection,  179 

Cretan  revolution,  186 

Crimean  War,  63 

Crown  Prince  of  Prussia,  his  marriage, 
82;  interviews  Bismarck,  86;  his 
indiscretion,  92 ;  opposes  Von 
Moltke,  no;  leads  a  flank  move- 
ment, 136;  supports  Bismarck,  141, 
201,  2li;  his  diary,  223,  226;  his 
inconsistency,  227,  231  ;  shakes 
hands  with  Bismarck,  235 ;  acts  as 
regent,  325,  385 

Crown  Prince  of  Saxony,  200 

Danish  and  German  law,  loo 

Danish  war,  104 

Darboy,  Archbishop  of  Paris,  249 

Delbrook,  Prussian  envoy,  226 

De  1'Huys,  Drouyn,  French  minister, 

138 
Disraeli,    supports    the    Sultan,    305  ; 

encourages    Sultan,    307 ;    threatens 

war  on  Russia,  315;  created  Lord 

Beaconsfield,  319 

Dollinger  and  the  Old  Catholics,  292 
Duke  de  Morny,  65 

Edinburgh  Reviewer,  the,  60 

Ems  telegram,  196 

Eugenie,  Empress,  125,  193,  220 

Falk,  Dr.  and  Minister  of  Public  Wor- 
ship, 281,  282 

Favre,  Jules,  214;  interviews  Bismarck, 
217;  his  opinion  of  Bismarck,  418 

Ferry,  French  premier,  373 

Francis  Joseph,  108,  145,  258,  414 


428 


INDEX 


Frankfort  Convention,  256 
Frankfort  Diet,  52,  6 1 
Fransecky,  Prussian  general,  137 
Frederick    Charles,   prince    and    field 

marshal,  103 ;  attacks  the  Austrians, 

133 ;  defeats  Bazaine,  224 
Frederick  the  Great,  49,  112,  245 
Frederick  William  IV.,  30,  37,  44,  54, 

67 
Free  trade  and  protection,  333,  338, 

342 

Freedom  of  speech,  172 
French  ecclesiastics,  276 
French  fashions,  255 
French  politics  and  Catholicism,  174 
French  religion,  175 
French  republic,  214 

Gablenz,  Baron,  121 

Gablenz,  General,  commands  in  Hoi- 
stein,  114 

Gagern,  Henry,  43,  45 

Gambetta,  French  politician,  241 ;  in- 
creasing influence  of,  295,  372 

Garibaldi's  attack  on  Rome,  180;  joins 
the  French,  215 

Gastein  convention,  ill 

German  Catholic  bishops,  289 

German  gymnasia,  1 6 

German  military  system,  183 

German  national  unity,  125 

German  navy,  98 

German  soldier  murdered,  261 

Giers,  De,  Russian  premier,  261 

Gladstone,  73,  361 

Goethe,  22 

Gortchakoff,  Russian  chancellor,  162; 
intrigues,  302,  318,  346 

Gottingen,  University  of,  19 

Granville,  Earl,  363 

Gravelotte,  battle  of,  203 

Hamilton,  Alexander,  50,  163 

Hanover,  the  King  of,  168 

Hazen,  General,  interviews  Bismarck, 

192 
Hesekiel's  biography,  34 


Hesse,  Electoral  prince  of,  56,  94 
Hodel,  the  assassin,  324 
Hohenlohe,  Cardinal,  266 
Hohenlohe,  prince  and  chancellor,  410 

Industrial  Congress  at  Berlin,  393 
Isabella,  Queen  of  Spain,  181 
Italian  politics,  140 

Jesuits  in  Germany,  268 
Jewish  traits,  353 
John,  King  of  Saxony,  145 
Junker  party,  35 

Kapp,  Dr.  Frederick,  162 
Karoly,  Austrian  premier,  95 
Kings,  divine  right  of,  38 
Krementz,  Bishop  of  Ermland,  263 
Kullman,  the  assassin,  286 
Kulturkampf,  or  religious  conflict,  262 

Laborers'  insurance,  358 
La  Marmora's  intrigues,  116 
Lasker,  a  socialist,  294 
Ledochowski,  Archbishop  of    Posen, 

290 

Legislation  in  the  Reichstag,  190 
Leo  XIII.,  Pope,  322;  presents  Order 

of  Jesus  Christ,  372 
Leopold,  King  of  Belgium,  367 
Leopold,  Prince  of  Hohenzollern-Sig- 

mariogen,    187;    candidate    for    the 

Spanish  throne,  188 
Levinstein,  Jew  banker,  70 
Linton,  an  English  engraver,  249 
Louis  XIV.,  his  invasions,  49 
Lowell,  James  Russell,  123 

MacMahon,  French  president,  274 
Majunke,    Paul,    a    rebellious    priest, 

288 

Manteuffel,  Edwin,  82 
Manteuffel,  minister,  68;  general,  114; 

visits  the  Tsar,  150 
May  Laws,  281,  293,  370 
Mensdorff-Pouilly,  count  and  Austrian 

minister,  107 


429 


INDEX 


Metternich,  32,  50 

Moltke,  Count  von,  72,  200,  203  ;  his 
strategy,  208,  212;  opposes  Bis- 
marck, 301 ;  his  eloquence,  326, 
378 

Mommsen,  the  historian,  332 

Motley,  John  L.,  21,  419 

Miiller,  professor  of  Tubingen,  96, 
1 66,  103 

Napoleon  I.,  206,  246 

Napoleon  III.,  his  life  of  Caesar,  64, 
73;  his  plans,  84;  his  intrigues, 
Ii8;  his  duplicity,  125;  intrigues, 
147;  seeks  Austrian  alliance,  176; 
hissed  at  Augsburg,  177;  hood- 
winked by  the  Tsar,  199,  205  ;  cap- 
tive of  war,  211 ;  at  Chiselhurst,  271 

Napoleon,  Prince  Jerome,  148 

Nelson,  English  admiral,  243 

Nicholas,  the  Tsar,  57 

Nicolsburg,  peace  of,  142 

Niel,  French  marshal,  173;  reorgan- 
izes French  army,  182 

Nobeling,  the  assassin,  327 

Paris  exposition,  161 ;  capitulation  of, 
240;  Commune,  248 

Persecution  of  the  Jews,  352 

Pfordten,  Von  der,  152 

Phillips,  Wendell,  127 

Pius  IX.,  32,  48;  his  intrigues,  228; 
uses  dangerous  language,  269;  ap- 
pears ridiculous,  291 ;  attempts  revo- 
lution, 292 

Poland,  231,  350 

Polish  independence,  253 

Pomerania,  II,  15 

Progressists,    the,    87,    88,    90,    137, 

357 

Prussian  constitution,  42 

Prussian  House  of  Peers,  89 

Prussian  officers,  their  haughty  behav- 
ior, 189;  impartiality,  204 

Rechberg,  Austrian  count,  98 


Riot  at  Salonica,  297 

Roon,  Minister   of    War,  82 ;    serves 

Bismarck,  85 
Russell,  Lord  Odo,  230 
Russian  government,  355 
Russian  intrigues,  345 

Saarbriicken,  battle  of,  2O2 
Sadowa,  battle  of,  136 
Salazar,  Spanish  minister,  187 
Salisbury,  Marquis  of,  316 
Salzburg,  meeting  of  emperors,   177; 

convention  of,  259 
Schlager  duelling,  20 
Schleswig  and  Holstein,  57  ;  question, 

101,  164 

Schouvaloff,  Russian  count,  316 
Schurz,  Carl,  36 
Schwarzenberg,  Prince,  47  ;  his  policy, 

53 

Secessionists,  343 
Servians  defeated,  310 
Socialism,  33,  359 
Socialists,  law  against,  329,  331 
Spanish  revolution,  181 
Spencer,  Herbert,  76 
Spicheren,  battle  of,  202 
Statistics  of  Franco-German  War,  247 
Stohrmann,  a  Magdeburg  priest,  287 
Strasburg,  Bishop  of,  264 

Talleyrand's  predictions,  51 

Thiers,  French  historian,  126;  goes  on 

a  circular  tour,  222,  231  ;  president, 

260,  270 

Todleben,  Russian  general,  314 
Treaty  of  Paris,  229 
Triumphal  procession  in  Berlin,  257 
Tunis  occupied  by  the  French,  321 
Turkish  character,  298 
Twesten,  deputy,  sued  for  libel,  172 

Ultramontanes,  200,  295 

Victor  Emmanuel,   his  honesty,   120; 
deserts  Napoleon,  139;  dies,  322 


INDEX 


Victoria,  Queen,  169;  sends  a  message 

to  the  Tsar,  312 
Vionville,  battle  of,  202 
Vizthum,  count  and  Saxon  envoy,  102 


Waltz,  a  quack  doctor,  80 
War,  genesis  of,  131 
Wellington,  Duke  of,  149 
William   I.,  of    Prussia,  23,    70,    71  ; 
holds  a  grand  council,  109;  writes 


to  the  Tsar,  143  ;  bargains  with  the 
Tsar,  196;  his  address  to  the  Reichs- 
tag, 25 1 ;  opposes  Austrian  alliance, 
348 

William  II.,  of  Prussia,  his  character, 
390;  insults  Bismarck,  396;  is  rec- 
onciled with  Bismarck,  408 

Wimpfen,  French  general,  210 

Windhorst,  Dr.,  170,  254,  265,  316 

Worth,  battle  of,  202 

Wiirtemberg  politics,  165 


THE   END. 


431 


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